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1. Introduction
1. Introduction
1.1. Context & relevance
Risk exposure is a main cause of poverty, deprivation and persistent vulnerability of
individuals and households worldwide. A decline of well-being as a result of risk oc-
currence is a common and unifying experience for every human-being. Risks such as
illness, injury or problems related to old age, unemployment or price fluctuations, har-
vest failure and weather shocks or natural disasters, crime or domestic violence can
have devastating effects on the individual and household's well-being, threatening its
level of subsistence.1 Therefore, as a result of risks, individuals and households devote a
considerable amount of physical and cognitive energy, as well as social engagement,
responding to shocks and averting transitory or permanent damage.
However, risk exposure is not evenly distributed. The level of exposure to risks sig-
nificantly varies between countries and between individuals and households. Individu-
als and households in low-income countries may experience a considerably higher risk
exposure, as they often live in an environment with economic, social and political in-
stabilities, and experience environmental or natural disasters. Poorer households tend
to be more exposed to risks than wealthier households, mostly due to their more dan-
gerous and less protected living circumstances. Also, illness is not evenly distributed.
Some individuals and households are extraordinarily exposed to health risks and high
health care costs. Empirically, a relatively small percentage of households face health
care costs that far exceed average health care costs. Generally, health risks, and the re -
sulting health care costs, occur randomly. However, some individuals and households
systematically show a higher likelihood of experiencing high health care costs. A vari-
ety of risk factors exist that can explain future above average health care costs, with
chronic diseases being only the most prominent example. Health risks cause a double
negative impact on individuals and households, firstly due to the loss of health itself
and secondly due to illness-related costs.  These include the actual  direct  treatment
costs and indirect costs, such as lost income of the ill, disabled or injured person and,
potentially, other household members caring for him/her. 
Even more than the variation of pure risk exposure, the mechanisms put in place in
order to eliminate or reduce the probability of risks and reduce the burden of the re-
1 cp.  The World  Bank (2001):  Attacking  Poverty.  World  Development  Report  2000-2001.  Oxford
Univ Press. Washington, D.C., p. 137f.
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sulting shock also vary. Individuals and households use a wide array of risk manage-
ment strategies in order to respond to risks and to protect themselves from shocks. Risk
management strategies are not limited to the household level. They stretch from the in-
dividual to the global level; from small cash savings at home, earmarked for emergency
cases, to community-built dams for flood prevention, insurance schemes against a vari-
ety of risks and vaccination programs to prevent communicable diseases, and to global
institutions for economic stability or the global initiative to fight HIV/AIDS. All these
strategies aim to reduce insecurity, uncertainty and vulnerability to shocks.
 Poor households not only face higher risk exposure to a wider array of risks than
wealthier households, but the capacity to cope with risks and the availability of risk
management strategies is much lower.2 Among poor or near-poor households, risks
have a higher impact, because they can lead to (reinforcing) poverty and a dramati-
cally reduced standard of living. These dynamics are frequently described by the terms
vicious cycle of poverty or  deprivation trap explaining the mutually reinforcing inter-
play between poverty, vulnerability, physical weakness, powerlessness and isolation.3
Insufficient response to risks is moving households into or deeper into poverty, thus
keeping the household in the deprivation trap. Making risk management capacities a
central consideration is essential for escaping the trap. 
Health risks are more likely to cause a deprivation trap than other types of risks.
First, unlike many other risks which may affect only a certain, often clearly defined,
sub-group, health risks have the potential to affect every individual. The aforemen-
tioned double-burden of health risks explains why health risks are a main cause for
falling into the deprivation trap. Poverty causes a poor health status, which increases
health care needs and treatment costs that may lead to further impoverishment or may
drop the household below the poverty line.4 If the household decides to forgo treat-
ment due to unaffordability or inaccessibility of health care services, the health status
is likely to worsen. Thus, foregone treatment or the unavailability of acceptable quality
health care intensifies households' ill health and often results in long-term or a perma-
nently reduced income-earning capacity.5
2 Ibid., p. 135.
3 Swanepoel,  Hennie;  Beer,  Frik  De  (2006):  Community  Development:  Breaking  the  Cycle  of
Poverty, 4 edition. Juta and Company Ltd. Lansdowne, South Africa, p. 4f.
4 Leive,  Adam; Xu,  Ke (2008):  Coping with Out-of-Pocket  Health Payments.  Empirical  Evidence
from 15 African Countries. In: Bulletin of the World Health Organization, vol. 86, nr. 11, pp. 849–
856.
5 Dodd, Rebecca; Munck, Lise (2002): Dying for Change. Poor People’s Experience of Health and Ill-
Health.  URL:  http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/voices/reports/dying/ (accessed  2014/08/02);
Meessen, Bruno; Zhenzhong, Zhang; Van Damme, Wim; et al. (2003): Iatrogenic Poverty. In: Tropi-
cal Medicine and International Health, vol. 8, nr. 7.
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There is little doubt that the chronically poor are dependent on social assistance in or-
der to manage (some of) their risks, as their capacity for self-help is generally low. On
the other hand, the large group of transitory poor are the ones that, if hit by shocks or
calamities, may drop below the official poverty line.6 The transitory poor may have
productive self-help capabilities and a successful set of risk management strategies that
could remove them from poverty or that could make them resilient enough not to face
a severe or permanent drop due to the shock.7 Supporting the effectiveness of risk
management strategies can be an effective tool to reduce the overall vulnerability of
these households and is a "necessary investment for achieving sustainable and equi-
table economic growth"8.9 
 The risk management capacities of households depend not only on their economic
situation, but also depend heavily on the social, political and institutional environment
at the local, regional, national and global levels. Those living in developing countries
are not only exposed to more risks, but they are also more vulnerable, as they have
limited access to risk management strategies on a systemic level (e.g. credit or insur-
ance). Due to the unavailability or inaccessibility of certain risk management strategies
for households in developing countries, protection from major risks is frequently in-
sufficient and their own risk management capacities are overwhelmed, if strategies at a
higher level (local, national or global) turn out to be inadequate.
The analysis of this study is based on a framework proposed by Holzmann and Jør-
gensen as an approach to analyze risk management capacities of households in their
social and political environment. The core of the Social Risk Management (SRM) frame-
work is a classification of all kinds of strategies that enable households to manage their
income risks and that distinguishes between risk reduction, risk mitigation (proactive)
and risk-coping (reactive) strategies.10 For the purpose of this study, the framework
was extended in several ways, incorporating later developments and criticisms of the
6 cp. Waelkens, Maria-Pia; Criel, Bart; Soors, Werner (2005): The Role of Social Health Protection in
Reducing Poverty.  The Case of Africa.  International Labour Organization. Geneva,  p.  15.  URL:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=7030561 (accessed 2009/08/31).
7 cp. Baulch, Bob; Hoddinott, John (2000): Economic Mobility and Poverty Dynamics in Developing
Countries. In: Journal of Development Studies, vol. 36, nr. 6, p. 18.
8 Holzmann, Robert; Kozel, Valerie (2007): The Role of Social Risk Management in Development. A
World Bank View. In: IDS Bulletin, vol. 38, nr. 3, p. 8.
9 Rösner, Hans Jürgen (2013): Mikrofinanzsystementwicklung und produktive Selbsthilfe. In: Ihne,
Hartmut (ed.): Einführung in die Entwicklungspolitik. Münster, p. 309; Holzmann et al. (2007): The
Role of Social Risk Management in Development, p. 8.
10 The SRM framework was developed with the aim to rethink the Social Protection Sector Strategy
of the World Bank, see Holzmann, Robert; Jørgensen, Steen L. (1999): Social Protection as Social
Risk Management. Conceptual Underpinnings for the Social Protection Sector Strategy Paper. In:
Social Protection Discussion Paper Series, vol. 9904.
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original concept. The extended framework helps to systematically analyze SRM strate-
gies that are applied by households and are accessible to them.
The management of health risks requires SRM strategies on multiple levels from the
individual to the global level. Proper management of health risks requires a function-
ing health care system on all levels, which guarantees the provision of a financially
and geographically accessible medical infrastructure for all households, with preven-
tion policies and structures to respond to unforeseen changes in epidemiological pat-
terns.11 In developing countries, health care (financing) systems often function poorly
and favor formal sector employees. Often, poor households, and those working in the
informal sector, have only restricted access to proper health care. Similarly, health care
financing systems are weak, so that individuals and households are not sufficiently
protected from catastrophic health care costs. If access to health care is not provided
for free, health insurance plays a pivotal role in successfully protecting households
from high health care costs. Health care costs show severe fluctuations that may ex-
ceed individuals' or households' risk management capacities. Pooling health risks over
a large number of people, which is the basic principle behind health insurance, is seen
as an effective and recommended risk management strategy for health risks.12
Although the role of social risk management in social protection is widely accepted,
exposure to risks, the actual use of social risk management strategies, the sequence of
their application, the dependency of social risk management on the institutional set-
ting,  and  limitations  on access  to  social  risk  management  strategies  in  developing
countries have been empirically tested an astonishingly small number of times. A wide
range of literature exists on the topic,  but most studies on social risk management
strategies have several limitations: The main body of publications was produced in the
form of assessments,  studies or reports closely linked to project  implementation or
linked to development agencies.13 Sometimes these studies do not entirely follow aca-
11 cp.  WHO (2000):  World  Health  Report  2000.  Health  Systems.  Improving  Performance.  World
Health Organisation. Geneva, p. 25.
12 Meessen et al. (2003): Iatrogenic Poverty, p. 582; Kawabata, Kei; Xu, Ke; Carrin, Guy (2002): Pre-
venting Impoverishment through Protection against Catastrophic Health Expenditure. In: Bulletin
of the World Health Organization, vol. 80, nr. 8, p. 612.
13 See for  example:  Flory,  Jeffrey;  Nagarajan,  Geetha (2009):  The Poor and Their Management of
Shocks. Financial Services Assessment Project. IRIS Center. College Park, MD; The World Bank
(2007): Malawi Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment. Full Report. World Bank. Washington, D. C.
URL: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/12/909050930/malawi-poverty-vulnerability-
assessment-investing-future-vol-2-3-full-report (accessed 2014/08/13); Example for purposive sam-
pling of clusters: Devereux, Stephen (1999): ‘Making Less Last Longer’. Informal Safety Nets in
Malawi. IDS Discussion Paper. Institute of Development Studies. no place. URL: http://www.eldis-
.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC7793.pdf (accessed  2014/04/06);  Waelkens  et  al.  (2005):
The Role of Social Health Protection in Reducing Poverty.
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demic standards and the application of rigorous research methods. Other studies nar-
row their perspective to one kind of risk, such as health, drought or natural disaster
risks.14 Some older studies on risk coping do not incorporate the SRM framework, but
use earlier typologies or classifications; this is sometimes problematic when these stud-
ies also have a narrower scope than the SRM framework, e.g. focusing on reactive cop-
ing strategies and neglecting proactive strategies.15 Almost all studies focus on only
one country, which does not give a holistic and in-depth picture of social risk manage-
ment as different study designs make meaningful country comparisons impossible.
This study is based on the data from an international household survey, allowing for
a comprehensive analysis of social risk management strategies by households and indi-
viduals between Ghana and Malawi, as the same research instruments were used in
both countries.  The comparison follows the logic  of  the 'most  similar  case  design,'
which seeks cases that are similar in a variety of aspects, but have significant differ-
ences in variables of interest that shape patterns of behavior. 16 Ghana and Malawi were
selected for the comparison of individual and household risk exposure to general risks
and health risks, as well as related social risk management strategies. These two coun-
tries are suitable for the comparison of social risk management strategies as they share
a variety of factors and differ in certain factors of interest. Both countries are located
in the Sub-Saharan African region, have a history of British colonialism, are predomi-
nantly rural and rely on agricultural production. They have functioning democracies
with the experience of a peaceful change of government. Both countries are not ex-
posed to violent conflicts and riots, wars or large natural/environmental disasters, be-
sides seasonal disasters such as drought, floods and fire. Ghana and Malawi are quite
stable in terms of their ethnic composition and without major ethnic conflicts. 
However, both countries differ in some important aspects relevant for the compari-
son of social risk management strategies. There are significant differences in terms of
history and the institutional arrangement of the health care financing systems. While
14 See for example: Sauerborn, R.; Adams, A.; Hien, M. (1996): Household Strategies to Cope with the
Economic Costs of Illness. In: Social Science & Medicine, vol. 43, nr. 3, p. 293ff.; Keil, Alwin; Zeller,
Manfred; Wida, Anastasia; et al. (2008): What Determines Farmers’ Resilience towards ENSO-Re-
lated Drought? An Empirical Assessment in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. In: Climatic Change, vol.
86, nr. 3-4.
15 See for example: Montgomery, Richard (1996): Disciplining or Protecting the Poor? Avoiding the
Social Costs of Peer Pressure in Micro-Credit Schemes. In: Journal of International Development,
vol. 8, nr. 2, p. 292f.; Sommerfeld, Johannes; Sanon, Mamadou; Kouyate, Bocar A.; et al. (2002): In -
formal Risk-Sharing Arrangements (IRSAs) in Rural Burkina Faso. Lessons for the Development of
Community-Based Insurance (CBI). In: International Journal of Health Planning and Management,
vol. 17, nr. 2, p. 153ff.
16 Meckstroth, Theodore W. (1975): I. ‘Most Different Systems’ and ‘Most Similar Systems’ A Study
in the Logic of Comparative Inquiry. In: Comparative Political Studies, vol. 8, nr. 2, p. 133.
5
1. Introduction
Ghana has implemented a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003 that aims
to include people working in the informal economy and aims to cover a wide variety
of services, Malawi continues to rely on a tax- and donor-financed health care system
which aims to provide basic services for free, in the so-called Essential Health Package
(EHP). It is expected that SRM strategies of individuals and households are heavily in-
fluenced by the institutional environment. Notwithstanding the suitability of Ghana
and Malawi for the comparison of SRM strategies, it needs to be noted that there are
other differences between the countries that might influence SRM behavior, and there-
fore need to be considered in the analysis.  For example,  Ghana has a significantly
higher economic production, ranks somewhat higher in the Human Development In-
dex (HDI) and suffers much less from the HIV/AIDS pandemic than Malawi. Also, the
culture and cultural heritages show differences likely to influence SRM-related behav-
ior.
This study compares exposure to a variety of risks, with an explicit focus on health
risks,  and the related risk management strategies of  individuals and households in
Ghana  and  Malawi.  The analysis  allows  for  insights  into  the  relationship  of  SRM
strategies with a variety of external and household-internal factors. It enables us to un-
derstand the application of SRM strategies dependent on the level of risk exposure and
to observe the sequence of the application of SRM strategies in relationship to increas-
ing severity of a shock. The comparison between Ghana and Malawi allows for more
generalized conclusions, as systemic differences in SRM become clearer, similarities of
risk behavior of low-income households can be extracted and effects of institutional
differences can be identified. The comparative method allows explaining and interpret-
ing the differences in proactive and reactive social risk management behavior, not only
between different groups and dependent on different determinants within a country,
but also understanding what SRM behavior is triggered by systemic differences be-
tween the countries.17
In this study, health insurance is acknowledged as a significant SRM strategy to mit-
igate health shocks; health insurance is recommended by many researchers as its risk
pooling mechanism has certain strengths that most other SRM strategies lack.18 For
this reason, a considerable part of the analysis is devoted to analyzing the relevance of
17 For the rationale of country comparisons, see: Sartori, Giovanni (1991): Comparing and Miscom-
paring. In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 3, nr. 3, p. 244ff.
18 Hsiao, William; Shaw, Paul (eds.) (2007): Social Health Insurance for Developing Nations. WBI De-
velopment Studies. The World Bank. Washington, D.C., p. 1. URL: http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/
phcf/publications/Hsiao.Shaw.2007 .SHI.developing.countries.1.2.pdf; Meessen, Bruno; Criel,  Bart;
Kegels, Guy (2002): Formal Pooling of Health Risks in Sub-Saharan Africa. Reflections on the Ob-
stacles Encountered. In: International Social Security Review, vol. 55, nr. 2, p. 582f.
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health insurance as an SRM strategy. However, conceptually, health insurance will be
treated as just one of many SRM strategies for health risks. Applying such a holistic
perspective on social health risk management strategies allows for better understand-
ing of positioning the strategy health insurance in their use by individuals and house-
holds, in relationship to other SRM strategies (such as savings, credit, social capital,
etc.), as well as public health care provision.
1.2. Research questions
The main interest of this study is to empirically evaluate the use and application of
strategies, by individuals and households, to manage risks and cope with shocks. A
particular emphasis is placed on health risks. The comparison of Ghana and Malawi al-
lows for the evaluation of the relevance of health insurance, commonly seen as the
main tool to cope with health care costs, as a social risk management strategy. Gener-
ally, there has been little research done concerning the way individuals and households
use their wide array of SRM strategies and how these households build up their sets of
SRM strategies depending on a variety of factors. This study aims to fill this knowledge
gap with an empirical evaluation based on household survey data.
Other studies indicate that SRM strategies depend on a variety of socio-economic
and geographic factors, as well as system configurations from a micro to a global level.
The applied social risk management strategies and the complexity of the sets of SRM
strategies were analyzed.  The sequence of the application of proactive and reactive
strategies by households in relationship to the severity of the shock(s) deserves a par-
ticular  focus.  The main  research  interest  of  this  study  centers  on  individuals  and
households that have a high exposure to general risks and/or health risks. Due to the
higher risk exposure, these households are more vulnerable than others and need to
rely on effective social risk management strategies. Therefore, these households are as-
sumed to behave differently from other households with regard to social risk manage-
ment. The main research question addresses this complex relationship:
In what ways is high risk exposure related to the application of social risk management
strategies by households and individuals in developing countries?
Fully addressing this main research question leads to five sub-questions that are being
subsequently addressed in the main analysis and discussion of the study:
1. What social (health) risk management strategies are applied by households and in
what sequence and complexity are they applied?
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2. In what ways are exposure to high general and high health risks associated with
the application of particular sets of social risk management strategies by house-
holds?
3. What is the level of exposure of individuals and households to high general risks
and high health risks?
The fourth and fifth research sub-questions focus explicitly on health insurance as an
SRM strategy. The fourth question elaborates on the significant differences in health
risk management between households who have health insurance coverage and those
who do not. This difference is triangulated using the country comparison of Ghana and
Malawi, as Ghana already offers a national health insurance scheme, called NHIS. The
fifth question differs from the previous ones as it introduces a forward looking aspect,
by analyzing a hypothetical health insurance product and its relation to households'
risk exposure and the application of other SRM strategies. The fifth sub-question there-
fore concludes the analysis:
4. In what ways does health insurance coverage relate to households' application of
other SRM strategies?
5. What  does  high risk exposure,  in combination with existing SRM strategies  of
households, imply for the demand for health insurance as an SRM strategy, by as-
sessing households' willingness to pay for a hypothetical health insurance product?
In the empirical sections of this study, the research sub-questions will be addressed one
after another in order to be able to subsequently and thoroughly answer the main re-
search question.
1.3. Methods
The study combines a literature review on several key concepts and their adaptation to
the study, with a quantitative analysis of household survey data. The review of litera-
ture focuses on the concepts of risks and health risks, including a discussion of high
direct and indirect health care costs, the social risk management framework, key as-
pects of health care financing in low- and middle income countries, micro health in-
surance as a social risk management strategy and measuring demand for health insur-
ance via a willingness to pay analysis.
The literature review centers on the framework of social risk management and its
further development, as well as its criticism. The framework has been substantially ex-
tended  and  adapted to  health  risks,  as  well  as  the  context  of  Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Households exposed to high risks or high costs are expected to behave differently from
other households. Hence, mechanisms have been developed to identify high-cost and
particularly high-risk households, evaluating a variety of sources including literature
on risk adjustment mechanisms of health insurance schemes in competitive health in-
surance markets. A second step focuses on the empirical evidence of these concepts in
Ghana and Malawi and the operationalization of the concepts for data analysis. 
Data from an international comparative household survey conducted in Ghana and
Malawi  is  the  basis  of  the  multi-faceted  comprehensive  quantitative  analysis.  The
household survey was designed and conducted by the author, who worked on all as-
pects of the study as project coordinator for the project Pro-MHI-Africa, together with
colleagues from the University of Cologne and project partners from the University of
Ghana, University of Malawi and University of Botswana. The cross-sectional house-
hold survey was conducted in Ghana, Malawi and Botswana from the 8th of March un-
til the 5th of May 2009. This study uses the data from Ghana and Malawi in order to al -
low for a two-country comparison based on a most similar case design. 19 Both coun-
tries show larger inter-regional differences than international differences on many as-
pects and variables. In terms of health risk management, the countries substantially
differ,  particularly  since  Ghana  introduced  the  National  Health  Insurance  Scheme
(NHIS) aimed to be the main social risk management strategy to avoid high health
care costs and improve access to health care.
A total of 1428 households were interviewed in these two countries, 600 in Ghana
and 828 in Malawi. Information on 7088 individuals was recorded from these house-
holds, 3088 in Ghana and 4000 in Malawi. The data are two-level data with information
at the household level and core sections on health care utilization at the individual
level. Analysis is conducted with the statistical software Stata 13.1 20 applying a variety
of univariate, bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques on individual and house-
hold levels.
1.4. Structure of the study
 The first part of the study (sections 2 and 3) elaborates on the theoretical background
for further analysis, based on a thorough literature review. In these sections, the main
19 The data of the sub-survey in Botswana were not included in this study for several reasons, partic-
ularly due to the status of Botswana as a middle income country in contrast to Ghana and Malawi
as low-income countries, differences in the sample design and a much smaller overall sample that
did not allow for meaningful statistical analyses on subgroups with a small frequency like people
with chronic conditions and high-risk households.
20 StataCorp (2013): Stata Statistical Software. StataCorp LP. College Station, TX.
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concepts of the study are further established, refined and adapted for the country set-
ting and analysis. The constructs of risk and health risks are fundamentally important
for the analysis and are discussed in detail in section  2, including an elaboration of
high-risk cases and the economic burden of health risks.
The main analysis is based on the concept of social risk management (SRM) which
is presented and adapted using a variety of improvements in section 3. First, the origi-
nal classification of SRM strategies developed by Holzmann and Jørgensen21 in 1999 is
introduced and more recent developments of the SRM concept are outlined and criti-
cally appraised. The adaptation of the SRM framework is presented in section 3.3 and
the wide variety of SRM strategies (those relevant for health risks) are elaborated in
section  3.4. Section  4 focuses on risks, risk exposure and social risk management in
Sub-Saharan  Africa,  starting  with  an  introduction  to  the  situation  in  Ghana  and
Malawi and discussing empirical evidence of social risk management strategies in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
Sections  5-7 comprise  the empirical  part  of  the  study.  First,  the  methodological
background of the study is laid out in section  5, starting with a description of the
quantitative household survey and the household sample in Ghana and Malawi and
presenting the methods used for data analysis. The analytical framework is presented
in section 6, laying the foundation for all analytical steps necessary to answer the re-
search questions as posed in section 1.2 and further hypothesized in section 6.2. The
variables are operationalized in section 6.3.
Section 7 contains the data analysis, which follows several steps along the central
theme of the research questions and hypotheses. After presenting important descrip-
tive information about the households and individuals in the sample in section 7.1, the
following section 7.2 provides an in-depth analysis on the exposure of households and
individuals  to  general  risks  (such  as  social,  economic,  environmental  and  weather
risks). Section  7.3 contains an analysis of the individual and household exposure to
health risks and the economic burden of illness (i.e. direct and indirect health care
costs), as well as their determinants. Section 7.4 is the core of the study as it provides a
thorough analysis of several SRM strategies at individual, household and community
levels and the complexity of the sets of SRM strategies that households use in order to
respond to risks. The analysis of determinants for the SRM strategies of households are
presented. After that, a thorough analysis on the relationship of high general risk ex-
posure, high health risk exposure, experience with high health care costs and SRM
21 Holzmann et al. (1999): Social Protection as Social Risk Management. Conceptual Underpinnings
for the Social Protection Sector Strategy Paper.
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strategies is provided. Several hypotheses are tested elaborating these complex rela -
tionships and how the behavior of high-risk and high-cost households differs with re-
gard to their SRM strategies. In section 7.5, health insurance as an SRM strategy and
the determinants of the demand for health insurance are analyzed. First, the prospec-
tive view on health insurance is analyzed using households' willingness to pay (WTP)
for a hypothetical health insurance product, as proxy for the demand for health insur-
ance. After that, health insurance membership is analyzed in its relationship with risk
exposure and the existence of other SRM strategies. Section 8 concludes the study with
a summary of the results and addressing the research questions.
2. Risk and risk structure22
Like all  households,  low-income households  are exposed to various kinds of  risks,
which they try to handle using complex arrays of social risk management strategies.
Particularly, low-income households in developing countries are vulnerable to risks, as
even minor shocks can cause severe hardship and can put the household in destitu-
tion.23 Generally, poor households have few assets to protect themselves and have less
means to respond to risks. These insights put the construct  risk as a central focus of
poverty analysis and social protection.24
In the following, risk shall be understood as the variation of the outcomes of an un-
certain future event, while probabilities, based on experience values, can be assigned to
this variation and the occurrence of the event itself. As some risks contain a specula-
tive chance to win or lose, a narrow definition of  risk strictly refers to such future
events that involve a loss, in case the event occurs.25 Throughout the study, this narrow
22 This chapter is partially based on a previously published article by the author, but contains sub -
stantial changes and large parts have been rewritten: Leppert,  Gerald (2012): Financing Health
Care. The Role of Micro Health Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: Bloemertz, Lena; Doeven-
speck,  Martin;  Macamo,  Elisio;  et  al.  (eds.):  Risk and Africa.  Multi-Disciplinary  Empirical  Ap-
proaches. Berlin.
23 Dercon, Stefan (2007): Risk, Insurance, and Poverty: A Review. In: Dercon, Stefan (ed.): Insurance
against poverty, Repr. UNU-WIDER studies in development economics. Oxford Univ. Press. Ox-
ford [a.o.], p. 9 and 28.
24 cp. The World Bank (2001): Dynamic Risk Management and the Poor. Developing a Social Protec-
tion Strategy for Africa I. Social Protection Strategy. World Bank. Washington, D.C., p. xi. URL:
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/01/10 470431/dynamic-risk-management-poor-
developing-social-protection-strategy-africa-vol-1-2-main-report (accessed 2014/07/21).
25 Rösner, Hans Jürgen (2008): Risikomanagementstrategien für arme ländliche Bevölkerungsgrup-
pen. In: Zeitschrift für das gesamte Genossenschaftswesen, vol. Sonderheft 2008, p. 18; The World
Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 139; Aven, Terje (2008):
Risk analysis. Wiley. Chichester [a.o.], p. 17.
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definition of risk was used, focusing on those risks causing negative shocks.  These
'negative' risks can be distinguished by risk characteristics and the source of risk. Differ-
ent risk characteristics and different sources of risk require different response strate-
gies or interventions.26 First, section 2.1 elaborates on risk characteristics and section
2.2 on sources of risk and at which levels these risks usually hit.
2.1. Risk characteristics and vulnerability to risks
Risk is an abstract construct and difficult to understand, particularly because all risks
have a significantly random component, the causal links leading to the occurrence of
risks are usually not entirely known, and shocks, which are the 'visible side' of risks,
can come in very different forms. Hence, to make the concept of risk useful for social
risk management analysis, it is necessary to have a closer look at the differences in risk
characteristics. Four main groups of risk characteristics can be distinguished. Firstly,
risks differ by stochastic criteria. Secondly, they differ by the population exposed to the
risk and, hence, potentially affected. Thirdly, risks can be distinguished by the  level
where the shock hits. Fourthly, risks differ by the extent of the shock.27
Although all risks have a random nature, the stochastic criteria of risks significantly
differ in terms of their (objective) probability and frequency,28 the uncertainty of occur-
rence, and the correlation between different risks or the risk itself.
The main stochastic criterion is the probability of a risk, which refers to the likeli-
hood that the risk occurs to a subject in a given time period and given background
knowledge. For example, if statistics show that 5 out of 100 individuals who show cer-
tain symptoms develop the illness within one year, then the probability for an individ-
ual who has the symptoms to fall sick with that particular illness within a year is 5%. If
more background information is known, such as an individual's weakened immune
system, the probability increases accordingly.29 The frequency of a risk is closely related
to the probability, but needs to be conceptually distinguished. If a risk frequently oc-
26 The World Bank (2001): Social Protection Sector Strategy. From Safety Net to Springboard. World
Bank.  Washington  D.C.,  p.  12.  URL:  http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/
01/8280354/social-protection-sector-strategy-safety-net-springboard (accessed 2014/07/04).
27 Other, slightly different categorizations of risk characteristics can be found in: Holzmann, Robert;
Jørgensen, Steen (2001): Social Risk Management. A New Conceptual Framework for Social Pro-
tection, and Beyond. In: International Tax and Public Finance, vol. 8, nr. 4, p. 539; Rösner (2008):
Risikomanagementstrategien für arme ländliche Bevölkerungsgruppen, p. 20f.
28 Contrary to objective probabilities which are a result of a thorough risk assessment, the subjective
perception of probabilities differs and leads to substantial misjudgments of risk and probabilities.
When using the term ‘probabilities’, this study refers to objective probabilities if not otherwise in-
dicated. Zweifel, Peter; Eisen, Roland (2003): Versicherungsökonomie, 2 edition. Springer. Berlin
[a.o.], p. 40f.
29 Aven (2008): Risk analysis, p. 167f.
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curs, its probability to occur at least once in a given time period is increased. Hence,
there is interplay between probability and frequency of risks, depending on the time
period under observation. However, not all risks can be expected to occur more than
once in a lifetime, examples being an HIV infection or death. The frequency of other
risks is unlikely to be higher than once in a given time period, for example risks that
may only occur in a particular season of the year. Other risks can occur at a higher fre-
quency in a given time period, such as contracting a cold, which may happen more of-
ten in a year. 
Due to incomplete information, in every risk assessment there is some level of un-
certainty. Whether and when a risk occurs to a particular individual, and what the ex-
tent of the shock will be, is in most cases uncertain.30 An objective risk assessment may
lack important data, so that the calculated probability can only approximate the real
probabilities. Some risks can be largely anticipated, as they are more predictable than
others;  either  because  their  likelihood  significantly  increases  at  regular  intervals,
shows seasonal fluctuations, or their likelihood significantly depends on a certain and
known factor, such as old age, with increased illness risks, and risk of social isolation
and inability to work.31 For example, the risk of seasonal food shortages is largely pre-
dictable, particularly if it follows a mediocre harvest season. For example, in Malawi,
the four months prior to the maize harvest are also called "hungry season",32 a typically
recurring risk with a high likelihood of occurrence. Other risks cannot be easily antici-
pated, such as infections and diseases, as they are largely random. 
In many cases, risks are correlated with each other, so that the probability of occur-
rence is not independent. Concerning correlation, two forms need to be distinguished:
Autocorrelation, between the same risk, and correlations between different risks. 
The first form is autocorrelation of a risk, which means that the risk once occurred
is more likely to occur again in the future. Such autocorrelation can result in an in-
crease of the probability of the risk for the same individual (e.g. in the case of certain
cancers or injuries of joints) or for other individuals (e.g. in the case of contagious dis-
eases).33 In the first case, when the likelihood is increased that the same risk repeats it -
self for the same individual, the risk has a recurring nature. In the latter case, the oc -
30 Ibid., p. 17 and 20.
31 The World Bank (2001): Dynamic Risk Management and the Poor. Developing a Social Protection
Strategy for Africa I, p. 2; The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report
2000-2001, p. 137f.
32 The World Bank (2001): Dynamic Risk Management and the Poor. Developing a Social Protection
Strategy for Africa I, p. 11.
33 cp. Holzmann, Robert; Jorgensen, Steen (1999): Social Protection as Social Risk Management. Con-
ceptual Underpinnings for the Social Protection Sector Strategy Paper. In: Journal of International
Development, vol. 11, nr. 7, p. 1013.
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currence of the risk for one individual has external effects for other individuals, as
there is a correlation between affected subjects; a typical example is a local flu out-
break where one ill subject increases the likelihood for others in the same community.
The direction of autocorrelation is not necessarily positive (i.e. leading to an increased
future risk probability) as indicated in the two examples above, but can be also nega-
tive (i.e. decreasing future risk): For example, the autocorrelation of certain diseases for
the same individual is negative, as is the case for measles, which is usually not con-
tracted by the same individual again. An example for a negative autocorrelation with
other individuals is when a risk occurrence of one individual sensitizes the others to be
more cautious, such as in the case of a car accident while drunk. It is important to note
that autocorrelation needs to be conceptually separated from the frequency of a risk as
discussed above; frequency of a risk includes repeated risks due to autocorrelation, but
is not limited to the case of autocorrelation.
The second type of correlation, between different risks, refers to the mechanism by
which a risk has a causal relationship with another risk or triggers other risks. In this
regard, it is necessary to distinguish between two cases: 
Case 1: Risk A → Risk B
Risk A increases the probability of risk B and there is a causal relationship.
Case 2: Risk X → Risk Y, Risk Z
Risk X increases the probability of risk Y and risk Z. There is a causal relationship be-
tween risk X and Y and between X and Z. However, there is no causal relationship be-
tween Y and Z. 
An example of the first case is that the realized risk of illness leads to the increased
probability of the risk of high health care expenditures. An uncured illness may also
cause negative long-term effects such as a future reduction of work ability and, finally,
a reduction in income.34
The second case refers to the situation when a certain event triggers multiple risks,
which correlate, but do not have a causal relationship with each other. These are typi-
cally referred to as "bunched risks". An example for bunched risks is a weather-related
shock such as drought, which increases the probability of several risks, such as harvest
failures, livestock loss and malnutrition.35 Another example is the risk of a tsunami, in
which an earthquake may cause direct damages to houses and also triggers a seismic
34 cp. The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 138.
35 see with regard to the risk situation of rural population: Rösner (2008): Risikomanagementstrate-
gien für arme ländliche Bevölkerungsgruppen, p. 27.
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wave, causing additional damages. The initiating events, the weather-related shock or
the earthquake, have a causal link with the other risks, but those have no causal rela-
tionship between each other, although they occur at the same time.
It  is  important  to  note  that  frequently  there  are  stochastically  independently
bunched risks, which refer to a lack of links or causal relationships between two or
more risks that coincidentally occur at the same time and also pose a particular chal -
lenge to the risk management strategies of households. 
Risks that correlate with each other, or occur either at the same time or after each
other, are "typically difficult to handle through informal means"36. Such bunched or re-
peated shocks pose a particular problem for poor households, since assets and other
risk coping and risk mitigation strategies may already be depleted leaving the house-
hold unable to respond to subsequent shocks. There is evidence that "households are
more likely to bounce back from a single shock than from repeated income shocks".37
The population exposed to a risk is the main differentiating factor in risk analysis. In
this regard, risks are distinguished between universal risks, categorical risks and life-
cycle risks. Universal risks are those that generally affect all members of society, inde-
pendent of factors like age, gender, and position in society or other dominant charac-
teristics. With regard to universal risks, the probability of risk occurrence may still sig-
nificantly vary between individuals, but universal risks lack factors that exclude gen-
eral risk exposure for a particular group of people. Other than universal risks, exposure
to categorical risks is (mostly) restricted to certain groups in society. For example, gen-
der is an important determinant for many illness-related risks, which are restricted to
men or women. Also, certain occupational groups are exposed to risks that other indi-
viduals are not exposed to, for example, mining-related lung diseases.  Life-cycle risks
are those that individuals are typically exposed to only at a certain age or part of life.
An example is Alzheimer's disease due to old age infirmity.38
Risks can be distinguished by the level at which the shock hits the population. Com-
mon (or aggregate) risks affect a whole village or community (meso-level), region, na-
tion or on an international level (macro-level).39 Macro-level risks, such as war, policy
36 Holzmann et al. (1999): Social protection as social risk management, p. 10.
37 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 138 and 140.
38 De Neubourg, Chris; Weigand, Christine (2000): Social Policy as Social Risk Management. In: In-
novation. The European Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 13, nr. 4, p. 408; Rösner (2008): Risikoman -
agementstrategien für arme ländliche Bevölkerungsgruppen, p. 18.
39 In the following, the term ‘common risks’ is used for risks that affect more than one individual or
household. This study does not follow the terminology by Holzmann et al. use ‘covariant’ or ‘co -
variate’ as this wrongly indicates an association between the risks that affect several individuals
and does not highlight the causal link resulting from the source of risk. Holzmann et al. (2001): So-
cial Risk Management, p. 539.
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shocks, and climate risks, are aggregated and noticed economy-wide. Meso-level risks
simultaneously affect multiple households in a community. On the other hand, idiosyn-
cratic (or individual) risks affect only specific individuals or households and have no, or
only  minor,  impact  on  other  households  in  the  community.40 Income  risks,  most
health-related risks, risks due to aging and the risk of loss of live-stock are examples
for such individual risks.41 As Dercon (2007) pointed out, there cannot always be a
clear  distinction between idiosyncratic  and common risks;  he  remarked  that  "even
within  well-defined  rural  communities,  few  risks  are  purely  common  or  idiosyn-
cratic".42 An example is some health-related risk that cannot be categorized as an idio-
syncratic risk, because it is covariate, such as infectious and communicable diseases,
which may lead to higher prevalence rates in certain regions, and, in its extreme form,
pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS. Additionally, HIV/AIDS poses secondary risks, such as
continuous health care costs (e.g. through ART) and the burden of properly taking care
of AIDS orphans.43 Another example of a common risk is naturally occurring arsenic
contaminated water, which is not passed on from one individual to another, but results
from an external factor and can severely impact health. A study in Bangladesh found
that entire communities were affected by arsenic contaminated water and several risk
management strategies were developed by communities.44 Generally, shocks on meso-
or macro-level, and particularly "Economy-wide shocks are often the hardest for poor
communities and households to cope with, especially when the shocks are repeated,
deep, or persistent".45
The shocks resulting from a risk  occurrence can take different forms; particularly
the extent of the shock can differ, which can be expressed by the severity and the dura-
tion of the shock. The more severe the shock, in terms of scale (e.g. complete harvest
loss or partial harvest failure) or duration (e.g. number of days without rainfall), the
more difficult it is for the affected individual or household to cope. Generally, severity
"can range from catastrophic (a natural disaster, death of the breadwinner) to minor (a
40 The World Bank (2001): Dynamic Risk Management and the Poor. Developing a Social Protection
Strategy for Africa I, p. 2; The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report
2000-2001, p. 136.
41 Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Management; Rösner (2008): Risikomanagementstrategien für
arme ländliche Bevölkerungsgruppen; Dercon (2007): Risk, Insurance, and Poverty: A Review, p.
10f.
42 Dercon (2007): Risk, Insurance, and Poverty: A Review, p. 10.
43 The World Bank (2001): Dynamic Risk Management and the Poor. Developing a Social Protection
Strategy for Africa I, p. 9f. and 14.
44 Lelii, Stefano (2012): Local Practices, Perceptions and Social Aspects Related to Arsenic-contami-
nated Water: an Ethnographic Case Study in Abhaynagar Upazila, Bangladesh (unpublished man-
uscript).
45 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 10.
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slight illness, a few days without work for casual laborers)".46 While bunched or re-
peated shocks may aggregate the severity, single severe shocks can also exceed house-
hold's risk management capacities.47 In a study in Indonesia, Gertler et al. (2002) re-
ported that households were able to buffer 71% of illness costs, in the case of moderate
illness shocks, but only 38% of costs in the case of severe illness shocks.48 Generally,
shocks with irreversible effects must be distinguished from those shocks that are tran-
sient. Examples for irreversible effects are injuries resulting in disability, or malnutri-
tion after birth, which can lead to permanent cognitive and learning disadvantages.49
As this study focuses on social risk management, it is clear that the probability of a
risk, the extent of the shock and, particularly, the impact of shocks on households, are
not to be treated as exogenous factors, but as endogenous, because they are subject to
social risk management strategies aimed at reducing the negative impact of risks on
the household. Hence, the classification of risk characteristics in this study differs from
others as it does not view the impact of a shock (and hence its severity) as part of
(static) risk characteristics, but rather as the effect of successful or failing risk manage-
ment strategies in response to a risk by all actors involved. Hence, a further discussion
of the extent and impact of shocks on households and individuals will be done in sec-
tion 3 and is in this section only briefly outlined. 
However, in the context of risk management, a distinction needs to be drawn be-
tween shocks and stressors, as they require different forms of social risk management
strategies. Hence, in this context, a shock can be understood as a major peak of pres-
sure, on the individual or household, beyond the normal range of variability as the re-
alization of a risk. On the other hand, stressors are a result of slowly and gradually in-
creasing pressure on the household, requiring adapting capacities. Examples for stres-
sors are degradation of soil, changing seasons and crop yields, due to climate change
or a gradual decline of an industry.50 In the following sections, this study narrows its
focus on shocks as the realization of risks requiring the typical forms of (health) risk
management as response. Stressors and their results, which require adaptive strategies,
are occasionally mentioned.
46 Ibid., p. 138.
47 Ibid.
48 Gertler, Paul; Gruber, Jonathan (2002): Insuring Consumption against Illness. In: American Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 92, nr. 1, p. 67.
49 Holzmann et al. (2007): The Role of Social Risk Management in Development, p. 10.
50 cp. Turner II, B.L.; Kasperson, Roger E.; Matson, Pamela A.; et al. (2003): A Framework for Vulner-
ability Analysis in Sustainability Science. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
vol. 100, nr. 14, p. 8074.
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As outlined above, some risk characteristics are impacted by (comprehensive) social
risk management and are, therefore, endogenous. Hence, the number of risks and the
extent of exposure to shocks, as presented in the classification of risk characteristics
above, cannot be established as a sufficiently analytical tool. They are an important
prerequisite to understanding risk exposure, but do not capture well enough the deter-
minants of the impact of these risks and shocks on households. The concept of vulner-
ability provides the conceptual link. In short, vulnerability to risks can be defined as
the degree to which an individual or household is likely to experience harm (utility
loss) due to the occurrence of risks. In the context of low-income countries, high vul-
nerability to poverty exists if the probability of falling into poverty over a certain time
period is sufficiently high.51 Other authors put the individual's perception about their
own vulnerability status at the center of their definition, because a 'sense of insecurity'
in itself reduces well-being and triggers a (negative) behavioral change in asset build-
ing and risk management.52
Thus, vulnerability depends on risk management capacities as well as on the expo-
sure to risk. For example, if a household lives in an environment where it is only ex-
posed to a few risks and has no SRM strategies in place, it can have the same degree of
vulnerability as a household in a risky environment with an elaborated set of SRM
strategies, at all levels from individual strategies to countrywide safety nets. Similarly,
in a situation without proper means, infrastructure or precautions to combat a certain
illness event, even a small negative event such as a minor infectious disease can have
life-threatening effects on an individual. Hence, vulnerability and risk exposure are in-
tertwined,  but  high  risk  exposure  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  high  vulnerability.
Therefore,  Chambers  (2006)  defined  vulnerability  as  a  concept  that  has  two  sides,
which he described as the external side and the internal side. 
The external side refers the level of risk exposure; all risks, shocks and stressors the
individual or household is exposed to. The internal side of vulnerability refers to the
lack of strategies to pro-actively or re-actively respond to these stresses or shocks, re-
sulting in damaging loss for the individual or household, and whether the individual or
household is able to fully regain a level of well-being similar to before the shock. Gen-
erally speaking, the internal side of vulnerability refers to the lack of capacity to cope
51 cp. Holzmann et al. (2007): The Role of Social Risk Management in Development, p. 12; Turner II
et al. (2003): A Framework for Vulnerability Analysis in Sustainability Science, p. 8074.
52 cp. the discussion about asset thresholds and poverty traps. Carter, Michael R.; Barrett, Christo-
pher B. (2007): Asset Thresholds and Social Protection. A ‘Think-Piece’. In: IDS Bulletin, vol. 38, nr.
3, p. 34f.
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with or adapt to (multiple) stresses and shocks.53 For the individual or household, such
losses can have different forms: they can be physical or psychological (health), eco-
nomic, social or political.54 Particularly difficult situations arise when high levels of ex-
ternal and internal vulnerability coincide. Typically,  poor households in developing
countries show not only a high level of external vulnerability (=risk exposure), but also
a high level of internal vulnerability (= lack of effective strategies against shocks).
2.2. Sources of risk
As already mentioned in section 2, risk can originate from a wide variety of different
sources, which, depending on the risk characteristics, require different response strate-
gies and interventions. These risk sources can be categorized into six groups:  They
comprise  economic risks (e.g.  harvest  failure,  unemployment,  business  loss),  natural
risks (e.g. earthquake, drought, flood), environmental risks (e.g. degradation of soil, pol-
lution, desertification, deforestation),  social risks (e.g. crime, domestic violence, riots,
isolation),  political risks (e.g. war, bad governance, unstable government, corruption,
discrimination of minorities), and health risks (e.g. disability, illness, injury, malnutri-
tion, death). Table  1 depicts the main sources of risk. The table further distinguishes
between the levels where the risk hits, which is on a continuum from the individual to
the country or global level. For example, a drought is likely a common risk affecting all
individuals and households in a region, or even hitting country-wide.
Out of all the sources of risk, particularly health, social and economic risks need to
be distinguished into common and  idiosyncratic risks, as they can hit on meso- and
macro levels, but they can also hit on the individual or household level only. The other
sources,  namely  natural,  political  and  environmental  risks,  are  generally  common
risks, unlikely to hit only single individuals or households. It is obvious that risks that
hit on the meso or macro level pose particular difficulties for households to properly
respond. In order to allow successful risk management, the most efficient level for SRM
strategies is one level above the level where the risk occurs. For example, if a commu-
nity is affected by harvest failure due to crop disease, the regional level would be more
capable of providing certain risk mitigation or risk coping strategies than the commu-
nity itself. A successful SRM strategy "requires pooling with areas not subject to the
risk".55
53 Chambers, Robert (2006): Vulnerability, Coping and Policy (Editorial Introduction). In: IDS Bul-
letin, vol. 37, nr. 4, p. 33; Watts, Michael J.; Bohle, Hans G. (1993): The Space of Vulnerability. The
Causal Structure of Hunger and Famine. In: Progress in Human Geography, vol. 17, nr. 1, p. 45f.
54 cp. Chambers (2006): Vulnerability, Coping and Policy (Editorial Introduction), p. 33.
55 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 136.
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Tab. 1: Sources of risk and level of occurrence
Source of 
risks
Idiosyncratic Common
Risk affecting an in-
dividual or house-
hold (micro)
Risks affecting groups 
of households or com-
munities (meso)
Risks affecting regions, nations or 
global risks (macro)
Natural Rainfall
Landslide
Earthquake
Flood or Drought
High winds
                       Volcanic eruption
Health Illness (predom. 
non-communicable)
Injury
Disability
Death
Illness (communicable)
                     Epidemic / pandemic
Social Domestic violence
Family break-up
Widowhood
Social isolation
Terrorism
Gang activity
Civil strife
War
Social upheaval
                        Crime
                        Corruption
Economic Business loss/fail-
ure
Crop/livestock loss
Resettlement
Harvest failure/ yield 
fluctuations
Unavailability of in-
puts
Growth collapse
Hyperinflation
Balance of payments, financial- or 
currency crisis
Technology shock
Terms of trade shock
Transition costs of economic re-
forms
                     Unemployment
       Price variability for food, inputs and commodities
Political Riots
Ethnic conflicts
Political default on social pro-
grams
Coup d'état
Failed states
Environ-
mental
Pollution
Deforestation
Soil degradation
Nuclear disaster
Global warming
Source: Adapted with changes, from World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty – World Development Report 56
56 Ibid., p. 136f.
20
2.3. Health Risks And Exposure to Health Risks
2.3. Health risks and exposure to health risks
2.3.1. The nature of health risks
Health risks are a particular kind of risk that deserve elevated attention in social risk
management. First of all, health risks are universal, as all human beings are potentially
exposed them, such as illness, injury, disability or death. Maintaining health and, par-
ticularly, retaining a good health status (when health risks have already occurred) have
a very high intrinsic value (health as a value per se and as a requirement to enjoy liv-
ing and derive utility from consumption) and economic value (health as requirement
to be able to work and raise income). Furthermore, willingness to pay for health care
services is extraordinarily high after falling sick, particularly in case of emergencies,
severe or painful illnesses. In situations of illness or pain, households are even willing
to accept health care expenditures reaching a catastrophic level for the household (see
section 2.4 for a more thorough discussion).57 The occurrence of health risks is uncer-
tain and the extent is unknown. Although there is some predisposition to illnesses (ei-
ther genetically or dependent on unhealthy behavior and/or environment) and certain
risk factors increase predictability and probability,  the risk of illness is  highly ran-
domly distributed (see subsequent section 2.3.2 for a further discussion).58 Furthermore,
different health risks can be distinguished regarding their duration and severity,  as
well as their probability; typically low-cost but high probability illnesses are distin-
guished from high-cost but low-probability illnesses. Examples for the first case are
small wounds and a cold, for the second case are illnesses, such as heart infarction or
brain tumor.59
As table 1 on the level of risk occurrence shows, many health risks are idiosyncratic
risks hitting on the individual- or household-level. Particularly, this includes all non-
communicable diseases, as well as injuries and disabilities that cannot be transmitted
between individuals. On the other hand, communicable diseases may be restricted to
the individual- or household-level (idiosyncratic), but for many illnesses (e.g. conta-
gious diseases) the likelihood is high that the disease may also affect other individuals
and households (meso-level). For example, some infectious diseases that are not trans-
57 Breyer, Friedrich; Kifmann, Mathias; Zweifel, Peter (2005): Gesundheitsökonomik, 5th revised edi-
tion. Springer. Berlin [a.o.], p. 1; Russell, Steven (1996): Ability to Pay for Health Care. Concepts
and Evidence. In: Health Policy Planning, vol. 11, nr. 3, p. 229f.
58 Smith, Peter C.; Witter, Sophie N. (2004): Risk Pooling in Health Care Financing. The Implications
for Health System Performance. HNP Discussion Papers. World Bank. Washington D.C., p. 1. URL:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Resources/2810627-
10 95069801400167/Chap9SmithWitterRiskPoolingFinal.pdf (accessed 2011/10/01).
59 Dror, David M.; Jacquier, Christian (1999): Micro-Insurance. Extending Health Insurance to the Ex-
cluded. In: International Social Security Review, vol. 52, nr. 1, p. 11.
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mitted between humans, such as tetanus, are classified as idiosyncratic risks. Good ex-
amples for (auto)correlated risks are a local flu epidemic, where the same type of dis -
ease is contracted from one to another, or diarrheal diseases contracted from a contam-
inated community water source. Illnesses that spread beyond a community or group of
households are local or even regional or national epidemics. Epidemics are usually in-
fectious diseases that show epidemiological  patterns,  with more disease cases than
usually expected in a certain population. Although the majority of diseases perceived
as 'epidemic' are infectious, some non-infectious diseases have also been classified as
such by some authors, such as smoking-related illnesses. The difference between an
epidemic and a pandemic is mostly the geographic spread defining the pandemic as a
worldwide epidemic.60
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the HIV/AIDS pandemic had a dramatic impact on the af-
fected countries. This is particularly the case in the Southern African countries, includ-
ing  Malawi,  but  also in West  Central  Africa,  for  example  in  Cameroon or  Gabon,
where the HIV/AIDS epidemic has hit society and the economy heavily, with a preva-
lence rate among adults higher than 10 percent.61 This resulted in an enormous burden
of disease, an increased number of deaths and, ultimately, a reduced overall life-ex-
pectancy, as well as a drop in the countries' economies.62
What makes health risks more critical for SRM interventions is that poor house-
holds are particularly exposed to health risks. The living and working conditions of
poor households often result in higher probability of illness and injury. Under-nutri-
tion or malnutrition results in physical weakness. Further, physical weakness as a re -
sult of "malnourishment and previous sickness tending to reduce resistance to disease
and to slow recovery"63 leads to further sicknesses and future vulnerability. Therefore,
poor households are more affected by communicable diseases compared to wealthier
households.64 Furthermore,  poor  households  are  more  vulnerable  to  the  impact  of
health risks (or any other risk) than other households, because any drop in income or
an increase in expenditures can make them destitute. In rural tropical conditions, the
confluence of hard agricultural work, high risk of infection, food shortages and diffi-
cult road conditions in the rainy season put additional risk on the households.65 These
experiences of poor households lead to a generally high level of  risk aversion;  the
60 Breslow, Lester (2002): Encyclopedia of Public Health, 1 edition. Gacl. New York, p. 394.
61 Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (2008): Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic
2008. Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. Geneva, p. 39.
62 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 138f.
63 Chambers (2006): Vulnerability, Coping and Policy (Editorial Introduction), p. 37.
64 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 137.
65 Chambers (2006): Vulnerability, Coping and Policy (Editorial Introduction), p. 37.
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knowledge that a small drop can have heavy negative impact on the household and its
members, alters behavior and may result in low risk production, low investments and
avoidance of any form of risky behavior.66
2.3.2. High-risk cases
As already mentioned in the previous section, the majority of health care costs is ran-
domly distributed.  Nevertheless,  a  significant share  of  future health care costs and
health care needs can be predicted based on information of individuals. Certain risk
factors lead to an increased probability that an individual will require treatment and
cause above average health care costs. These risk factors not only increase the proba-
bility of future health care costs, but also influence the behavior of those experiencing
an increased health risk. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the existence of such risk
factors in individuals and households changes their risk behavior and the application
of social health risk management strategies. These factors are operationalized by form-
ing high-risk groups in the empirical part of this study in section 6.3.
In order to predict future health care costs, these risk factors must be ex-ante identi-
fiable.67 They can be roughly categorized in (1) socio-demographic factors such as age,
gender, income or education, in (2) information about extent and costs of health care
utilization in previous periods, e.g. high treatment episodes, high health care costs and
drug prescriptions, as well as costs due to longer hospitalization stays, in (3) diagnosis-
based information, which needs to be distinguished between (3a) genetic predisposi-
tion or congenital illnesses and (3b) chronic or permanent illnesses,68 (4) regional or ge-
ographic differences, for example households in endemic areas or environmental- or
climate-related health problems, and (5) individual characteristics such as (5a) the per-
ceived subjective health status or (5b) life-style dependent health risks.69 Although a
66 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 138.
67 For the purpose of retrospective risk adjustment mechanisms, additional ex-post risk factors can
be taken into consideration. For example, it is known that individuals cause high health care costs
in the months prior  to death.  This  allows a retrospective compensation of  a health insurance
scheme for such additional costs.
68 Depending on the source, chronic conditions are either defined after the duration of the illness
(e.g. a duration longer than three months) or based on the diagnosis of a chronic (non-communica-
ble) disease such as diabetes, arthritis, cardiovascular diseases, etc. Cp. Morewitz, Stephen John
(2010): Chronic diseases and health care: new trends in diabetes, arthritis, osteoporosis, fibromyal -
gia, low back pain, cardiovascular disease, and cancer. Springer. New York, p. 1ff.; Wang, Qun;
Brenner, Stephan; Leppert, Gerald; et al. (2014): Health Seeking Behavior and the Related House-
hold Out-of-Pocket Expenditure for Chronic Non-Communicable Diseases in Rural Malawi.  In:
Health Policy and Planning, p. 2f.
69 The list by Breyer et al. has been adapted for the context of developing countries and this study.
For example, the risk factors ‘behaviour on changing health insurance schemes’ and ‘mortality’
(an ex-post risk factor) have been left out. Some other adjustments were made. Cp. Breyer et al.
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variety of risk factors have been discussed in academia, Breyer et al. (2005) concluded
that the largest part of the variance of health care expenditures cannot generally be
predicted.70 Applying available real-life data, researchers concluded that about 20% of
systematic predictability of individual health care costs may be realistic as a lower
bound of R2 in risk adjustment models. With inclusion of further individual informa-
tion, it could be expected that the predictability increases only slightly. Generally, out-
patient care could be better predicted than inpatient care.71
The first category of socio-demographic factors consists of easily available and identi-
fiable variables such as sex, age, and education, as well as income or wealth variables.
The variable sex is significantly predictive of health care costs. However, the influence
of the variable sex heavily depends on the age of the subject. Empirical studies in the
Netherlands (1995) and the USA (1992-1993) showed that sex had no significant influ-
ence on health care costs until the age of 15. However, in the age group 15-50, women
showed higher health care costs than men. This relationship reversed for the age group
above 50 years, showing higher health care costs among men. However, such results
depended heavily on the sample of the study, because, for example, a study among in-
sured in the US-American Medicaid scheme (1991-1992) showed higher health care
costs for men among all adult age groups.72 The risk factor age showed a more linear
pattern, as there was a clear relationship between age and chronic health conditions. 73
Except for the 0-4 year old children (who showed relatively higher health care costs
than the next age group), health care costs increased continuously with older age. An
empirical study in the USA (1991-1992) showed that the age group of 60-64 years re -
sulted in health care costs being approximately ten times higher than the age group 5-
9 years. Other studies also found a significant relationship between age and health care
costs,  although  less  strong:  The  aforementioned  study  in  the  Netherlands  (1995)
showed health care costs for the age group 60-64 years old over three times higher and
for the group 85-89 years old over 8-times higher than the group 5-9 years old.74
The second group of risk factors consist  of  information about extent and costs of
health care utilization in previous time periods. Variables such as high treatment utiliza-
(2005): Gesundheitsökonomik, p. 300ff.
70 Ibid., p. 303.
71 van Vliet, René C.J.A. (1992): Predictability of Individual Health Care Expenditures. In: The Journal
of Risk and Insurance, vol. 59, nr. 3, p. 453; van de Ven, Wynand P.M.M.; Ellis, Randall P. (2000):
Risk Adjustment in Competitive Health Plan Markets. In: Culyer, Anthony J.; Newhouse, Joseph P.
(eds.): Handbook of Health Economics, vol. Part 3. Ch. 14, Volume 1a. Elsevier Science B. V. Ams-
terdam (a.o.), p. 791f.
72 van de Ven et al. (2000): Risk Adjustment in Competitive Health Plan Markets, p. 794ff.
73 van Vliet (1992): Predictability of Individual Health Care Expenditures, p. 453.
74 van de Ven et al. (2000): Risk Adjustment in Competitive Health Plan Markets, p. 795f.
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tion episodes, high health care costs and previous drug prescriptions, as well as longer
hospitalization stays in the previous year, are a better predictor for future health care
costs than socio-demographic factors. The predicted variance, R2, could be expected to
be quite high, in the range of 0.06 to 0.1,75 although the data from existing studies usu-
ally included expenses that were covered by health insurance, but lacked other private
expenses,  as  well  as  diagnostic  information.  Costs  and  utilization  of  all  treatment
events,  of  outpatient treatment,  of  inpatient  treatment (particularly longer  hospital
stays) and medication can be relevant factors predictive of future health care costs;
these variables can be used as dummy variables if the prior extent of utilization and/or
costs exceeds a certain threshold.76 
The third category of  diagnosis-based information has received extensive research,
particularly in North-America and Europe, on the question, how competitive health in-
surance markets could be regulated in order to avoid risk selection by health insurance
schemes. In many cases, diagnosis-based factors showed better predictive power com-
pared to information on the utilization during previous time periods. For example, Ash
et al. (2001) found that diagnostic groups, based on the Diagnostic Cost Groups and
Hierarchical Condition Categories (DCG/HCC), were slightly superior to models using
prior health care expenditures.77 Diagnosis-based models were particularly strong for
permanent and chronic conditions. Disability and functional impairment were rela-
tively good predictors of future health care costs, leading to roughly doubled health
care costs compared to other groups.78 Several chronic conditions have proven to be a
good predictor of high future health care costs. Among these were chronic respiratory
diseases (e.g. asthma or chronic lung diseases), chronic cardio-vascular diseases (e.g.
hypertension or stroke), diabetes type II, cancer (e.g. lung cancer, colorectal cancer and
breast cancer) and other chronic diseases (such as cystic fibrosis, depression or arthri -
tis), but also HIV/AIDS and its opportunistic diseases.79 The South African risk adjust-
ment mechanism, for example, listed 25 chronic diseases which result in predictably
higher health care costs in future periods.80 For complex risk adjustment mechanisms,
75 Ibid., p. 797.
76 Spycher,  Stefan (2002):  Risikoausgleich in der Krankenversicherung0:  Notwendigkeit,  Ausgestal-
tung und Wirkungen. Haupt. Bern [a.o.], p. 103f. and 197.
77 Ash, Arlene S.; Zhao, Yang; Ellis, Randall P.; et al. (2001): Finding Future High-Cost Cases. Com-
paring Prior Cost versus Diagnosis-Based Methods. In: Health Service Research, vol. 36, nr. 6 Pt 2,
p. 201 and 203.
78 van de Ven et al. (2000): Risk Adjustment in Competitive Health Plan Markets, p. 806.
79 cp. Ibid., p. 811.
80 McLeod, Heather; Grobler, Pieter (2010): Risk Equalisation and Voluntary Health Insurance. The
South Africa Experience. In: Health Policy, vol. 98, nr. 1, p. 30f. and 35; The chronic diseases list in -
clude chronic cardiovascular diseases, autoimmune diseases, Mental/neurological diseases, respi-
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very detailed disease categories have been developed that have predictive power for fu-
ture health care costs, for example the DCG/HCC model used 781 morbidity categories
that were aggregated in 184 classes.81 
The fourth group of  regional and geographic differences acknowledges the different
epidemiological profiles of countries and within-country regions; disciplines like geo-
graphical epidemiology, medical geography and medical anthropology, focus on ex-
plaining the different level of exposure to health risks due to climate, geography and
cultural patterns.82 Besides large-scale differences between continents and countries,
there are also substantial regional differences in illness patterns. For example, regional
differences in health care expenditures in Germany have been studied by Göpffarth
(2011). He reported that there were large differences between administrative districts
and that those were largely the result of illness patterns and different distributions of
age and sex. Compensating for both influence patterns, the pure regional effect was
rather low, with a span from the lowest to the highest per-capita expenditures from
1852-2666 € (equals +44.0%) and a standard deviation of just 98.90 €.83 However, even in
the relatively small country of Germany, the health care costs resulting from certain
disease categories varied widely between administrative districts. The author attributed
this to social factors, such as education and availability of health care providers. 84 In
the USA, the geographic differences in health care costs (without further discussion of
epidemiological  differences)  have been studied using Medicare  data from 1996;  the
study identified geographic factor price variations as an important factor for the mea-
sured differences in health care costs.85
ratory diseases, diabetes, endocrine disorders, chronic inflammatory diseases, renal failure and oc-
ular  disorders.  Council  for  Medical  Schemes  South  Africa  (2014):  Chronic  disease  list.  URL:
https://www.medicalschemes.com/medical_schemes_pmb/chronic_disease_list.htm (accessed
2014/04/09).
81 Kasper, Stefanie (2002): Der Risikostrukturausgleich in der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung, vol.
10. Schriften zur Sozialpolitik. Weiden/Regensburg, p. 73.
82 For more information, see: Waller, Lance A; Gotway, Carol A (2004): Applied spatial statistics for
public health data. Wiley-Interscience. Hoboken, NJ, pp. 1–5; Trostle, James A.; Sommerfeld, Jo-
hannes (1996): Medical Anthropology and Epidemiology. In: Annual Review of Anthropology, vol.
25; for regional and country-specific prevalence rates: WHO (2010): World Health Statistics 2010.
Geneva.
83 Goepffarth,  Dirk  (2011):  Regionalmerkmale  im Risikostrukturausgleich.  Ein  Beitrag  zum funk-
tionalen Wettbewerb und zu bedarfsgerechter Versorgung? In: Repschläger, Uwe; Schulte, Claudia;
Osterkamp, Nicole (eds.): BARMER GEK. Gesundheitswesen aktuell 2011 - Beiträge und Analysen,
p. 24.
84 Higher health care expenditures due to education likely resulted from higher utilization patterns
rather than higher morbidity. In the German case, regional differences based on household income
and unemployment rate proved to be insignificant. Ibid., p. 26 and 31.
85 van de Ven et al. (2000): Risk Adjustment in Competitive Health Plan Markets, p. 806f.
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The fifth group stands out from the other four, as it refers to  individual or subjective
characteristics and attitudes such as the subjective perceived health status or life-style
dependent health risks. The general perceived health status and more formalized self-
assessed health criteria based on physical functions such as the 'Activities of Daily Liv-
ing (ADL)' measure are predictors for future health care needs and costs.86 Life-style
dependent health risks are difficult to assess, since they include risk-taking behavior
and intentions (e.g. extreme sports, unhealthy diet, unwillingness to quit smoking or
other incautious behavior) which are not socially desirable and, therefore, cannot be
properly  assessed  using  questionnaires  and  interviews.  Overall,  these  self-reported
data seemed to be less reliable and possessed a lower predictive power than diagnosis-
based models.87
2.4. The dual economic burden of health risks
Unlike many other risks, health risks show a dual economic risk profile, which makes
them, together with the (temporary or permanent) loss of health, particularly challeng-
ing for affected individuals and households. Illness or injury of household members
may cause a drop or loss of income due to the sick individual's or of the care-givers' in-
ability to work. At the same time, the household may be facing high health care costs,
adding to the economic burden. Additionally, the loss of health itself puts (non-finan-
cial)  pressure  on  the  household,  particularly  in  the  case  where  long-term or  irre-
versible  negative  health  consequences  are  expected.88 The random characteristic  of
health risks, which is particularly pronounced in the case of injuries and communica-
ble diseases, make many health risks barely predictable. Both, the illness itself and also
the payments for treatments may come unexpected. For low-income households, un-
foreseen high health care costs generally have the consequence of curtailing other ex-
penditures (e.g.  those planned for  consumption or  investment)  in order to pay for
treatment. Hence, health care costs strongly contrast to other costly events (e.g. school
fees) that are certain, and for which the households can make long-term dispositions.89
86 Spycher (2002): Risikoausgleich in der Krankenversicherung, p. 81f. and 67ff.
87 van de Ven et al. (2000): Risk Adjustment in Competitive Health Plan Markets, p. 803f.
88 Rösner (2013):  Mikrofinanzsystementwicklung und produktive Selbsthilfe,  p.  315;  Breyer et  al.
(2005): Gesundheitsökonomik, p. 221.
89 Wagstaff,  Adam;  van  Doorslaer,  Eddy  (2003):  Catastrophe  and  Impoverishment  in  Paying  for
Health Care. With Applications to Vietnam 1993-1998. In: Health Economics, vol. 12, nr. 11, p. 10ff.
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2.4.1. Health care costs and catastrophic health care spending
The costs of illness can be distinguished by direct and indirect costs. Direct costs gen-
erally refer to all expenditures directly related to the utilization of health care services,
such as paying the doctor or the hospital (treatment), transportation of the patient to
and from the doctor or hospital (transport), drugs, ointments or injections (medicines),
glasses, crutches, hearing aids (medical devices) and imaging services or laboratory
tests (diagnostics). Indirect costs generally refer to the loss of income, assets, or means
of production due to illness. Particularly in developing countries, treatment of severe
illness leads to a loss of work income due to the lost working days of the patient and,
generally, also of one or more family members assisting the patient. Furthermore, ill-
ness can result in the long-term inability to work and generate income. Other factors
are often counted among indirect health care costs, such as the opportunity costs of ill-
ness, the costs involved in obtaining a loan, e.g. interest rates, or selling productive as-
sets that are then lacking in the household.90
The extent  of  direct  and indirect  costs  and the resulting  burden on households
highly depend on the design of the (public) health care financing system, e.g. whether
all  or  certain  services  are  provided  for  free,  whether  a  fee  for  service  is  applied,
whether low-income groups are exempt from user fees or whether health insurance
schemes pool the risks and smooth the health care expenditures. However, in most
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, public health care financing lacks the capacity to sig-
nificantly  reduce  the  financial  burden  of  illness,  particularly  affecting  low-income
households. 
The major financial burden for households originates from user fees at the point of
service, so-called out-of-pocket payments, which are neither pooled between individu-
als nor give they households a real chance for inter-temporal pooling. Out-of-pocket
payments were defined by the WHO as “[...]  direct outlay of households, including
gratuities and payments in kind, made to health practitioners and suppliers of pharma-
ceuticals, therapeutic appliances and other goods and services, whose primary intent is
to contribute to the restoration or to the enhancement of the health status of individu-
als or population groups [...]”.91 Effects of out-of-pocket payments on health care uti-
lization by households are well studied; they were found to have – besides the costs in-
90 McIntyre, Diane; Thiede, Michael; Dahlgren, Göran; et al. (2006): What Are the Economic Conse-
quences for Households of Illness and of Paying for Health Care in Low- and Middle-Income
Country Contexts? In: Social Science and Medicine, vol. 62, nr. 4, p. 856ff; Gumber, Anil (2001):
Hedging the Health of the Poor. The Case for Community Financing in India. Health, Nutrition
and Population (HNP) Discussion Paper. World Bank. Washington, D.C., p. 8; Asfaw, Abay; Jüt -
ting, Johannes (2002): Mutual Health Insurance (MHI). A Viable Solution to Increase Access to
Health Care? An Ethiopian Case Study. Center for Development Research (ZEF). Bonn, p. 3.
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curred – a strong effect among low-income households to delay seeking care, to in-
crease self-medication and to use informal health care.92
The risk of falling below the poverty line (or remaining there) due to such high ill -
ness-related health care expenditures is generally measured by an indicator called cata-
strophic health care costs. Health care expenditures are seen as catastrophic if their ex-
tent is above a certain threshold. Ranson et al. (2003) defined this threshold as expendi-
tures  exceeding 10% of  income.93 Other authors defined catastrophic  costs as these
costs exceeding 40% of the income, after subtracting the expenditures for vitally impor-
tant goods.94 For low-income households, even the costs of common illnesses can ex-
ceed the threshold for catastrophic health care costs. Chronic or recurrent illnesses ag-
gravate this situation.95 Furthermore, the resources of low-income households are lim-
ited, so that not only high cost cases can deplete their physical capital, but also low
cost treatments that are repeated over time.96 In a study in Indonesia, Pradhan et al.
(2002) confirmed that out-of-pocket spending was highly skewed and therefore "a sig-
nificant fraction of the population could suffer catastrophic levels of health expendi-
ture relative to their incomes".97 This conclusion got even weightier, because Pradhan
et al. showed that less wealthy households had lower absolute health care expendi-
tures, likely as a result of lower health care utilization patterns, particularly of inpa-
tient care.98 
2.4.2. High-cost cases
Health care costs "are known to be highly concentrated, with a few people generating
a large percentage of total costs in a year"99. Previous research by the author showed
that health care costs varied considerably among ill persons. In a household survey
that collected data from 4316 ill persons among low-income groups in India in 2005, a
91 World  Health  Organization  (2008):  Indicator  definitions  and  metadata.  URL:
http://www.who.int/whosis/indicators/compendium/2008/3exo/en/ (accessed 2009/07/04).
92 Gilson, Lucy (1997): The Lessons of User Fee Experience in Africa. In: Health Policy and Planning,
vol. 12, nr. 4, p. 276.
93 Ranson, Michael Kent (2002): Reduction of Catastrophic Health Care Expenditures by a Commu -
nity-Based Health Insurance Scheme in Gujarat, India. Current Experiences and Challenges. In:
Bulletin of the World Health Organization, vol. 80, nr. 8.
94 Kawabata  et  al.  (2002):  Preventing  Impoverishment  through  Protection  against  Catastrophic
Health Expenditure, p. 612.
95 Waelkens et al. (2005): The Role of Social Health Protection in Reducing Poverty, p. 4.
96 Meessen et al. (2003): Iatrogenic Poverty, p. 581.
97 Pradhan, Menno; Prescott, Nicholas (2002): Social Risk Management Options for Medical Care in
Indonesia. In: Health Economics, vol. 11, nr. 5, p. 444.
98 Ibid.
99 Ash et al. (2001): Finding future high-cost cases, p. 194.
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high level concentration of health care costs could be shown: Approximately 5.5% of
persons with the highest direct health care expenditures in their illness episodes had to
bear over 50% of overall direct health care costs in the entire risk pool. 100 If indirect
costs were included, the concentration of costs was even higher, since indirect costs
can become a significant part of the overall expenditures in long-term or chronic ill-
nesses. Such expenditure patterns are similar across studies: For example, in 1984, a
study observing patterns of the health care expenditures for 1666 members in an em-
ployee benefit plan in Los Angeles, USA, came to the conclusion that less than 6% of
the insured individuals caused about 55% of the health care costs.101 In US data on inpa-
tient and ambulatory care (1997-1998), Ash et al. found that one quarter of individuals
had no cost at all and the 1% of individuals having caused the highest health care costs
needed 31% of all costs in the observed sample.102 The pattern of relatively few high-
cost cases also holds true in sub-populations. For example, a study by Liptak (2007) on
children using the US Medical Expenditure Panel from 2000 and 2001 showed that 10%
of children caused 54% of all health care costs.103
A comparative cross-sectional analysis by Berk et al. (2001) using health care expen-
diture data from the years 1987 and 1996 in the USA revealed "a remarkable stability in
the concentration of expenditures over the […] decade"104. The highest 5 percent of the
population accounted for 55% (1996) and 56% (1987) of all health care costs, respec-
tively. The highest one percent in 1996 still accounted for 27%, and the highest one per-
cent in 1987 for 28%, of total health care costs. Furthermore, the lowest 50% of the pop-
ulation used about 3% of health care costs in both years. In that study, the majority of
expenditures of the high-cost individuals could be attributed to inpatient hospital ser-
vices.105
Future high health care costs depend on the current high health care costs only to a
certain extent. In the aforementioned study by Liptak on children in the USA, the au-
thor showed that out of the 10% of cases with the highest costs, 49% remained in this
100 Leppert, Gerald (2012): Operating on the Edge. How to Counter Insurance-Related Financial Risks
in Micro Health Insurance Beyond the Scope of a Single Organization. In: Rösner, Hans-Jürgen;
Leppert, Gerald; Degens, Philipp; et al. (eds.): Handbook of Micro Health Insurance in Africa. LIT
Verlag. Berlin, p. 235f.
101 Alexandre, Leslie M. (1988): Who Are the High Cost Cases in a Health Benefits Plan? International
Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans. Brookfield, Wisconsin, p. 1 and 8.
102 Ash et al. (2001): Finding future high-cost cases, p. 198f.
103 Liptak, G. S. (2007): Short-Term Persistence of High Health Care Costs in a Nationally Representa -
tive Sample of Children. In: Medical Benefits, vol. 24, nr. 1, p. 5.
104 Berk, Marc L.; Monheit, Alan C. (2001): The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures, Revisited.
In: Health Affairs, vol. 20, nr. 2, p. 12.
105 Ibid., p. 12f.
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high cost group; 12% dropped to the bottom half and the rest still showed above aver-
age health expenditures.106 Determinants predicting high health care costs were age,
insurance status, whether children were included in the “Children With Special Health
Care  Needs screener”  and children with functional  limitations.107 Generally,  people
with disabilities incur predictable and above-average comparatively high health care
costs, have lower income earning capabilities, are more vulnerable for multidimen-
sional poverty, and, hence, require public support.108 For example, a study by Trupin et
al. (1987), using national medical expenditures survey data in the USA, showed that the
medical expenditures of individuals with activity limitations were four times larger
than that of other individuals.109
For any population and sub-population, it is typical that a few individuals in a given
time period experience excess  health care  expenditures.  Over several  time periods,
these high-cost cases are not necessarily the same individuals, as the fluctuations in ex-
cess health care expenditures are, to a large extent, random. However, a considerable
share of high health care costs can be explained by a few variables such as illness-re-
lated variables, e.g. chronic diseases or disabilities, or personal characteristics, such as
age. These so-called high-risk groups were the subject of the earlier section 2.3.2, dis-
cussing predictable high health care costs. These two groups – high-cost cases and
high-risk cases – somewhat overlap, so that some cases can be attributed to both at the
time, as they are high-risk/high-cost cases. Those households or individuals that fall
into both categories at the same time more likely incur high health care expenditures
with catastrophic impact on the entire household.
Performing statistical  analyses with health care costs can be challenging due to
their particular distribution patterns.  Typically, the frequency distribution of health
care costs is highly asymmetric and heavily positively right skewed with a long right
(lower) tail. With such distributions, the measure of location mode gives the smallest
value, whereas the  median represents the middle value and the  mean is the largest
value of the three.110 For all calculations related to such distributions, it is obvious that
106 Liptak (2007): Short-Term Persistence of High Health Care Costs in a Nationally Representative
Sample of Children, p. 5.
107 Ibid.
108 Haveman, Robert; Wolfe, Barbara (no date): The Economics of Disability and Disability Policy, p.
12ff. and 33f.; Mitra, Sophie; Posarac, Aleksandra; Vick, Brandon (2013): Disability and Poverty in
Developing Countries: A Multidimensional Study. In: World Development, vol. 41, p. 11.
109 Trupin, Laura; Others, And (1995): Medical Expenditures for People with Disabilities in the United
States,  1987.  Disability  Statistics  Report  5.  U.S.  Government Printing Office,  Superintendent of
Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 200402-9328. Washington D.C., p. 8.
110 Chernick, Michael R.; Friis, Robert H. (2003): Introductory Biostatistics for the Health Sciences:
Modern Applications Including Bootstrap, 1 edition. Wiley-Interscience. Hoboken, NJ, p. 75f.
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the arithmetic mean alone is an insufficient measure and is prone to false interpreta-
tion, because extreme values have too strong an influence on the mean; the median or
the α-trimmed mean are better measures for the description of such variables (see also
section 5.3).111
3. Social risk management112
3.1. The social risk management framework
Social risk management (SRM) is a conceptual framework for social protection mea-
sures,  developed by Holzmann and Jørgensen for  the Social Protection Unit  at  The
World Bank in 1999.113 The concept was built upon the insight that the focus of social
protection needs to be moved from traditional measures of social protection (e.g. social
assistance and labor market interventions) to measures and interventions enabling in-
dividuals,  households and communities to apply better risk management tools and,
therefore, to reduce their income risks and vulnerability.114 The motivation of Holz-
mann and Jørgensen for the development of the social risk management approach was
their fundamental criticism of the traditional view on social protection in development
practice that did not sufficiently address vulnerability as an aspect of the multidimen-
sional concept of poverty. In their eyes, development cooperation's actions were too
strongly focused on reactive and ex-post strategies.115 Their aim was to lay the founda-
tion for a complete rethinking of social protection strategies at major development
agencies, most notably The World Bank. 
Two major conceptual developments that had started in the 1980s strongly influ-
enced the development of the SRM framework: The concept of vulnerability and the
newly perceived pivotal importance of social protection. Since the beginning of the
1980s, the concept of vulnerability had been increasingly discussed in the development
111 Wilcox, Rand R. (2010): Fundamentals of Modern Statistical Methods - Substantially Improving
Power and Accuracy, 2 edition. Springer. New York [a.o.], p. 136.
112 This chapter is partially based on a previously published article by the author, but contains sub -
stantial changes and large parts have been rewritten: Leppert (2012): Financing Health Care. The
Role of Micro Health Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa.
113 Holzmann et al. (1999): Social Protection as Social Risk Management. Conceptual Underpinnings
for the Social Protection Sector Strategy Paper; The original article was later republished in the
Journal of International Development: Holzmann et al. (1999): Social protection as social risk man-
agement.
114 Holzmann et al. (1999): Social Protection as Social Risk Management. Conceptual Underpinnings
for the Social Protection Sector Strategy Paper, p. 4 and 5.
115 Ibid., p. 23.
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context and at the latest, in 2000, it had become an integral part of the main-stream
conceptualization of poverty with the publication of the World Development Report
"Attacking Poverty" 2000-2001. This was the first World Development Report incorpo-
rating the concept of multidimensional poverty, as previous reports incorporated only
material deprivation and low levels of health or education into the poverty conceptual-
ization.116 In light  of  the  discussions  on multidimensional  poverty,  and also  in  the
process of the development of the Millennium Development Goals, the relevance of so-
cial protection gradually changed: Until the mid-1990s, social protection still played a
minor role in development policy and it was perceived to produce costs and to have
negative  effects  on  economic  development.117 This  perception  has  subsequently
changed acknowledging that social and economic development is mutually reinforc-
ing. In 1995, this recognition culminated in the first official international development
agenda for poverty reduction, social development and social protection in the United
Nations "Copenhagen declaration of social development".118 While the authors of the
SRM framework acknowledged that social protection had moved to the center of the
development agenda,  they criticized that  the  traditional  social  protection measures
may be less effective at achieving these goals, since they concentrate "on the (ex post)
poor instead of the (ex-ante) vulnerable".119 According to the World Bank, the tradi-
tional social protection framework, consisting of labor market interventions, social in-
surance and pensions, social safety nets and social funds, often consists of passive in-
come redistribution and "fails to address the distribution of risks and resources within
the household as well as gender differences in experiences of poverty and vulnerabil-
ity".120
116 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 15 and 19f.;
Swift, Jeremy (1989): Why Are Rural People Vulnerable to Famine? In: IDS Bulletin, vol. 20, nr. 2;
Sen, Amartya (1981): Poverty and Famines. An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Clarendon
Press. Oxford, p. 23ff.
117 Waelkens et al. (2005): The Role of Social Health Protection in Reducing Poverty, p. 11.
118 For the first time, the heads of state and government ‘recognize the significance of social develop-
ment and human well-being for all and to give to these goals the highest priority both now and
into the twenty-first century’ and agree on commitments for social development, poverty eradica-
tion and their roots,  provision for the basic needs, economic and social protection, a.o.  It  was
agreed to include these goals in upcoming structural adjustment programs. UN (1995): Report of
the World Summit for Social Development (A/CONF.166/9),  pp. paragraph 1,  2, 8, 20; commit -
ments  1,2,8.  URL:  http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf166/aconf166-9.htm (accessed
2014/07/21).
119 Holzmann,  Robert;  Sherburne-Benz,  Lynne;  Tesliuc,  Emil (2003):  Social  Risk Management.  The
World Bank’s Approach to Social Protection in a Globalizing World. Washington D.C., p. 1f. URL:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Publications/2002200 38/SRMWBAp-
proachtoSP.pdf.
120 The World Bank (2001): Social protection sector strategy, p. 9.
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Addressing  this  criticism,  Holzmann  and  Jørgensen  proposed  the  SRM conceptual
framework aiming to cure the risks that may cause poverty instead only the symptoms
of poverty. The proposed concept put vulnerability at the core of assessment and set
the focus on different forms of prevention (which were called pro-active strategies in
the terminology of Social Risk Management).121 Furthermore, they stated that the SRM
framework "extends Social Protection as traditionally defined since it goes beyond pub-
lic  provision of  risk management instruments and draws attention to informal and
market-based arrangements".122 
In essence, the original concept of social risk management was defined by Siegel et
al. (1999) as "public measures intended to assist households manage risk and uncer-
tainty in order to reduce vulnerability, improve income and consumption smoothing,
and contribute to economic development"123 Hence, the link between poverty and vul-
nerability was seen in poorly managed risks and therefore, "effective risk management
will not only stabilize income and consumption but is an investment in poverty reduc-
tion".124 In 2005, Alwang et al. defined social risk management more comprehensively,
stating that the SRM approach "concerns itself with how, and with what instruments,
society manages risks. Hence, SRM refers to the social management of risk and not the
management  of  social  risks"125 and they continued  by stating  that  "SRM promotes
proactive ex ante risk management strategies […] as substitutes and/or complements to
reactive ex post risk coping".126 
The core of the SRM conceptual framework is a classification of strategies to man-
age the risks that individuals and households face. The authors classified risk manage-
ment strategies on three levels: They distinguished between different types of social
risk management strategies, between different levels of formality and different types of
actors. The different types of SRM strategies were grouped into three broad categories:127
121 Holzmann, Robert; Jorgensen, Steen (2001): Risk and Vulnerability. The forward Looking Role of
Social Protection in a Globalizing World. SP Discussion Paper. World Bank. Washington, D. C., p.
3f.  URL:  http://www.researchgate.net/publication/22805550978_Risk_and_vulnerability_the_for-
ward_looking_role_of_social_protection_in_a_globalizing_world/file/9c960 520579a33a8eaf.pdf
(accessed 2014/07/04).
122 Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Management, p. 531.
123 Siegel, Paul B.; Alwang, Jeffrey (1999): An Asset-Based Approach to Social Risk Management. A
Conceptual Framework. Social Protection Discussion Paper Series. World Bank. Washington, D.C.,
p. 2.
124 Devereux, Stephen; Sabates-Wheeler, Rachel (2007): Editorial Introduction. Debating Social Protec-
tion. In: IDS Bulletin, vol. 38, nr. 3, p. 2.
125 Alwang, Jeffrey; Siegel, Paul B.; Canagarajah, Sudharshan (2005): Viewing Microinsurance As A
Social Risk Management Instrument: Potential and Limitations. In: Journal of Insurance & Risk
Management, vol. IV, nr. 07, p. 42.
126 Ibid.
127 Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Management, p. 541.
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1. Prevention strategies ("to reduce the probability of a down-side risk")
2. Mitigation strategies ("to decrease the potential impact of a future down-side
risk")
3. Coping strategies ("to relieve the impact of the risk once it has occurred")128
In this categorization, type 1 "prevention strategies" and type 2 "mitigation strategies"
are ex-ante measures taken before the risk occurs, while coping strategies are ex-post
strategies that are taken after the risk has taken place.129
In the original SRM framework, the category of mitigation strategies was further
distinguished by Portfolio diversification strategies, Informal and formal insurance mech-
anisms and Hedging. The aim of portfolio diversification strategies is to reduce "the vari-
ability of income by relying on a variety of assets from which returns are not perfectly
correlated",130 an example being the accumulation of different types of assets such as
physical, financial, human or social capital. The aim of informal and formal insurance
mechanisms is "risk sharing (i.e., risk pooling) through a number of participants whose
risks are not (very) correlated";131 local informal risk-sharing arrangements or formal
insurance schemes are  examples  of  this  strategy.  The third  mitigation strategy de-
scribed by Holzmann et al. is hedging which is "based on risk exchange or payment of
a risk price to somebody for assuming that risk".132 According to Holzmann, this strat-
egy can be found in informal arrangements such as certain family arrangements or la-
bor contracts. The strategy type hedging was dropped in later publications (after 2001)
describing the SRM framework, without further discussion.
The criterion of the level of formality in the SRM framework distinguishes between
informal/personal arrangements, formal/market-based arrangements and formal/publicly
mandated or provided arrangements. The first category informal/personal arrangements
comprise strategies like mutual community support or marriage. The second category
formal/market-based arrangements includes the accumulation of financial assets or in-
surance contracts. The third category of formal/publicly mandated or provided arrange-
ments includes social insurance and financial transfers.133
The last criterion, the type of actor, distinguishes between all possible main actors of
social risk management, while the "role of the actors/institutions need to be considered
128 All three quotes cited from: Ibid., p. 541f.
129 Holzmann et al. (2003): Social Risk Management. The World Bank’s Approach to Social Protection
in a Globalizing World, p. 6f.
130 Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Management, p. 541.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., p. 542.
133 Holzmann et al. (1999): Social protection as social risk management, p. 1016f.
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in their capacity to best deal with this situation".134 These main actors range from indi-
viduals, households and communities to NGOs, market institutions, and to government
and international institutions.
The main achievement of the concept, the classification of a wide variety of SRM
strategies, is its extensibility, which makes theoretical and practical adoption possible.
Although several points of criticism were raised on the SRM conceptual framework,
particularly on its embeddedness in the social protection frame (see subsequent section
3.2), a refinement of the classification has barely been made. Still, the uptake of the
classification of  SRM strategies  has  been quite  high.  According to Devereux et  al.
(2007) the SRM framework became the "most influential approach to social protec-
tion"135. Competing conceptual frameworks include the "Transformative Social Protec-
tion", the "Asset thresholds", the "POVNET approach" and the "Universal Social Mini-
mum". Different from the SRM approach, these frameworks highlight other aspects
more intensively, such as social protection as a basic right, structural causes of vulner-
ability and a guarantee of minimum resources for a decent and dignified livelihood. 136
The SRM framework focuses on transitional poverty as a result of risks "as a comple-
ment to social protection's more traditional emphasis on equity and basic needs"137. De
Neubourg et al. (2000) argued that the main achievement of the SRM approach in so-
cial policy lay in the widening of scope with regard to social policy instruments and
strategies and that it highlighted the roles and interdependencies of public authorities,
markets and families in their contribution to social welfare.138
In the course of this study, the SRM framework has been adopted as a concept (see
section  3.3) for analyzing the behavior of individuals and households in the light of
(health) risks. The starting point in the discussion of the SRM framework is that house-
holds are exposed to a multitude of risks and poor households are particularly vulnera-
ble to them. By investing in a complex combination of physical, cultural/human and
social capital, each household builds its own array of SRM strategies, in order to man-
age their risks or to cope with shocks in order to avoid consumption shortfalls.139 In
section 3.2, criticism on the SRM framework and recent developments are discussed. In
section 3.3, the general adaptation of the SRM framework is developed and presented
with several extensions and improvements to the original concept; this adaptation will
then be used further in this study.
134 Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Management, p. 543.
135 Devereux et al. (2007): Editorial Introduction, p. 2.
136 Devereux et al. (2007): Editorial Introduction.
137 Ibid., p. 2.
138 De Neubourg et al. (2000): Social Policy as Social Risk Management, p. 412.
139 Dercon (2007): Risk, Insurance, and Poverty: A Review, p. 9f.
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3.2. Criticism and recent developments of the SRM framework
During the last decade, the SRM framework, driven mainly by the World Bank, has
made enormous inroads in social and development policies in low-income countries.
However,  several  points  of  criticism  were  raised  on  the  Social  Risk  Management
framework. 
The strength of the framework is its focus on income risks and on household strate-
gies for dealing with associated shocks. This focus is also its weakness, as it neither
puts chronic poverty at the core, nor does it fully capture the multidimensional nature
of  poverty.140 In the wider sense of  risk management,  enormous promotional  effort
needs to be invested in enabling the chronically poor to be able to manage their risks,
which includes improving education, their generally poor health status (e.g. due to un-
der-/malnutrition and living conditions) and political rights.141 Holzmann et al. (2007)
acknowledged that the SRM framework was less relevant in dealing with structural de-
terminants of poverty, so that several measures including traditional social protection
elements, economic growth and poverty reduction measures were needed.142 Further-
more, the explicit conceptual linking of chronic poverty and risk management capaci-
ties, as stated in the SRM concept, has been criticized by McKinnon (2004) who argued
that chronic poverty is not always linked to high risk exposure or the lack of SRM
strategies. He gave the example of the elderly poor, who lay beyond the SRM frame-
work and emphasized the need for state interventions for such groups.143
As pointed  out  above,  several  risk  constellations  pose  a  particular  challenge  to
households'  risk management capacities and might overwhelm them. While house-
holds can more easily deal with single smaller risks or small but frequent shocks, their
capacities reach limits when risks occur repeatedly or are bunched or when they are
large, infrequent shocks.144 In this regard, Holzmann et al. (2007) acknowledged that
the SRM framework needed to be extended to better capture the idea of "redundancy"
in SRM. Redundant SRM strategies mean that there are  "multiple layers of risk man-
140 The World Health Report 2000/2001, for example, mentioned multiple dimensions of poverty; be-
sides income poverty and vulnerability for example also forms of social exclusion, access to edu-
cation, civil and political liberties. The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development
Report 2000-2001, p. 15ff.
141 Guenther, Bruce; Huda, Karishma; Macauslan, Ian (2007): Broadening Social Risk Management.
Risks, Rights and the Chronic Poor. In: IDS Bulletin, vol. 38, nr. 3, p. 17f.
142 Holzmann, Robert; Kozel, Valerie (2007): The Role of Social Risk Management in Development. A
World Bank View. Reply to Comments. In: IDS Bulletin, p. 21.
143 McKinnon, Roddy (2004): Social Risk Management and the World Bank. Resetting the ‘Standards’
for Social Security? In: Journal of Risk Research, vol. 7, nr. 3, p. 310.
144 Dercon (2007): Risk, Insurance, and Poverty: A Review, p. 10f.
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agement instruments that can come into effect once a prior layer is exhausted" 145. Al-
though the idea of redundancy was not present in the original outline of the frame-
work, it already included SRM strategies on higher levels beyond the individual- or
household-level, such as governmental measures, e.g. public social safety nets, or pri -
vate and market-based instruments.146
McKinnon also criticized another main assumption in the SRM framework. He chal-
lenged the main assumption that access to proper SRM strategies resulted in higher
risk-taking, which again resulted in higher returns and, finally, in economic develop-
ment. He argued that asset ownership did not necessarily lead to increased income and
criticized the premise of the 'rational actor' in neo-liberal thinking, without acknowl-
edging the actors' embeddedness in moral and social value systems and the existence
of personal risk attitudes. Furthermore, he pointed out that higher risk-taking comes
with higher risk exposure that could make the poorest worse off.147
Furthermore, the reduced scope of the SRM concept to center merely around nega-
tive income effects of risks has been criticized, as it neglected the social and psycho-
logical effects of risks, as well as different perceptions of risk assessment.148 Generally,
how the poor evaluate risk, and how choices with regard to risk and risk management
are made, has not sufficiently been reflected in the SRM framework.149 The lack of dis-
cussion about the key risk management functions identification, monitoring and assess-
ment of risks, as well as the evaluation of the appropriateness of certain SRM strate-
gies, has been called a weakness of the SRM approach.150 In the adoption of the SRM
approach, few researchers included these key risk management features in their exten-
sions of the concept.151 Understanding the perceptions about risk, knowing the pro-
cesses of risk evaluation and clarifying the selection of appropriate SRM strategies by
individuals and households are crucial to understanding the real role of SRM strategies
and their actual contribution to social protection of low-income households.
Although the SRM approach sought to reposition "the traditional areas of Social
Protection (labor market intervention,  social  insurance and social  safety nets)  in a
framework that includes [...] strategies to deal with risk"152 and therefore claimed to be
145 Holzmann et al. (2007): The Role of Social Risk Management in Development, Reply to comments,
p. 21.
146 Ibid.
147 McKinnon (2004): Social risk management and the World Bank, p. 308.
148 Guenther et al. (2007): Broadening Social Risk Management, p. 17.
149 Haddad, Lawrence (2007): Comment on ‘The Role of Social Risk Management in Development. A
World Bank View’. In: IDS Bulletin, vol. 38, nr. 3, p. 15.
150 McKinnon (2004): Social risk management and the World Bank, p. 309.
151 see Rösner (2008): Risikomanagementstrategien für arme ländliche Bevölkerungsgruppen, p. 21.
152 Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Management, p. 1.
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an overarching concept, "it appears decidedly limited, arguably static, in its ambition
to pursue […] 'social justice'"153. Thus, the SRM concept, as laid out in its original publi-
cation, did not include acknowledgment of normative criteria such as the social 'Mini-
mum Standards' and "the belief that social protection is a fundamental right of all citi -
zens"154. On the other hand, social protection as a human right is the view taken by the
International Labour Organization (ILO), UNDP, and OECD.155 The ILO declared social
protection as a human right to be a priority objective. During the 1990s, the ILO recon-
sidered its approach on social security and broadened it from income security to a
more  general  basic  needs model  and  included  a  wider  range  of  contingencies  and
risks.156 The new understanding of social protection included all measures from indi-
vidual, household, private and public actors that provide social security elements. In
addition to the traditional social security measures, such as social assistance, social
(health) insurance and benefits for families with children, the new understanding at
the ILO included protection against "economic and social distress that would be caused
by the absence or a substantial reduction of income from work as a result of various
contingencies (sickness, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, invalidity, old
age, death of the breadwinner)".157 The ILO decent work concept was part of the same
broader understanding of social protection, but with a focus on "contingencies that
arise in work".158 
Looking closely at  both approaches, the SRM framework and the ILO rights-based
social protection approach are not contradictory, but rather complementary: A norma-
tive element, which is inherent in the ILO approach, is little discussed in the SRM
framework. In the SRM framework, the implicit normative goal is the reduction of vul-
nerability; the ILO approach sees social protection as a human right, which includes
the goal of reducing vulnerability. The ILO approach is much wider in scope than the
SRM framework, as it includes the traditional social security elements, aims to secure
basic  needs  and  also  protection  from  contingencies/risks,  while  the  latter  focuses
mostly on the management of risks. However, the SRM framework also acknowledged
153 McKinnon (2004): Social risk management and the World Bank, p. 304.
154 Ibid., p. 308f.
155 Yates, Jenny; Cooper, Ros; Holland, Jeremy (2006): Social Protection and Health. Experiences in
Uganda. In: Development Policy Review, vol. 24, nr. 3, p. 340.
156 van Ginneken, Wouter (1996): Social Security for the Informal Sector. Issues, Options and Tasks
Ahead. In: International Labour Office Geneva Working Paper, p. 2.
157 Waelkens et al. (2005): The Role of Social Health Protection in Reducing Poverty, p. 13f.
158 International Labour Office (2002): Decent Work and the Informal Economy, vol. 4. International
Labour  Office.  Geneva,  p.  57.  URL:  http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/
ilc/ilc90/pdf/rep-vi.pdf (accessed 2010/05/14).
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the need for provision by the government of social assistance programs for the poor. 159
Waelkens argued that both approaches "are gradually merging"160 and there is good in-
dication for this, although slight discrepancies remain. For example, the authors of the
SRM framework perceived publicly provided schemes as more critical than the advo-
cates of the ILO social protection approach and pointed to the risk that "poorly de-
signed and/or implemented systems, governance problems, or exaggerated generosity"
can cause significant negative  welfare effects.161 Similarly,  the SRM framework was
criticized as focusing too strongly on the productivity aspect of social protection and
not fully integrating the aspects of entitlement and basic needs of the chronic poor. 162
In a response to Guenther et al. (2007), Holzmann et al. (2007) expressed hesitation at
including the postulation for minimum provisions, following the right-based approach
in the SRM framework, and calling for more empirical research on whether this ap-
proach leads to long-term sustainability of social protection, but also acknowledging
that recent research points in this direction.163 
In  addition  to  the  previously  discussed  points,  the  SRM  framework  has  a  few
methodological shortcomings. Although the concept of social risk management has
been incorporated into many programs by development agencies and organizations, or
has influenced their policies, the requirements of an academic framework differ from
practical needs for development strategies. 
Critics have raised two points which require further improvements of the concept:
the lack of analytical structures to assess combinations of risks and their impact, and
risks that cause irreversible effects and, therefore, render risk management after occur-
rence of the risk more difficult.164 Generally, the transmission mechanism between risks
and shocks was also not discussed in the original SRM framework. In this regard, and
also with regard to the distinction between key terms of the framework, the frame-
work remains remarkably vague. 
There is a whole array of SRM strategies that do not reduce the probability of risk,
but do reduce the extent of the resulting shock.165 These are barely reflected in the SRM
framework. For example, a communal fire brigade usually does not aim to reduce the
159 see also van Ginneken (1996): Social Security for the Informal Sector. Issues, Options and Tasks
Ahead, p. 3f; Holzmann et al. (1999): Social protection as social risk management, p. 15; Holzmann
et al. (2007): The Role of Social Risk Management in Development, Reply to comments, p. 21.
160 Waelkens et al. (2005): The Role of Social Health Protection in Reducing Poverty, p. 14.
161 Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Management, p. 535.
162 Guenther et al. (2007): Broadening Social Risk Management, p. 18.
163 Holzmann et al. (2007): The Role of Social Risk Management in Development, Reply to comments,
p. 20f.
164 Haddad (2007): Comment on ’The Role of Social Risk Management in Development, p. 15f.
165 cp. Rösner (2008): Risikomanagementstrategien für arme ländliche Bevölkerungsgruppen, p. 22.
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probability of fire, but the extent of damage after a fire occurs. Similarly, the extent of
the negative consequences of an illness can be minimized by early diagnosis and treat-
ment.166 This lack of the second aspect of prevention is a major omission in the original
SRM framework.
The lacking selectivity of key terms and strategies is to be criticized: Between 1999
and 2007, at least six articles have been published on the concept of social risk man-
agement by Holzmann, with varying co-authors. Reviewing these publications gives
the impression that the definitions of key terms and the distinction of the terms risk,
shock, effects of a risk, impact of a risk, and impact of a shock have not been elaborated
on sufficiently. Also, the framework has been changed without further discussion; for
example, the strategy "Hedging", which was described in early publications of the con-
cept, was removed from later publications.167 In addition, the descriptions of the main
SRM strategies were not consistent between publications, for example the description
for the same strategy changed from "mollify the risks"168 to "decrease the potential of a
future down-side risk"169 and "reduce the impact of a future risk"170 to "mitigate the ef-
fects of the risk".171
In the original framework, the classification of risks, the classification of main SRM
strategies and the classification of actors did not sharply distinguish between the in-
cluded elements and did not capture the full range of options. Whereas a classification
system aims to group strategies into classes where they best fit and tries to make the
classes distinguishable or mutually exclusive, a typology system consists of logically
exclusive categories (=types) that aim to be complete without the possibility that there
is a type outside of the typology (if categorical) or outside the scale of the typology (if
metric). Although this is difficult to achieve, it is preferable from an analytical view-
point. Apart from the binary distinction between proactive and reactive strategies, the
original authors of the SRM framework followed the classification approach. An aca-
demic revision of the concept has been done by Rösner (2008) which approximates a
166 McKinnon,  Roddy (2010):  Promoting  the  Concept  of  Prevention in Social  Security.  Issues  and
Challenges for the International Social Security Association. In: International Journal of Social
Welfare, vol. 19, nr. 4, p. 456.
167 Holzmann et al. (1999): Social Protection as Social Risk Management. Conceptual Underpinnings
for the Social Protection Sector Strategy Paper, p. 1018; Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Man -
agement, p. 542.
168 Holzmann et al. (1999): Social protection as social risk management, p. 1014.
169 Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Management, p. 541.
170 Holzmann et al. (2003): Social Risk Management. The World Bank’s Approach to Social Protection
in a Globalizing World, p. 7.
171 Holzmann et al. (2007): The Role of Social Risk Management in Development, p. 11.
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typology of the original concept.172 Further steps toward a typology are carried out in
section 3.3.
The SRM framework, provided the criticized points are considered, can serve as an
analytical tool of risk exposure and social risk management,  but it  needs to be ac-
knowledged that SRM is one part of a variety of social, political and economic mea-
sures, providing social protection and is interdependent with other measures. For ex-
ample, the World Development Report 2000-2001 stated that, besides social risk man-
agement, "Economic growth is one way of reducing vulnerability of poor people. As
their incomes rise they are better able to manage risks"173. This shows that effective
SRM strategies are essential to reduce the vulnerability of poor households, but cannot
serve their ultimate purpose if other factors in a country do not improve.
In summary, the positioning of the SRM framework as an overarching concept is
overstating its scope. It needs to be seen rather as an integral part of social protection.
It is good at capturing mechanisms to counter contingencies and to reduce vulnerabil-
ity; therefore, it is located between policies to guarantee a social minimum (addressing
chronic poverty) and policies to achieve economic and social empowerment, political
rights and growth. These three areas of intervention are interdependent. With the idea
of redundancy in SRM strategies on multiple levels, the SRM framework can address
risk exposure and vulnerability of the chronic poor, and those risks resulting in irre-
versible effects. These two groups are likely to be overburdened in risk management
and may lack sufficient access to SRM strategies on individual and household level, and
therefore require support in risk management from higher levels. If limited to the pur-
pose of reducing vulnerability, the SRM framework can serve as a significant analytical
concept, provided methodological shortcomings are addressed to make the framework
useful in academic analyses.
3.3. Adaptation of the social risk management framework
The discussion in the previous section 3.2 revealed some conceptual deficiencies in the
original SRM framework. For example, critical points were raised on the incomplete
link  of  the  framework  to  'traditional  social  protection'  mechanisms  and  chronic
poverty, the lack of a human rights view on social protection, the exclusive focus on
income risks, the missing discussion on risk perception and risk assessment, as well as
the lack of discussion on irreversible and bunched shocks in the framework. Further-
172 Rösner (2008): Risikomanagementstrategien für arme ländliche Bevölkerungsgruppen, p. 21ff.
173 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 135.
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more, methodological issues were raised about the framework, particularly on the def-
inition of key terms and weaknesses in the classification of SRM strategies.
For this study, the framework was adapted to remedy the methodological shortcom-
ings (e.g. definitions and typology) and to integrate some points raised by critics and
newer developments in the SRM framework. By this, the study follows the embedded
design of social risk management. In this sense, SRM is seen as an integral part of so-
cial protection in general and with regard to health risks. In line with some critics of
the SRM framework, it needs to be acknowledged that not all social protection mea-
sures have the primary goal of risk management, but might have positive side effects
on risk management capacities. Such is the case with improvements to an equitable ed-
ucational system, economic growth, civil rights and opportunity enhancing measures
or  empowerment  strategies.174 Additionally,  the  adapted framework is  not  only  re-
stricted to "public measures"  assisting households to manage risks,  but includes all
SRM strategies protecting households or individuals from risk exposure or the impact
of risks, independently from the type of actor, whether they are initiated or carried out
by individuals, households, NGOs, cooperatives, private and public actors, and inde-
pendently from the level where risk management is applied.175
Following this wider approach of the framework, Social Risk Management refers to
how societies cope with risks and "encompasses a broad range of informal and formal
proactive and reactive strategies used by individuals, families, communities and na-
tions,  including private  and public  interventions to assist  vulnerable  individuals  or
groups in the assessment of risks and to provide support against impacts of exposure
to risk".176
As noted above and as shown in figure 1, the SRM framework cannot be seen as a
separate framework or as an overarching concept for social protection, but has to be
embedded in the institutional framework and the wider environment where individu-
als and households live. The need and application of SRM strategies are particularly de-
pendent on two factors: 
First, they are dependent on the economic capabilities of the actors that can carry
out social risk management. The rationale of highlighting the economic capabilities is
that the access or feasibility of many SRM strategies is dependent on the economic sta-
tus of the potential actors in social risk management. For example, if a household is
174 cp. Yates et al. (2006): Social Protection and Health, p. 341.
175 Rösner, Hans Jürgen (2012): Micro Health Insurance in Different Institutional Settings. In: Rösner,
Hans-Jürgen; Leppert, Gerald; Degens, Philipp; et al. (eds.): Handbook of Micro Health Insurance
in Africa. LIT Verlag. Berlin, p. 23.
176 Ibid.; Cp. Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Management, p. 1.
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economically able to reach a certain asset threshold, the vulnerability to certain shocks
is reduced, because the asset base is sufficient to mitigate the shock. Similarly, if the
economic capabilities of a country are sufficient for disaster prevention through the
construction of dams or irrigation systems, the risk for individuals and households to
experience severe droughts or flooding is reduced. Hence, economic capabilities and
the access to social risk management strategies is interdependent, so that there is a
trade-off in governmental programs: Either, the political actors in the first place enact
policies  for  economic  development  and  reduction  of  chronic  poverty  that  enables
households with better access to SRM strategies in the second place, or they enact poli -
cies for the improvement of SRM strategies in the first place which protect the eco-
nomic capabilities of individuals and households and allow economic development in
the second place. Figure  1 displays only those policies from which a direct effect on
SRM can be expected, policies to improve education or civil liberties and good gover-
nance are likely to have positive side effects on social risk management, but rather in-
directly. 
Second, the need and application of SRM strategies depend on the extent of per-
ceived risk exposure. This is crucial, because first, a comprehensive and objective scale
of risk exposure cannot exist. Second, the entire process of risk identification and risk
assessment needed to be taken into consideration, because the perceived need for risk
management grows with increased understanding of the causes of risk and its impact
(see figure 1). Either if a risk is unknown or the linkages between risk and shock are
unknown, those SRM strategies which are objectively appropriate may subjectively be
perceived as not required. On the other hand, if the individual or household is aware of
the risk, a risk assessment was successful in linking cause and effect, and a possible re-
sponse is identified, this significantly influences the awareness of the need for applica-
tion of the appropriate SRM strategies for this particular risk.
On the relationship between risk exposure, risk identification and risk assessment,
the SRM framework remains rather weak, although the original SRM framework was
operationalized by The World Bank in so-called "Risk and Vulnerability Assessments"
for the implementation of SRM programs and the setting of priorities and sequences of
action. These assessments are based on macroeconomic risk data, data from house-
holds surveys or qualitative methods to elicit the risk perception of the target group.177
Vulnerability analyses are an essential part of these assessments.178 The assessments are
based on the assumption that risks can be objectively assessed and then suitable re-
177 Holzmann et al. (2001): Risk and vulnerability, p. 17f.
178 Holzmann et al. (2003): Social Risk Management. The World Bank’s Approach to Social Protection
in a Globalizing World, p. 10.
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sponse mechanisms need to be found to combat these risks. Nevertheless, the original
SRM framework contains little information on the actual mental and cognitive pro-
cesses of risk management among the target population itself.
As indicated above, the process of risk management is complex and comprises sev-
eral stages in order to make informed and strategic decisions regarding the manage-
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Source: author, based on Rösner 2008; Holzmann et al. 1999, 2001, 2003, 2007, The World Bank 2001.
Fig. 1: Typology of social risk management strategies
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ment of unsure events.179 In a first step, the risk or threat needs to be perceived and
identified, in order to be able to deal with it. An important part of risk identification is
the causal analysis or in other words the answer to the question: what is needed for
the risk to occur.180 In many cases, the causal analysis is particularly difficult, as it re-
quires some understanding of the underlying system. The result of the causal analysis
implies possible response strategies. For example, if the cause for a bad health situation
is perceived by the individual not to be caused by viruses or bacteria, but rather by
witchcraft or other supernatural forces, the identified risk and the possible response
strategies are completely different.181 In such a case, it would not be perceived as a risk
with a certain probability (because it is directly caused by another human being or by
their own bad behavior and it is not based on randomness) and the resulting response
strategies would be the consultation of a traditional healer, instead of preventive health
measures or a medical treatment. Another important step in the process of risk man-
agement is the estimation of the probability of occurrence and the extent of the shock
(=severity) and its potential impact on the individual or household. Based on this risk
assessment, the household can develop an appropriate and feasible response strategy,
which includes the evaluation, selection and implementation of preventive actions to re-
duce or eliminate the risk or other proactive strategies to limit the extent of the shock or
its impact or to mitigate the impact of the shock.182 It is necessary to keep in mind that
the residual option for the individual or household is always the conscious or uncon-
scious decision not to act in any way before the risk occurs (which implies the use of
reactive risk management strategies in the case that the risk occurs). The entire process
of  risk management requires  considerable knowledge and education as well  as the
means to react to a risk. 
In section 3.2 it was noted that the lack of a clear distinction between key terms is a
main weakness of the SRM framework. Hence, this study aims for clarity of the terms
and definitions used. In the context of this study, a risk refers to a future uncertain neg-
ative variation that can be assigned to a certain probability of occurrence (see section
2). As discussed in section 2.2, a shock is defined as a major peak of pressure on the in-
dividual or household beyond the normal range of variability and is the realization of a
risk. Furthermore, the impact of a shock refers to the extent to which a shock reduces
179 Educating target groups about risk management is part of holistic financial education programs,
see:  Nelson,  Candace  (2008):  Risk  Management  and  Insurance  -  Protect  your  family’s  future,
Trainer’s Guide, edited by Global Financial Education Team. Washington, D.C., p. ii.
180 Aven (2008): Risk analysis, p. 39f.
181 Witchcraft, black magic or the ‘evil eye’ is still a common belief in Malawian or Ghanaian soci -
eties. Breslow (2002): Encyclopedia of Public Health, p. 123 ‘Black magic and evil eye’.
182 Rösner (2008): Risikomanagementstrategien für arme ländliche Bevölkerungsgruppen, p. 21.
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the well-being of an individual or household. Consequentially, it is important to note
that the shock does not equate with the actual reduction of well-being which the indi -
vidual or household experiences. For example, if a tsunami occurs (the risk), usually a
large wave (the shock) hits the shore of a country with a certain intensity. If the coun-
try has not prepared for a potential tsunami wave, such a shock likely has a severe
negative impact on households. However, if a country installed an early warning sys-
tem, built dams and built houses with an elevated first floor (e.g. built on top of poles),
the impact on individuals and households will be rather minor. Still, neither the risk of
a tsunami was reduced, nor the extent of the shock. This example illustrates that vul-
nerability to a risk depends on risk exposure, the extent of the shock and the applica-
tion of SRM strategies. Thus, for a thorough analysis of SRM strategies, a strict concep-
tual distinction of risk, shock, and impact of a shock is required.183
Figure  1 presents a typology of  the main four types of  social  risk management
strategies, with seven classes of strategies. As in the original SRM framework, the main
distinction between the SRM strategies is drawn between proactive strategies meaning
'actions put in place in anticipation of a shock' before the risk event occurs and reac-
tive strategies, meaning 'actions in response to a shock' once the risk has occurred.184 In
a second level, the proactive strategies are distinguished using three main sub-types: 
(1) whether the strategy aims to reduce the probability of the risk,
(2) whether it aims to limit the extent of the shock or its impact or
(3) whether the strategy aims to mitigate the impact of the shock.
Since reactive strategies are used after the shock occurred, they have the major aim to
relieve the impact of the shock. Both, sub-type 3 of proactive strategies and the reactive
strategies, do not have any influence on the extent of the shock, but rather proactively
mitigate or reactively relieve the impact of the shock, while mitigation is seen as a
more active process than the one to relieve the impact.185
All strategies can be initiated and carried out by actors on different levels. Figure 1
shows four different groups of actors: (1) Individual or household, (2) group- or com-
munity-based, (3) market-based or non-profit sector and (4) publicly provided, while
publicly provided includes several layers of government (regional, national) as well as
183 An even finer distinction between primary and secondary shocks as well  as primary and sec -
ondary impacts will be discussed in this section on the topic of reactive strategies. 
184 Siegel et al. (1999): An Asset-Based Approach to Social Risk Management. A Conceptual Frame-
work; Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Management; Alwang et al. (2005): Viewing Microinsur-
ance As A Social Risk Management Instrument: Potential and Limitations; Rösner (2008): Risiko -
managementstrategien für arme ländliche Bevölkerungsgruppen.
185 In the terminology used, mitigating is perceived to be pursued in a more actively and forward
looking manner while relieving is perceived to be more passive or with the only aim only to reac -
tively reduce the burden from the individual or household.
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international agreements and actions. As previously discussed, it is difficult to deter-
mine the adequate level for the management of certain risks. As Holzmann et al. ini-
tially suggested, most risk management strategies can take place at the lowest, individ-
ual/household level, as they have "all the private information" and therefore the issue
of asymmetrical information can be avoided, which is a problem for higher risk man-
agement levels.186 At the same time, it is obvious that certain risks are likely to over-
burden the individual/household level, such as the cost of hospitalization. Considering
these points and the criticism on the original SRM framework, it seems that two prin-
ciples are most appropriate for efficient and effective social risk management: redun-
dancy and subsidiarity. The first principle, redundancy, has been discussed in section
3.2, stating that it is favorable to provide strategies for the same type of risk on multi -
ple levels in order to prevent failures of SRM strategies on other (lower) levels. On the
other hand, the principle of subsidiarity takes up the idea by Holzmann et al. of pursu-
ing the lowest possible level of risk management: The principle of subsidiarity is an es-
sential element of social policy in welfare states; it postulates that the lowest organiza -
tional level shall be preferred where certain actions in social policy can be performed.
Since some required information is only available on this level, it might be the most
efficient level. In case where the actors on that level are unable to perform the action,
support of self-help capacities is often the appropriate response, in contrast to shifting
the responsibility of the action to a higher level.187 The incapacity to self-help might be
a particular problem in a low-income setting, where an insufficient economic situation
of households and the local level often results in lacking self-help capacities. Hence,
the aforementioned multiple layers of SRM strategies represents two different aspects
when a higher level comes into effect: the action at the higher level can either aim to
support self-help capacities or take over responsibilities for risk management.
3.4. Social risk management strategies in the adaptation of the
SRM framework
The previous section laid out the two main types of social risk management: proactive
and reactive strategies. Furthermore, for the proactive type, three more sub-types were
presented ranging from the reduction of the probability of an adverse risk, and the limi-
tation of the extent of the shock or its impact to the mitigation of the impact of the shock.
The resulting seven main strategy classes are at the third level, below the sub-types.
186 Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Management, p. 1009 and 1019.
187 cp.  Frerich,  Johannes  (1996):  Sozialpolitik,  3 edition.  Oldenbourg  Verlag.  München,  p.  31;  Rib -
hegge, Hermann (2004): Sozialpolitik. Verlag Franz Vahlen. München, p. 43ff.
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The strategy classes are presented in the following, starting from the left side in figure
1 to the right. 
Prevention of risks is certainly the most elegant SRM strategy, as it aims to reduce
the probability of the risk, which reduces the occurrence and, therefore, does not result
in a shock.  Risk reduction and risk elimination (or avoidance) strategies aim to reduce
the probability of occurrence of an adverse risk. In cases where the probability can be
reduced to zero, it is called risk elimination. It is obvious that the majority of risks can-
not be fully eliminated, for example, the risk of an accident in traffic can never be re-
duced to zero. However, for example, the risk of low agricultural yield can be elimi-
nated by moving to a non-agricultural profession. Another example for risk elimina-
tion is the risk of drought due to lack of rainfall removed by using complex irrigation
systems, e.g.  through the use of permanent groundwater.  In case of landslides and
flooding, disaster risk can be eliminated by community risk assessments and targeted
resettlements of households to unaffected areas.188 Other risks can be successfully re-
duced, but not eliminated, such as the construction of dikes can reduce the risk of
flooding. With regard to health risks, several prevention strategies exist. Some health
risks can be successfully reduced by specific actions like hygiene measures, sanitation
or healthy nutrition. The risk of certain illnesses can even be nearly eliminated through
vaccinations. However, these illnesses, such as Meningitis and Hepatitis B, but also
Pertussis and Tetanus, are still prevalent and frequent causes of death in Malawi and
Ghana.189 These actions can reduce or eliminate the probability of occurrence of the ill-
ness event.
Even if the probability of the risk itself cannot be reduced, a significant proactive
strategy can be to try to limit the extent of the shock or the extent of the impact. This in-
cludes all strategies that are proactively put in place to properly (or quickly) react, in
the case the risk occurs, so that the extent of the shock or damage can still be reduced.
For many types of risk, this is a relevant SRM strategy class which has received too
little attention. This type of proactive strategy is missing from the original SRM frame-
work, which is a significant omission. In his work on the concept of prevention in so-
cial security,  McKinnon elaborated different types of  prevention in detail.190 He ex-
188 for  cooperative  risk  assessments  and  pro-active  risk  elimination  see:  Seiler,  Eberhard  (2008):
Beiträge von kooperativer  Selbsthilfe zum Risikomanagement von Naturkatastrophen.  In:  Zeit-
schrift für das gesamte Genossenschaftswesen, vol. Sonderheft 2008, p. 77ff.
189 World Health Organization (WHO) (2011): WHO Disease and injury country estimates: Death and
DALY estimates  for  2009  by  cause  for  WHO Member  States,  Persons,  all  ages,  WHO.  URL:
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/estimates_country/en/index.html (accessed
2012/10/03).
190 McKinnon (2010): Promoting the concept of prevention in social security, p. 456f.
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tracted three different levels of prevention. The first type of prevention perfectly corre-
sponds to the aforementioned SRM strategy risk reduction or elimination or using Holz-
mann's words to "prevent the risk from occurring"191. The second type of prevention is
missing from the original SRM framework, as it aims to limit the extent of the shock or
the extent of the impact, including measures such as early diagnosis and treatment to
reduce the total extent, such as serious consequences of an illness. Storing basic drugs
and dressing materials at home, the establishment of an emergency ambulance, a fire
brigade or a responsive health care system are practical examples. They do not reduce
the probability of the risk, but are pro-actively put in place to reduce the extent of
damage from the risk occurrence.
The third sub-type of SRM strategies aims to mitigate the impact of a shock and com-
prises  complex  groups  of  proactive  risk  management  strategies. It  partially  corre-
sponds to the third type of prevention in McKinnon's typology and the SRM strategy
termed  risk  mitigation in  the original  SRM framework.192 Like  the above described
proactive strategies, mitigation strategies are set in place before the risk occurs, but
they neither reduce the probability of the risk, nor the overall extent of the damage.
They rather aim to mitigate the impact of the shock on the individual or household
(and ultimately may be able to reduce secondary risks). This is done by either pooling
over time (self-insurance), over assets affected by different risk types (portfolio diversi-
fication) or between individuals (risk sharing or risk pooling).193
Probably the most common SRM strategy is self-insurance, which means that the in-
dividuals or the household pool its resources over time. It follows the simple logic of
"accumulating assets in good times and drawing on them in bad".194 Building up an as-
set base for future events or shocks is an essential tool for poor households to secure
and develop their livelihoods. Individual and household assets can take various differ-
ent forms: Generally, assets can be defined as a "stock of wealth used to generate well-
being"195. This wide definition comprises a complex portfolio of assets in its multiple
types including stores,  investments and claims.196 With regard to assets, there needs to
be a distinction between tangible and intangible assets, occurring on a continuum,
from readily available assets (e.g. for risk management purposes of the household) and
191 Holzmann et al. (2007): The Role of Social Risk Management in Development, p. 11.
192 Ibid.; McKinnon (2010): Promoting the concept of prevention in social security, p. 456.
193 cp. Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Management, p. 8.
194 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 143.
195 Siegel et al. (1999): An Asset-Based Approach to Social Risk Management. A Conceptual Frame-
work, p. 10.
196 Chambers (2006):  Vulnerability,  Coping and Policy (Editorial  Introduction),  p.  36;  Swift (1989):
Why Are Rural People Vulnerable to Famine?, p. 44.
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assets that are only available after a longer duration, to intangible but potentially exis-
tent assets. Some assets can also have different forms of return, thus matching more
than one point on the continuum.197 Stores are tangible assets and include goods such
as precious metals, jewels or other objects of value including live-stock, crop reserves
or food stores, including cash savings or bank accounts.198 With regard to availability,
stores range from quickly to relatively quickly available,  heavily depending on the
functioning of (local) asset markets.
Access to financial assets, which fall into the group of asset stores, can be facilitated
by microfinance institutions that can provide access to financial products, such as de-
posits or savings products, to people with low-income. Informal or semi-formal rotat-
ing savings and credit associations (RoSCA) play an enormous role as flexible savings
schemes, in order to pay for unpredictable costs, "as they often extend loans, which
may be used for consumption".199,200
Building up savings and assets for future shocks is a commonly used proactive SRM
strategy in developing countries. However, this type of strategy has some implicit im-
perfections.  First,  access  to  secure  savings  and  asset-holding,  as  well  as  access  to
durable assets of stable value, is often restricted. Second, many physical assets are indi-
visible, e.g. cattle, so that return and actual need might be mismatched. Third, sale of
physical assets depends on functioning asset markets, which can be a problem in rural
areas, particularly in times of need. Fourth, assets in livestock and crop reserves have
the implicit problem that the prices vary and, in times of a shock, the return might
even be negative. This is particularly the case if the shock hits the entire community. 201
Particularly after a macro shock, the value of assets and income are often covariant, so
that it is difficult to mitigate an income shock through the sale of assets.202
Formal financial products, such as savings at banks, are often not accessible to poor
and rural households. In most developing countries, there are gaps in the formal finan-
cial sector, since formal banks often do not target rural areas and the low-income sec -
tor, due to low profit margins and high transaction costs. These financing gaps are of-
197 Drought animals or milk cows can either be used for production and income generation or they
can be sold (for quicker returns, but might result in less efficient future production).
198 Swift (1989): Why Are Rural People Vulnerable to Famine?, p. 44.
199 Dercon (2007): Risk, Insurance, and Poverty: A Review, p. 13.
200 Seibel, Hans D. (2008): Changing Patterns of Risk Management by Self-Help Organizations of Sav-
ings and Credit. The Nigerian Experience. In: Zeitschrift für das gesamte Genossenschaftswesen,
vol. Sonderheft 2008.
201 Dercon (2007): Risk, Insurance, and Poverty: A Review, p. 14f.
202 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 143.
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ten  closed  by  semi-formal  or  informal  micro-financial  institutions  providing  small
loans and savings accounts to the target group.203
Investments comprise tangible and intangible assets. Individual productive assets
are,  for  example,  farming  or  business  equipment  (e.g.  animals,  plants,  inputs,  ma-
chines), buildings and household equipment, as well as infrastructure (e.g. land, wells,
transport means). Collective assets include shared production facilities (e.g. mills, irri-
gation), infrastructure (e.g. water supply and sanitation systems) and rules (e.g. access
to common property resources, land rotation). Such collective assets are often less tan-
gible and a household has less control over the use and development of collective as-
sets.204 With regard to risk management, collective assets often fall in the category of
pro-active SRM strategies, as they frequently include agreements on contingencies. In-
vestment in human capital,  including education and health,  reduce vulnerability of
households in the long run and, therefore, need to be categorized as intangible assets
that are available after a longer duration.
Following Swift's classification of  assets,  the third group after stores and invest-
ments would be 'claims'. What Swift called 'claims' is close to the concept which other
authors would call 'building social capital' (on micro, meso and macro level), 'risk shar-
ing'  or 'informal insurance mechanisms'  in the SRM terminology. Therefore, Swift's
ideas were integrated into the SRM terminology and discussed in the section on risk
diversification.205
According to Swift, the sequence in which the household's assets, stores and invest-
ments, including claims, are used by the household is essential to understanding their
use as an SRM strategy.206 When households face severe shocks, such as famines, there
is evidence that the households are not willing to deplete some of their (productive) as-
sets.207 On the other hand, in order to pay for health care, physical capital, in the form
of savings, credit or assets, is an important source, particularly if out-of-pocket pay-
ments at point of service are required.
Risk diversification is a sub-type of mitigation strategies, which aim to either diver-
sify the type of risks a household is exposed to or to inter-personally diversify the risk,
between a group of individuals.
Through portfolio diversification, the first strategy class applying risk diversification,
a household aims to reduce the vulnerability to certain risks and aims to diversify the
203 cp. Rösner (2013): Mikrofinanzsystementwicklung und produktive Selbsthilfe, p. 311f.
204 Swift (1989): Why Are Rural People Vulnerable to Famine?, p. 44f.
205 cp. Ibid.; Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Management, p. 541.
206 Swift (1989): Why Are Rural People Vulnerable to Famine?, p. 45.
207 Ibid., p. 43.
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risks the to which household is exposed, thereby reducing the absolute negative im-
pact on the household in the case a risk occurs. Technically speaking, it "reduces the
variability of income by relying on a variety of assets from which returns are not per-
fectly correlated".208 Hence, it reduces household's vulnerability to a particular shock. A
typical example for this is income diversification, which aims at the reduction of in-
come  fluctuations  through  multiple,  different,  and  not  entirely  correlated,  income
sources.209 In developing countries, this often means extending non-farm activities and
paid farm activities, besides their own farming activities. Due to market entry con-
straints,  for  example  due  to  the  lack  of  skills,  formal  education  or  capital,  poorer
households tend to diversify their income sources less than wealthier households. In-
come diversification for poorer households is often restricted to activities with low en-
try costs, such as paid agricultural labor, handcraft production, weaving, food process-
ing, dung-cake collection, and charcoal or firewood production. These activities often
imply low-returns.210 Rural areas pose a particular challenge to income diversification,
as  different  agricultural  income  sources  are  heavily  correlated.  Thus,  the  income-
smoothing effect of diversification in crops, plots and live-stock income is limited due
to overall dependency on climate and rain patterns. Also, the entire agricultural labor
market is influenced by these factors. Diversification with non-farm activities could
partially solve these issues, but positive effects depend on job or market entry barri-
ers.211
An alternative strategy to income diversification is  income skewing. Applying this
strategy, the household reduces its income risk by focusing on low-risk activities as
main income sources. An example for income skewing is the focus of poor farmers on
low-risk crops, for example the very common growing of maize in Malawi. The focus
on low-risk activities smooths income, but these activities usually result in low re-
turns.212 Technologies that reduce fluctuations in income or harvest yields, such as irri -
gation systems,  pesticides,  disease-resistant  plants  as  well  as  advanced  agricultural
equipment, are often not accessible for low-income households.213
Risk diversification within a group of individuals, which also belongs to the sub-type
risk mitigation, comprises the strategy classes risk sharing and risk pooling. Like other
strategies that belong to the sub-type risk mitigation, these strategies do not reduce the
total extent of the shock. However, risk diversification with other individuals outside
208 Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Management, p. 541.
209 Dercon (2007): Risk, Insurance, and Poverty: A Review, p. 16f.
210 Ibid., p. 17f.
211 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 142.
212 Dercon (2007): Risk, Insurance, and Poverty: A Review, p. 12.
213 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 137f.
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the household reduces both the extent of the shock and the impact of the shock for the
affected household itself, since other (unaffected) individuals take over some burden of
the shock. This mechanism is referred to by the terms risk pooling or risk sharing.
Both mean that losses or costs associated with the negative event are transferred to a
group/pool. While risk sharing refers to an accumulation of social capital that provides
confidence in mutual help, if it is required,  risk pooling relies on pre-financing (=pre-
mium) and a predefined benefit package (=coverage) that are both defined ex-ante. The
principle of risk pooling is the core element of insurance schemes. Several strategies of
inter-personal risk diversification play a large role in SRM. 
Informal risk-sharing arrangements are very common in developing countries. Based
on relationships, friendships or social networks, with values of solidarity, community
cohesion or reciprocal bonds, the individual or household who experiences a shock can
have the expectation of reciprocity. Hence, risk-sharing is based on expected, but still
voluntary, transfers, gifts or loans to the member of a network facing an emergency. In
case of a shock, individuals or households can make claims for resources or help from
these networks, such as production or consumption resources, labor or animals from
other households in the community. These claims are accumulated based on a wide
range of activities; such as borrowing, gifts, support to community funds and activities
and from cooperative production and work exchange between kin, friends and neigh-
bors.214 Generally, in the context of developing countries, it is difficult to differentiate
risk-sharing groups from other social interactions. Establishing close links with neigh-
bors, extended family and relatives, and engaging in professional networks or partici -
pating in community organizations are typical activities also relevant for SRM, as they
build mutual obligations. Although social networks can generally span and link several
levels,  from micro  level  (households,  community,  local  authorities)  and  meso level
(clan, kin, business relations and local/district authorities) to the macro level (regional
or national authorities and organizations and the international community), the social
networks of rural populations are often limited to the micro and meso level.215 
Although some risk-sharing arrangements explicitly serve risk management pur-
poses, most informal risk-sharing arrangements serve multiple purposes, with SRM be-
ing only one of them. Due to the versatile nature of risk-sharing arrangements, it is
difficult to analytically capture their capacities for social risk management. Still, evi-
dence showed that informal risk-sharing networks can be a highly relevant SRM strat -
egy, particularly in coping with idiosyncratic risks.216 Such risks can be more easily
214 cp. Swift (1989): Why Are Rural People Vulnerable to Famine?, p. 44f.
215 Ibid., p. 44f.
216 Dercon (2007): Risk, Insurance, and Poverty: A Review, p. 12 and 21.
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borne at the community-level, but common shocks which affect many or all house-
holds in a community exceed the capacities of communities, so that higher level SRM
strategies are required.217 Also, for the success of risk-sharing arrangements, it is im-
portant that the risks of participants are not highly correlated. Furthermore, according
to a study by the World Bank, another limitation of risk-sharing arrangements is that
informal risk-sharing arrangements are more likely to be horizontal than vertical, so
that risk-sharing partners have a similar economic status (i.e. risk-sharing between
poor households) and are more likely to be exposed to the same risks. On the other
hand, in vertical risk-sharing arrangements, patron-client relationships can frequently
be observed, which may be disadvantageous for poor households.218 
Besides informal risk-sharing arrangements, there are more formal risk-pooling ar-
rangements that are based less on personal interaction and have more clearly formu-
lated contribution schemes. These more formal arrangements are based on regular pay-
ments and have defined rules for loss compensation. Contrary to risk sharing arrange-
ments, insurance schemes are typically based on larger risk pools. Due to the random-
ness of risks and due to substantial fluctuations in the extent of losses, the size of the
risk pool is a critically important factor. With an increasing risk pool size, the fluctua-
tions of loss, in relation to the total loss, decrease. This statistical phenomenon is called
law of large numbers and allows insurance schemes with a sufficiently large risk pool
size to bear the impact of rare, but costly, events (e.g. hospitalizations or surgeries)
more efficiently than the individual or small group (e.g. protection from catastrophic
health care expenditures).219
Reactive strategies refer to all ad-hoc actions that are taken by a household to cope
with a loss occurrence. Contrary to proactive strategies, they address the risk only af-
ter it occurs.  Coping strategies, which is the only strategy class in reactive strategies,
aim to relieve the impact of the shock.220 
Reactive strategies are usually used when accessible pro-active strategies are ex-
hausted. For smaller shocks, the household might be able to take the money required
for risk-coping directly from running income or from cash savings. For larger shocks,
borrowing, loans or emergency loans play an important role in risk coping, taken ei-
ther from moneylenders, banks, microfinance institutions, or RoSCAs.221 Another reac-
217 Ibid., p. 12.
218 The World Bank (2001): Dynamic Risk Management and the Poor. Developing a Social Protection
Strategy for Africa I, p. 18.
219 Berliner, Baruch (1982): Die Grenzen der Versicherbarkeit von Risiken. Zürich, p. 47f.
220 cp. Holzmann et al. (2001): Social Risk Management, p. 8.
221 Seibel (2008): Changing Patterns of Risk Management by Self-Help Organizations of Savings and
Credit. The Nigerian Experience.
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tive strategy is selling assets. These risk-coping strategies often come with a high fu-
ture debt and interest burden for the household. Many of the shock coping strategies
are unproductive and reduce future opportunities, for example if the household has to
sell productive assets or livestock. Unproductive SRM strategies include removing chil-
dren from school (e.g. to save tuition fees and school-related costs) and delaying health
care. Reactive strategies also include the increase and reallocation of labor, including
temporary  migration,  and  child  work,  as  well  as  exhausting  all  potential  income
sources.222 
Dercon (2007) reported that risk-coping strategies were easily exhausted and typi-
cally insufficient, and therefore, he demanded a stronger focus on better safety nets at
higher levels and proactive strategies.223 An often highlighted example in public health
research is the need of households to compensate high health care costs with the sale
of productive assets. The application of this strategy can be seen as a last resort: Selling
productive assets reduces the future ability of the household to earn income and it in-
creases long-term vulnerability, particularly in the case of repeated or bunched shocks,
exhausting the household's asset base.224
Cohen et al. (2005) analyzed coping strategies in more detail and concluded that the
impact of risks typically follows a two-stage process with immediate and secondary
impacts. Immediate impacts refer to the immediate or short-term loss that occurs after
the shock hits, such as treatment costs or funeral expenses. The secondary impact of
shocks refers to further down-turns due to either the extent of the original shock (and
failing, ineffective pro-active SRM strategies), follow-up risks, if the shock could not be
successfully mitigated, or as negative side-effects of coping strategies, aimed at reliev-
ing the impact of the shock. In their analysis of negative effects of coping strategies,
the authors built upon the categorization proposed by Montgomery (1996), who distin-
guished between low-stress, medium-stress and high-stress coping strategies.225 Cohen
et al.  (2005)  showed that risks that were expected to be "followed by medium and
longer-term repercussions [...] call for other strategic choices by households".226 While
the application of low stress coping strategies themselves entailed mild secondary im-
pacts of shocks, medium stress, and ultimately high stress coping strategies, entailed
future severe negative impacts on the household's well-being. For example, using run-
222 Dercon (2007): Risk, Insurance, and Poverty: A Review, p. 12; Holzmann et al. (2003): Social Risk
Management. The World Bank’s Approach to Social Protection in a Globalizing World, p. i.
223 Dercon (2007): Risk, Insurance, and Poverty: A Review, p. 13.
224 Meessen et al. (2003): Iatrogenic Poverty, p. 581.
225 Montgomery (1996): Disciplining or protecting the poor?, p. 292f.
226 Cohen, Monique; Sebstad, Jennefer (2005): Reducing Vulnerability. The Demand for Microinsur-
ance. In: Journal of International Development, vol. 17, nr. 3, p. 407.
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ning income, improving family budgeting and modifications to consumption were cat-
egorized as low stress coping strategies in response to shocks, because they lead to
only minor secondary shocks, such as a temporary change in lifestyle or reallocation
of household resources. The use of savings and borrowing from informal or formal
sources were categorized as medium stress strategies, because they deplete financial
resources and cause indebtedness. In addition, high stress coping strategies caused se-
vere secondary shocks such as reduced long-term productive capacity, reduced future
chances of children and increased vulnerability due to depleted assets. Examples of
high stress  coping strategies  were selling productive  assets,  taking children out  of
school, reducing food consumption, defaulting on loans or diverting to illegal income
earning activities.227 An example of a severely high-stress coping strategy is depleting
human capital by reducing food consumption and cutting the number or size of meals,
which may cause long-term detrimental impacts on children's physical and cognitive
development.228 This last example corresponds to a category introduced by Devereux
(1999). Devereux used a different terminology for coping strategies and described an
additional  form of  reactive  behavior  in  response  to  shocks  that  he  called  survival
strategies, which "reflect economic destitution and a failure to cope".229 In his opinion,
the sequence of coping strategies reflects a pattern of discrete stages, which reflect an
"increasing  desperation".  First,  strategies  with  little  long-run  costs,  which  are  re-
versible in their consequences (i.e. low-stress or medium-stress strategies), are adopted,
followed by strategies that cause higher long-run costs and that are more difficult to
reverse (i.e. high-stress strategies) and finally, survival strategies which are high-risk,
erosive and generally irreversible, that aim to "prevent destitution and death" 230. As an
example,  Devereux mentioned permanent migration out of the village,  with an un-
known future,  or  the  sale  of  the  last  (breeding)  livestock.231 In  conclusion,  coping
strategies  describe  a  whole  array of  different  strategies.  While  most  of  these  SRM
strategies can take different forms on the continuum between low-stress strategies and
survival strategies, proactive strategies being generally preferable, there is also a sig-
227 Ibid., pp. 407–411.
228 Holzmann et al. (1999): Social protection as social risk management, p. 13.
229 The terminology used by Devereux differed from the SRM framework and the stress-levels intro-
duced by Montgomery. Devereux described a continuum of increasingly erosive strategies, from
proactive,  positive ‘accumulation strategies’  and ‘adaptive strategies’  to reactive and defensive
‘coping strategies’ and ‘survival strategies’. Devereux (1999): Making less last longer, p. 11.
230 Ibid., p. 8.
231 Ibid., p. 12.
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nificant qualitative difference in the efficiency of reactive coping strategies, as some
may cause severe long-term negative impacts on households and individuals.232
In the context of reactive SRM strategies, it is important to note that the residual
type of reactive risk management is the strategy of not reacting to the shock and re-
maining passive. This includes the reduction of consumption and future investments in
production and education. This passive form of risk management is often used if other
SRM strategies are exhausted, or if the household is incapable of actively responding to
the shock.
For many households,  access to proper SRM strategies and diversification of SRM
strategies is a major problem. Public social protection schemes might be non-existent
or access is restricted to formal sector employees. Also, formal arrangements are often
inaccessible for households in rural areas or in the informal sector, which is the case
for formal financial products (e.g. savings, credit and insurance). However, access to
other informal SRM strategies is also limited. Income-based strategies (including plant-
ing high-yield crops, diversification and migration) might be limited due to constraints
on entering these profitable activities, with the result that poor households engage in
low-return but low-risk activities.233 Strategies that fall in the category of self-insur-
ance, such as asset building, might also be "limited by access to assets and poor func-
tioning of assets markets when a crisis hits the household".234 Risk pooling has other
limitations, like the local availability of suitable (micro)insurance products, their af-
fordability and the long-term sustainability of microinsurance schemes. Therefore, the
set of SRM strategies of many households in developing countries relies on building an
asset stock of locally available goods and informal risk-sharing arrangements and so-
cial capital within kin, extended family or neighborhood structures. However, poorer
households have limited self-help capacities and their asset stocks are quickly depleted
in case of shocks. There is also evidence that they only have access to a few other sig-
nificant SRM strategies. Poor households are often even excluded from informal risk-
sharing arrangements, for a variety of reasons. For example, they have more difficul-
ties in fulfilling the reciprocal obligations and also, they have to value current con-
sumption over future consumption; therefore poor households are more likely to drop
out  of  risk sharing arrangements.235 Evidence from Tanzania  suggests that the rich
have denser networks and risk-sharing arrangements than the poor and, therefore,
232 Although Cohen et al. did not distinguish between proactive and reactive strategies in their classi -
fication of low, medium and high stress coping strategies, still all high stress strategies fall into the
category of reactive risk management strategies, according to the adapted SRM framework.
233 Dercon (2007): Risk, Insurance, and Poverty: A Review, p. 28.
234 Ibid.
235 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 144 and 157.
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may be able to better cope with their risks than poor households.236 Hence, in the case
of the poorest households, there is little doubt that SRM strategies on higher levels are
required; for example, the World Bank concludes that these poorest households "may
well be more efficiently helped with targeted cash transfers"237. 
Table  2 represents a matrix of possible social risk management strategies. Those
strategies which are primarily used for health risk management are noted in the table
with an asterisk. The table follows the typology presented in figure 1 on page 45. The
vertical axis represents the typology of pro-active and re-active SRM strategies and the
horizontal axis shows the level of action where the social risk management strategy
takes place. As discussed in section 3.3, SRM strategies on different levels may address
the same type of risk, keeping the objective of redundancy in mind. 
236 De Weerdt, Joachim (2007): Risk-Sharing and Endogenous Network Formation. In: Dercon, Stefan
[Hrsg.] (ed.): Insurance against poverty, Repr. UNU-WIDER studies in development economics.
Oxford Univ. Press. Oxford [a.o.], p. 213.
237 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 157.
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4. Risks and social risk management in Sub-Saharan 
Africa
4.1. Introduction to country focus on Ghana and Malawi
Ghana is located in West Africa, had a population of about 23.69 million people and a
size of 2380540 square kilometers.238 Ghana borders Côte d'Ivoire to the west, Burkina
Faso to the North, Togo to the east and the Atlantic Ocean to the South. The majority
of land area (69.2%) was used for agriculture, while about half of the population (49.5%)
lived in rural areas. See table  3 for an overview of country indicators for Ghana and
Malawi.
Malawi, on the other hand, is a land-locked country in South East Africa with a
population of about 14.57 million people and a size of 1180480 square kilometers.239 It
borders Zambia to the west, Mozambique to the south and east and Tanzania to the
north and east. Agricultural land accounted for 58.1% of the land area and the vast ma-
jority of the population lived in rural areas (84.6%).
As previously discussed in the introduction (section 1.1), using Ghana and Malawi
for a country comparison of risk exposure and the application of social risk manage-
ment strategies is suitable for several reasons, as they share several characteristics and
differ in some factors of interest. Both Ghana and Malawi experienced relatively high
levels of political stability,  with democratic elections,  and are multi-ethnic societies
without major ethnic conflicts.  They have economic similarities, as both economies
had a  considerable  reliance on agricultural  production,  31.81% (Ghana)  and 32.06%
(Malawi) of GDP, albeit Ghana operated on a significantly higher economic production
level, with a GDP per capita (PPP) international-$ 2816 in 2009, compared to interna-
tional-$ 814 in Malawi.240,241
The trade patterns of Ghana and Malawi were quite different, mostly due to Ghana's
richness in natural resources. The main export goods of Ghana were gold, crude oil
238 Data from year 2012. The World Bank (2014): Data Ghana. URL: http://data.worldbank.org/coun-
try/ghana (accessed 2014/06/15).
239 Data from year 2012. The World Bank (2014): Data Malawi. URL: http://data.worldbank.org/coun-
try/malawi (accessed 2014/06/15).
240 values in current US$. The World Bank (2014): Data Ghana; The World Bank (2014): Data Malawi.
241 Crude oil extraction and export started in Ghana in 2011. The crude oil industry is now one of the
fastest growing industries with a growth of 37.5% (from 2013 to 2014). The data in this study have
been collected before the crude oil  exports started. IHS Global Insight (2014):  Country Intelli -
gence: Report: Ghana. In: Ghana Country Monitor, p. 4 and 14.
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(since 2011)  and cocoa.  Ghana also exported other minerals such as bauxite,  man-
ganese ore and diamonds, while aluminum led the manufactured export goods. The
main agricultural export goods besides cocoa were timber and fish. The main imports
were petroleum products, manufactured capital goods and consumer goods (e.g. food,
household items). Ghana had a trade deficit.242 The exports of Malawi were more domi-
nated by agricultural products. Malawi derived their main export earnings from the
export of tobacco, which made the country dependent on seasonal fluctuations and
global tobacco prices. Other agricultural export goods were tea, sugar and coffee. Also,
exports of uranium have been growing in recent years. Generally, Malawi was heavily
dependent on fuel imports; one reason for the country's trade deficit.243
Both countries were in the category 'low human development' in the Human Devel-
opment Index (2010) with Ghana at a somewhat higher country ranking of 130 (index
value 0.467) than Malawi at 153 (0.376) out of 169 countries. 244 At 73.7%, the literacy
rate among adults was higher in Malawi than in Ghana, which had 66.6%. In general,
poverty levels in Ghana were significantly lower than in Malawi. The poverty head-
count ratio of having less than PPP $1.25 per day was significantly higher in Malawi
(61.64%)  than in Ghana (28.50%).  Income disparities  were similar in both countries
with a Gini coefficient of 42.76 in Ghana and 43.91 in Malawi. See table 3.
Tab. 3: Basic general, economic and development indicators for Ghana and Malawi
Indicators Ghana Malawi
Surface area (sq. km)1 2380540 1180480
Agricultural land (% of land area)1 69.22 58.12
Population (Total)1 2306910533 1405730338
Rural population (% of total population)1 49.49 84.55
Annual population growth rate (%)2 d2.40 d3.10
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)1 2816.16 813.55
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $)1 2810.00 790.00
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)1 31.81 32.06
Industry, value added (% of GDP)1 19.00 18.54
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)1 49.20 49.40
Borrowers from commercial banks (per 1,000 adults)1 33.76 16.16
242 Ibid., p. 14.
243 IHS Global Insight (2014): Country Intelligence: Report: Malawi. In: Malawi Country Monitor, p.
6f.
244 In 2013, Ghana was able to increase in the HDI to ‘medium human development’ (rank 135, index
0.558) while Malawi remained in the ‘low human development’ (rank 170, index 0.418).  UNDP
(2010): Human Development Report 2010. The Real Wealth of Nations. Pathways to Human Devel-
opment, 2 edition. Palgrave Macmillan. New York, p. 145 and 150; UNDP (2013): Human Develop-
ment Report 2013. The Rise of the South. Human Progress in a Diverse World. New York, p. 150.
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Indicators Ghana Malawi
Depositors with commercial banks (per 1,000 adults)1 271.28 159.88
Human Development Index (HDI) Rank d130 d153
GINI index1 b42.76 d43.91
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population)1 b51.84 d82.31
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population)1 b28.59 d61.64
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population)1 b28.50 d50.70
Literacy rate among adults aged >= 15 years (%)2 66.60 73.70
Female headed households (% of households with a female head)1 c33.70 d28.10
Notes: Data are from year 2009 if not indicated otherwise. a=2004, b=2006, c=2008, d=2010
Sources: 1= The World Bank Data, 2=World Health organization Global Health observatory Data 
Repository.245
There are significant cultural differences between Ghana and Malawi and both coun-
tries had a very different colonial experience; however, many institutions in both coun-
tries have some influence from their British colonial origins.246 Ghana regained inde-
pendence in 1957 and Malawi in 1964. Since then, Ghana's and Malawi's history of ap-
proaching health risks on a macro level has been very different. While Malawi contin-
ued to follow the path of a publicly funded health system without fees for essential
services at public health care facilities, Ghana has more frequently changed their fi-
nancing system: First, after independence Ghana aimed for free health care services,
later introduced user fees at point of service and started a National Health Insurance
Scheme (NHIS) in 2003. See sections 4.3.6.1 and 4.3.6.2 for a more comprehensive view
on the health care financing systems of Ghana and Malawi. 
The identified vulnerable groups are quite similar in both countries. Based on an
analysis  of  the  Ghana Living  Standard Survey IV,  thirteen most  vulnerable  groups
were identified. Among these were rural agricultural producers, people with chronic
illnesses (incl. HIV/AIDS), displaced communities (e.g. due to flooding, droughts), resi-
dents of urban slums, etc.247
245 World Health Organization (2012): Global Health Observatory Data Repository. Country Statistics.
URL: http://apps.who.int/ghodata/?theme=country (accessed 2012/10/03); The World Bank (2014):
Data Ghana; The World Bank (2014): Data Malawi.
246 Ghana has subsequently become a colony with pre-colonial experiences ranging back at least to
the 17th century when several European countries were constructing forts as trade posts at the
Ghanaian Gold Coast that were heavily involved in slave trade since the late 17th century. In 1820,
the British Colonial Office took over the trade posts and South Ghana was declared British Crown
Colony in 1874. Ghana became independent in 1957. On contrary, Malawi was a colony only for a
short time period (from 1891 when it became a British protectorate until 1964). British colonial
rule in Malawi started only after Great Britain had abolished slave trade.
247 Entire list of vulnerable groups: rural agricultural producers, children in difficult circumstances,
people living with HIV/AIDS, displaced communities, disadvantaged women, residents of urban
slums, the elderly, physically challenged persons, people with chronic diseases, drug addicts, vic-
64
4.1. Introduction to Country focus on Ghana And Malawi
In a poverty analysis in Malawi by the World Bank, four most vulnerable groups in
Malawi  were  identified:  "rural  households  with  small  landholdings,  female-headed
households, AIDS orphans and their relatives, and those who could not care for them-
selves"248. For these groups, the four major risks were "seasonal price increases and
food shortages, periodic drought, large periodic macroeconomic shocks, and the threat
of HIV/AIDS"249.
4.2. Risks, risk exposure and vulnerability in Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Many developing countries have a comparatively high risk profile. Part of this high
risk exposure is due to the adverse geography of these countries. Tropical or subtropi -
cal climate increases the risk of parasitic or tropical diseases, including malaria. It in -
creases the risk of extreme weather conditions and climate-related natural disasters.250
Moreover, many developing countries show characteristics of over-proportionally high
risk exposure to a variety of other "man-made" risks, ranging from economic, social
and political instabilities and inefficiencies to environmental disasters.  Additionally,
natural disasters such as tsunamis for coastal areas, earthquakes or volcano eruptions
add to the high level of risk exposure. However, as previously discussed, pure risk ex-
posure does not necessarily translate into high vulnerability to shocks, which is rather
a function of risk exposure, social risk management capacities on all levels and eco-
nomic situation.
4.2.1. General risk exposure and vulnerability in Sub-Saharan Africa
Looking at disaster risk in Africa "illustrates the dynamic interplay between naturally-
occurring  hazard  processes  and  the  continent's  wide-ranging  vulnerability  condi-
tions".251 Hence, the negative impact of shocks is less an outcome of risk exposure itself
than an expression of the human or country's internal vulnerability.252 As reported by
Bhavani et al. (2008), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is not the region with the highest risk
tims of abuse, victims of harmful traditional practices, unemployed. Government of Ghana (2003):
Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005. An Agenda for Growth and Prosperity. Volume I.
Analysis and Policy Statement, p. 114f.
248 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 147.
249 Ibid.
250 Todaro, Michael P.; Smith, Stephen C. (2008): Economic Development, 10 (rev.) edition. Pearson
Longman. Harlow, U.K., p. 66f.
251 Holloway, Ailsa (2012): Disaster risk in Africa: Dynamic discourse or dysfunctional dialogue? In:
Bloemertz, Lena; Doevenspeck, Martin; Macamo, Elisio; et al. (eds.): Risk and Africa. Multi-Disci-
plinary Empirical Approaches. Berlin, p. 22.
252 cp. Ibid., p. 23.
65
4. Risks And Social Risk Management In Sub-Saharan Africa
exposure, but it is "the most vulnerable to disasters because of physical, social, eco-
nomic and environmental factors that negatively affect the capacity of people to secure
and protect their livelihoods."253 Particularly, weather and climate shocks, as well as
natural disasters, pose a severe threat on households' livelihoods in SSA, because the
majority of households live in rural areas and are heavily dependent on agricultural
production.254 Bhavani et al. further laid out that large-scale risk exposure has been
constantly increasing in SSA from 1985 to 2006, naming floods (25%), droughts (18%),
and windstorms (7%) as the largest natural disasters, though "epidemics, famine, in-
sects" (46%) accounts for the largest share.255 This list did not include the "regular" bur-
den of disease in SSA, which was at a comparably high level in terms of communicable
and, increasingly, chronic non-communicable diseases (CNCDs). 
In a thorough look at the context of risk coping in Malawi, Devereux (1999) de-
scribed three types of risks and related shocks to which people are exposed. First, he
described random shocks, which are mainly unpredictable and randomly occurring,
such as price shocks,  flood, drought or  illness.  Second, he described  regular shocks
which are predictable (e.g. seasonal risks), but unknown in their severity. Third, he de-
scribed processes, which correspond to stressors as introduced in section 2.2, that mean
a steady increase of pressure on the household, e.g. resulting from a decline of soil fer-
tility or a steady rise in food and commodity prices. The first two types require typical
risk management strategies, with the second allowing for more planning and proactive
strategies, while the third type mainly required adaptive behavior.256 
Particularly in rural Malawi, regular shocks and random shocks are sometimes dif-
ficult to differentiate. About 85% of Malawians live in rural areas and the majority of
them work small-scale farmland, with less than one hectare of land. Due to regular
droughts, irregular rainfall during the rainy season and little use of irrigation systems,
exposure to crop failure and food shortages is relatively high.257 Generally, predomi-
nantly agricultural societies are highly dependent on price variability of inputs and
253 Bhavnani, Rakhi; Owor, Martin; Vordzorgbe, Seth; et al. (2008): Status of Disaster Risk Reduction
in the Sub-Saharan Africa Region. January 2008. United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reconstruction. Worldbank. no place, p. 1.
254 The World Bank (2012): Managing Risk, Promoting Growth. Developing Systems for Social Protec-
tion in Africa. Social Protection Strategy. World Bank. Washington, D.C., p. 2. URL: http://sitere-
sources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/social-protection-full-report-EN-2012.pdf (accessed
2014/02/03).
255 Bhavnani et al. (2008): Status of Disaster Risk Reduction in the Sub-Saharan Africa Region. Janu-
ary 2008, p. v and 2.
256 Devereux (1999): Making less last longer, p. 17.
257 Flory et al. (2009): The Poor and Their Management of Shocks, p. 6; Diagne, Aliou; Zeller, Manfred
(2001): Access to Credit and Its Impact on Welfare in Malawi. International Food Policy Research
Institute. Washington, D.C., p. 6.
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crops  which  increases  their  vulnerability.258 For  example,  a  study  by Diagne  et  al.
(2001) showed that price variations of crops can have a negative impact on households.
They concluded that "the price of maize has a significant and negative direct impact on
per capita calorie intake".259 The analysis by Devereux (1999) gave a similar picture,
where he described agricultural production risks, price fluctuations/increases in food,
inputs and commodities as well as labor market risks as dominant sources of risk in
Malawi. While the first mainly affected rural households, the latter two also affected
urban households.  Particularly, urban households were dependent on labor markets
and vulnerable to price shocks, but a large share of rural households were also depen-
dent on the labor market, as they engaged in agricultural and non-agricultural short-
term employments, usually in the form of piecework, to complement farm income.260
In a household survey in Malawi in 2008, Flory et al. (2009) analyzed the most fre-
quently experienced shocks that led to a reduction in income among rural households
in Central Malawi.261 In that study, using a twelve months recall period, 96% of house-
holds reported at least one shock and 56% reported three or more shocks. The most fre-
quently mentioned shocks fell into the categories of economic shocks, natural/environ-
mental shocks, and health shocks. Social shocks were reported less often. Among the
most frequently mentioned economic shocks were death/theft of livestock or poultry
(56% of households that reported shocks)262, followed by large rise of food prices (47%),
unexpected increase in input prices (34%), large fall in sale prices for crops (29%), busi -
ness failure (15%) and loss of salaried employment (2%). Shocks due to natural/environ-
mental risks were reported as low crop yields due to drought, flood or crop diseases
(27%) and damaged/destroyed dwellings by fire or flood (5%). Health shocks (illness/ac-
cident) of household members (39%) and death of household members (10%) were re-
ported as life-cycle risk. Social risks reported were theft (12%), end of regular assis-
tance, aid or remittance (11%), break-up of the household (3%), and communal fights
(2%).263 72% of total shocks were reported to have had some severity as they "directly
lowered household incomes"; livestock or poultry losses were above average at 85%
258 Morduch, Jonathan (1994): Poverty and Vulnerability. In: The American Economic Review, vol. 84,
nr. 2, p. 221.
259 Diagne et al. (2001): Access to Credit and Its Impact on Welfare in Malawi, p. xii.
260 Devereux (1999): Making less last longer, pp. 17–22.
261 Flory et al. excluded life-cycle events/risks such as births, weddings, school graduations, funeral
from their study. Flory et al. (2009): The Poor and Their Management of Shocks, p. 14.
262 The categories of the study did not allow distinguishing between death and theft of livestock/poul-
try. Theft would be categorized as social risk rather than economic risk, according to table  1 on
page 20.
263 Flory et al. (2009): The Poor and Their Management of Shocks, p. 14f.
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and illness/accident of a household member that lowered household incomes at 67%,
out of the total of this type of shock.264
The characteristics of certain types of risks are more covariant than others, as re-
ported by Flory et al. (2009). Economic risks, such as increases of food prices, were re-
ported by over 50% of respondents to be covariant, while livestock or poultry losses
had some level of covariance (32%). On the other hand, illness and accidents were pre-
dominantly reported to be idiosyncratic (96%).265
4.2.2. Health risks and burden of disease in Sub-Saharan Africa with 
particular focus on Ghana and Malawi
By international comparison, individuals and households in Sub-Saharan Africa are
over-proportionally exposed to a variety of communicable and non-communicable dis-
eases. Generally, the burden of disease is inequitably higher in low-income countries,
but in Africa, certain health indicators are particularly low. For example, child mortal-
ity rates (0-4 years) and adult mortality rates (15-49 years) are higher compared to
other low- and middle income countries in other regions; while high income countries
are lowest in all mortality figures. The same patterns hold true in the prevalence rates
of moderate and severe illnesses, as well as DALYs, where African countries fare the
lowest, followed by low- and middle income countries in other regions.266 For many
years, communicable diseases were the main cause of disease in low-income countries,
but recent years have seen an increasing burden of chronic non-communicable dis-
eases,  such as  cardiovascular  disease,  diabetes,  cancer and chronic  pulmonary dis-
eases.267
The comparison between Ghana and Malawi concerning important health indica-
tors and the burden of disease shows some significant differences. In Ghana, life ex-
pectancy at birth has remained quite stable over the last twenty years and was at 60
years (in 2009).268 By comparison, in Malawi, the life expectancy at birth was much
lower in 2009 (at 47 years), which was actually a decrease from 48 years in 1990. This
comparably low level of life expectancy could be attributed, to a large extent, to the
264 Ibid., p. 15.
265 Ibid., p. 16.
266 WHO (2004): The Global Burden of Disease. 2004 Update. World Health Organization. Geneva, p.
15 and 17f. (on mortality rates), 33 (prevalence), 41 (DALYs).
267 Boutayeb, Abdesslam (2006): The Double Burden of Communicable and Non-Communicable Dis -
eases in Developing Countries. In: Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine And
Hygiene, vol. 100, nr. 3, p. 192.
268 World Health Organization (2012): Global Health Observatory Data Repository. Country Statistics,
Year of measurement 2009.
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HIV/AIDS crisis. The lowest life expectancy was reached in 2000, when life expectancy
at birth was at 43 years.269
Comparing the DALY rates per 1000 00 population of Ghana and Malawi (see table
4), the burden of disease in Malawi and Ghana was comparable with regard to most
causes, but with some significant differences. Aggregating over all  causes,  the total
burden of disease (as indicated by DALYs) was higher in Malawi, at 580748, than in
Ghana, at 340141. 
The difference almost exclusively stemmed from the first main category "Communi-
cable, maternal, perinatal and nutritional causes", in which, at 460845, Malawi had more
than double the DALY rates as Ghana (210124). In Malawi, this disease category also ac-
counted for the majority of causes of death with 65.1%, which was higher than Ghana
with 50.7%.270
While there was a variance in most cause categories, the DALYs of HIV/AIDS were
much higher in Malawi (140443) than in Ghana (2592). This is not surprising, since the
median prevalence rate of HIV in Ghana was 2.1% in 2011, relatively low compared to
many other Sub-Saharan countries.271 In comparison, Malawi has been in the center of
the HIV/AIDS crisis and still had a prevalence among adults of 10.6 % in 2010. 272 In line
with the prevalence rate, HIV/AIDS was a major cause of death in Malawi with 337
deaths per 1000 00 population compared to 74 in Ghana.273
Also, the DALY rates of diarrheal diseases in Malawi were 5231, more than double
the rate of Ghana, which was 2063. This difference could only be partially attributed to
potable water access and sanitation. The difference with regard to these variables was
quite small: In 2010, 84.60% of the population had access to improved water sources in
Ghana compared to 81.30% in Malawi. Similarly, in Ghana, 13.73% of the population
had access to improved sanitation facilities compared to 10.26% in Malawi.274
The burden of disease from malaria was similar in both countries, but was at a high
level with a DALY rate of 4186 in Ghana and 4809 in Malawi. Malaria significantly
269 Ibid.
270 Data from 2012. The World Bank (2014): Data Ghana; The World Bank (2014): Data Malawi.
271 Ghana AIDS Commission (2012): Ghana Country AIDS Progress Report. Reporting Period January
2010  -  December  2011,  p.  22.  URL:  http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/
knowyourresponse/countryprogressreports/2012countries/ce_GH_Narrative_Report%5B1%5D.pdf
(accessed 2012/10/04).
272 Government of Malawi (2012): 2012 Global AIDS Response Report. Malawi Country Report for
2010 and 2011, p. 2. URL: http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/knowyourresponse/countrypro-
gressreports/2012countries/ce_MW_Narrative_Report%5B1%5D.pdf (accessed 2012/10/04).
273 Data for  2009.  The confidence interval for  Ghana is  [59-90] and for  Malawi [250-436].  World
Health Organization (2012): Global Health Observatory Data Repository. Country Statistics.
274 The World Bank (2014): Data Ghana; The World Bank (2014): Data Malawi.
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caused more deaths in Malawi,  87  deaths per 1000 00 population per year,  than in
Ghana with 48 deaths per 1000 00.275
The large difference in respiratory infections could be mostly attributed to lower
respiratory infections in Ghana (1874),  which were over three times lower than in
Malawi (6866). Also, the DALYs of maternal conditions were almost three times as high
in Malawi (3062) compared to Ghana (1193).276 Again, this could not be explained from
other typical indicators, such as the rate of births attended by skilled health personnel,
which at 71.3% (2010) was higher in Malawi than in Ghana, at 54.7% (2008). However,
with regard to the maternal mortality ratio, Malawi reported to have a significantly
higher death rate at 460 than Ghana, which had 350 deaths per 1000 00 live births.277 In
a report on the achievements for the Millenium Development Goals, the government of
Malawi enumerated several factors that led to bad maternal health indicators, particu-
larly the insufficiencies of skilled health personnel, poor access to essential health care
services as well as inadequate and poorly equipped health facilities with the unavail -
ability of basic essential drugs.278
Tab. 4: Estimated DALYs per 1000 00 population by cause: Ghana, Malawi (2004)
Causes Ghana Malawi
I.Communicable, maternal, perinatal and nutritional
conditions
 211124  461845 
A. Infectious and parasitic diseases  120705  300389 
1. Tuberculosis  1091  1224 
2. STDs excluding HIV  363  429 
3. HIV/AIDS  2592  140443 
4. Diarrhoeal diseases  2063  5231 
5. Childhood-cluster diseases  419  350 
6. Meningitis  195  620 
7. Hepatitis B / C  60  105 
8. Malaria  4186  4809 
9. Tropical-cluster diseases  1002  1032 
10. Leprosy  3  3 
11. Dengue  0  6 
275 Data from 2008. The confidence interval for Ghana was [24-61] and for Malawi [66-111] World
Health Organization (2012): Global Health Observatory Data Repository. Country Statistics.
276 Ibid.
277 Data are inter-agency estimates. Year 2009. The confidence interval for Ghana was [210-630] and
for Malawi [290-710]. Ibid.
278 Ministry of Development Planning and Cooperation Malawi (2011): 2010 Malawi Millennium De-
velopment Goals Report, p. 36f.
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13. Trachoma  2  36 
14. Intestinal nematode infections  283  138 
B. Respiratory infections  1912  6965 
C. Maternal conditions  1193  3062 
D. Perinatal conditions  4605  3743 
E. Nutritional deficiencies  709  2685 
II.Noncommunicable diseases  101510  8850 
A. Malignant neoplasms  845  621 
B. Other neoplasms  28  31 
C. Diabetes mellitus  193  203 
D. Endocrine disorders  225  301 
E. Neuropsychiatric conditions  3006  2359 
F. Sense organ diseases  1347  1195 
G. Cardiovascular diseases  1807  1483 
H. Respiratory diseases  829  820 
I. Digestive diseases  621  520 
J. Genitourinary diseases  262  212 
K. Skin diseases  178  110 
L. Musculoskeletal diseases  352  298 
M. Congenital anomalies  734  612 
N. Oral conditions  83  85 
III. Injuries  2508  3054 
A. Unintentional injuries  1937  2310 
B. Intentional injuries  570  744 
total 341141 581748
Source: World Health organization (WHo) (2009)279
Nutritional deficiencies caused a higher burden of disease in Malawi (DALY rate at
2685) than in Ghana (709), across all sub-categories: protein-energy malnutrition, io-
dine deficiency, vitamin A deficiency and iron-deficiency anemia.280 Another indicator
backed up this difference: the prevalence of undernourishment in Malawi was 23.10%
of the population, compared to 5.80% in Ghana, in 2009. On the other hand, the malnu-
trition prevalence among children under 5 years was slightly lower in Malawi (12.10%
in 2009) than in Ghana (14.30% in 2008).281
279 World Health Organization (WHO) (2009): WHO Disease and injury country estimates: Death and
DALY estimates  for  2004  by  cause  for  WHO Member  States,  Persons,  all  ages,  WHO.  URL:
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/estimates_country/en/index.html (accessed
2012/10/03).
280 Ibid.
281 The World Bank (2014): Data Ghana; The World Bank (2014): Data Malawi.
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With regard to the second main category Noncommunicable diseases (NCD) in table 4,
Ghana showed a significantly higher burden of disease (DALY rate of 100510) compared
to Malawi (8850). Particularly,  malignant neoplasms, neuropsychiatric disorders and
cardiovascular diseases accounted for this difference. As higher age was a risk factor
for most of these diseases, particularly for chronic noncommunicable diseases (CNCD),
it could be assumed that the relatively higher mean age of the Ghanaian society com-
pared to the Malawian society influenced these figures. As expected, the difference be-
tween Ghana and Malawi diminished when looking at  the  age-standardized DALY
rates for NCDs, which were 130365 in Ghana and 130 57 for Malawi.282 
Between 1990 and 2010, Ghana and Malawi significantly improved the health indi-
cators of children. In Ghana, the under-five mortality rate (probability of dying by age
5 per 1000 live births) was gradually reduced from 12.2 in 1990 to 7.4 per 100 children
under five years in 2010. In Ghana, malaria was responsible for most deaths among
children under five years due to a single illness (18 %), directly followed by prematurity
(16%), pneumonia (13%) and birth asphyxia (11%).283 In Malawi, the reduction of the un-
der-five mortality rate was from 22.2 per 100 children in 1990 to 9.2 in 2010. 284 Pneu-
monia was responsible for most deaths among children under five years, due to a sin-
gle illness (14%), directly followed by malaria (13%), HIV/AIDS (13%) and prematurity
(13%).285
In conclusion, the burden of disease for communicable and maternal diseases in
Malawi was higher than in Ghana, particularly due to HIV/AIDS, diarrheal diseases,
lower respiratory infections and maternal conditions. Both countries had a high bur-
den of disease from malaria. In Ghana, the burden of disease from non-communicable
diseases  was higher,  which  was largely  a  result  of  the  higher life  expectancy and
higher average age of the population in Ghana.
4.3. Social risk management in Sub-Saharan Africa
Multiple levels – from individual to the global – are involved in social risk manage-
ment.  Besides  public  actors  (local,  regional  and national  governments),  individuals,
households, communities as well as market-based or non-profit institutions are actors
282 Comparing the DALY rates with the age-standardized DALY rates, only the category ‘II. Noncom-
municable diseases’ showed a significant change, while the other cause categories did not signifi-
cantly change. World Health Organization (WHO) (2009): WHO Disease and injury country esti-
mates: Death and DALY estimates for 2004 by cause for WHO Member States, Persons, all ages.
283 World Health Organization (2012): Global Health Observatory Data Repository. Country Statistics,
Year of measurement 2010.
284 Ibid., Year of measurement 2009.
285 Ibid., Year of measurement 2010.
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in social risk management. The typology of SRM strategies, as shown in figure  1 on
page 45, depicts all possible types of SRM strategies. This section, on the other hand,
provides an overview of SRM strategies being applied in the societies of Sub-Saharan
Africa. In a first step, it will be shown that SRM strategies are not necessarily applied
by households in a linear order. After that, the SRM strategies for which evidence ex-
ists, are presented loosely following the logic of figure 1, starting first with individual
and household strategies (micro-level) and then continuing with strategies on the com-
munity level (meso-level) and moving from proactive to reactive strategies. 
Devereux (1999) analyzed a wide array of SRM strategies in rural and urban Malawi,
with a focus on those strategies that involve interactions with other households. Ac-
cording to Devereux, SRM strategies are generally not adopted in a one-dimensional
linear sequence, but rather "in multiple, iterative layers; several discrete strategies are
adopted in parallel and each is pursued with increasing intensity at increasing cost or
irreversibility as conditions deteriorate, until ameliorated by a positive countervailing
event".286 A typical behavior describing the iterative layers of SRM strategies in the
words of Devereux:
"Neighbours who occasionally lend sugar or salt are now asked for interest-free loans.
The wealthy headman who extracts unpaid labour as tribute from community members
is called upon to release some of his surplus grain to villagers who have no food. The
brother who works as a cleaner in town and occasionally remits clothes is expected to
bring a bag of maize next time he visits the village."287 
Iterative and frequent reciprocal interactions are an integral part of households' sets of
SRM strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa.288 Therefore, some frequent SRM strategies are
difficult to fit into the dichotomy of proactive and reactive strategies, when only look-
ing at the type of strategy. Among such strategies which can be proactively and reac-
tively applied are borrowing and informal credit arrangements, transfers or gifts and
sale of assets.
A study on risk management strategies, conducted by Flory et al. (2009) in Malawi,
exemplified the complexity of sets of SRM strategies in a low-income setting. For the
Malawian context, Flory et al. presented strong evidence of the typical SRM strategies
of risk-sharing, such as reciprocal gift-giving in the community (friends or relatives).
286 Devereux (1999): Making less last longer, p. 16.
287 Ibid.
288 cp. The World Bank (2001): Dynamic Risk Management and the Poor. Developing a Social Protec-
tion Strategy for Africa I, p. 16; Schindler, Kati (2010): Credit for what? Informal Credit as a Cop-
ing Strategy of Market Women in Northern Ghana. In: Journal of Development Studies, vol. 46, nr.
2, p. 10.
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Informal borrowing is another typical, mostly reactive, strategy. In the study by Flory
et al. (2009) four SRM strategies were used significantly more often than other strate-
gies. The strategy used to cope with a shock was predominantly the use of cash sav-
ings, in 70.61% of all  shocks (including cash stored at home, at a friend's place, in
RoSCAs or bank account), followed by increased working hours (6.62%), sale of ani-
mals (5.83%) and increased sale of crops (3.66%). Other strategies accounted for 13.3%.
In these other strategies, some can be categorized as high-stress strategies that can
cause  long-term  negative  effects  on  the  household,  following  the  classification  by
Montgomery  from 1996  (see  categorization  in  section  3.3):  Sale  of  physical  assets
(tools, furniture, etc.) (0.70% of all shocks), borrowing from money lender (0.24%), re-
duced  food  consumption  (0.22%),  temporary  migration  (0.22%),  stopped  business
(0.20%), rented out farmland (0.20%), sold farmland (0.18%), previously non-working
household members started working (0.12%), removed children from school to work
(0.04%).289
In summary, out of all households experiencing shocks, Flory et al. (2009) classified
12.14% of households as having used high-stress coping strategies, 70.93% having used
only medium- or low-stress coping strategies. Another 16.93% of households did not
use any SRM strategy for the experienced shocks.290 Additionally,  households using
high-stress coping strategies were slightly less food secure, were likely to experience a
larger number of shocks, have more likely outstanding informal loans, live more likely
in rural areas and have a slightly higher average family size than other households.291
Flory et al. (2009) also showed that access to formal financial products and social net-
works decreased the likelihood of using high-stress coping strategies.292 It is important
to note that Devereux et al. (1999) and Flory et al. (2009) calculated very different fre-
quencies of using of high-stress coping strategies. One reason for this could have been
that the sampling technique applied by Devereux explicitly focused on the selection of
a very poor urban setting and rural communities, which were known to be food-inse-
cure.293 A more detailed  discussion on high-stress  SRM strategies,  which  Devereux
called 'erosive' strategies, follows in the subsequent section 4.3.1.
289 Flory et al. (2009): The Poor and Their Management of Shocks, p. 18f.
290 Ibid., p. 21.
291 Ibid., p. 24ff.
292 Ibid., p. 35.
293 Devereux (1999): Making less last longer, p. 42.
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4.3.1. Social risk management on individual and household level in Sub-
Saharan Africa
In his study on informal safety nets in Malawi, Devereux described several SRM strate-
gies on the individual and household levels. In rural Malawi, he reported income diver-
sification and increase of labor supply as principal SRM strategies. Households fre-
quently supplemented income from their own small-scale agricultural production with
casual non-farm or farm labor income (in cash or in-kind) in the form of piecework;
activities which households typically increased in difficult times.294 Although this addi-
tional labor income is a form of income diversification, it is a weak SRM strategy for
several reasons. First, paid farm labor directly competes with their own farming activi-
ties, because planting and harvesting times are overlapping, so that today's labor in-
come reduces future crop earnings from owned farm land. Second, wage levels for
piecework are comparatively low. Third, the size of labor markets for piecework is of-
ten parallel in relation to their own good or bad harvests, which reduces their suitabil-
ity as SRM strategies in the times when they are needed most. However, there are also
reports that wealthy farmers "feel some moral obligation to hire more [...] than they
actually need when faced with people begging for work."295 Such cases involve some
redistributive effect in times of need. 
In his analysis, Devereux noted substantial differences in sets of SRM strategies be-
tween rural and urban areas, but also similarities. For example, diversification in agri-
cultural and non-agricultural income was not a rural phenomenon, as it was also com-
mon in urban areas. In Malawi, the majority of urban households practiced agricul-
tural activities in rural areas, in addition to urban income generation. Additionally, as-
sisting relatives in rural areas with harvesting activities was common among urban
residents.296
Devereux also reported that gender roles have changed and income diversification
patterns with it. Women in Southern Malawi were increasingly economically active
and derive income for the household, e.g. from trading or sale of cooked food.297 For re-
gions bordering on foreign countries, informal cross-border trade of commodities and
labor were a significant strategy for the income-earning of households.298 Generally,
294 Particularly, farm labor income may be problematic, because it directly competes with their own
farming activities since planting and harvesting times tend to be at the same time. Ibid., p. 24.
295 Ibid., p. 27.
296 Ibid., p. 33.
297 Ibid., p. 24.
298 Cross-border trade benefits from relative comparative advantages of the countries. Particularly in
crises, informal cross-border has been intensified. For example, in the Malawian petrol crisis in
2009, illegal petrol trade from Mozambique significantly contributed to income. Ibid., p. 27f.
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urban areas allowed more income-diversification possibilities than rural areas, which
included different informal sector employments, street vending as well as stigmatized
and illegal activities (e.g. prostitution, theft, sale of smuggled or stolen goods). 299 How-
ever, overall income diversification levels in Malawi were quite low when compared
internationally, as the average share of non-agricultural income was just 34% in 1991.300
Income diversification is dependent on a sufficient labor supply. Hence, the combi-
nation of increased labor supply and increased income diversification, can either serve
as proactive or reactive SRM strategies. To some extent, increased labor supply is a
normal variation depending on income earning possibilities or increased need. A delib-
erate increase in income diversification (and labor supply) can be proactively used to
mitigate the impact of future income shocks, as the household decreases its depen-
dency on one income source, and with it its vulnerability to these income shocks. On
the other hand, an increase in labor supply and earning income from different sources
is also a typical reactive SRM strategy, in order to compensate for the losses or costs
involved with a certain shock ex-post. Increased labor supply can involve an increase
in working hours of the breadwinners in the household, as well as an addition of more
household members serving as income earners. In its typical form, there are only mi-
nor secondary (long-term) negative impacts on the households, as long as this addi-
tional work (in its type and extent) does not overly endanger the physical or mental
health of household members or the future capabilities of children. It is not uncommon
for children to be taken out of school to join the labor market or to replace working
adults in household chores.301 In about 10% of urban Malawian households, Devereux
identified children that were sent "to look for money" and about 9% where they were
taken out of school; on the other hand, both practices were not common in rural areas
of Malawi (0%).302
Similar to increased labor supply and income diversification, the SRM strategies ac-
cumulation of assets and sale of assets are important strategies for both pro-active self-
insurance and reactive coping.  For example,  ownership of livestock,  such as cattle,
sheep or goats, is a form of in-kind savings throughout Africa. Devereux (1999) noted
that livestock was kept for several reasons and that "livestock sales are a standard cop-
ing response by households to food shortage".303 As already noted in section  3.3 de-
scribing the SRM framework, returns of livestock sales may be low or negative which
299 Ibid., p. 34.
300 The World Bank (2001): Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 2000-2001, p. 142.
301 Devereux (1999): Making less last longer, p. 34.
302 Ibid., p. 51.
303 Ibid., p. 29.
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reduces their effectiveness as SRM strategy. This is particularly problematic for poor
households who have to sell livestock for risk-coping during community-wide shocks
(e.g. seasonal drought), because at such times livestock asset prices are generally low.304
As Sauerborn et al. (1996) reported in Burkina Faso, households were aware that "sell-
ing livestock under pressure would lead to a bad price"305 and therefore tried to pursue
intermediate SRM strategies, such as temporary loans, until livestock prices increased.
In empirical data for Malawi from 1999, Devereux reported that the sale of assets in
times of crisis was very common. For example, over 10% of households sold livestock
or poultry to generate cash and over 10% of urban households (over 5% in rural areas)
sold household items for cash generation. Renting out land was also commonly prac-
ticed by about 7% of urban households and about 4% of rural households.306
The reduction of consumption is one of the most practiced reactive coping strategies
on the household level. This strategy can entail the replacement of higher quality with
lower quality products (e.g. food, housing, water sources, etc.), the replacement of pur-
chases through (less efficient) self-production or work (e.g. substitution of purchased
fuel/charcoal with self-collected firewood or the replacement of transportation with
walking), or a reduction in the quantity of consumed goods. Dietary changes are one
typical type of consumption reduction. In Malawi, Devereux (1999) reported that di-
etary changes were an almost universal risk coping strategy in rural areas. While some
dietary adjustments were generally not followed by negative secondary shocks (e.g. us-
ing different or cheaper ingredients), others might imply negative future consequences
and could be counted to be 'erosive strategies', particularly concerning children's devel-
opment and physical strength (ultimately resulting in frailty to diseases). Among these
dietary adjustments were eating fewer meals or serving smaller portions.307 Devereux
(1999) found that over 90% of households in rural areas have applied such critical di-
etary adjustments, such as fewer meals a day and smaller portions, compared to less
than 50% of households in urban areas.308 The reduction in other non-food consump-
tion, particularly the reduction of firewood or paraffin purchases, was reported by over
80% of rural and over 60% of urban households. A shift to less secure water sources
was reported by over 30% of urban households (0% rural households).309
Seasonal migration is a typical risk-coping strategy of households. In this scenario,
the breadwinners in the family migrate to other parts of the country, or abroad, for
304 Dercon (2007): Risk, Insurance, and Poverty: A Review, p. 15f.
305 Sauerborn et al. (1996): Household Strategies to Cope with the Economic Costs of Illness, p. 294.
306 Devereux (1999): Making less last longer, p. 51.
307 Ibid., p. 29.
308 Ibid., p. 51.
309 Ibid.
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better income-earning potential.  In times of food stress, rural families use a similar
mechanism, when they send their children to wealthier relatives, or to relatives in ur-
ban areas, where the food is less scarce. Devereux reported this strategy was used by
over 10% of households in Malawi in an analysis of his 1999 data. 310 The SRM strategy
of migration reaches its erosive state when, for example, children are sent as servants
to wealthier families or to early marriages.311
4.3.2. Social risk management on community-level and market-based SRM 
strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa
Apart from individual and household-level SRM strategies, community-based strate-
gies play a particularly important role in risk management. In Sub-Saharan Africa,
there is evidence of a wide variety of informal, community-level risk management ar-
rangements. As Sommerfeld et al. (2002) pointed out, such community-based arrange-
ments were still widely used, but they were under pressure and even reported to be in
"demise in the process of individualization and formalization of transactions, as a re-
sult of increasing monetarization".312 A study from 1988 in Burkina Faso indicated a
high significance placed on family, friends, neighbors, clans and kinship networks, as it
was reported that over one fourth of total income was contributed to these networks
and somewhat less than one fourth of income was received from them.313 According to
Bhattamishra et  al.  (2010)  they serve as  risk-sharing  arrangements,  but  limitations
were also reported, such as their overall risk managing capacities, difficulties with co-
variate  shocks,  small  risk  pools  and  social  exclusion.314 On  the  other  hand,  Bhat-
tamishra et al. mentioned as advantage of community-based SRM strategies that they
are decentralized, accessible to low-income households and that they function through
"a combination of effective peer monitoring, fear of social sanctions as well as repeated
interactions over time between the same individuals".315 Most informal risk-sharing ar-
rangements are rooted in the close relationships of families,  clans, kinship, friends,
peers or neighbors. Assistance for individuals or households in times of shock or times
of need is based on an expectation of reciprocity, solidarity and moral obligation.316
310 Ibid.
311 Ibid., p. 31.
312 Sommerfeld et al. (2002): Informal risk-sharing arrangements (IRSAs) in rural Burkina Faso, p. 149.
313 Ibid., p. 150.
314 Bhattamishra, Ruchira; Barrett, Christopher B. (2010): Community-Based Risk Management Ar-
rangements: A Review. In: World Development, vol. 38, nr. 7, p. 930.
315 Ibid., p. 924.
316 Sommerfeld et al.  (2002): Informal risk-sharing arrangements (IRSAs) in rural Burkina Faso, p.
158f.
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Bhattamishra et al. (2010) reported several community-based preventive SRM strate-
gies for  risk reduction and elimination. This included, for example, pest and pathogen
control in medical and veterinary care, immunization programs, deworming and sani-
tation programs, potable water infrastructure (e.g. wells, sewage disposal), irrigation
systems, and community-based information systems. Many of these preventive mea-
sures show a significant effect of positive externalities within and between communi-
ties.317 Although there are also preventive actions on the individual and household lev-
els, they are not well documented. An example for risk prevention strategies on the in-
dividual level is the burning of field vegetation and pastures in order to eliminate or
keep away snakes and rodents.318
Different types of community-based arrangements for pro-active risk management
that aim to limit the extent of the shock are reported for Sub-Saharan Africa. According
to Sommerfeld et al. (2002) fire associations and sea rescue associations are prevalent
in West Africa.319 In Uganda, informal ambulance services, called engozi, exist. Particu-
larly in South-Western Uganda, most people belong to such a scheme that provides
transportation  to  hospitals  for  the  sick.320 Another  example  for  this  SRM strategy,
which is common in Sub-Saharan societies, is a rapid meeting in the extended family
or community, by the so-called therapy managing group, consisting of clansmen, other
kinsmen and friends, who decide on necessary steps and approaches of treatment for a
sick individual.321
Several community-level arrangements exist that enable households to self-insure,
in the sense of the terminology introduced in the adaptation of the SRM framework in
section  3.3. Bhattamishra et al. (2010) described several forms of savings, as well as
production or investment credit, with the aim of building future assets. An example is
cereal banks in Africa (particularly the Sahel), which aim to provide in-kind savings in
grains, seeds loans and storage facilities, with the ultimate goal to reduce (seasonal)
commodity price fluctuations.322 Another common form is the rotating savings and
credit association (RoSCA) or accumulating savings and credit association (ASCA). The
first type, RoSCA, refers to "informal associations of people who make regular mone-
tary or non-monetary contributions to a fund which is given to each contributor in ro-
317 Bhattamishra et al. (2010): Community-Based Risk Management Arrangements, p. 927f.
318 Sommerfeld et al. (2002): Informal risk-sharing arrangements (IRSAs) in rural Burkina Faso, p. 150.
319 Ibid., p. 149f.
320 Musau, Stephen N. (1999): Community Based Health Insurance. Experiences and Lessons Learned
from East and Southern Africa. PHRplus (Partners for Health Reformplus), USAID. Bethesda, MD,
p. 4. URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACH317.pdf (accessed 2011/09/01).
321 Edgerton, Robert B. (1980): Traditional Treatment for Mental Illness in Africa. A Review. In: Cul -
ture, Medicine and Psychiatry, vol. 4, nr. 2, p. 170.
322 Bhattamishra et al. (2010): Community-Based Risk Management Arrangements, p. 925f.
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tation"323, either randomly or in a predefined turn. The second type, ASCA, refers to
regular contributions to a pool, which can be used more flexibly, either as normal sav-
ings, as loans within the group or as a common pool to pay for shocks in a member's
household.324 Hence, both can serve risk management purposes, while ASCAs have,
due to a common permanent fund, more potential as SRM strategy, RoSCAs also allow
for financial support for a member of the association facing a shock. In such situations,
RoSCAs allocate the funds out of turn to the member in need, extra collections are
started, or assistance of group members beyond the association's purpose are carried
out, as reported by Seibel (2008) on RoSCAs in Nigeria.325 In Burkina Faso, RoSCAs
usually deduct a share from the "common fund towards a loan fund or a contingency
fund from which important risk sharing activities may be financed", such as credit pro-
vision for health care costs of member households.326 
Access to other, formal financial products is more limited and often only accessible
to households working in the formal sector. This is particularly the case in the coun-
tries of Sub-Saharan Africa, as it has one of the smallest financial sectors in the world.
Although there are several imperfections in financial markets in low-income countries,
some market-based SRM strategies from commercial or non-profit institutions can be
accessible for rural and low-income households. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are
among those institutions targeting people working in the informal sector or in rural
areas. They have provided small scale financial services for the target population and
catered to a substantial market in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years. The core services
of MFIs are credit and savings products, but increasingly MFIs additionally provide mi-
croinsurance services.327 Typically, to keep transaction costs low and repayment rates
high, MFIs disperse loans to groups of loan takers and apply group liability and the
loans are meant to be investment loans in small enterprises or micro-enterprises run
by the loan takers. In the meanwhile, many MFIs also provide individual loans and
consumption loans.328 According to Bhattamishra et al. (2010) the liability of the group
to repay the loans is an incentive for group members to provide assistance to other
group members against shocks beyond the contractually defined MFI-related interac-
tions.329 On the other hand, criticism of microfinance was raised when reports became
323 Sommerfeld et al. (2002): Informal risk-sharing arrangements (IRSAs) in rural Burkina Faso, p. 157.
324 Bhattamishra et al. (2010): Community-Based Risk Management Arrangements, p. 926.
325 Seibel (2008): Changing Patterns of Risk Management by Self-Help Organizations of Savings and
Credit. The Nigerian Experience, p. 46.
326 Sommerfeld et al. (2002): Informal risk-sharing arrangements (IRSAs) in rural Burkina Faso, p. 157.
327 Robinson, Marguerite S (2001): The microfinance revolution, 1 edition. Washington, D.C., p. 9.
328 Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz; Morduch, Jonathan (2007): The Economics of Microfinance. MIT
Press. Cambridge, p. 12ff.
329 Bhattamishra et al. (2010): Community-Based Risk Management Arrangements, p. 926.
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public on excessive group pressure to repay loans in MFIs having resulted in suicides
of (overly) indebted borrowers.330 Many microcredit products include mandatory sav-
ings or credit-life insurance, through which the loan is waived if the loan taker dies
and sometimes an additional financial compensation is paid for the spouse and the
family.  The growth rates have been high for microfinance products in Sub-Saharan
Africa during the past years, although the market penetration for low-income house-
holds was only at about 15% in 2008.331 Still, microfinance institutions are, for most
low-income households and those working in the informal sector, the only possibility
to access formal savings and credit services,  as the commercial banking sector has
quite a low outreach. For example, in Ghana and Malawi, the percentage of depositors
at commercial banks in Ghana is at 27.1% and in Malawi at 16.0% of adults. The access
to loans at commercial banks is more restricted, so that only 3.4% of adults are borrow-
ers at commercial banks in Ghana and only 1.6% in Malawi.332
The type and extent of impact of microcredit and microsavings services on individu-
als and households is  still  debated.  In a systematic  literature review,  Stewart et  al.
(2010) identified only 15 impact assessment studies of medium or high quality in Sub-
Saharan African countries.333 Their review extracted few positive impacts consistent
with most of the studies. First, they identified a generally positive impact on wealth, in
the form of increased savings or accumulation of assets.334 Second, they found a gener-
ally positive impact on health,  for example in the form of increased investment in
health (e.g. health insurance), higher expenditure on health care and a positive effect
on the health of children.335 Regarding other types of impacts, the results of the ana-
lyzed studies were mixed. On microcredit and microsavings as SRM strategies, the au-
thors drew the cautious conclusion that "microfinance enables poor people to be better
placed to deal with shocks, but this is not universal (some clients take their children
330 The microfinance crisis was discussed particularly in India. Several (commercial) MFIs urged bor-
rowers into high risk and high debt. Loan officers and loan groups exerted high pressure to repay
loans. Ahmed, Fakhruddin; Brown, Brad; Williams, Susan Perry (2013): Is It Time to Regulate Mi -
crofinance? In: Progress in Development Studies, vol. 13, nr. 3, p. 210 and 212.
331 Women’s  World  Banking  (2008):  Diagnostic  to  Action.  Microfinance  in  Africa,  p.  2f.  URL:
http://collab2.cgap.org//gm/document-1.9.349783/Diagnostic%20to%20Action_%20Microfinance
%20in%20Africa.pdf (accessed 2010/02/09).
332 The World Bank (2014): Data Ghana; The World Bank (2014): Data Malawi.
333 Stewart et al. identified 35 studies in total, but dropped 20 studies from the analysis due to poor
reporting or methodology. Stewart, Ruth; van Rooyen, Carina; Dickson, Kelly; et al. (2010): What
Is the Impact of Microfinance on Poor People? A Systematic Review of Evidence from Sub-Saha-
ran Africa, edited by EPPI Centre, Social Science Research Uni, Insititute of Education University
of London, et al. London, p. 5 and 25.
334 Ibid., p. 31ff.
335 Ibid., pp. 31ff., 34f., 44 and 49.
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out of school)"336. In a panel study by Romero et al. (2011) on the impact of microsav-
ings on coping strategies in Malawi, the authors concluded that they had not found a
significant effect on shock coping behavior.337 With the increased use of microsavings
(in this case from Opportunity International Bank Malawi (OIBM)), the use of coping
strategies  with  high  negative  (long-term)  impact  on the  household  also  increased.
Compared to the situation before  the introduction of  the microsavings product  by
OIBM, both the households' strategy to take no action against adverse shocks and the
use of cash savings decreased, while a reduction in household consumption, increased
labor supply and the depletion of assets increased. Hence, according to the study by
Romero et al., microsavings at OIBM did not lead to an improvement in risk manage-
ment capacities.338
In the social risk management category of risk-sharing, Bhattamishra et al. (2010)
reported  several  arrangements,  particularly  mutual  gift-giving,  informal  credit  ar-
rangements and traditional property rights.339 According to Bhattamishra et al., mutual
gift-giving, inter-household transfers or remittances are very common mechanisms for
risk sharing; their use evidently increases if the household income significantly drops,
as shown by a study from rural Botswana.340 Generally, informal credit arrangements
show a high diversity. Informal state-contingent loans, as reported from Nigeria, are an
example of the repayment duration and interest rate of existing loans varying by the
economic status (i.e. if hit by a shock) of both the borrower and the lender; therefore,
they can serve, to some extent, as an SRM instrument, as they smooth expenses on in-
terest and repayments, depending on the economic well-being of the involved par-
ties.341 In  urban  Malawi,  Devereux  (1999)  reported  that  informal  borrowing  from
friends, employers and moneylenders was very common, and that the practice showed
a significant diversity. Monetary or non-monetary loans between friends and from an
employer were often given as part of reciprocity arrangements at no or low interest
rates and could serve as an informal safety network. However, these support networks
336 By ‘microfinance’ Stewart et al. refer to microsavings and microcredit. Ibid., p. 49.
337 The panel study was conducted for Opportunity International Bank (OIBM) Malawi.  The most
commonly reported adverse economic shocks were loss of livestock, increased prices of food and
input and a drop in crop prices. Romero, José M.; Nagarajan, Geetha (2011): Impact of Microsav -
ings on Shock Coping Strategies in Rural Malawi. IRIS Center, University of Maryland. no place, p.
35ff. URL:  http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m/template.rc/1.9.561786?cid=PSD_MFGate-
wayBulletinEN_W_EXT.
338 Ibid., p. 34ff.
339 Not all reported risk management arrangements have evidence in Sub-Saharan Africa. These are
skipped in this study.
340 Bhattamishra et al. (2010): Community-Based Risk Management Arrangements, p. 924.
341 Ibid., p. 925.
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reached their limit when covariate shocks hit many or all of the households. 342 In com-
parison, loans from moneylenders are less preferred and often used only if other bor-
rowing sources are exhausted, mostly, because interest rates of informal moneylenders
in Malawi can reach a nominal rate of 100%, independent of loan duration.343 Using
empirical data from 1999, Devereux showed that about 40% of households made use of
informal transfers from relatives or friends, but also reported that about 20% of urban
households (about 30% of rural households) experienced refusal of help by relatives or
friends.344
A particular form of gift-giving is a national or international remittance from family
members, relatives, friends or past employers, which may be an important income re-
source for households. Generally, the extent of remittances is often under-estimated as
they are difficult to measure. In 2006, international remittances to Sub-Saharan African
countries were estimated at US$ 9 billion and were, therefore, about 45-65% of formal
transfers.345 Remittances can take the form of regular or irregular cash allowances, the
first being usually independent of any event and the latter more frequently dependent
on certain life-cycle events or shocks experienced by the receiving household. Accord-
ing to Gupta et al. (2009) the majority of remittances aimed to increase or smooth con-
sumption or were for investment in human capital, e.g. education, nutrition and health
care and they concluded that "remittances have a direct poverty-mitigating effect, and
a positive impact on financial development".346 In a study on remittances as a risk-shar-
ing strategy in Ghana, Mazzucato (2008) showed that a share of remittances was sent
to manage shocks. For example, remittances for health care and funerals were of vital
importance for receiving households; remittances for these purposes comprised about
7% of all remittances. However, according to Mazzucato, the vast majority were sent
for the purpose of business (33%), housing (16%), general help (41%), subsistence (20%)
and education (11%).347 In Malawi, using 1998 data, Davies et al. (2009) reported that
over 20% of households received remittances, with an average of 43% of total income
(non-business income). This study found that the single most reason for the use of re-
342 Devereux (1999): Making less last longer, p. 35f.
343 Ibid., p. 36f.
344 Ibid., p. 51.
345 cp. Ibid., p. 37f.; Gupta, Sanjeev; Pattillo, Catherine A.; Wagh, Smita (2009): Effect of Remittances
on Poverty and Financial Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: World Development, vol. 37, nr.
1, p. 105.
346 Gupta et al. (2009): Effect of Remittances on Poverty and Financial Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa, p. 112 and 105.
347 The study uses data from 2003/04 from Ghana-Netherlands migrants. Mazzucato, Valentina (2009):
Informal Insurance Arrangements in Ghanaian Migrants’ Transnational Networks. The Role of Re-
verse Remittances and Geographic Proximity. In: World Development, p. 4f.
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mittances  is  education,  among other  not  further  specifiable  increases  in  consump-
tion.348 Similarly, according to a study by the African Development Bank in 2007, the
most frequent uses for remittances were family expenses, health care and education.349
Regarding national remittances, Devereux (1999) reported that urban to rural remit-
tances were most common, but there were exchanges in both directions, mostly pri-
mary goods (e.g. grain, maize, vegetables and meat) from rural to urban areas and any
kind of manufactured goods from urban to rural areas.350 
Traditional rights systems to common property showed a significant risk manage-
ment element in pastoralist, farming and fishing communities. Land use rights, water
resources and fishing grounds were negotiated and allocated within a community and
also between communities, also on the basis of shocks experienced by households or
communities.351 There is evidence that output from common property production par-
tially is redistributed to poor households and those affected by shocks.352 For example,
several types of rotating labor arrangements were found in rural Burkina Faso for the
purpose of assisting each other in agricultural tasks, as well as for house renovation or
construction. These mechanisms also served risk management purposes, e.g. for sick or
elderly members of the community. Sometimes, in Burkina Faso, the village head or
traditional authority organized collective work for the assistance of a household hit by
a shock (e.g. for agricultural work) or for the construction of public goods, such as
construction or renovation of roads, health centers, schools, or cattle immunization
campaigns etc.353
Funeral or burial societies are more similar to risk-pooling arrangements, following
the terminology of the adapted SRM framework. Contrary to other risk-sharing ar-
rangements, both the membership and rules of a funeral society are usually well-de-
fined; the societies either have a common fund or an expected monetary or in-kind
contribution in case of a death in the society members' households. 354 Cohen et al.
(2005) reported several of such risk-sharing arrangements in their study in Tanzania,
Uganda and Kenya, in the form of burial societies protecting against high funeral costs
and hence providing some protection for the surviving dependents. Cohen et al. also
348 Davies,  Simon; Easaw, Joshy;  Ghoshray,  Atanu (2009):  Mental Accounting and Remittances.  A
Study of Rural Malawian Households. In: Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 30, nr. 3, p. 327f.
349 African Development Bank (2009): Migrant Remittances. A Development Challenge, p. 42f. URL:
http://collab2.cgap.org//gm/document-1.9.349757/Migrant%20Remittances,%20a%20Development
%20Challenge.pdf (accessed 2010/02/05).
350 Devereux (1999): Making less last longer, p. 38, 42 and 50.
351 Bhattamishra et al. (2010): Community-Based Risk Management Arrangements, p. 925.
352 Ibid., p. 927.
353 Sommerfeld et al. (2002): Informal risk-sharing arrangements (IRSAs) in rural Burkina Faso, p. 154.
354 Bhattamishra et al. (2010): Community-Based Risk Management Arrangements, p. 925.
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mentioned the so-called Friends in Need Groups, which are less specific to a particular
risk, but provide support in case of extraordinary shocks. Both types of groups require
payment of dues and provide assistance from the group resources if a more or less de-
fined shocks hits.355 According to Bhattamishra et al. (2010), community-based health
financing, particularly micro health insurance, is often an externally induced arrange-
ment providing risk-pooling for health risks. Micro health insurance, as a social risk
management instrument for health risks and high health care costs based on risk-pool-
ing mechanisms, is discussed more in detail in section 4.3.5. 
 Assessing the effectiveness of informal risk-sharing arrangements (not including
risk-pooling mechanisms such as microinsurance), the World Bank (2001) considered
the insurance effect quite low, although a high frequency of interactions can be identi-
fied.356 Another weakness of many community level SRM strategies was reported by
Cohen et al. (2005), who identified a wealth effect in access to informal groups. Access
to these risk-sharing groups was found to be regressive, since poorer households "often
fall out of informal group-based systems if they cannot keep up with the reciprocal
obligations".357 Along these lines, Dercon showed, in a study in Ethiopia, that there
were indications that risk sharing within the community was less present for house-
holds with only small landholdings.358 On the other hand, access to formal insurance
mechanisms is substantially more restricted, for example, Cohen et al. noted that for-
mal insurance was generally perceived to be only for the rich.359 On the availability of
formal health insurance for rural and low-income households in SSA, see section 4.3.3.
4.3.3. Social health risk management strategies and the sequence of their 
application in Sub-Saharan Africa
As pointed out in section 2.3, health risks have particular risk characteristics. First, all
individuals are exposed to health risks without exception and health risks are often not
predictable. Second, health risks pose a three-fold challenge to households' response
strategies: one challenge stems from the loss of health itself and another from the dou-
ble economic burden of disease resulting from health care expenditures and the third is
indirect costs, including loss of income. Although many SRM strategies are appropriate
as a response to different types of risk (such as saving or borrowing), some SRM strate-
355 Cohen et al. (2005): Reducing vulnerability, p. 398f.
356 The World Bank (2001): Dynamic Risk Management and the Poor. Developing a Social Protection
Strategy for Africa I, p. 16.
357 Cohen et al. (2005): Reducing vulnerability, p. 400.
358 Dercon, Stefan; Krishnan, Pramila (2000): In Sickness and in Health. Risk Sharing within House-
holds in Rural Ethiopia. In: Journal of Political Economy, vol. 108, nr. 4, p. 715 and 722.
359 Cohen et al. (2005): Reducing vulnerability, p. 400.
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gies are particularly or exclusively applied in response to health risks. In this section,
the typical SRM strategies to counter health risks are further analyzed, going from the
household level to the national level. Another focus of this section is the sequence of
the application of household's SRM strategies against health risks.
In a study in the East African countries of Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, Cohen et
al. (2005) identified several typical  pro-active household response strategies for risks
like illness, death or property loss. The reported strategies were primarily self-insur-
ance strategies, such as depleting savings or selling consumer durable goods, and were
followed by informal group mechanisms, such as risk-sharing arrangements. 360 Cohen
et al. (2005) also reported several reactive strategies, such as borrowing from formal
and informal sources, the use of savings and the depletion of assets. An example of a
community-based form of reactive strategies is a local habit in Kenya, so-called haram-
bees, where fund-raising is practiced for households that are hit by a shock; even rais-
ing large sums, e.g. for hospitalization costs.361
In a mixed-methods study on risk coping strategies in Burkina Faso conducted in
1992, Sauerborn et al. (1996) analyzed typical SRM strategies, in case of illness, and
took into consideration the sequence of  the application of  strategies.  According to
Sauerborn et al., the households typically first applied the strategy of using available
cash and savings (including migrant remittances) and gifts from extended family to
pay for health care costs.362 The second most common SRM strategy in Burkina Faso,
which sequentially came after the use of savings, was selling assets and taking loans. 363
Sale of assets was reported to be practiced particularly in the form of livestock sales.364
Loans were frequently taken from extended family, neighbors or friends at low or no
interest (i.e. in the case of loans to kin). In the sequence of strategies, an increase in la -
bor supply, taking up additional income generation activities (such as collecting fire-
wood, building fences, weaving or tailoring) and taking up wage labor were the third
type of strategy pursued by households. Comparatively poor households were an ex-
ception, as they used this type of strategies as the second coping strategy after the use
of savings, which was likely related to their generally low availability of assets and
lack of access to loans.365 Sauerborn et al. (1996) reported that (unlike the evidence for
Malawi, see section 4.3.1) households in Burkina Faso tried to avoid piecework labor
for wages for the reason of avoiding the trade-off between working in their own field
360 Ibid., p. 398f.
361 Ibid.
362 Sauerborn et al. (1996): Household Strategies to Cope with the Economic Costs of Illness, p. 293f.
363 Ibid., p. 296.
364 Ibid., p. 294.
365 Ibid., p. 296.
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or for wages. Going for free health care services, ignoring the illness or forgoing treat-
ment were other reported SRM strategies.366 In Burkina Faso, lost work time due to ill-
ness of a household member was primarily mitigated through the substitution of work
by other household members. The secondary strategy to compensate for lost work time
reported was taking work assistance from other households, hiring labor or restructur-
ing the production so that less work was needed (e.g. change of crops or use of more
pesticides and fertilizer).367
Waelkens (2005)  described the sequence of  SRM strategies in response to health
risks at the household and community levels in Africa. According to her, a typical first
step of ill persons was accessing "local and cheap solutions" such as home remedies
and modern or traditional drugs, which were locally available. In the second step, the
most  convenient  and  accessible  provider  (traditional  or  western  health  care)  was
sought. In case the second step failed, or was inaccessible in terms of financial or op-
portunity costs, health care seeking was postponed.368 Waelkens described self-insur-
ance as a main proactive SRM strategy, on the individual or household level, which
comprised  savings,  calling  in  debts,  or  sale  of  assets.  Community-based  proactive
mechanisms predominantly  belong to  the  group of  informal  risk  sharing  arrange-
ments. In Waelkens' study, these proactive mechanisms ranged from funeral societies,
to 'friends in needs groups', and SACCOs or ROSCAs to "other member-based associa-
tions that give, in return for due contributions, a right to accessing the group resources
for a determined purpose"369.
In a study of informal sector workers in Tanzania, concerning their strategies to
manage health care costs, Munga et al.  (2009) concluded that informal savings net-
works (i.e. ROSCAs) "are significant in not only helping households to cope with finan-
cial shocks caused by malaria but also in overall attempts by the poor […] to disentan-
gle themselves from the medical poverty trap".370 On the other hand, Munga et al. noted
that reactive strategies "such as borrowing from friends and neighbors have a greater
tendency to drag households further into medical poverty".371 However, it was reported
that  proactive  community-level  mechanisms  were  decreasingly  adapted  due  to  a
rapidly changing world and dissolving traditional living situations, which reduced the
366 Ibid., p. 294 and 299.
367 Ibid., p. 295 and 297.
368 Waelkens et al. (2005): The Role of Social Health Protection in Reducing Poverty, p. 16.
369 Ibid.
370 Munga, Michael A.; Gideon, Gilbert M. (2009): Assessment of the Experiences and Coping Strate -
gies of People Working in the Informal Sector in Their Quest to Access Health Care Services. The
Case of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In: Bioscience Trends, vol. 3, nr. 1, p. 13f.
371 Ibid., p. 15.
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effectiveness of informal risk-sharing arrangements, that were based on traditional val-
ues such as kin, extended family or reciprocal structures.372
Reactive strategies, as reported by Waelkens et al., ranged from a pure reallocation
of  household  resources,  or  borrowing small  amounts,  to consumption reduction to
strategies with a longer-term negative effect. Among the strategies negatively affecting
the household long-term were selling productive assets, taking children out of school,
defaulting on loans or taking loans from moneylenders with high interest, and also
drastically reducing food consumption.373
Access to market-based SRM strategies to counter health risks is  generally quite
limited for households who work in the informal sector in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Risk-
pooling mechanisms for low-income households, such as private health insurance, al-
most exclusively target middle- or high-income households. In a study on microinsur-
ance in Africa, Matul et al. (2010) counted only 0.7 million low-income African house-
holds insured for health with a regulated insurance company (i.e. private health insur-
ance) or other risk carrier. Private insurers in Africa covered less than half the number
of households compared to those covered by mutual or community-based health insur-
ance schemes. In total, Matul et al. counted about 1.9 million individuals in Africa, cov-
ered for part of their health risks. Additionally, the regulated insurance companies who
were active in the low-income market tended to focus on the higher end of that mar-
ket.374 Section 4.3.5 provides a more thorough analysis of the number of rural or low-
income individuals covered by health insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa.
In their analysis on private health insurance in low- and middle income countries,
Drechsler et al. (2007) argued that private for-profit health insurance in Sub-Saharan
Africa would likely remain a niche product mostly for high-income individuals in the
foreseeable future and concluded that "private pro-profit insurance will not become a
significant pillar of the health care system of African countries".375 Due to the poor out-
look for private health insurance, Drechsler et al. advised a scaling-up of small-scale
non-profit schemes,376 such as micro health insurance schemes, further described in
section 4.3.5. According to Drechsler et al., an exception for the low permeation of pri -
vate health insurance on the African continent is South Africa, which has an estab-
372 Waelkens et al. (2005): The Role of Social Health Protection in Reducing Poverty, p. 16f.
373 Ibid., p. 17.
374 Matul, Michal; McCord, Michael J.; Phily, Caroline; et al. (2012): The Landscape of Micro Health
Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: Rösner, Hans-Jürgen; Leppert, Gerald; Degens, Philipp; et al.
(eds.): Handbook of Micro Health Insurance in Africa, 1. Lit Verlag. Berlin, p. 68, 74 and 79f.
375 Drechsler, Denis; Jütting, Johannes P. (2007): Chapter 7: Scope, Limitations, and Policy Responses.
In: Preker, Alexander S.; Scheffler, Richard M.; Bassett, Mark C. (eds.): Private Voluntary Health In -
surance in Development. Friend Or Foe. The World Bank. Washington, D.C., p. 196.
376 Ibid., p. 181.
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lished private health insurance market.377 Similarly, in Botswana, private health insur-
ance schemes have a significant outreach.378 Drechsler et al. also mentioned Namibia
and Zimbabwe, whose private health insurance schemes accounted for 22.4% and 18.8%
of total expenditure on health, respectively. This figure showed the concentration of
private health insurance among wealthy groups of society, because only 8% of the pop-
ulation were covered by private health insurance, whose premiums still accounted for
one fifth of the total expenditure on health in Zimbabwe.379 
Health risk management strategies on the national level in Sub-Saharan Africa dif-
fer widely between countries. In terms of health care financing systems, countries ap-
ply a combination of different strategies comprising tax- or donor-financed health fi-
nancing strategies or (mandatory) social health insurance (SHI) (in figure 2 SHI is sub-
sumed under general government expenditure on health), private pre-paid health plans
or private health insurance, and out-of-pocket payments, as well as other private ex-
penditures on health. A closer look at these sources of health care financing in interna-
tional comparison showed a large diversity in the systems, which is presented in figure
2, on the distribution of financing sources.380 The sources shown in this figure add up to
the total expenditure on health (THE) in the respective country. The data showed that
many countries in West and Central Africa, including Ghana, showed comparatively
high shares of out-of-pocket payments, with all their detrimental effects on livelihoods
and systematic inefficiencies, as discussed above in section 2.4.1. On the other hand, in
South African countries,  shares of out-of-pocket payments were comparatively low
and usually corresponded with relatively high levels of general government spending
on health.381 In about half of the countries in SSA (21 countries / 52.5%), governmental
spending on health constituted more than half of the sources for health care. In a few
countries,  governmental  spending  exceeded  70%  of  THE,  the  case  in  Botswana,
Malawi, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Cap Verde and Gabon. On the other side of contin-
uum are 13 countries (32.5%) that had a share of out-of-pocket payments (OOPS) above
377 Drechsler, Denis; Jütting, Johannes P. (2005): Private Health Insurance in Low- and Middle-Income
Countries. Scope, Limitations, and Policy Responses. OECD Development Centre. Issy-les-Moulin-
eaux, p. 195.
378 Swami, Bonu N.; Okurut, Francis N.; Yinusa, Dauda O.; et al. (2012): Problems and Prospects of Mi-
cro Health Insurance. Case Study of Itekanele Medic Aid Scheme in Botswana. In: Rösner, Hans-
Jürgen;  Leppert,  Gerald;  Degens,  Philipp; et al.  (eds.):  Handbook of Micro Health Insurance in
Africa, 1. Lit Verlag. Berlin [a.o.], p. 96.
379 Drechsler et al. (2007): Chapter 7: Scope, Limitations, and Policy Responses, p. 195.
380 The figure was taken from a previously published article by the author. Leppert (2012): Financing
Health Care. The Role of Micro Health Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 179.
381 An exception is South Africa where private prepaid plans have a large share of total expenditure
on health in comparison to other African countries, followed by Namibia.
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50%, including Ghana. The share of OOPS even exceeded 70% in two countries, Bu-
rundi and Guinea. However, it needed to be noted that the distribution of sources of
total health expenditure neither gives information about the absolute value of THE nor
the quality of care provided, which is often a concern in systems with predominant
provision of health care by public health care providers. As discussed above, OOPS and
spot market transactions between users and health care providers are regressive and
have negative side effects, such as catastrophic health care costs and the exclusion of
the poor from health care utilization. In order to avoid OOPS, two main mechanisms
90
Source: author, Data from WHo, Statistical Information System 2008.
Fig. 2: Sources of health care financing
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were established during the 19th and 20th century, country-wide health insurance/SHI
and subsidy-based financing, both common health care financing mechanisms in in-
dustrialized countries.382 As intensively discussed in other parts of this study, health in-
surance is a strategy recommended by many researchers and development practition-
ers.  Subsidy-based financing,  which  is  often more recently  in development  context
termed user fee abolition, also brought improvements to access to health care and in-
creased utilization.383
The large diversity in health care financing and health risk management strategies
in Sub-Saharan Africa, as shown in figure  2, have historic roots; they are a result of
colonial structures, post-colonial constraints, patterns of path-dependency and spatial
innovation diffusion processes. The subsequent section  4.3.4 analyzes national health
risk management strategies and the emergence of micro health insurance from a his-
toric viewpoint.
4.3.4. History and trends in health care financing systems in Sub-Saharan 
Africa384
In colonial times, mainly mission-owned hospitals, whose numbers often exceeded the
number of government-owned hospitals, offered (mostly) free health care to the local
population. These missionary hospitals offered their services together with their mis-
sionary beliefs, leading to dependency and a widespread antipathy amongst the local
population. Furthermore, early missions were often “directly instrumental to colonial-
ist intervention”.385 In comparison, public health care institutions for the local popula-
tion were mainly established after the First World War, when colonial governments
started to overtake responsibility for African health care. In general, health policy was
closely linked to the colonies’ economic function within colonial rule and a proper
health status of the population served as a means to economic and missionary goals,
rather than as an intrinsic aim by itself. Therefore, (rudimentary) established public
health care services aimed predominantly at strengthening imperial rule, by maintain-
382 Preker, Alexander S.; Langenbrunner, Jack; Jakab, Melitta (2002): Rich-Poor Differences in Health
Care Financing. In: Dror, David M.; Preker, Alexander S. (eds.): Social Re Insurance. A New Ap-
proach to Sustainable Community Health Financing. The World Bank. Washington, D.C., p. 22.
383 Ridde, Valéry; Morestin, Florence (2011): A Scoping Review of the Literature on the Abolition of
User Fees in Health Care Services in Africa. In: Health Policy and Planning, vol. 26, nr. 1, p. 9f.
384 This section is partially based on a previously published article by the author, but contains many
changes:  Leppert,  Gerald;  Degens,  Philipp;  Ouedraogo,  Lisa-Marie  (2012):  Emergence of Micro
Health  Insurance  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  In:  Rösner,  Hans-Jürgen;  Leppert,  Gerald;  Degens,
Philipp; et al. (eds.): Handbook of Micro Health Insurance in Africa. LIT Verlag. Berlin.
385 Good,  Charles  M.  (1991):  Pioneer Medical  Missions  in  Colonial  Africa.  In:  Social  Science and
Medicine, vol. 32, nr. 1, p. 2.
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ing the health of the local workforce in the agricultural, mining and military sectors.
In addition, colonialists regarded providing health care as one element of the racist
western "civilizing mission".386
After regaining their independence in the 1950s and 1960s, many African countries
aimed to provide free or heavily subsidized health care, following the slogan "health
for all", similar to the British tax-based Beveridge-model.387 Yet, most countries did not
focus on contribution-based systems, such as (compulsory) social health insurance in
the form of the Bismarck model.388 The 1979 Alma-Ata Declaration further emphasized
the aim of  universal  health care  provision.389 However,  public  health care  facilities
rarely stretched beyond urban areas and mining enclaves; rural areas were often only
served by missionary providers who had been subsequently starting to charge user
fees, due to the increasing concerns of cost recovery.390 Furthermore, over the years,
budgetary constraints, mainly resulting from narrow tax income, contributed to low
quality of health care provision, long waiting periods and non-availability of essential
drugs.391 
In addition, as a result of the structural adjustment policies by the World Bank and
the IMF in the 1980s, public spending was further reduced in order to achieve eco-
nomic recovery in developing countries.392 Hence, African governments were forced to
decrease their spending on health and education in favor of serving common debts.393
As a result, many African governments failed to provide better access to quality health
386 see Ibid., p. 1f.; Worboys, Michael (2000): The Colonial World as Mission and Mandate. Leprosy
and Empire, 1900-1940. In: Osiris, vol. 15, pp. 211–213.
387 Criel, Bart (1998): District-Based Health Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa, Vol. I, vol. 9. Studies in
Health Services Organisation & Policy, Part I: From Theory to Practise. ITG Press. Antwerp, p. 1.
388 see  Ron,  Aviva;  Abel-Smith,  Brian;  Tamburi,  Giovanni (1990):  Health Insurance in Developing
Countries. The Social Security Approach. International Labour Office. Geneva, p. 16.
389 Dror, David M.; Preker, Alexander S.; Jakab, Melitta (2002): The Role of Communities in Combat-
ing Social Exclusion. In: Dror, David M.; Preker, Alexander S. (eds.): Social Re Insurance. A New
Approach to Sustainable Community Health Financing.  World Bank Publications.  Washington,
D.C., p. 42f.
390 Atim, Chris (1998): The Contribution of Mutual Health Organizations to Financing, Delivery, and
Access to Health Care. Synthesis of Research in Nine West and Central African Countries. Techni-
cal Report. Partnerships for Health Reform Project, Abt Associates Inc., USAID. Bethesda, p. 1.
URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACH273.pdf (accessed 2010/04/01).
391 Criel (1998): District-Based Health Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa, Vol. I, p. 1.
392 Arhinful, Daniel Kojo (2003): The Solidarity of Self-Interest. Social and Cultural Feasibility of Rural
Health Insurance in Ghana, vol. 2003. African Studies Centre - Research Report. PrintPartners Ip -
skamp B.V., Enschede. Leiden, p. 46f.
393 Naiman, Robert; Watkins, Neil (1999): A Survey of the Impacts of IMF Structural Adjustment in
Africa.  Growth,  Social  Spending  and  Debt  Relief.  URL:  http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/
jspui/handle/12304560789/7914 (accessed 2012/09/30).
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care, undermining achievements they had made.394 In 1987, the Bamako initiative – co-
ordinated by African ministers of health and initiated by the WHO and UNICEF –
aimed at (and partially achieved) improving access to essential drugs and improving
quality  of  health  care  facilities.395 In  order  to  stabilize  the  income  of  health  care
providers, the commonly called “fee for service” or “cash and carry” system was intro-
duced, making the patients pay out-of-pocket for most of the treatment. By 1993, al-
most all  countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had introduced some form of user fees.396
Hence, the reduced public commitment to social health risk management on the na-
tional level resulted in an increased burden of health risks on the household- and com-
munity-levels. Redundancy of SRM on multiple levels, as mentioned in section 3.2, was
undermined, leaving households without support and backup mechanisms in SRM on
higher levels; a gap which could be only partially filled by charitable providers offering
services at or below cost recovery thresholds and by other local or employer initia -
tives.
Over the last  twenty years,  several  studies confirmed negative effects of  out-of-
pocket payments. Extensive out-of-pocket-payments pose a large financial burden to
the population, lead to an overall reduced utilization of health care services and ulti-
mately to an exclusion of the poor segments of society.397 For example, Asfaw et al. ex-
amined the effects of user fees in rural areas of Ethiopia and concluded that they “have
a very strong negative impact on the utilization of health care services”, especially
among the poor.398 
However, the Bamako initiative not only endorsed the introduction of user fees, but
also emphasized the self-responsibility of communities, decentralization, community
control and the introduction of community-based micro health insurance schemes.399
Hence, MHI schemes were promoted to fill the gap of health care financing left by gov-
394 Olukoshi, Adebayo O. (1996): Extending the Frontiers of Structural Adjustment Research in Africa:
Some notes on the Objectives of Phase II  of  the NAI Research Programme.  In: Gibbon, Peter;
Olukoshi, Adebayo O. (eds.): Structural Adjustment and Socio-Economic Change in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Some Conceptual, Methodological and Research Issues, vol. 102. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet
research report. Motala, p. 62.
395 Criel (1998): District-Based Health Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa, Vol. I, p. 40f.
396 Atim (1998): The Contribution of Mutual Health Organizations to Financing, Delivery, and Access
to Health Care, p. 2.
397 Leive et al. (2008): Coping with out-of-pocket health payments; Lagarde, Mylene; Palmer, Natasha
(2008): The Impact of User Fees on Health Service Utilization in Low- and Middle-Income Coun-
tries. How Strong Is the Evidence? In: Bulletin of the World Health Organization, vol. 86, nr. 11;
Asfaw, Abay; von Braun, Joachim; Klasen, Stephan (2004): How Big is the Crowding-Out Effect of
User Fees in the Rural Areas of Ethiopia? Implications for Equity and Resources Mobilization. In:
World Development, vol. 32, nr. 12.
398 Asfaw et  al.  (2004):  How Big  is  the  Crowding-Out Effect  of  User  Fees  in  the  Rural  Areas  of
Ethiopia?, p. 2077.
93
4. Risks And Social Risk Management In Sub-Saharan Africa
ernments'  decisions  to  rely  on  user  fees  as  financing  mechanism.  Numerous  MHI
schemes have been initiated in Sub-Saharan African countries over the past 25 years
(see subsequent section  4.3.5), that operated either independently from any govern-
ment effort or with (limited) government support. In those countries of SSA, where so-
cial health insurance schemes were established, they almost exclusively targeted indi-
viduals and households working in the formal sector; hence, access to these financing
schemes often does not exceed 5% of society.400 The largest share of society works in
the informal sector and tends to be excluded from these traditional social insurance
mechanisms.401
As already mentioned in section 3.1 on the development of the SRM framework, so-
cial protection in health has been seen as an increasingly important building block in
order to achieve economic growth and poverty reduction.402 After 2000, and at the lat-
est  since  the  World  Health  Report  2010,  the  international  focus  has  increasingly
adopted the goal to achieve universal health care coverage by ensuring that health care
services are accessible to all people without financial barriers. Hence, the report claims
that countries "must raise sufficient funds, reduce the reliance on direct payments to
finance services, and improve efficiency and equity."403 
This refocus in international health policies has led to increased efforts in many
low- and middle income countries to implement more equitable health interventions
(e.g. in Malaria control, maternity and child care)404 and to extend risk pools by either
improving tax-based health financing systems or by implementing social health insur-
ance schemes  for  the formal  sector  and/or  the informal sector.  However,  evidence
399 see McPake, Barbara; Hanson, Kara; Mills, Anne (1993): Community Financing of Health Care in
Africa. An Evaluation of the Bamako Initiative. In: Social Science and Medicine, vol. 36, nr. 11, p.
1383.
400 Xaba, Jantjie; Horn, Pat; Motala, Shirin (2002): The Informal Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa. Employ-
ment  Sector  2002/10.  International  Labour  Office.  Geneva.  URL:  www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_1220204.pdf (accessed 2014/09/30).
401 On average the informal economy accounts for about 80 per cent of non-agricultural employment
in African countries, International Labour Office (2002): Decent Work and the Informal Economy,
p. 1.
402 cp. Arhin-Tenkorang, Dyna (2001): Health Insurance for the Informal Sector in Africa. Design Fea-
tures,  Risk  Protection,  and  Resource  Mobilization.  HNP  Discussion  Papers.  The World  Bank.
Washington, D.C.
403 WHO (2010): The World Health Report 2010. Health Systems Financing. The Path to Universal
Coverage. World Health Organization. Geneva, p.  xi.  URL:  http://www.who.int/whr/2010/en/in-
dex.html (accessed 2012/02/14).
404 De Allegri, Manuela; Louis, Valérie R; Tiendrébeogo, Justin; et al. (2012): Moving Towards Univer-
sal Coverage with Malaria Control Interventions. Achievements and Challenges in Rural Burkina
Faso. In: The International Journal of Health Planning and Management; Yates, Rob (2010): Women
and Children First.  An Appropriate First  Step towards Universal Coverage.  In:  Bulletin of  the
World Health Organization, vol. 88, nr. 6.
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showed that these efforts differ significantly with regard to the target population (i.e.
outreach of programs to low-income households and informal sector workers), covered
services and the extent of cost coverage. Also, the organizational structure differs be-
tween countries. Programs are either extensions of formal sector programs, systems
built on MHI schemes and experience or green-field programs with national roll-out
structures. Also, the programs differ in the source of financing, as newer schemes are
based on general government revenues, with or without payroll contributions by for-
mal sector employees, household insurance premiums, or on an ear-marked share of
the VAT.405
4.3.5. Micro health insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa406
As discussed above,  poor or  low-income households  are most vulnerable to health
risks  but  less  protected  against  the  consequences.  Informal  community-level  SRM
strategies, such as risk-sharing arrangements, have their limitations and essential pub-
lic- or marked-based SRM strategies fail or are inaccessible for the target population.
This is the case, for example, for social health insurance schemes in most countries of
SSA.
On the other hand, micro health insurance explicitly targets rural and urban low-in-
come households working in the informal economy and helps them access an SRM
strategy applying risk pooling mechanisms, in order to reduce the risk of catastrophic
health care costs. Thus, micro health insurance is defined as a risk management institu-
tion for the low-income population (mostly working in the informal sector) that covers
the costs of certain predefined illness-related losses (= limited benefit package) to a cer-
tain extent (= limited coverage). The key feature of micro health insurance is that the
premium is prepaid on a regular basis before the illness-related event occurs. The pre-
mium is calculated to be affordable to the low-income population. Like any insurance,
micro health insurance units apply risk pooling between good and bad risks, based on
the fact that health risks are inter-temporally and inter-personally distributed. Due to
being embedded in local communities, the benefits of risk pooling can reach rural and
remote areas and low-income households with comparably low transaction costs. Fur-
thermore, the schemes act in several other functions, such as the implementation of
405 Lagomarsino,  Gina;  Garabrant,  Alice;  Adyas,  Atikah;  et  al.  (2012):  Moving  towards  Universal
Health Coverage. Health Insurance Reforms in Nine Developing Countries in Africa and Asia. In:
The Lancet, vol. 380, nr. 9845, p. 935 and 939ff.
406 This section is partially based on a previously published article by the author, but contains sub -
stantial changes and large parts have been rewritten: Leppert (2012): Financing Health Care. The
Role of Micro Health Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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hygiene  and  sanitation  measures,  prevention,  health  education  and  control  of  the
health services market by observing prices and quality. There is increasing evidence
that micro health insurance units can serve as an effective SRM strategy to cope with
catastrophic  health  care  costs  and,  thus,  can  avoid  households  falling  below  the
poverty  line.  Furthermore,  there  is  little  doubt  that  most  micro  health  insurance
schemes have improved access to health care services for their members.407 
Generally, micro health insurance units operate in a wide variety of organizational
forms.408 Out of the five different models identified,409 the most relevant models are the
mutual model, the provider-based model and the partner-agent model. In the mutual
model, following the cooperative principles, the members of the insurance scheme are
both  policyholders  and  owners  and  the  risk-bearing  entity.  This  type  of  member-
owned institution is not-for-profit and usually built on democratic principles; members
are involved in some or all decisions of the organization. A functioning mutual health
insurance scheme requires some level  of active participation of its  members.410 The
members bear the financial risk and profits remain in the organization. Local coopera-
tives, communities and self-help organizations running an insurance scheme are exam-
ples of this mutual model.411 In the provider-based model, health care providers (private
or charitable clinics or  hospitals)  offer prepaid insurance for  their  clients, entitling
them to use their services to a certain extent for free or at a reduced rate. The primary
motivation of the provider is either to increase profit or, in case of a not-for-profit or
charitable hospital, to improve cost recovery, smoothing of income flows and improved
access to its services for low-income households. In the partner-agent model, an NGO,
microfinance institution, or local organization (agent) teams up with a commercial in-
surance company (partner) in order to provide insurance services for their member-
ship. Both risks and profits are borne by the insurance company. From the insurer's
407 De Allegri, Manuela; Sauerborn, Rainer; Kouyate, Bocar; et al. (2009): Community Health Insur-
ance in Sub-Saharan Africa. What Operational Difficulties Hamper Its Successful Development?
In: Tropical Medicine and International Health, vol. 14, nr. 5, p. 593.
408 For a thorough discussion of different types of micro health insurance, see: Leppert et al. (2012):
Emergence of Micro Health Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa, pp. 39–46; Radermacher, Ralf; Dror,
Iddo (2006): Institutional Options for Delivering Health Microinsurance. In: Churchill, Craig (ed.):
Protecting the Poor.  A Microinsurance Compendium. International Labour Office / Munich Re
Foundation. Geneva, Munich.
409 Leppert et al. (2012): Emergence of Micro Health Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 40.
410 Leppert, Gerald; Müller, Verena (2008): Stellenwert von Partizipation in kooperativen Formen des
Risikomanagements in Entwicklungsgesellschaften - eine Analyse anhand von Mikrokrankenver-
sicherungen. In: Zeitschrift für das gesamte Genossenschaftswesen, vol. Sonderheft 2008, p. 111f.
411 Fischer,  Klaus;  Qureshi,  Zahid (2006):  Cooperatives  and Insurance.  The Mutual  Advantage.  In:
Churchill, Craig (ed.): Protecting the Poor - A Microinsurance Compendium. International Labour
Office / Munich Re Foundation. Geneva / Munich, pp. 336–356.
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point of view, the agent allows the selling of policies at low transaction costs, as the
agent carries out product sales and servicing.
In  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  the  first  two  MHI  models  –  the  mutual  model  and  the
provider-based model – play a particularly significant role. Since the introduction of
user fees, their increased development can be seen as a result of failing health care fi -
nancing systems in Sub-Saharan Africa and also of failing private insurance markets,
as described above. Hence, households working in the informal economy were con-
fronted with high user fees and a far reaching exclusion from access to health care (see
discussion in section 4.3.4). As a consequence, many MHI schemes have been founded
aimed at ameliorating the pressing financial situation of low-income people and to im-
prove access to health care. 
While few pre-payment schemes existed in the 1970s, many health care financing
schemes applying insurance principles were initiated in the late 1980s and increasingly
in the 1990s. Many of these schemes were founded by faith-based organizations and as
an extension of charitable hospitals that needed to improve their cost recovery. Some
MHI schemes were initiated as mutual health insurance schemes without close rela-
tionship to a health care provider and with or without external or governmental sup-
port. In West and Central Africa – Benin, Burkina Faso, D.R. Congo, Ghana, Guinea,
Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal – MHI schemes appeared in the late 1980s and
first half of the 1990s; with their emergence in Cameroon, Niger and Mauritania start-
ing  more  recently.412 In  East  Africa,  micro  health  insurance  grew considerably  in
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda as a response to the introduction of user fees for health
care services.413
4.3.5.1. Outreach and roles of micro health insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa
Micro health insurance increasingly plays a role in health care financing in many Sub-
Saharan  countries.414 In  total,  over  14  million  (about  1.8%)  people  in  Sub-Saharan
Africa, mostly those working in the informal sector, were covered by a micro health
insurance scheme or by national health care financing systems incorporating micro
health insurance, in 2009. Micro health insurance schemes, narrowly defined as those
entities independent from national governments, cover about 2.1 million individuals in
412 Criel, Bart; Waelkens, Maria-Pia; Soors, Werner; et al. (2008): Community Health Insurance in De-
veloping Countries,  International Encyclopedia of Public Health, vol.  1, p.  784f.;  see also Atim
(1998): The Contribution of Mutual Health Organizations to Financing, Delivery, and Access to
Health Care, p. 15ff.; Fonteneau, Bénédicte (1999): L’émergence de pratiques d’économie sociale en
matière de financement de la santé au Burkina Faso. Catholic University of Leuven. Leuven, p. 32.
413 Musau (1999): Community Based Health Insurance, p. 2ff.
414 Criel et al. (2008): Community Health Insurance in Developing Countries.
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Sub-Saharan Africa,415 while national health care financing on the basis of micro health
insurance schemes in Ghana, Rwanda and Tanzania cover, 12.2 million people. Criel et
al. (2008) still counted this form of health insurance, where governments implement
community-based schemes on a district level, as micro health insurance, although they
argued that many aspects in these schemes resemble social health insurance arrange-
ments.416 
Comparing the number of covered individuals in SSA to other regions of the world
(e.g. South Asia, South East Asia and Latin America), MHI (and health insurance in
general) is still in its nascent stage in most Sub-Saharan African countries. In order to
give an overview of the landscape of micro health insurance in Africa, a comprehen-
sive review of literature and case studies was conducted.
Figure 3 shows the geographical distribution of micro health insurance in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa. Three main clusters of MHI can be identified, which also differ by the main
type of micro health insurance in these countries. Looking at the emergence of micro
health insurance in these clusters, it is observable that certain spatial diffusion pro-
cesses on innovation and information on 'micro health insurance' played an important
role in its development. 
The largest cluster of MHI can be identified in the countries of West Africa and
some countries bordering Central Africa. The francophone West African countries, but
also English-speaking West African countries and neighboring countries in Central
Africa, have an especially strong history of mutual health organizations, also termed
community-based  health  insurance  or  mutuelles  de  santé.  For  example,  the  West
African network of mutual health organizations La Concertation reported a sixfold in-
crease in the number of schemes from 1997-2003 in the West African Economic and
Monetary Union (UMEOA).417 In the West African cluster, only Ghana successfully in-
tegrated existing micro health insurance schemes into a national health care financing
strategy (for  further discussion of  the  Ghanaian system,  see  page  103 and section
4.3.6.1).
415 In the aforementioned study by Matul et al. (2012) using a different methodological approach, the
authors  counted in  total  1.9  million low-income individuals  in Africa that  were  covered with
health insurance in 2010. See: Matul et al. (2012): The Landscape of Micro Health Insurance in Sub-
Saharan Africa, p. 65f.
416 Criel et al. (2008): Community Health Insurance in Developing Countries, p. 783f.
417 La Concertation (2004): Inventaire des mutuelles de santé en Afrique - Synthèse des travaux de
recherche  dans  11  pays.  URL:  http://www.ilo.org/gimi/  RessFileDownload.do?
ressourceId=82&ressFilename=82.pdf&sizeKb=6340377&longTitle=Inventaire+des+syst%E8mes+d
%27assurance+maladie+en+Afrique%3A+synth
%E8se+des+travaux+de+recherche+dans+11+pays&author=La+Concertation&ressYear=2004 (ac-
cessed 2010/02/09).
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A few countries in East Africa, particularly Kenya and Uganda, also have a base of mu-
tual health insurance schemes.418 However, in East Africa and Central Africa (i.e. D.R.
Congo), the movement of mutual health organizations was never as strong as in the
West African countries. In the East-African and Central-African cluster, other types of
MHI are more prominent. There, “health care providers and governments play a promi-
nent role in the launch and management of [micro health insurance] schemes”.419 Typi-
418 Basaza, Robert; Pariyo, George; Criel, Bart (2009): What Are the Emerging Features of Community
Health Insurance Schemes in East Africa? In: Risk Management and Healthcare Policy, vol. 2, p.
48f.; Halvorson, George C. (2007): Health Care Co-Ops in Uganda. Effectively Launching Micro
Health Groups in African Villages. Permanente Press. Oakland, p. 124 and 151.
419 Criel et al. (2008): Community Health Insurance in Developing Countries, p. 786.
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cal examples for this development path are Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda,420 but also D.
R. Congo, where, for example, the Bwamanda hospital founded a micro health insur-
ance scheme in 1986 and successfully operates it with over 1000 00 members .421 Matul
et al. (2012) reported that private health insurance also played an increasing role in
East Africa, where insurance companies increasingly also offered products suitable for
the informal sector or engage in partner-agent models with community-based organi-
zations or NGOs that provided health insurance for their members, an example being
Microcare Insurance Ltd. In Uganda.422
The third distinct cluster of MHI is located in the wealthier countries of Southern
Africa, where private health insurance has a larger outreach and a higher relevance in
the national health care system. Particularly, South Africa has a long history of estab-
lished mutual schemes (Medical Schemes), which operate as registered and regulated
insurers, and for-profit health insurance providers. Although these schemes predomi-
nantly target high- and middle-income formal sector employees, a few of them also
offer insurance products for households working in the informal economy. However,
about 86% of the population in South Africa rely on tax-funded health services or out-
of-pocket payments.423 In Botswana, one private health insurance company, Itekanele
Medic Aid explicitly targets informal sector households.424 As already mentioned in
section 4.3.3, Namibia and Zimbabwe also have a sizable private health insurance mar-
ket;  however,  health  insurance  schemes  in  these  countries  predominantly  serve
wealthy formal sector employees. Matul et al. (2012) reported that regulated private in-
surers are the most significant player in the low-income market in these countries of
420 Musau (1999):  Community Based Health Insurance,  p.  xi;  Basaza,  Robert;  Criel,  Bart;  Van der
Stuyft, Patrick (2007): Low Enrolment in Ugandan Community Health Insurance Schemes Under-
lying Causes and Policy Implications. In: BMC Health Services Research, vol. 7, nr. 105, p. 106.
421 CDI Bwamanda (2012): Health Insurance. CDI-Bwamanda Website. URL: http://www.cdibwaman-
da.com/website/main/en/?mid=Healthcare&sid=HealthInsurance (accessed  2012/09/30);  Criel,
Bart; Kegels,  Guy (1997): A Health Insurance Scheme for Hospital Care in Bwamanda District,
Zaire. Lessons and Questions After 10 Years of Functioning. In: Tropical Medicine and Interna-
tional Health, vol. 2, nr. 7.
422 Matul  et  al.  (2012):  The Landscape  of  Micro  Health  Insurance  in  Sub-Saharan Africa,  p.  74f.;
Dekker, Marleen; Wilms, Annegien (2009): Health Insurance and Other Risk-Coping Strategies in
Uganda. The Case of Microcare Insurance Ltd. In: World Development, vol. 38, p. 370f.
423 McIntyre, Diane; Garshong, Bertha; Mtei,  Gemini; et al.  (2008):  Beyond Fragmentation and to -
wards Universal Coverage. Insights from Ghana, South Africa and the United Republic of Tanza-
nia. In: Bulletin of the World Health Organization, vol. 86, nr. 11, p. B; Söderlund, Neil; Hansl, Bir -
git (2000): Health Insurance in South Africa. An Empirical Analysis of Trends in Risk-Pooling and
Efficiency Following Deregulation. In: Health Policy and Planning, vol. 15, nr. 4, p. 378f.
424 Rohrdantz,  Lisa-Marie;  Degens,  Philipp  (2009):  Report  qualitative  field  research  in  Botswana
03/2009, Unpublished report in the project Pro-MHI-Africa.;  Swami et al. (2012): Problems and
Prospects of Micro Health Insurance. Case Study of Itekanele Medic Aid Scheme in Botswana.
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Southern Africa.425 A more recent trend in the East African cluster, namely Rwanda
and Tanzania, is the integration of micro health insurance schemes into a nationwide
health care financing strategy – similarly to the aforementioned case of Ghana (for
further discussion, see page 103).426
Table  5 summarizes the evidence of micro health insurance schemes and their co-
verage. Some numbers in the table are rather vague as there was no sufficient data
available for some countries.427
In general,  table  5 reveals  that  micro  health  insurance  schemes  in  francophone
African  countries  are  more  prominent  and  have  a  larger  coverage  than  in  other
African countries. There are at least three reasons for the increased adoption in franco-
phone African countries. First, West African countries show comparatively high levels
of out-of-pocket payments (see figure  5);  second, most schemes strongly emphasize
solidarity values among members (often in connection with and based on traditional
solidarity arrangements) and third, Belgian and French in particular, but also Danish
and Swedish NGOs, mutual societies and development agencies have been strongly
supporting the development of mutual health insurance schemes promoting values like
solidarity and  “mutualité”.428 Overall, outreach of MHI remains comparatively low in
Sub-Saharan Africa and schemes operate on a relatively small scale in terms of mem-
ber base and risk pool size. 
425 Matul et al. (2012): The Landscape of Micro Health Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 74f.
426 Logie, Dorothy E.; Rowson, Michael; Ndagije, Felix (2008): Innovations in Rwanda’s Health Sys-
tem. Looking to the Future. In: The Lancet,  vol.  372, nr. 9634; Japan International Cooperation
Agency (2008): Local Level Service Delivery, Decentralisation and Governance.  A Comparative
Study  of  Uganda,  Kenya  and  Tanzania  Education,  Health  and  Agriculture  Sectors.  URL:
https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/study/topical/tanzania/pdf/001.pdf (accessed
2010/02/09).
427 No evidence for micro health insurance could be found for following countries: Angola, Central
African Republic, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia,
Malawi, Mozambique, Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
428 Criel et al. (2008): Community Health Insurance in Developing Countries, p. 784.
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Tab. 5: Micro health insurance units in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2009 (independent entities)
Country Peoplecovered
Func-
tional 
schemes
Remarks on Sources
Benin 410428 42 Atim 1998, ILO 2000, Ndiaye 2007
Botswana 120 00 1 Rohrdantz 2009
Burkina Faso > 200 00 81 ILO 2000, Bere/Kabore 2005, Ndiaye 2007, Roth 2007, Criel 2008
Cameroon 510637 47 ILO 2000, Ndiaye 2007, La Concertation 2007
Chad 1775 7 Moutade Naimbaye 2003, Ndiaye 2007
DR Congo > 1140465 28 Atim 1998, Criel 1998, Musau 1999, Arhin-Tenkorang 2001
Guinea 840820 55 Arhin-Tenkorang 2001, Ndiaye 2007
Guinea-Bissau 400400 1 Arhin-Tenkorang 2001, Waelkens 2004
Ivory Coast 5270670 36 Atim 1998, Ndiaye 2007
Kenya > 660500 32 Musau 1999, ILO 2000, McCord 2007, Criel 2008
Mali 4690815 51 Atim 1998, ILO 2000, Ndiaye 2007
Mauritania 130 55 3 Ndiaye 2007
Niger 490868 9 Ndiaye 2007
Nigeria > 680300 3 Atim 1998
Senegal 3080563 79 Atim 1998, ILO 2000, Ndiaye 2007
South Africa > 1340827 3 // 180 ILO 2000, Söderlund 2000 (medical schemes mostly formal sector)
Togo 200 11 9 ILO 2000, Ndiaye 2007
Uganda 400 00 14 Musau 1999, ILO 2000, Roth 2007, Smith 2009, Basaza 2008
Total: > 206650144 > 561
Sources: own calculation based on literature review429
429 Atim (1998): The Contribution of Mutual Health Organizations to Financing, Delivery, and Access
to Health Care; International Labour Organization (2000):  Health Micro-Insurance. A Compen-
dium. Geneva; Ndiaye, Pascal; Soors, Werner; Criel, Bart (2007): Editorial: A View from Beneath.
Community Health Insurance in Africa. In: Tropical Medicine and International Health, vol. 12, nr.
2; Rohrdantz et al. (2009): Report qualitative field research in Botswana 03/2009, Unpublished re-
port  in  the  project  Pro-MHI-Africa.;  Bere/Kabore,  Yolande Sévérine  (2005):  État  des  lieux  des
mutuelles de Santé au Burkina Faso. URL: http://learning.itcilo.org/ilo/step/clones/doc/mutuelles-
desante/Diagnostic%20mutuelles%2020 05%20BURKINA.pdf (accessed 2010/02/09); Roth, Jim; Mc-
Cord, Michael J.; Liber, Dominic (2007): The Landscape of Microinsurance in the World’s Poorest
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However, some governments have endorsed the concept and support MHI units in dif -
ferent ways. In Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Senegal, governments acknowledge
micro health insurance units, subsidize, regulate and support them.430 As already men-
tioned above, Ghana, Rwanda and Tanzania went a step further and integrated micro
health insurance schemes into their  national  health care  financing strategies;  MHI
schemes became part of public social protection and the governments initiated new
schemes on the basis of the original MHI principles.431 The original design ideas of
these systems included decentralized operating micro health insurance schemes on the
local or district-level, with involvement of the communities under national regulation
and coordination. Some other countries considered and developed similar strategies,
e.g. Burkina Faso.432 Burundi implemented – with limited success – another strategy
100 Countries. MicroInsurance Centre. no place. URL:  http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/
document-1.9.291795/400285_file_15.pdf (accessed  2011/10/28);  Criel  et  al.  (2008):  Community
Health Insurance in Developing Countries; La Concertation (2006): Résultats de l’inventaire 2007.
URL:  http://www.concertation.org/gimi/  concertation/InventoryShowSearchStat.do (accessed
2010/02/09); Moutade Naimbaye, Thomas (2003): Inventaire des systèmes d’assurance maladie en
Afrique - Rapport du Tchad.  URL:  http://www.ilo.org/gimi/concertation/resource.do?page=/con-
certation/publications/carte/  tchad/Etudes_3033003730 26_100110.pdf (accessed  2010/02/09);  Criel,
Bart (1998):  District-Based Health Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa,  Vol.  II,  vol.  10.  Studies  in
Health Services Organisation & Policy, Part II: Case Studies. ITG Press. Antwerp; Musau (1999):
Community Based Health Insurance; Arhin-Tenkorang (2001): Health Insurance for the Informal
Sector in Africa. Design Features, Risk Protection, and Resource Mobilization; Waelkens, Maria-
Pia;  Criel,  Bart (2004):  Les  Mutuelles  de Santé en Afrique Sub-Saharienne -  État des Lieux  et
Réflexions  sur  un  Agenda  de  Recherche.  Health,  Nutrition  and  Population  Discussion  Paper.
World Bank. no place. URL: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPU-
LATION/Resources/2810627-10 95069801400167/Waelkens-LesMutuelles-whole.pdf (accessed
2010/02/09);  McCord,  Michael  J.  (2007):  Supplying  Health  Microinsurance.  Lessons  from  East
Africa. In: International Journal of Public Administration, vol. 30, nr. 8/9; Söderlund et al. (2000):
Health insurance in South Africa; Smith, Anja; Hendrie, Simon; Bester, Hennie; et al. (2009): Mak-
ing Insurance Markets Work for the Poor. Microinsurance Policy,  Regulation and Supervision.
Uganda Case Study. Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Working Group on Microinsurance. no
place; Basaza, Robert; Criel, Bart; Van der Stuyft, Patrick (2008): Community Health Insurance in
Uganda. Why Does Enrolment Remain Low? A View from Beneath. In: Health Policy, vol. 87, nr.
2.
430 Criel et al. (2008): Community Health Insurance in Developing Countries, p. 784f.
431 Chankova, Slavea; Sulzbach, Sara; Diop, François (2008): Impact of Mutual Health Organizations.
Evidence from West Africa. In: Health Policy and Planning, vol. 23, nr. 4, p. 265; Fonteneau, Béné-
dicte;  Galland,  Bruno  (2006):  The  Community-Based  Model.  Mutual  Health  Organizations  in
Africa. In: Churchill, Craig (ed.): Protecting the Poor - A Microinsurance Compendium. Interna-
tional Labour Office / Munich Re Foundation. Geneva / Munich, p. 393; Logie et al. (2008): Innova-
tions in Rwanda’s health system; Japan International Cooperation Agency (2008): Local Level Ser-
vice Delivery, Decentralisation and Governance. A Comparative Study of Uganda, Kenya and Tan-
zania Education, Health and Agriculture Sectors; Saksena, Priyanka; Antunes, Adélio Fernandes;
Xu, Ke; et al. (2011): Mutual Health Insurance in Rwanda. Evidence on Access to Care and Finan-
cial Risk Protection. In: Health Policy, vol. 99, nr. 3, p. 204.
432 Ouedraogo, Lisa-Marie (2012): ‘Access for all’ and ‘Reaching the poor’? In: Rösner, Hans-Jürgen;
Leppert, Gerald; Degens, Philipp; et al. (eds.): Handbook of Micro Health Insurance in Africa, 1. Lit
Verlag. Berlin [a.o.], p. 442ff.
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with “Carte d'Assurance Maladie” (CAM), a nationwide type of provider-based insur-
ance scheme introduced by the government for households in the informal sector.433,434
Table 6 gives details on the outreach of these national schemes.
Tab. 6: National health care financing based on micro health insurance schemes (2009)
Country People covered Functional schemes Remarks on Sources
Burundi n/a 1 Arhin-Tenkorang 2001, Kippenberg 2008
Ghana 907730100 145
Atim 1998, Criel 1998, ILO 2000, Arhin-
Tenkorang 2001, Sulzbach 2005, Preker 
2007, Roth 2007, Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning Ghana 2008, Ministry of
Health Ghana 2008
Rwanda 201010 34 226 Diop 2000, Ndahinyuka 2004, Logie 2008, Ministère de la sante Rwanda 2004
Tanzania 3300 00 68
Musau 1999, Arhin-Tenkorang 2001, Roth 
2007, McIntyre 2008, Japan International 
Cooperation Agency 2008, McCord 2007
Total: > 12,204,134 > 440
Source: own calculation435
433 Arhin-Tenkorang (2001): Health Insurance for the Informal Sector in Africa. Design Features, Risk
Protection, and Resource Mobilization; Kippenberg, Juliane; Sahokwasama, Jean Baptiste; Amon,
Joseph J. (2008): Detention of Insolvent Patients in Burundian Hospitals. In: Health Policy Plan-
ning, vol. 23, nr. 1.
434 In the narrow definition of micro health insurance, the CAM scheme in Burundi would not be in-
cluded in the list as it is a governmental scheme. However, it is listed, because it explicitly targets
the informal sector, applies a risk pooling mechanism and involves so-called “commune commit-
tees” in decision processes.
435 Diop, Francois; Schneider, Pia; Butera, Damascene (2000): Prepayment Schemes in the Rwandan
Districts of Byumba, Kabgayi,  and Kabutare.  Technical Report.  Partnerships for Health Reform
Project, Abt. Associates Inc. Bethesda, MD; Japan International Cooperation Agency (2008): Local
Level Service Delivery, Decentralisation and Governance. A Comparative Study of Uganda, Kenya
and Tanzania Education, Health and Agriculture Sectors; Kippenberg et al. (2008): Detention of In-
solvent Patients in Burundian Hospitals; Logie et al. (2008): Innovations in Rwanda’s health sys -
tem; McIntyre et al. (2008): Beyond Fragmentation and towards Universal Coverage. Insights from
Ghana, South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania; Ministère de la Santé du Burkina Faso
(2001): Plan national de développement sanitaire 2001-2010; Ministry of Health Ghana (2008): In-
dependent Review - Health Sector Programme of Work 2007; Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning, Government of Ghana (2008): Press Conference with hon. Minister of State, Ministry of
Finance and Economic Planning. Implementation of Measures to Reduce Economic Hardships,
2008/06/24; Ndahinyuka, Jovit (2004): Etude de cas sur les rôles des acteurs dans le développement
des  mutuelles  de  santé  au  Rwanda.  URL:  http://www.ilo.org/gimi/concertation/resource.do?
page=/concertation/publications/carte/rwanda/Etudes_3034102140645_8911.PDF (accessed
2010/02/09); Preker, Alexander S.; Scheffler, Richard M.; Bassett, Mark C. (eds.) (2007): Private Vol -
untary Health Insurance  in Development.  Friend Or Foe.  The World  Bank.  Washington,  D.C.;
Sulzbach, Sara; Garshong, Bertha; Owusu-Banahene, Gertrude (2005): Evaluating the Effects of the
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Table 6 shows that the national systems, building on the idea of MHI, were able to sub-
stantially increase outreach and membership of micro health insurance and health in-
surance in general. The efforts of national health care financing built on micro health
insurance schemes lead to many advantages, such as improved outreach, coverage and
awareness, but also show major drawbacks, such as problems resulting from official-
ization and reduced independence of the schemes. The example of Ghana is further
elaborated in section 4.3.6.1.
4.3.5.2. Challenges of micro health insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa
Although microinsurance schemes aim at filling a gap in social health risk manage-
ment  strategies and the number of  covered people have been on the rise  for  over
twenty years, overall enrollment rates remain low in Sub-Saharan Africa, despite suc-
cessful outreach in other regions, e.g. in India. Several challenges that are (to a certain
extent) unique to Sub-Saharan Africa have been identified and are discussed below. 
In a 2004 synthesis of eleven country studies, the West African network La Concer-
tation found that financial viability of mutual health organizations is a major problem.
5.3% of the schemes observed in the study were in financial trouble and unable to
cover the claims of their members.436 Furthermore, in a study on community-based
health insurance units in Africa, Fonteneau et al. (2006) mentioned several challenges
that the schemes face.437 One challenge mentioned was small risk pools, which may
lead to financial instability. In a study by Fonteneau on mutual MHI schemes, around
95% of the schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa covered less than 1000 persons.438 According
to Fonteneau, the origins lay in limited capacities of the initiating organizations, from
a technical and marketing perspective, and the problem of reaching people outside the
original member base. In this regard, attributes like religion, ethnicity or gender can
have limiting effects on an extension of the member base.439 Negative effects of a small
risk pool were clearly demonstrated by Dror et al. using a statistical simulation of mi-
cro health insurance schemes, based on real data from a large insurance provider in
Ireland. Insurance schemes with an average membership of 1203 members have the
National Health Insurance Act in Ghana. Baseline Report. PHRplus (Partners for Health Reform-
plus), USAID. Bethesda, Maryland.
436 La Concertation (2004): Inventaire des mutuelles de santé en Afrique - Synthèse des travaux de
recherche dans 11 pays, p. 9.
437 Fonteneau et al. (2006): The Community-Based Model. Mutual Health Organizations in Africa.
438 Ndiaye et al. (2007): Editorial: A View from Beneath. Community Health Insurance in Africa.
439 Fonteneau et al. (2006): The Community-Based Model. Mutual Health Organizations in Africa, p.
386f.; Ndiaye et al. (2007): Editorial: A View from Beneath. Community Health Insurance in Africa,
p. 159.
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probability of insolvency of no less than 34%, if they could store 10% capital loading for
safety reasons on top of the premium, the so-called safety margin. Still, 21.4% of the
schemes would become insolvent at a safety margin of 20%. On the contrary, the risk
of becoming insolvent can be reduced significantly to 7.5%, if the membership can be
extended to an average of about 2604 members.440 Due to the problems arising from
small risk pools, micro health insurance schemes in West and Central Africa, for exam-
ple in Cameroon, Mali, Senegal, Benin or Guinea, have started to build networks and
implement common funds, such as reinsurance funds or high-risk funds, ameliorating
the problems with small risk pools.441
Low subscription rates, resulting in a small risk pool, can have multifaceted reasons.
The availability of quality health care providers, in especially in rural areas, is crucial
for the success of a micro health insurance scheme. In Ghana, for example, all special-
ized hospitals are located in the Greater Accra region, although the majority of people
live in rural areas. Often the low quality of public health care providers (i.e. hospitals)
reduces confidence in a micro health insurance scheme to fulfill its purpose. Besides
the lack of medical infrastructure, De Allegri et al. mentioned as an important factor
the “lack of clear legislative and regulatory framework” for micro health insurance
units in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.442,443
The benefit package of an insurance scheme depends on premium payments. If pre-
mium payments are low or irregularly paid during collection periods, the micro health
insurance scheme has three basic possibilities of achieving financial stability. Either
the micro health insurance scheme further limits the benefit package, so that certain
services are not included at all or only at a very low level, or it restricts payouts up to a
certain ceiling or  pays out only above a certain amount of expenditures (≈co-pay-
ments). A third option is a strict handling of exclusions, e.g. excluding pre-existing or
chronic illnesses or persons above a certain age. The latter option is not commonly
used, because exclusions thwart the social function of micro health insurance schemes
440 Dror, David M.; Armstrong, J.; Kalavakonda, V. (2005): Why Micro Health Insurance Schemes Can-
not Forego Reinsurance. In: Journal of Insurance and Risk Management (Special Issue on Micro
Health Insurance), vol. 4, nr. 7, p. 9ff.
441 Njamnsi, Mildred Kongla (2012): Integrating Paupers into Mutual Health Organizations. The Com-
munity  Model.  A  Report  from  Cameroon.  In:  Rösner,  Hans-Jürgen;  Leppert,  Gerald;  Degens,
Philipp; et al. (eds.): Handbook of Micro Health Insurance in Africa, 1. Lit Verlag. Berlin [a.o.], p.
388f.;  Fonteneau  et  al.  (2006):  The Community-Based  Model.  Mutual  Health  Organizations  in
Africa, p. 388ff.; Leppert (2012): Operating on the Edge. How to Counter Insurance-Related Finan-
cial Risks in Micro Health Insurance Beyond the Scope of a Single Organization, p. 242ff.
442 De Allegri et al. (2009): Community health insurance in sub-Saharan Africa, p. 587 and 590.
443 Efforts have been made recently to improve legislation and regulation for micro health insurance
units in West Africa. In 2009, the network La Concertation developed a new legislation for the
West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) to be adopted by its member countries.
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and conflict with basic values like solidarity and reciprocity. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the
first option, to strongly limit the benefit package, is chosen by many micro schemes.
Due to the excessive costs of some illnesses, they may be excluded from the benefit
package (e.g. HIV/AIDS and opportunistic diseases or hospitalizations). Therefore, peo-
ple attracted by low premiums sometimes get disappointed by the heavy restrictions
on reimbursements and high dropout rates are the consequence. However, reasons for
high drop-out rates can also be rooted in a poor understanding of the underlying prin-
ciples of insurance or a conscious reluctance to it among some members. If an individ-
ual or a household stays healthy over the entire financial year of the insurance, they
usually do not get any payout and, therefore, they might not be willing to renew their
policies. People who were not sick during a period, often expect to get a refund of (part
of) the premium. Most micro health insurance schemes are aware of this problem and
include special services (not related to the core function of an insurance scheme) like
free health checks for all members during a business year.
Besides issues concerning member size and limited benefits, technical and manage-
ment  skills  have  been  identified  as  crucial  problems  influencing  the  success  of  a
scheme, although measures for  improvement have been undertaken during the last
years.444 Insurance products need actuarial knowledge and managing a financial insti-
tution needs considerable business skills. Micro health insurance schemes usually op-
erate on a very low scale and often lack personnel with comprehensive management
skills. The administration is often based on voluntary work by an inexperienced and
fluctuating staff. These deficiencies are often answered with flexibility (e.g. in amounts
of reimbursement or in handling rules) and closeness to the members, with mixed suc-
cess.
To solve some of the aforementioned problems, micro health insurance units join
networks, form unions or federations of micro schemes in order to lobby for a place in
the governmental regulatory framework, to give financial support to the member orga-
nizations,  e.g.  through  reinsurance  mechanisms and  to  give  technical  support  and
trainings.445
444 Fonteneau et al. (2006): The Community-Based Model. Mutual Health Organizations in Africa, p.
388; De Allegri et al. (2009): Community health insurance in sub-Saharan Africa, p. 591.
445 Ndiaye et al. (2007): Editorial: A View from Beneath. Community Health Insurance in Africa, p.
160; Criel et al. (2008): Community Health Insurance in Developing Countries, p. 784f.; De Allegri
et al. (2009): Community health insurance in sub-Saharan Africa, p. 587ff.
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4.3.5.3. Relevance of micro health insurance as social risk management 
strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa
As elaborated on in section 3.3, health insurance is one of the several possible social
risk management strategies in response to health risks. As discussed, risk pooling, the
core principle behind health insurance, is widely perceived as a suitable SRM strategy
to deal with the particular nature of health risks (see section 2.4). Health insurance is
most effective if the risk pool size is large enough and if risk-pooling occurs between
different income groups, which is the case in social health insurance schemes. For mi-
cro health insurance schemes reaching an efficient risk pool size is a challenge. It is
also difficult to attract different income groups to join a common risk pool in a volun-
tary scheme. Hence, MHI reaches its significance in the absence of (inclusive) social in-
surance schemes. The ability of micro health insurance to pool risks over a compara-
tively large group of individuals gives it an advantage over other SRM strategies (e.g.
self-insurance or informal risk-sharing arrangements). Those SRM strategies can easily
be overburdened by high health care expenditures and health risks that show a high
level of autocorrelation, as discussed in section 2.1. Alwang et al. (2005) saw microin-
surance as a valuable extension to the SRM strategies savings and credit, because in-
surance explicitly deals with risk management and, therefore, microinsurance could be
"viewed as a potential SRM tool to reduce vulnerability".446 However, Alwang et al.
noted that the impact of microinsurance on the reduction of vulnerability depends on
the comprehensiveness of the entire set of SRM strategies. They cautiously added that
– keeping operational limitations and market constraints in mind – microinsurance "is
best able to address idiosyncratic, low loss events, and the financial viability of the
[microinsurance scheme] may be enhanced if it covers single-event types of risk".447
Micro health insurance is widely acknowledged as a useful SRM strategy, but their ca-
pacity to deal with high-loss, (inter)correlated risks is debated as well as the size of the
positive impacts. More recent impact assessments of micro health insurance showed
that  MHI  schemes  were  able  to  protect  low-income  households  from catastrophic
health care costs and improve access to health care, within their operational limits.
Many studies also indicated that MHI schemes had some positive impact on type and
quality of care.448 Hence, MHI schemes – within their limits – successfully fill the gap
446 Alwang et al. (2005): Viewing Microinsurance As A Social Risk Management Instrument: Potential
and Limitations, p. 43.
447 Ibid., p. 56 and 63ff.
448 Radermacher, Ralf;  McGowan, Heidi;  Dercon, Stefan (2012): What is the impact of microinsur-
ance? In: Churchill, Craig; Matul, Michal (eds.): Protecting the Poor. A Microinsurance Compen-
dium, vol. 2. International Labour Office / Munich Re Foundation. Geneva/Munich, p. 66 and 81.
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in social risk management as the only provider of the SRM strategy risk-pooling when
"both governments and markets fail to deliver financial protection against sickness of
the poor".449,450
The figures above (tables 5and 6) show that both micro health insurance units orga-
nized in different institutional types and social health insurance schemes driven by
governments increasingly play a role in Sub-Saharan Africa. The spatial distribution of
health insurance that also covers households in the informal sector shows a concentra-
tion in West Africa, East Africa and a few countries in Central Africa. The outreach of
micro health insurance schemes and social health insurance schemes is still very low
in SSA, covering only a very small percentage of households. Additionally, many coun-
tries  had difficulties  to thoroughly support  MHI schemes or  to implement a social
health insurance schemes, as in the case of Nigeria.451 Few studies have empirically an-
alyzed the actual role of (micro) health insurance within (complex) sets of social risk
management strategies. This is done in the following section by comparing Ghana's
and Malawi's approach to health care financing and the SRM strategies applied by in-
dividuals and households to counter health risks.
4.3.6. Health care financing systems in Ghana and Malawi
4.3.6.1. System of health care financing in Ghana452
Ghana's approach to health care financing has changed significantly over time. After
its independence in 1957, the government of Ghana removed the previously existing
user fees at point of service, aimed at the provision of health care services for free
through tax-financing. However, due to the stagnating Ghanaian economy in the early
1970s,  a  decline  in health care  quality,  shortages of  essential  drugs,  and perceived
overuse of services, the government decided to reintroduce small health care user fees
at point of service in 1972.453 In the 1970s and 1980s, the Ghanaian health care system
was characterized by a lack of reasonable access to health care in many rural areas, a
449 Dror et al. (2002): The Role of Communities in Combating Social Exclusion, p. 44.
450 Alwang et al. (2005): Viewing Microinsurance As A Social Risk Management Instrument: Potential
and Limitations, p. 63.
451 Onwujekwe, Obinna E.;  Uzochukwu, Benjamin SC; Obikeze, Eric N.; et al. (2010): Investigating
Determinants of Out-of-Pocket Spending and Strategies for Coping with Payments for Healthcare
in Southeast Nigeria. In: BMC Health Services Research, vol. 10, nr. 1, p. 2.
452 This section is partially based on a previously published article by the author Leppert (2012): Fi -
nancing Health Care. The Role of Micro Health Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa.
453 Agyepong, Irene Akua; Adjei, Sam (2008): Public Social Policy Development and Implementation.
A Case Study of the Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme. In: Health Policy and Planning,
vol. 23, nr. 2, p. 154.
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demoralized and underpaid staff, under-the-table payments and deteriorating quality
of service.454 In 1985, Ghana finally diverged from the initial goal of providing health
care services for free or at very low fees, when the government introduced the so-
called "cash-and-carry" system, a considerable increase in user fees with the aim of im-
proving the overall cost-recovery of health care services and the entire health sector.
With its policy of raising substantial user fees, Ghana followed the typical trend of
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, which was triggered by financial constraints, unac-
ceptable quality standards in health care and requirements by the IMF structural ad-
justment policies as previously described in section 4.3.4.
In the 1990s, as the aforementioned negative public health impacts of user fees be-
came more apparent, particularly for rural households and those working in the infor-
mal sector, the search for alternative solutions began.455 Remedies, such as the 1997 in-
troduction of partial user fee exemptions for vulnerable groups, did not solve the fun-
damental problems.456 As a result, different actors created multiple community-based
and  charitable  provider-based  micro  health  insurance  schemes  to  ameliorate  cata-
strophic health care costs and the effects of foregone treatment on people's health sta-
tus. In 2001, Atim et al. counted at least 47 operational mutual health organizations in
the country.457 Later, in a national effort, Ghana introduced the country-wide National
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), a partially contribution-based and partially tax-fi-
nanced health insurance scheme explicitly targeting the informal sector.458 In October
2003,  the Ghanaian government enacted the law for the National Health Insurance
Scheme (NHIS) aimed at access to proper health care financing for all Ghanaian citi-
zen. The law formed District-wide Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (DMHIS) either
based on existing mutual health organizations or new schemes, in those districts where
previously no insurance scheme was present (large enough in terms of outreach and
scope of membership).459 This fundamental design was the result of many years of bad
454 Chankova, Slavea; Atim, Chris; Hatt, Laurel (2010): Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme. In:
Escobar, Maria-Luisa; Griffin, Charles C.; Shaw, R. Paul (eds.): Impact of Health Insurance in Low-
and Middle-Income Countries. Brookings Institution Press. Washington, D.C., p. 60.
455 Waddington, C. J.; Enyimayew, K. A. (1989): A Price to Pay. Part 1. The Impact of User Charges in
Ashanti-Akim District, Ghana. In: International Journal of Health Planning and Management, vol.
4, nr. 1, p. 18 and 41; Asenso-Okyere, Kwadwo (1995): Financing Health Care in Ghana. In: World
Health Forum, vol. 16, p. 91.
456 Chankova et al. (2010): Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme, p. 60.
457 Atim, Chris; Grey, Steven; Apoya, Patrick; et al. (2001): A Survey of Health Financing Schemes in
Ghana. PHRplus - Partners for Health Reformplus Project, Abt. Associates Inc., USAID. Bethesda,
Maryland, p. 36.
458 Government of Ghana (2003): National Health Insurance Act.
459 Ibid.; Government of Ghana (2004): Legislative Instrument 1809 - National Health Insurance Regu-
lations.
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experiences with catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for health care, due to the cash-
and-carry system, and good experiences with the increasingly successful mutual health
organizations,  that had rapidly spread throughout the country since 1992.  Some of
these schemes served as a good example for the Ministry of Health in the design of a
potential national health insurance scheme.460 
Regarding the design of the NHIS, the main innovation was the integration of com-
munity-based mechanisms with a contribution system and nationwide risk pooling.
The government decided to diversify the income sources for the National Health Insur-
ance Fund (NHIF). However, the funding was not based only on premium payments by
members. In addition to member premiums, the government increased the revenues of
the insurance schemes with a payroll deduction of 2.5% from formal sector workers,
via the retirement fund Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) and an
earmarked percentage (2.5%) of the value added tax (VAT), called the National Health
Insurance Levy. This arrangement made it possible to bear the scheme's losses and to
include the coverage of certain groups, who were exempt from paying insurance pre-
miums. These groups were children under eighteen, if at least one parent held an in-
surance card, the very-poor (indigents) and elderly above 70 years.461 In 2008, addi-
tional groups were exempt from the insurance premium, such as pregnant women, in
order to meet Millenium Development Goals 4 and 5.462 For adults working in the in-
formal sector, the annual premium level was set at 7.2 - 48 Ghana Cedis, depending on
their economic situation, although DMHIS tended to apply a flat rate premium as the
households' ability to pay was difficult to assess.463 For example, the Nkoranza DMHIS
applied a premium rate of 10 GHS (~4.97€) (2007), the Offinso DMHIS 15 GHS (~11.03€)
(2007), and the partner schemes which were the subject of the empiric study Dangme
West  DMHIS  7.2  GHS  (~3.58€)  (2009),  while  some  more  wealthy  individuals  paid
higher premium levels, and West Gonja DMHIS 10 GHS (~4.97€) (2009).464 An adminis-
460 Atim et al. (2001): A Survey of Health Financing Schemes in Ghana, p. 5 and 53.
461 Appiah-Denkyira, Ebenezer; Preker, Alexander (2007): Reaching the Poor in Ghana with National
Health Insurance. An Experience from the Districts of the Eastern Region of Ghana. In: Deutsche
Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (ed.): Extending Social Protection in Health:
Developing  Countries’  Experiences,  Lessons  Learnt  and  Recommendations.  GTZ,  ILO,  WHO;
Saleh, Karima; Schieber, G; Lavado, Rouselle; et al. (2012): Health Financing in Ghana. World Bank.
Washington D.C., p. 23.
462 Ghana  National  Health  Insurance  Authority  (2011):  Annual  Report  2010,  p.  19.  URL:
http://www.nhis.gov.gh/annualreport.aspx (accessed 2014/08/19).
463 Akazili, James; Gyapong, John; McIntyre, Diane (2011): Who Pays for Health Care in Ghana? In:
International Journal for Equity in Health, vol. 10, nr. 26, p. 4.
464 Annual average exchange rates GHS to EUR, source www.oanda.com: 0.73572 (2007), 0.49772 (2009). 
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tration fee of 2-3 GHS was charged on top of the premium.465 In 2009, all over the
country, 145 DMHIS were operating, with ten regional offices and a network of accred-
ited health care providers, comprising 1930 health care facilities.466
According to official figures by the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA), in
2010, the NHIS in Ghana covered 8.16 million people (active membership), represent-
ing 34% of the entire population, seven years after the inception of the NHIS. 467 Only
slightly more than one third of total NHIS members (36.03%) contributed to the NHIF:
29.40% of total members were informal adults paying an annual premium, 6.10% were
formal sector employees contributing 2.5% of their payroll via SSNIT, 0.53% were for-
mal sector pensioners also contributing via SSNIT. All other groups that accounted for
63.97% were exempt from the membership premiums: 49.44% children aged below 18
years, 6.67% adults aged 70 years and above, 2.32% indigents (exempt groups based on
means and poverty testing), and 5.54% pregnant women.468 
Tab. 7: Sources of funding of Ghana NHIS (2009)
Sources of funding Percentage
National health insurance levy (earmarked 2.5% of VAT) 61.0%
Investment income of the NHIF 17.0%
SSNIT contribution 15.6%
Insurance premium 3.8%
Sector budget support 2.3%
Other income 0.2%
Source: Ghana National Health Insurance Authority: Annual Report 2009.469
Table  7 shows the income flows of the NHIS. The most significant source of funding
was the national health insurance levy, which accounted for 61.0% of total funding, fol-
465 Nguyen, Ha Th; Rajkotia, Yogesh; Wang, Hong (2011): The Financial Protection Effect of Ghana
National Health Insurance Scheme. Evidence from a Study in Two Rural Districts. In: International
Journal for Equity in Health, vol. 10, nr. 4, p. 5.
466 Ghana  National  Health  Insurance  Authority  (2010):  Annual  Report  2009,  p.  16.  URL:
http://www.nhis.gov.gh/annualreport.aspx (accessed 2014/08/19).
467 The NHIS membership numbers until 2009 have been officially declared as inaccurate. They re-
ferred to a ‘cumulative membership base’ which did not reflect the active membership, as it in-
cludes NHIS members who did not renew their membership cards. Hence, it was decided to quote
the 2010 figure which is much lower, but more accurate, than the 2009 figure which was at 12.5
million active members and 14.5 million total membership. Ibid., p. 14, 26 and 29; Description of
inaccuracies in membership calculation and 2010 figures:0: Ghana National Health Insurance Au-
thority (2011): Annual Report 2010, p. 16.
468 Data from year 2009 are used. Percentages refer to the cumulative total membership of the NHIS
(not necessarily active members). Ghana National Health Insurance Authority (2010): Annual Re-
port 2009, p. 26.
469 Ibid., p. 34.
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lowed by investment income of the NHIF with 17.0%. Contributions from formal sector
employees via the SSNIT accounted for 15.6%, while contributions of informal sector
workers accounted for 3.8% of total funding.
In comparison to the benefit packages that had been offered under the previously
existing mutual health organizations, the benefit package for the insured was substan-
tially improved in the NHIS and included a variety of drugs, out-patient, in-patient,
oral health, eye care, maternity care and emergency services.470 
Since  the  inception  of  the  NHIS,  national  health  care  utilization  patterns  have
changed, although not at a rapid pace. From 1998/99 to 2005/06, the number of individ-
uals with an illness or injury that did not utilize health care went down by 28.6%, from
56.2% to 40.1%, according to Schieber et al. (2012).471 Chankova et al. (2010), in a com-
parative cross-sectional study, showed that seeking care from a modern health care
provider nearly doubled from 2004 (before inception of the NHIS) to 2007, from 37% to
70%, and pointed out that seeking care from an informal provider fell at the same time
from 76% to 44%; average spending for treatment also fell significantly.472 The effect
was similarly strong when insured and uninsured households were directly compared.
For example, Schieber et al. (2012) reported that the utilization of government hospitals
was 38.6% for insured individuals and 22.0% for uninsured individuals in 2008. Restrict-
ing the analysis to the lowest wealth quintile, a higher discrepancy in utilization was
identified between insured (39.2%) and uninsured (11.9%) individuals. Also, much less
insured individuals forewent treatment (2.6%) compared to 9.9% of uninsured individu-
als.473 In a study on the financial protection of the NHIS in two rural districts in 2007,
Nguyen et al. (2011) reported that insured households still occured out-of-pocket pay-
ments: for uncovered services, from informal health care providers, but also for ser-
vices that should be covered by the NHIS, such as drugs, tests, antenatal care or hospi-
talization.474 They concluded that the NHIS has a financial protection effect, particu-
larly among the poorest quintile, as it "significantly reduced the probability of cata-
strophic OOP payment on health services",475 However, according to Schieber et al.
(2012) there were membership equity concerns; using data from 2009, they found that,
in the highest wealth quintile, women were 71% more likely and men 100% more likely
to hold an NHIS card, compared to the same group in the lowest wealth quintile, de-
470 Ibid., p. 42f.
471 Saleh et al. (2012): Health Financing in Ghana, p. 41f.
472 Chankova et al. (2010): Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme, p. 71f.
473 Saleh et al. (2012): Health Financing in Ghana, p. 41f.
474 Nguyen et al. (2011): The financial protection effect of Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme,
p. 1 and 10.
475 Ibid., p. 8f.
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spite exemptions for poor households.476 This result was confirmed by Sarpong et al.
(2010)  who reported that 21% of  those households  with low socio-economic status
(SES) were insured with the NHIS compared to 60% of households with high SES.477 
The NHIS has faced a variety of problems, ranging from slow administration, to
mismanagement and fraud on multiple levels.478 The NHIS has been confronted with
rising costs, so that increasingly DMHIS were in distress and had to inquire at the
NHIA for  additional funding.  In 2010,  expenditures outpaced revenues for  the first
time, so that capitation payments were discussed.479 The initial decentralized design of
the NHIS, with the DMHISs as main actors, has subsequently been changed by central-
izing tariff negotiations with health care providers and claim settlements. Since 2009,
the new Ghanaian government, led by John Atta-Mills from the National Democratic
Congress (NDC), changed the future direction of the scheme, breaking the initial in-
tentions of the scheme's design. The NDC carried out several changes towards further
centralization of the NHIS and announced a decision to shift the system increasingly
to a tax-financed base and pushed the idea of a life-time membership without annual
premium payments.480 This plan of a one-time premium raised substantial concerns,
but finally seemed to be put on hold.481
4.3.6.2. System of health care financing in Malawi
After Malawian independence in 1964, the government has never diverged from the ul-
timate objective of providing health care services at public health care facilities for
free,  although the health sector shows signs of severe underfunding, raising major
quality concerns.482 Since 2005,  the Malawian government has implemented the so-
called Essential Health Package (EHP), which included high impact and cost-effective
health care services without user fees and without insurance premium or user contri-
476 Saleh et al. (2012): Health Financing in Ghana, p. 40.
477 Results are based on a household survey from 2008. Sarpong, N.; Loag, W.; Fobil, J.; et al. (2010):
National Health Insurance Coverage and Socio-Economic Status in a Rural District of Ghana. In:
Tropical Medicine and International Health, vol. 15, nr. 2, p. 195.
478 Chankova et al. (2010): Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme, p. 63f.
479 Lagomarsino et al. (2012): Moving towards universal health coverage, p. 937.
480 Modernghana (2009): One-time NHIS next year. June 16, 2009. URL:  http://www.modernghana.-
com/print/2220 96/1/one-time-nhis-next-year.html (accessed  2009/07/04);  National  Democratic
Congress (NDC) (2008): Manifesto for a Better Ghana 2008; Ghana National Health Insurance Au-
thority (2010): Annual Report 2009, p. 16f.
481 Schieber, George; Cashin, Cheryl; Saleh, Karima; et al. (2012): Health Financing in Ghana. World
Bank Publications. Washington D.C., p. 161f.; Bentil, Naa Lamiley (2013): NHIS one time premium
on hold, Modern Ghana. URL:  http://www.modernghana.com/news/4930246/1/nhis-one-time-pre-
mium-on-hold.html (accessed 2015/07/26).
482 Lüftl, Stefan (2002): Staatliche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit: Malawi - (k)ein hoffnungsloser Fall.
In: Deutsches Ärzteblatt, vol. 48/99.
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butions, coordinated and financed through the health Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp)
to which various international donors contribute.483
Tab. 8: Intervention areas and included services of the Essential Health Package
Vaccine preventable diseases (P,T)
Malaria (P,T)
Reproductive health, incl. safe motherhood initiatives, essential obstetric care, prevention 
of mother-to-child transmission (I) 
Tuberculosis and related complications (P,C,T)
Schistosomiasis (P,T)
Acute respiratory infections and related complications (M)
Acute diarrheal diseases (incl. Cholera) (P,T)
HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted infections, related complications, incl. VCT, ART (P,M)
Malnutrition, nutrition deficiencies and related complications (P,M)
Eye, ear and skin infections and related complications (M)
Common injuries, incl. Emergency care for accidents, trauma and their complications (T)
Notes: P=Prevention, t=treatment, I=Interventions, C=Control, M=Management
Source: African Development fund Health Development Division (2005): Appraisal Report. Support to the 
Health Sector Programme Republic of Malawi. p. 4f.
Generally, the health sector in Malawi is heavily dependent on external resources: In
2009, over two thirds of the total expenditure on health was contributed by external
donors (80.2%).484
The EHP was part of the poverty reduction strategy of the Malawian government
and was the primary health strategy for the Ministry of Health. The EHP aimed at im-
proving access to primary health care services and prevention measures concerning
the major causes of morbidity and mortality of the Malawian population.485 Table  8
shows the services covered by the EHP. The WHO Commission on Macroeconomics
and Health recommended USD 34 (2007) per capita for “a package of basic, cost-effec-
tive health care interventions” and estimated the real cost of the Malawian EHP at
USD 28.6 (2007/2008). On the contrary, the actual total health expenditure per capita
(including private payments) has been measured at only US$ 21 in 2006 and US$ 20 in
2007.486 In an assessment of the EHP, Bowie et al. (2011) concluded that the EHP was
483 Gwatkin,  Davidson;  Kataika,  Edward;  Cardinal,  Isabell;  et  al.  (2006):  Malawi’s  Health  SWAp.
Bringing Essential Services Closer to the Poor? In: Malawi Medical Journal, vol. 18, nr. 1, p. 1.
484 World Health Organization (2014): Malawi - National Expenditure on Health (Malawian Kwacha).
URL:  http://apps.who.int/nha/database/Key_Indicators_by_Country/Index/en (accessed
2014/08/19).
485 African Development Fund Health Development Division (2005): Appraisal Report. Support to the
Health Sector Programme Republic of Malawi, p. 4f.
486 Government of Malawi -  Ministry of  Health (2007):  Malawi National Health Accounts (NHA)
2002-2004  with  Sub-Accounts  for  HIV  and  AIDS,  Reproductive  and  Child  Health.  Lilongwe;
Bowie, Cameron; Mwase, Takondwa (2011): Assessing the Use of an Essential Health Package in a
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seriously under-funded so that only half of the funds for the required annual expendi-
tures per capita were available. Still, the authors reported that EHP service utilization
has been increasing over the years and about two thirds of the estimated number of
treatments required under the EHP had been delivered. However, due to this mismatch
in funding and actual service delivery and due to lack of staff and large numbers of pa-
tients, they argued that "quality of care is likely to have been compromised".487 Such
problems were confirmed by Mueller et al. (2011) who reported major difficulties to
even deliver the defined EHP, as there was evidence on continuous and major deficien-
cies in human resources and drug supply, as well as problems associated with lack of
resources, but also problems with governance, incentives and accountability.488
Quality of health care has been criticized by various authors concluding that access
to quality health care in Malawi was still below acceptable levels by international stan-
dards: As mentioned above, financial and human resource gaps as well as shortages in
drug availability at public facilities have been highlighted. This has led to the migra-
tion of health professionals abroad, illegal sale of free drugs, low quality of health care,
long waiting times in public facilities as well as private treatments by publicly em-
ployed doctors along with high out-of-pocket payments.489 These problems were obvi-
ous indications of government failure;  however, the Malawi Ministry of Health has
been aware of these shortcomings and expressed its inability to solve these issues in
the short run, especially in remote and rural areas. As the Malawian health system has
been predominantly publicly funded and still lacks essential services and quality, in-
creasingly, the introduction of user payments has been discussed. User fees have been
charged in CHAM mission health centers and hospitals as well as private facilities;
Sector Wide Approach in Malawi. In: Health Research Policy and Systems, vol. 9, nr. 4, p. 4; Per
capita total  expenditure on health at average exchange rate (US$):  World Health Organization
(2012): Global Health Observatory Data Repository. Country Statistics.
487 Bowie et al. (2011): Assessing the Use of an Essential Health Package in a Sector Wide Approach
in Malawi, p. 5f. and 9.
488 Mueller, Dirk H.; Lungu, Douglas; Acharya, Arnab; et al. (2011): Constraints to Implementing the
Essential Health Package in Malawi. In: PLoS ONE, vol. 6, nr. 6, p. e200741.
489 Lüftl (2002): Staatliche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit: Malawi - (k)ein hoffnungsloser Fall; Mendis,
Shanti; Fukino, Keiko; Cameron, Alexandra; et al. (2007): The Availability and Affordability of Se-
lected Essential Medicines for Chronic Diseases in Six Low- and Middle-Income Countries.  In:
Bulletin of  the World  Health Organization,  vol.  85,  nr.  4;  Ministry  of Health (Malawi)  (2007):
Malawi  National  Health  Accounts  (NHA)  2002/2003-2004/2005.  URL:  http://www.who.int/nha/
country/Malawi-NHA_2002_03-2004_05.pdf (accessed 2010/02/09);  Muula, Adamson S.;  Maseko,
Fresier C. (2006): How Are Health Professionals Earning Their Living in Malawi? In: BMC Health
Services Research, vol. 6; Record, Richard; Mohiddin, Abdu (2006): An Economic Perspective on
Malawi’s Medical ‘Brain Drain’.  In: Globalization and Health, vol.  2, nr.  12; Zere,  Eyob; Moeti,
Matshidiso; Kirigia, Joses; et al. (2007): Equity in Health and Healthcare in Malawi. Analysis of
Trends. In: BMC Public Health, vol. 7.
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both perceived to provide services of better quality compared to public health care fa-
cilities.490 For some services, even at public health care facilities, considerable direct
health care costs have applied for fees and drugs that had to be purchased by the pa-
tient outside of the facility.491 In an analysis of the health financing system in Malawi
by Zere et al. (2010), the authors documented the underfunding of the health sector
and the EHP and called for a substantial increase in governmental spending on health.
They also reported that the dependency of the health sector on external resources had
increased, but concluded that – due to the economic situation of Malawi – a further in-
crease of contributions by donor countries was needed in the short to medium-term.
Furthermore, they suggested the development of a prepaid mechanism, i.e. a health in-
surance scheme, to facilitate progress towards universal health coverage.492
For health care provision, Malawi has relied on a public-private mix of health care
providers. The majority of health care services in Malawi have been provided by public
health care facilities (about 60%). The Christian Health Association of Malawi (CHAM)
is the umbrella organization of charitable, faith-based health care providers run by dif-
ferent churches. In 2010, CHAM delivered approximately 37% of all health care ser-
vices, with 80% of its facilities in remote and under-served rural areas. Private health
care facilities provided the remaining percent of health care provision.493 CHAM facili-
ties are not-for-profit and charge moderate user fees for their  services.  Since 2004,
CHAM facilities  have  been subsidized  by  the  Ministry  of  Health  via  service  level
agreements (SLAs) in order to provide services for free to vulnerable and underserved
populations, with a focus on maternal and neonatal services. However, Chirwa et al.
(2013) raised criticism on the SLA system and reported, for example, late payment of
bills by the government and lack of transparency.494 McIntyre et al. (2013) attributed
490 Kavinya,  Thengo (2013):  Opinions  on the  Suggestion that  Malawians  Should  Start  Paying  for
Health Services in a Bid to Improve Health Care in the Country. In: Malawi Medical Journal, vol.
25, nr. 1, p. 26.
491 An analysis of direct and opportunity costs for tuberculosis diagnosis, see: Kemp, Julia R.; Mann,
Gillian; Simwaka, Bertha Nhlema; et al. (2007): Can Malawi’s Poor Afford Free Tuberculosis Ser-
vices? Patient and Household Costs Associated with a Tuberculosis Diagnosis in Lilongwe. In:
Bulletin of the World Health Organization, vol. 85, nr. 8, p. 582.
492 Zere, Eyob; Walker, Oladapo; Kirigia, Joses M.; et al. (2010): Health Financing in Malawi. Evidence
from National Health Accounts. In: BMC International Health and Human Rights, vol. 10, p. 5 and
8–10.
493 Phiri,  Innocent;  Masanjala,  Winford (2012):  Willingness  to  Pay for  Micro  Health  Insurance  in
Malawi. In: Rösner, Hans-Jürgen; Leppert, Gerald; Degens, Philipp; et al. (eds.): Handbook of Mi-
cro Health Insurance in Africa, 1. Lit Verlag. Berlin, p. 286; CHAM ran 169 health care facilities in
Malawi: Christian Health Association Malawi (CHAM) (no date):  Map of 169 Health Facilities;
Maseko, Fresier Chidyaonga (2010): Social Health Insurance in Malawi. Draft Version 1.2, p. 10.
494 Chirwa, Maureen; Kazanga, Isabel; Faedo, Giulia; et al. (2013): Promoting Universal Financial Pro-
tection.  Contracting  Faith-Based  Health  Facilities  to  Expand  Access.  Lessons  Learned  from
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these problems to the inability and capacity constraints of the MoH and its district
health offices, in charge of carrying out the SLAs, to make timely payments, to supply
drugs and to supervise and monitor the contracted facilities. Due to general under-
funding and due to these organizational constraints at the district level, some CHAM
facilities stopped providing 'free' services under such circumstances.495
Health insurance currently plays a minor role in Malawi. In 2009, Malawi was ser-
viced  by  only  two  health  insurance  companies,  the  Medical  Aid  Society  Malawi
(MASM), which controled 80% of the private health insurance market in Malawi, and
OASIZ Medical Aid Scheme, which provided employer-based health insurance con-
tracts mainly in the parastatal sector. MASM had a wider focus as it provides health in-
surance in employer-based or individual contracts, but also concentrated on formal
sector employees in mostly urban areas.496 A variety of companies and organizations
run their own medical aid schemes for their employees, such as the National Bank of
Malawi scheme (NABMAS) or the University of Malawi scheme (UNIMAID) that sub-
sidize a large percentage of health care costs.497 
None of the aforementioned health insurance products were tailored for low-in-
come or  informal  sector  workers.  The lowest  priced health  insurance  product,  the
EconoPlan product offered by MASM was, with a monthly premium per person at
MWK 520 (2009)(~2.69 €)498, high or even prohibitively priced for most middle and low-
income earners  in  Malawi,  although  enrollment  was  open,  in  principle,  to  people
working in the informal economy. The coverage ceiling for EconoPlan was 24-times
the premium level and included treatment at public, CHAM and specified private clin-
ics.499
In a study on private health insurance among formal sector workers in Malawi,
Makoka et al. (2007) found out that formal sector employees tended to seek health care
from private health care providers, a sector which has been fast growing and perceived
to deliver better quality. Furthermore, they found that income was a significant predic-
Malawi. In: Health Research Policy and Systems, vol. 11, p. 2 and 7f.
495 McIntyre, Diane; Ranson, Michael Kent; Bhupinder, K Aulakh; et al. (2013): Promoting universal
financial protection: evidence from seven low- and middle-income countries on factors facilitating
or hindering progress. In: Health Research Policy and Systems, vol. 11, nr. 36, p. 4 and 8.
496 cp. Makoka, Donald; Kaluwa, Ben; Kambewa, Patrick (2007): The Demand for Private Health Insur-
ance in Malawi. In: University of Malawi, Economics Department Working Paper, vol. 2, p. 3268f.;
Phiri et al. (2012): Willingness to Pay for Micro Health Insurance in Malawi, p. 289f.
497 Maseko (2010): Social Health Insurance in Malawi. Draft Version 1.2, p. 41.
498 Average exchange rate for year 2009 from OANDA Corp. (http://www.oanda.com) Malawi 1 EUR
= 193.212 MWK.
499 Pro MHI Africa (2009): Micro Health Insurance Mapping Exercise, Malawi.
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tor of holding a private health insurance policy in Malawi. 500 Hence, rural and informal
sector economy households, which account for the majority of Malawians have effec-
tively had no access to health insurance.
Studies have also shown that access to publicly provided health care services is not
fully equitable. For example, Zere et al. (2007) analyzed equity trends in health status
and health care utilization in Malawi and argued that pro-rich inequities in health sta-
tus and health care utilization "are widespread in Malawi and in some cases are widen-
ing despite concerted efforts of government and its development partners"; they con-
cluded that poor households benefited less from publicly provided services than non-
poor households.501 Maseko (2010) confirmed inequities in access to publicly financed
health care services and indicated lower health care utilization patterns in rural areas
and showed lower utilization patterns for child care and maternal care among the low-
est wealth quintile.502
4.3.6.3. Comparison of health care financing indicators in Ghana and Malawi
As shown in the previous two sections on health care financing in Ghana and Malawi,
the systems function quite differently. In comparison, table 9 shows selected indicators
on health care financing patterns in Ghana in Malawi. Additional variables of health
care provision are also shown in the table, such as staff and hospital bed availability as
well as some selected variables concerning health system output.
In 2009, the total expenditure on health (THE) in Ghana (current US$ 56.1) was
twice as much as in Malawi (current US$ 28.7). In relationship to the gross domestic
product (GDP), the total expenditure on health was even relatively higher, with 8.3% in
Malawi and 5.1% in Ghana. The THE comprises government and private expenditures
on health. In Ghana, the share of government contribution (57.8%) was considerably
lower than in Malawi (74.3%) and the private expenditure on health was higher, ac-
cordingly. Private expenditure included voluntary health insurance schemes, with no
government control and payments by corporations and households (including out-of-
pocket payments).
In 2009, despite the existence of the NHIS, Ghana still showed high levels of out-of-
pocket payments, accounting for 66.6% of private expenditure on health and relatively
large 28.1% of THE. In monetary terms, out-of-pocket payments per capita in Ghana
500 Makoka, Donald; Kaluwa, Ben; Kambewa, Patrick (2007): Demand for Private Health Insurance
Where Public Health Services are Free. The Case of Malawi. In: Journal of Applied Sciences, vol. 7,
nr. 21, p. 3273.
501 Zere et al. (2007): Equity in health and healthcare in Malawi, p. 12.
502 Maseko (2010): Social Health Insurance in Malawi. Draft Version 1.2, p. 13f.
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amounted to current US$ 15.8.503 In comparison, out-of-pocket payments in Malawi
were relatively lower, at 53.5% of private expenditure, which accounted for 13.7% of
THE – due to the relatively lower private expenditures on health. Out-of-pocket pay-
ments per capita amounted to current US$ 3.9.504 In Malawi, the positive trend concern-
ing out-of-pocket payments, a significant drop in the share of out-of-pocket payments
from 26% of THE in 1998 to 9% in 2006, has been reversed in recent years, so that the
out-of-pocket rate reached levels between 13% (2007) and 16% (2007).505
As already indicated in section  4.3.6.2,  private health insurance had a  relatively
small outreach in Malawi. Out of private expenditure on health, which was at 25.7% in
Malawi, private health insurance schemes (private prepaid plans) accounted for only
15.9% of private expenditure, and accounted for only 4.1% of THE. In Ghana, after the
inception of the NHIS, the importance of private health insurance in Ghana has sub-
stantially decreased. While the share of prepaid plans of private expenditure on health
was constantly between 10-11% (1995-2005), the share fell to 6-7% from 2006 onwards.
A similar pattern showed the share of prepaid plans in relation to THE, which fell
from a range of 4.0-5.6% before 2005, to 2.4-2.7% between 2007 and 2009.506
A look at the share of external resources of the THE marked a significant difference
in the health care financing systems of Ghana and Malawi. As external resources can
either be channeled via government expenditure on health or via private expenditure
on health, this figure could easily be assigned to either. While the share of external re-
sources of  the THE accounted for 13.1% in Ghana, the share  of  external  resources
showed the dependency of Malawi's health sector on international organizations and
donors: In 2009, 80.2% of THE in Malawi were contributed from outside the country.
Since 1995, the dependency of the Malawian health sector on external resources in-
creased substantially: While the annual average of external resources out of THE was
still  34.6% in the years 1995-1999,  it  increased to 56.4% in 2000-2004 and finally to
76.9% in the years 2005-2009.507 This substantial increase was partially an effect of the
economic situation in Malawi, but also due to the burden of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
The  Global  Fund  to  fight  HIV/AIDS,  which  was  also  channeled  via  the  SwAP  in
503 World Health Organization (2014): National Health Accounts (NHA) indicators. Global Health Ex-
penditure  Database.  URL:  http://apps.who.int/nha/database/ViewData/Indicators/en (accessed
2014/08/19).
504 Ibid.
505 Zere et al.  (2010): Health Financing in Malawi.  Evidence from National Health Accounts,  p.  7;
World Health Organization (2014): Malawi - National Expenditure on Health (Malawian Kwacha).
506 World Health Organization (2014): Ghana - National Expenditure on Health (Ghana Cedi). URL:
http://apps.who.int/nha/database/Key_Indicators_by_Country/Index/en (accessed 2014/08/19).
507 World Health Organization (2014): Malawi - National Expenditure on Health (Malawian Kwacha).
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Malawi,  caused a significant  increase  in these external  resources.508 In comparison,
Ghana was able to reverse an increase in dependency on health care financing from
external resources: The share of external resources of the THE tended to increase (with
some annual fluctuations) from 7.3% in 1995 to 23.6% in 2005, the highest percentage.
After 2005,  coinciding with the introduction of the NHIS,  the share of external re-
sources significantly decreased to 17.9% in 2006 and 13.0% in 2007.509
The health care financing system in Malawi is based on tax- and donor-financed
provision of health care services and, therefore, these sources accounted for 100% of
general government expenditure. The NHIS in Ghana, classified as social security ex-
penditure, accounted for 26.0% of general government expenditure on health in 2009.
The  NHIS  increasingly  became  a  major  funding  source  for  the  health  sector  in
Ghana.510 Overall, 15.0% of THE was channeled through the NHIS.511 However, the con-
tributions by the informal sector to the NHIS only accounted for 0.57% of THE; in the
system of National Health Accounts, these contributions were considered part of gov-
ernment expenditure, because the NHIS was considered to be a mandatory system, al-
though this was only the case for formal sector members. For informal sector mem-
bers, it is a  de facto voluntary scheme, although the National Health Insurance Act
aims for compulsory membership.512
Tab. 9: Selected indicators on health care financing, health care provision and health 
system outputs, Ghana and Malawi
Indicators Ghana Malawi
Per capita total expenditure on health (current US$)4 56.1 28.7
Total expenditure on health (THE) as a percentage of GDP4 5.1 8.3
General government expenditure on health as a percentage of THE4 57.8 74.3
Private expenditure on health as a percentage of THE4 42.2 25.7
External resources for health as a percentage of THE4 13.1 80.2
Private prepaid plans as a percentage of private expenditure on health4 6.3 15.9
Out-of-pocket expenditure as a percentage of private expenditure on 
health4 66.6 53.5
508 Averages of five-year periods are given, because the annual percentages show a significant varia-
tion.  Ibid.;  Munthali,  Spy;  Ilsen,  Dietmar  (2012):  The  Potential  of  Micro  Health  Insurance  in
Malawi. In: Rösner, Hans-Jürgen; Leppert, Gerald; Degens, Philipp; et al. (eds.): Handbook of Mi-
cro Health Insurance in Africa, 1. Lit Verlag. Berlin [a.o.], p. 130.
509 World Health Organization (2014): Ghana - National Expenditure on Health (Ghana Cedi).
510 In the WHO National Health Accounts, the NHIS was listed for the first time in 2005 as social se -
curity system and accounted for 21.7%. World Health Organization (no date): WHO Country Co-
operation  Strategy  2008-2011  Ghana.  Brazzaville,  p.  8.  URL:  http://www.afro.who.int/en/
ghana/country-cooperation-strategy.html (accessed 2014/08/19).
511 World Health Organization (2014): National Health Accounts (NHA) indicators. Global Health Ex-
penditure Database.
512 Government of Ghana (2003): National Health Insurance Act, p. Art. 31.
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Social security expenditure on health as a percentage of general govern-
ment expenditure on health4 26.0 0
Physicians (per 1,000 population)3 0.09 0.02
Nurses and midwives (per 1,000 pop.)3 1.05 0.34
Pharmaceutical personnel density (per 1000 pop.)3 a0.071 a0.021
Laboratory health workers density (per 1000 pop.)3 a0.012 0.040
Environmental and public health workers density (per 1000 pop.)3 a0.001 0.030
Community and traditional health workers (per 1,000 pop.)3 a0.192 a0.732
Health management & support workers density (per 1000 pop.)3 a0.011 a0.248
Other health workers density (per 1000 pop.)3 a0.026 0.138
Hospital beds (per 1,000 pop.)1 0.93 c1.30
Children with fever receiving antimalarial drugs (% of children < 5 with 
fever)1
b52.6 b43.4
Births attended by skilled health personnel (%)2 a54.7 b71.3
Antiretroviral therapy coverage (% of people with advanced HIV infec-
tion)1 28 40
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)1 94 93
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)1 93 92
Notes: Data are from year 2009 if not indicated otherwise. a=2008, b=2010, c=2011
Sources: 1= The World Bank Data, 2=World Health organization Global Health observatory Data 
Repository, 3=World Health organization Health Workforce, 4=World Health organization, National 
Health Accounts Indicators. 513
The figures  in  table  9 confirmed a  severe  shortage  of  health  care  professionals  in
Malawi,  a  problem which  was  already  addressed  in  section  4.3.6.2.  Highly  skilled
health staff in Malawi are rare and international migration of health professionals, the
so-called 'medical brain-drain', has exacerbated the Malawian situation.514 In Malawi,
there were – per 1000 00 population – only two physicians, 34 nurses or midwives, 2.1
pharmaceutical staff and 4 laboratory workers. In Ghana, which did not excel in inter-
national comparison concerning health staff availability, highly skilled staff was more
widely available than in Malawi, as there were 9 physicians, 105 nurses or midwives,
7.1 pharmaceutical staff and 1.2 laboratory workers, per 1000 00 population. Due to the
lack  of  highly  skilled  health  professionals,  Malawi  employed  relatively  more  low-
skilled staff compared to Ghana (see table 9). With regard to the availability of hospital
513 The World Bank (2014): Data Ghana; The World Bank (2014): Data Malawi; World Health Organi-
zation  (WHO)  (2014):  World  Health  Statistics.  Health  Workforce.  Data  by  country.  URL:
http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.A1444?lang=en (accessed 2014/05/25); World Health Or-
ganization (2012): Global Health Observatory Data Repository. Country Statistics; World Health
Organization (2014): National Health Accounts (NHA) indicators. Global Health Expenditure Data-
base.
514 Record et al. (2006): An Economic Perspective on Malawi’s Medical ‘Brain Drain’, p. 6f.; Muula et
al. (2006): How Are Health Professionals Earning Their Living in Malawi?, p. 1f.
122
4.3. Social Risk Management In Sub-Saharan Africa
beds, an indicator for the health infrastructure, Malawi provided 1.30 hospital beds per
1000 population, which was more than Ghana, with 0.93 per 1000.
5. Methods
5.1. Background of the study
The empirical data used for this study were generated by the project "Pro MHI Africa –
EU-African University Network to strengthen community-based micro health insur-
ance"515 (2008-2010),  which was funded by the ACP-EU Cooperation Programme in
Higher Education (EDULINK), a program implemented by the ACP Group of States,
with the financial assistance of the European Union. The aim of the international uni-
versity consortium between the University of Cologne, the University of Botswana,
University of Ghana and University of Malawi, was to build capacities in micro health
insurance. The project was coordinated by the Department for Cooperative Studies of
the University of Cologne.
The university network aimed to improve the institutional, academic and research
capacity of the partnering universities, for the development of effective social health-
related programs and to strengthen community-based micro health insurance. For this,
the team members conducted research on health care financing of low-income house-
holds in the partner countries, developed an evidence-based microinsurance curricu-
lum for university students and training modules for micro health insurance units and
communities, and published the Handbook of Micro Health Insurance in Africa.516 An
integral part of the project was close cooperation with two community-based health
financing organizations in research and capacity development in each country.
The project  included a  significant research component  on health care financing,
health risks, and health risk management of low-income households with a particular
focus on micro health insurance. The essential part of the research component was a
quantitative cross-sectional household survey in the three participating African coun-
515 Pro-MHI-Africa project website: http://www.microhealthinsurance-africa.org 
516 Rösner, Hans-Jürgen; Leppert, Gerald; Degens, Philipp; et al. (2012): Handbook of Micro Health In-
surance in Africa. LIT Verlag. Berlin.
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tries.517 In Ghana and Malawi, which are subject of this study, the household survey
was conducted between the 8th of March and the 5th of May 2009.
5.2. Household survey
5.2.1. Study setting and partner organizations
In Ghana and Malawi, the household survey was carried out in four regions, which co-
incided with the catchment areas of the four local partner organizations. The partner
organizations, one in each region, were selected using a complex mapping exercise
conducted by the research  team.  Potential  partner  organizations  were community-
based health financing organizations, such as micro health insurance schemes, pre-
paid plans, health banks or drug funds, other risk management institutions, such as mi-
crofinance institutions, which aimed to provide access to risk management strategies,
such as credit,  emergency-credit,  savings,  credit-life insurance,  life-insurance or  fu-
neral insurance, to low-income populations, mostly in the informal sector. Finally, the
project partnered with two microfinance institutions in Malawi (Malawi Union of Sav-
ings and Credit Cooperatives (MUSCCO) and the Foundation for International Com-
munity Assistance (FINCA)) and two district-wide mutual health insurance schemes in
Ghana (Hewaminami Kpe Mutual Health Insurance Scheme (Dangme West DMHIS)
and West Gonja Mutual Health Insurance Scheme (West Gonja DMHIS)). 
In Ghana, partner organization West Gonja DMHIS was located in the district West
Gonja in the Northern region of Ghana and the Dangme West DMHIS in the district
Dangme West in the Greater Accra region in the South of Ghana. Both institutions had
a long history as community-based micro health insurance schemes and were inte-
grated in the Ghana-wide NHIS after 2003.
The Dangme West (Dangbe West)518 district is part of the Greater Accra region in
the South of  Ghana,  with the district  capital Dodowa. The region spans over 1442
square kilometers and is the largest district in the Greater Accra region. In the North-
East, it is connected to the Volta river and in the South to the Atlantic Ocean. 519 The
517 It was decided to compare for this study Ghana and Malawi. Botswana was excluded for several
reasons. First, it is a middle-income country with significant income from natural resources. The
country is able to provide a free health care system on a relatively high level. Furthermore, due to
difficulties in the sampling process in Botswana, the local team decided to follow a snowball sam-
pling strategy. Due to this methodological difference, the data were not directly comparable to the
other two countries.
518 The district had just recently been renamed to Shai Osudoku District.
519 Ghana  Districts  (no  date):  Ghana0»  Greater  Accra  Region0»  Dangme  West.  URL:  http://dang-
mewest.ghanadistricts.gov.gh/ (accessed 2014/04/16).
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population size of Dangme West district was 1220836 (2010).520 It is a rural district with
the main occupations of farming, fishing in the Volta river and the ocean as well as
trading.  The Dangme Hewaminami Kpe (DHK), translated as "A good health associa-
tion" in English, started as a mutual health insurance scheme in 2000. The scheme was
designed as a district mutual health insurance scheme by the Health Research Unit of
the Ministry  of  Health of  Ghana and the London School  of  Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine, with the financial support of the European Union and DANIDA. It served as
a  community-based pilot  scheme for  the nationwide NHIS,  introduced later.521 The
scheme joined the NHIS in 2005, as one of the DMHIS. Until the end of 2008, the mem-
bership was around 400 00 members.
The West Gonja district in the Northern region of Ghana spans over 8352 square
kilometers, out of which 3800 square kilometers are occupied by the Mole National
Park and Kenikeni Forest Reserves.522 The district capital is Damongo. The population
of West Gonja district was 840727 (2010).523 It is a rural district with farming and forest-
ing.  The  West  Gonja  community  financing  health  insurance  scheme  in  Damongo,
which later was called West Gonja Mutual Health Insurance Scheme, started opera-
tions in January 1996.  The catholic church, which runs the mission hospital  "West
Gonja Hospital" in Damongo, initiated the health insurance scheme to improve access
to health care and to reduce the financial burden of treatment for the target population
mostly poor and rural households. Additionally, the catholic church sought to stabilize
income flows from the health care services provided by the hospital. Hence, the origi-
nal  benefit package included mostly inpatient services provided at  the West Gonja
Hospital.  The scheme joined the NHIS after its  inception.  At  the end of  2008,  the
scheme had around 500500 members, about 50% of the target population.
In Malawi, the project partnered with two community-based microfinance institu-
tions. MUSCCO was located in the Central region of Malawi and FINCA Malawi in the
Southern region of Malawi. Both institutions provided credit and savings products to
their members, as well as credit-life insurance and emergency loans. MUSCCO also
provided a life-savings product.
The Malawi Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (MUSCCO), founded in 1980,
was the umbrella organization for 57 Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) in
520 Ghana statistical service (2010): 2010 Population and Housing Census for all districts, p. 4. URL:
http://www.ghanadistricts.com/home/?_=83&sa=7060 (accessed 2013/03/04).
521 Atim et al. (2001): A Survey of Health Financing Schemes in Ghana, p. 53.
522 Ghana Districts (no date): Ghana0» Northern Region0» West Gonja District. URL: http://westgon-
ja.ghanadistricts.gov.gh/ (accessed 2014/04/16).
523 Ghana statistical service (2010): 2010 Population and Housing Census for all districts, p. 9.
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Malawi, with a membership of about 550 00 members.524 MUSCCO's headquarter was
in Lilongwe, Central region, but the Savings and Credit Cooperatives operated in all
regions of Malawi and provided microsavings, microcredit, credit-life insurance and a
life-savings product. Loans were given on an individual basis or in group-based lend-
ing systems (in the Southern region).
The Foundation for  International  Assistance (FINCA) was an international  NGO
that operated as a microfinance institution in Malawi. The head quarter was in Blan-
tyre, Southern region of Malawi and the Southern region was also the focus of opera-
tions. FINCA provided microcredit, microsavings and credit-life insurance, mostly via
so-called village banks, a group-based lending system.
5.2.2. Scope and structure of the survey
The household survey was designed to allow for country comparisons (see section 5.2.3
on the sampling strategy). The questionnaire (Appendix 5) was designed in coopera-
tion with the project's country teams and consisted of sections that were identical in
all countries and were, therefore, comparable; additionally there were optional coun-
try-specific sections.525 The standardized questionnaire consisted of 26 pages and was
divided into ten sections. It was administered to the heads of household. The question-
naire followed a two-stage design collecting household-level information and individ-
ual-level information. Several sections and item blocks were collected with informa-
tion on all individuals in the household, such as basic individual information in the
household roster (questionnaire section 0). The core part of the questionnaire collect-
ing information on individual level were the sections on health care utilization (ques-
tionnaire section 2), an extensive section on utilization and spending on health care
applying the method of illness episodes (recall period 3 months), a section on hospital-
ization events (recall period 24 months), a section on maternity events (recall period 5
years) and a section on chronic and permanent illnesses (recall period 12 months).
 The part of the questionnaire collecting information on household level consisted
of a section on the general availability of health care providers (questionnaire section
1), on health insurance membership and spending (questionnaire section 3), on non-
health-related household expenditure (questionnaire section 4), a section on member-
524 Membership figures from 2004. Enarsson, Sven; Wirén, Kjell (2005): MUSCCO - Malawi Union of
Savings and Credit Cooperations. CGAP Working Group on Microinsurance. Malawi, p. iv and 5.
URL:  http://www.microinsurancenetwork.org/publication/fichier/_MUSCCO_Case_Study_8.pdf
(accessed 2011/10/27).
525 Exceptions were currencies, and household roster information on membership in the partner orga-
nizations and questions on the educational level.
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ship in community associations (questionnaire section 5), a section on attitudes and
trust in the community, organizations and authorities (questionnaire section 6), a sec-
tion on general  risks  and risk aversion (questionnaire  section 8)  and a  section on
household income and sources (questionnaire section 9). This section also contained
questions on household and productive assets in order to be able to create a wealth in-
dex and wealth quintiles for the households.
As discussed in section 3.4, and presented in table 2 on page 60, a variety of SRM
strategies exist in the context of low-income households in Malawi and Ghana. A vari-
ety of SRM strategies, as well as household risk exposure to general risks, and individ-
ual exposure to health risks could have been extracted from the household survey data.
Several sub-sections of the questionnaire contained relevant information. The ques-
tionnaire section 8 on "Risk and risk aversion" captured information on household
level of  exposure to general  risks in the last  three years and how it  impacted the
household. The section on health care utilization contained information on individual-
level health risk exposure. On household level, information was collected on member-
ship in community organizations, community-groups and support networks and re-
lated activity levels. The household roster collected information on membership in the
partner organizations and health insurance schemes on individual level and question-
naire section 3 on household-level membership and spending on health insurance. In-
formation on asset-accumulation strategies could be extracted from the static wealth
status based on asset possession. All health care utilization sections contained detailed
parts on how the household/individual managed to pay for direct and indirect health
care costs with information on the used SRM strategies.
Another focus of the survey was household health insurance membership, consist-
ing of a section on health insurance membership and spending, as well as membership
in the local partner organizations, a sub-section on the membership in the Ghanaian
NHIS (Ghana-specific section) and a section measuring Willingness to Pay (WTP) for
health insurance. The section on WTP used an elaborated strategy to elicit the willing-
ness to pay of the head of household following the contingent valuation method using
a bidding game. In contingent valuation, individuals are directly asked, in a hypotheti-
cal survey, what the maximum amount is that they are willing to pay for a certain
product.526 Out  of  the  different  methodologies  of  contingent  valuation,  the  bidding
game approach was chosen over the take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) approach, as there are
526 cp. Olsen, Jan Abel; Smith, Richard D. (2001): Theory versus Practice. A Review of ‘Willingness-to-
Pay’ in Health and Health Care. In: Health Economics, vol. 10, nr. 1, p. 40.
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indications that this approach leads to more reliable outcomes.527 However, the bidding
game approach is prone to a starting point bias;528 therefore, a payment card approach
was used in order to elicit a variable starting price (the WTP of the individual respon-
dent) for the bidding game (the WTP for the household member to be insured). The
payment card visually showed 12 increasing monetary values in the local currency,
which assisted the respondent in his/her decision on an individual willingness to pay
for the hypothetical health insurance product (see Appendix 8).529 The value  selected
from the payment card, multiplied by the number of family members he/she is willing
to insure, served as a starting price for the subsequent bidding game in order to avoid
a starting point bias. 
The respondent was asked whether he/she was willing to accept the amount of the
first bid (the calculated starting point). If the respondent agreed, the interviewer itera-
tively increased the value in small steps until the respondent disagreed to the men-
tioned value. This highest bid was taken as the maximum willingness to pay of the
household. In case the respondent disagreed to the calculated starting point value, the
interviewer iteratively reduced the value by small steps until the respondent agreed to
the value for the first time. Again, the result served as the maximum willingness to pay
of the household for the potential micro health insurance product.
5.2.3. Household sampling strategy and data collection
The  internationally  comparative  household  survey  applied  a  three-stage  sampling
strategy. The first was the distribution of the sample between the countries, based on
feasibility calculations by the local partner universities, University of Ghana and Uni-
versity of Malawi, on the basis of equal budgets for each university. The second stage
consisted of the even distribution of the overall sample to two distant research sites in
each country. The catchment areas of the four community-based partner organizations
in Ghana and Malawi defined the research sites for the household survey. In a third
stage, half of the households were randomly selected on the basis of the partner insti-
tutions' membership registers. For the other half of the households, the non-member
527 Dong et al.  (2003) analyzed the test-retest reliability of both approaches in rural Burkina Faso.
Dong, Hengjin; Kouyate, Bocar; Cairns, John; et al. (2003): A Comparison of the Reliability of the
Take-It-or-Leave-It and the Bidding Game Approaches to Estimating Willingness-to-Pay in a Rural
Population in West Africa. In: Social Science and Medicine, vol. 56, nr. 10, p. 2187.
528 Dong, Hengjin; Kouyate, Bocar; Cairns,  John; et al. (2003): Willingness-to-Pay for Community-
Based Insurance in Burkina Faso. In: Health Economics, vol. 12, nr. 10, p. 858.
529 O’Brien, Bernie; Gafni, Amiram (1996): When Do the ‘Dollars’ Make Sense? Toward a Conceptual
Framework for Contingent Valuation Studies in Health Care. In: Medical Decision Making, vol. 16,
nr. 3, p. 297.
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households closest to households selected from the membership list in the same vil-
lage, served as control households. 
The household selection was handled slightly differently in Ghana and Malawi, be-
cause the partner organizations in Ghana had difficulties providing accurate and up-to-
date membership lists. Therefore, it was decided that the selection mode in Ghana was
a random selection of villages and communities within the catchment area of the orga-
nization. In a second step, the field coordinators consulted the local village/community
volunteer for the district-wide mutual health insurance scheme in the village and then,
based on village-wide membership lists, randomly selected members of the partner in-
stitution as respondents. Like in Malawi, the non-member household closest to the re-
spondent member-households in the same village served as a control household. The
Northern region in Ghana deviated from the other three regions. Due to the commu-
nity-based character and the longer history of the West Gonja scheme, some villages
were found to have very high outreach levels of the DMHIS, so that it was not possible
to retrieve sufficient non-member households as direct controls in the sampled villages.
In the study area in the Northern region, there were long distances between villages,
so large inter-village variations were expected. For this reason, and to avoid distortions
through an adjustment of the sampling strategy in one research site only, which would
lead to difficulties in the comparability to the other research sites, it was decided to
maintain the same sampling strategy in Northern Ghana. The side effect of this strat-
egy was an accepted deviation from the member/control quota, due to the unavailabil-
ity of sufficient control households in these villages. Hence, it was decided that in the
case  that  no close  non-member households  existed,  the  interviews were continued
with the closest member households, who were not previously interviewed. Therefore,
the actual sample in the Northern region diverted from the applied quota rule, but ful-
filled the criteria of a comparable number of successful household interviews between
the regions.
Overall, 1428 households were successfully interviewed with complete data sets, 600
households in Ghana and 828 households in Malawi. In total, 793 households (55.53%)
who were members of  a partner organization and 635 control  households  (44.48%)
were successfully interviewed. Table  10 gives an overview of the sample by country
and region.
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Tab. 10: Sample size by country and region
Ghana (N=600) Malawi (N=828)
Catchment area Dangme West 
DMHIS
West Gonja 
DMHIS
MUSCCO FINCA
Region Greater Accra 
region (South)
Northern re-
gion
Central region Southern re-
gion
Sample size 301 299 387 441
Quota rule: Member 
household vs. control 
households 
50%/50% 50%/50% 50%/50% 50%/50%
Actual sample: Mem-
ber households vs. 
control households
154 (51.2%) /
147 (48.8%)
252 (84.3%) / 
47 (15.7%)
172 (44.4%) /
215 (55.6%)
215 (48.8%) /
226 (51.3%)
Source: author
The partner universities oversaw the field implementation of the household survey and
the recruitment of interviewers for the face to face interviews. The field coordinators
were research assistants at the partner universities permanently working on the Pro
MHI Africa project. Several mechanisms were applied to ensure high data quality and
comparability of the data between the countries: the jointly discussed and developed
highly standardized questionnaire, digital data entry tools, clear instructions for inter-
viewers and supervisors, methodology workshops for the local research teams, and in-
tensive interviewer trainings and pre-tests in each country. The interviews were ad-
ministered using pen and paper. Double data entry took place at the local partner insti-
tutions using the data entry tool CSPro 4.0.530 After that, the data were cleaned and the
different data sets merged. Data cleaning and data analysis was done using the statisti-
cal software Stata 13.1.531
5.3. Statistical methods used in analysis
This study applied a variety of univariate, bivariate and multivariate statistical tech-
niques, in order to test the hypotheses. For comparisons of different groups of a vari -
able, the arithmetic mean was used and, if the distribution of the variable required it,
the median or the α-trimmed mean (α=0.05) was additionally calculated. In the 0.05-
trimmed mean, the lowest and the highest 5% cases of a variable were dropped and the
arithmetic mean of the remaining cases was calculated. As discussed in the section
530 U.S. Census Bureau (no date): CSPro. URL: http://www.cspro.org/cspro/software/start.cfm?dest=1.
531 StataCorp (2013): Stata Statistical Software.
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2.4.1 on health care costs, the median and the trimmed mean are more appropriate
measures if the distribution of a variable does not follow a normal standard distribu-
tion. The median is represented by the 0.5 percentile, which is the value of the case
that splits all cases in half, if sorted from lowest to highest case. Therefore, percentiles
are robust against outliers at the top of the distribution. The α-trimmed mean ignores
outliers at the top and bottom of the distribution and is, therefore, robust for any out -
liers on both ends.532 Both measures are more suitable than the arithmetic mean for a
distribution highly right-skewed with a long right tail, which is the case, for example,
in health care costs and income.533 In the case of health care costs, the concentration
curve and the Gini disparity coefficient was calculated to illustrate that health care
costs are concentrated among a small share of individuals.534 In analysis, means and
distributions of different sub-categories of a variable were compared.
Several bivariate statistical methods were applied. In cross tabulations of two vari-
ables, the Pearson χ2-test of independence was used to measure whether the two vari-
ables (or two groups of one variable) were independent and whether the distributions
of the groups significantly differed.535 To measure the strength of relationship, different
measures were applied, depending on the level of measurement of the variables, no-
tably Φ, τb, and r.536 The measures of association Φ was calculated for the case of two di-
chotomous variables, in order to measure the strength of relationship.537 If one variable
could be identified as a dependent variable, the odds ratio of the bivariate logistic re -
gression was estimated and interpreted.  For multiple  groups of  ordered categorical
532 Wilcox (2010): Fundamentals of Modern Statistical Methods - Substantially Improving Power and
Accuracy, p. 131ff. and 156f.
533 cp. Cleff, Thomas (2015): Deskriptive Statistik und moderne Datenanalyse, 2 edition. Gabler. Wies-
baden, p. 66.
534 Bomsdorf, Eckart (1999): Deskriptive Statistik. WISO Studientexte 1, 10 edition. Josef Eul Verlag
GmbH. Lohmar, p. 69 and 74ff.; Toutenburg, Helge; Heumann, Christian (2006): Deskriptive Statis -
tik: Eine Einführung in Methoden und Anwendungen mit SPSS, 5 edition. Springer. Berlin [a.o.], p.
89ff.
535 Bortz, Jürgen; Schuster, Christof (2010): Statistik für Human- und Sozialwissenschaftler, 7 edition.
Springer-Lehrbuch. Berlin [a.o.], p. 137ff.; Acock, Alan C. (2012): A Gentle Introduction to Stata, 3
(revised) edition. Stata Press.  College Station, TX, p.  123d.;  Kühnel,  Steffen-M.; Krebs,  Dagmar
(2004):  Statistik für die Sozialwissenschaften: Grundlagen,  Methoden, Anwendungen, 2 edition.
Rowohlt Tb. Reinbek bei Hamburg, p. 335.
536 cp.  Pett,  Marjorie A. (1997):  Nonparametric statistics in health care research. SAGE.  Thousand
Oaks [a.o.], p. 274; Cleff (2015): Deskriptive Statistik und moderne Datenanalyse, p. 80.
537 Acock (2012): A Gentle Introduction to Stata, p. 129; Chen, Peter Y.; Popovich, Paula M. (2002):
Correlation. Parametric and nonparametric measures.  Sage. Thousand Oaks [a.o.], p.  29ff.; Pett 
(1997): Nonparametric statistics in health care research, p. 226ff.
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variables, the measure tau-b (τb) was used.538 For two continuous variables, the Pearson
correlation coefficient r was calculated to measure the strength of relationship.539
T-tests were applied in order to test whether the means of a continuous variable be-
tween the two different categories of a grouping variable differed significantly.  Al-
though commonly applied, the t-test has several critical assumptions, such as equal
variances in both categories and normality of the variable in both categories. Further-
more, the t-test is less accurate if these assumptions are violated and also if the sample
sizes of the categories strongly differ.540 For  example,  such a critical case occurs in
health care research using household survey data, by comparing the means of a vari-
able of interest between individuals who have a certain illness and those (the majority)
who do not.541 In addition,  for variables which violated the assumptions of the t-test,
the non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test was calculated, which com-
pares the distribution of a continuous variable in the two levels of the categorical vari-
able and which has fewer assumptions on the underlying variable than the t-test; the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  is  particularly  reliable  when  one  or  both  samples  are
small.542
For  more  than  two  categories  of  a  continuous  variable,  analysis  of  variance
(ANOVA) was applied. In order to test whether there was a significant difference be-
tween a set of means in the categories of the variable, multiple-comparison tests were
used applying the Bonferroni correction.543 Generally, ANOVA models have assump-
tions similar to the t-test, such as equal variances and normality assumptions, and are
538 Acock (2012): A Gentle Introduction to Stata, p. 134ff.; Chen et al. (2002): Correlation. Parametric
and nonparametric measures, p. 84ff.
539 Kühnel et al. (2004): Statistik für die Sozialwissenschaften, p. 401ff.; Kohler, Ulrich; Kreuter, Frauke
(2008): Datenanalyse mit Stata: Allgemeine Konzepte der Datenanalyse und ihre praktische An-
wendung, 3 edition. Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag. München, p. 187; Chen et al. (2002): Corre -
lation. Parametric and nonparametric measures, p. 9.
540 Bortz, Juürgen; Lienert, Gustav A; Boehnke, Klaus (2008): Verteilungsfreie Methoden in der Bio -
statistik. Springer. Heidelberg, p. 122.
541 cp. Pett (1997): Nonparametric statistics in health care research, p. 28f.
542 Ibid., p. 87ff.; on the use of non-parametric tests if assumptions of t-test are violated: Bortz et al.
(2008): Verteilungsfreie Methoden in der Biostatistik, p. 130; since the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test
has been chosen over the Mann-Whitney U-test, as it is more reliable if the categories contain
small sample(s):  Pett (1997): Nonparametric statistics in health care research, p. 93; Bortz et al.
(2010): Statistik für Human- und Sozialwissenschaftler, p. 305.
543 The Bonferroni multiple-comparison test is a reliable, but conservative measure, to be used for a
‘small  number  of  simultaneous  tests  (up  to  five)’;  for  a  larger  number  of  tests,  for  example
Scheffé"s test would be preferrable (which may be less sensitive): Everitt, Brian; Skrondal, Anders
(2010): The Cambridge dictionary of statistics. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge [a.o.], p.
59.; Hamilton, Lawrence C (2012): Statistics with Stata. Duxbury/Thomson Learning. Belmont, CA
[a.o.], p. 153; Acock (2012): A Gentle Introduction to Stata, pp. 209–214; Stata Press (ed.) (2013):
Stata user’s guide release 13. Stata Press. College Station, TX, p. 1548.
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sensitive to distributions that contain outliers. Hence, the Kruskall-Wallis test, a non-
parametric  alternative to ANOVA, was additionally presented,  if  these assumptions
were violated.544 As measure of effect size of the grouping variable on the dependent
variable, Cohen's d (δ) was calculated and presented.545
Several multivariate regression models were estimated. When the dependent vari-
able was dichotomous, which was the case, for example, with chronic conditions and
long hospitalization stays,  multivariate  logistic  regressions were applied,  using  the
maximum likelihood estimation with b coefficients. B coefficients are used to standard-
ize the effects of the variables in regression models, showing how much a one unit
change in the independent variable increases or decreases the predicted log odds of the
dependent variable.546 In order to compare the importance of factors on the dependent
variable, transformed, standardized coefficients were calculated that present the per-
cent  changes  in  the  odds  of  the  dependent  variable,  if  the  independent  variable
changes by one unit or alternatively by one standard deviation.547 As a measure of the
degree of explained variance, the adjusted McFadden Pseuso-R2 (likelihood-ratio index)
was calculated. The Count-R2 was additionally provided, a common measure that gives
the share of correctly predicted values.548
In cases when the dependent variable was continuous (metric), multivariate linear
ordinary-least-square (OLS) regressions were estimated. For OLS regressions, the ad-
justed R2 was reported, which is the degree to which the regression model explains the
variance in the dependent variable. Compared to the usual R2, the adjusted R2 is more
reliable, as it considers the N and the number of parameters, particularly relevant for
multiple linear regression models with many variables.549 The Breusch-Pagan test was
544 Hamilton (2012): Statistics with Stata, p. 153f.; On the assumptions of ANOVA and the Kruskall-
Wallis test: Acock (2012): A Gentle Introduction to Stata, p. 206 and 218f.
545 Cohen’s delta (contrary to omega^2) is not a measure of explained variance in the dependent vari-
able, but rather considers the difference of the two means and the standard deviation (denomina -
tor). Acock (2012): A Gentle Introduction to Stata, Revised Third Edition, p. 166 and 171ff.; Wilcox
(2010): Fundamentals of Modern Statistical Methods - Substantially Improving Power and Accu-
racy, p. 117f.
546 For bivariate logistic regression, the odds ratios were estimated and interpreted. For multivariate
models, the b-coefficients were estimated, because they allow comparisons between predictors.
Acock (2012): A Gentle Introduction to Stata, p. 310; Kohler et al. (2008): Datenanalyse mit Stata, p.
273f.; Hamilton (2012): Statistics with Stata, p. 258ff.
547 Long, J. Scott; Freese, Jeremy (2003): Regression models for categorical dependent variables using
stata, Rev. ed. edition. Stata Press. College Station, TX, p. 73ff.; Acock (2012): A Gentle Introduc-
tion to Stata, p. 310ff.
548 Kohler et al. (2008): Datenanalyse mit Stata, p. 280f.; Long et al. (2003): Regression models for cate-
gorical dependent variables using stata, p. 82 and 85f.
549 Bortz et al. (2008): Verteilungsfreie Methoden in der Biostatistik, p. 192 and 347f.; Kohler et al.
(2008): Datenanalyse mit Stata, p. 204f.
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applied to measure the level of heteroscedasticity, and in order to reduce the level of
heteroscedasticity, the Huber-White sandwich estimator was applied, which produces
more robust regression coefficients than the standard OLS estimation.550 In order to
further reduce the level of heteroscedasticity, the natural logarithm of some dependent
variables with high level of heteroscedasticity were calculated and used in the regres-
sion model, because it avoided problems with heteroscedasticity.551 Centered variance
inflation factors (VIFs) were calculated,  in order to detect and avoid collinearity of
variables.552 If the independent variables in a multivariate regression model formed log-
ical groups, they were step-wise included into the regression model, in order to evalu-
ate the effects of the different factor groups.
For selected bivariate and multivariate linear models, the measure ω2 was calculated,
to estimate the effect sizes of different factors in linear models (OLS regression models
and ANOVA calculations). Ω2 can be seen as equivalent to the incremental increases in
adjusted R2 estimates and, therefore, is an estimator of the variance explained in the
dependent variable.553
6. Analytical framework and hypotheses
6.1. Analytical framework and structure of analysis
As elaborated in detail in section 2.1 on risk characteristics, mutual interdependencies
between social risk management strategies and risk characteristics (e.g. risk probability
and risk exposure, the extent of shocks) can be expected. Section 3.3 provided more de-
tail about how different SRM strategies may have different impacts on risk exposure,
risk-related shocks and the impact of the shock on households (see figure  1 on page
45). Hence, SRM strategies either ex-ante reduce the probability of the risk or the ex-
tent of the shock; or they reduce ex-ante or ex-post the impact of the shock on house-
holds or individuals. As shown in the first part of the study (sections 2-4.3.6.3), both
risk exposure and accessibility of SRM strategies are dependent on certain socio-eco-
550 Kühnel et al. (2004): Statistik für die Sozialwissenschaften, p. 427f.; Kohler et al. (2008): Datenanal-
yse mit Stata, p. 225f.; Baum, Christopher F (2006): An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Us-
ing Stata. Stata Press. College Station, TX, p. 145ff.; Fahrmeir, Ludwig; Kneib, Thomas; Lang, Stefan
(2009): Regression: Modelle,  Methoden und Anwendungen (Statistik und ihre Anwendungen), 2
edition. Springer. Heidelberg [a.o.], p. 131 and 135f.; Stata Press (ed.) (2013): Stata user’s guide re-
lease 13, p. 309f.
551 Kohler et al. (2008): Datenanalyse mit Stata, p. 238.
552 Bortz et al. (2010): Statistik für Human- und Sozialwissenschaftler, p. 350f.; Acock (2012): A Gentle
Introduction to Stata, p. 268f.
553 Acock (2012): A Gentle Introduction to Stata, p. 231f.
134
6.1. Analytical framework And Structure of Analysis
nomic characteristics, such as the wealth of the household, the household size or the
age of the individual. Socio-economic characteristics are not the only influence on the
use of SRM strategies by households, previous risk experience and the perception of
being exposed to higher risks than others are also relevant factors. For example, previ-
ous experiences with illness or with treatments that caused high health care costs in-
fluences household's health risk management strategies, because households prepare
for potential future illnesses. Similarly, a household might be aware that individuals in
the household carry a higher risk of falling sick compared to others. Both experiences
with high costs and perceptions of high risk exposure influence households' risk man-
agement behavior. However, these motivating factors needed to be treated conceptu-
ally differently, as they were expected to have different effects on households' behavior
with regard to ex-ante risk management strategies. In this study, these two different
parts of  the illness experience were conceptualized as  high-cost  cases and  high-risk
cases.
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Fig. 4: Conceptual framework
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6. Analytical framework And Hypotheses
The analytical framework, as presented in figure 4, showed four main analytical parts,
which demonstrated strong interdependencies (parts in the figure are discussed clock-
wise): 
The first main part (top right in the figure) represented the variables on risk expo-
sure. These were separated by households' and individual risk exposure to (a) general
risks, (b) short-term and (c) long-term health risks. As introduced in section 2.4 on the
dual economic burden of health risks, direct and indirect health care costs (particularly
if considered catastrophic) are a substantial part of health risk exposure. On individual
level, high-cost and high-risk individuals were defined on basis of cost data and their
individual characteristics.
The second main analytical  part  represented the  social  (health) risk management
strategies (SRM) applied by households to manage general risks and health risks. A va-
riety of SRM strategies that were discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3 were extracted from
the dataset and operationalized, such as diversification in income and occupations, as-
set-holding, savings, credit, insurance, and social activity levels or community trust.
Since  health  insurance  was only  widely  available  as  an  essential  SRM strategy in
Ghana, the willingness to pay for health insurance was calculated as a proxy for the
need of health insurance as an SRM strategy. For this analytical part, it was decided
not to use the concept of social capital. Some concepts are well-established constructs,
such as trust, participation and social networks. The described phenomena were ana-
lyzed without subsuming it under the concept of social capital.554 However, each of the
observed phenomena were analyzed regarding its value for risk management and were
operationalized using these constructs. In this sense, the concept of social capital in-
spired the analysis, by keeping the interchangeable nature of capital in mind, which
was considered to be “convertible” between social, physical and cultural. Cognitive and
structural views on social capital were also considered in the analysis.
The third main analytical part was the implications for the SRM strategy 'health in-
surance'  (using actual health insurance membership and the proxy of willingness to
pay for health insurance by households) representing the triangular relationship with
high risk exposure and other SRM strategies. This analysis aimed to determine the suit-
ability of health insurance as SRM strategy and whether it filled gaps in the existing
sets of SRM strategies.
554 cp.  Inaba,  Yoji  (2013):  What’s  Wrong  with  Social  Capital?  Critiques  from  Social  Science.  In:
Kawachi, Ichiro; Takao, Soshi; Subramanian, S.V. (eds.): Global Perspectives on Social Capital and
Health. New York [a.o.], p. 326f.
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The fourth analytical part (on the left side of the figure) represented the main socio-
economic and personal determinants, as well as other confounding variables. These vari-
ables were used to measure the relationship with the three main conceptual parts.
First,  each of  the parts was descriptively presented and then their  interrelations
with the other analytical parts were described. The analysis followed eight steps along
the conceptual framework. In the steps, important descriptive statistics and the distri-
bution of the dependent variables were discussed along with determinants and con-
founders of the variables. An overview of the analysis structure is given in table 11, in-
dicating the section, where the analytical parts were detailed.
Tab. 11: Structure and steps in analysis
Step Method Analytical parts Section
0 General descriptives 7.1
1 Descriptives, distri-bution
Risk exposure (individual 
and household-level) 7.2&7.3
2 Bivar. analysis, mul-tivar. regression
Risk exposure (individual 
and household-level) ↔
Determinants & 
confounders 7.2&7.3
3 Descriptives, distri-bution Social risk management 7.4
4 Bivar. analysis, mul-tivar. regression Social risk management ↔
Determinants & 
confounders 7.4
5 Bivar. analysis, mul-tivar. regression Social risk management ↔ Risk exposure 7.4
6 Multivar. regression Willingness to pay for health insurance ↔
Determinants & 
confounders 7.5
8 Multivar. regression Health insurance member-ship ↔
Social risk man-
agement
Risk exposure
7.5
Source: author
6.2. Hypotheses
Based on the literature review from chapter 2, 3 and 4, several hypotheses were devel-
oped following the research questions and the conceptual framework. The hypotheses
were operationalized based on the available data and variables. With regard to general
household exposure to risks, it was hypothesized that:
137
6. Analytical framework And Hypotheses
1      There is a significant relationship of socio-economic household characteris-
tics and geographic factors with exposure of households to general risks
H1a: Type and extent of general risk exposure show a significant geographic vari-
ation between countries, regions and between categories of household envi-
ronment.
H1b: The lowest wealth quintile and the lowest income quintile experience the
highest general risk exposure.
H1c: Higher educational level of the household reduces general risk exposure.
With regard to health care costs and health risks, it was hypothesized that:
2     The economic burden of disease is concentrated on a few individuals and
households, while certain determinants increase the likelihood to face high
health care costs.
H2a: High acute health risk exposure of individuals can be partially explained by
personal characteristics such as sex, old age or pre-existing medical condi-
tions (e.g. chronic diseases or long hospitalization stays).
H2b: Health care costs are heavily positively skewed so that the economic burden
of disease severely hits a small percentage of individuals and households, so
that less than 10% of individuals and households carry more than 50% of total
health care costs.
H2c: Households with health insurance are less likely to be in the high-cost group
than uninsured households (Financial protection of health insurance)
H2d: High-risk households have at least twice the likelihood to be in the high-cost
group than low- or medium-risk households.
With regard to household sets of social risk management strategies, it was hypothe-
sized that:
3      Households apply a wide array of risk management strategies which depend
on socio-economic and geographic characteristics as well as high-risk status
and high-cost exposure.
H3a: Certain  socio-economic  characteristics  (education,  wealth,  household  size,
age of head of household, religion) of the household as well as geographic
characteristics (country, region) make a significant difference in the applied
risk management strategies.
H3b: High-risk exposure of households is related to higher complexity of sets of
risk management strategies.
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H3c: High-risk exposure of households is related to higher application of those
SRM  strategies  that  can  be  considered  pro-active  strategies  compared  to
other groups.
H3d: High-cost households use more complex sets of SRM strategies than other
households.
H3e: High-cost households who are also high-risk households have a significantly
different set of SRM strategies compared to other high-cost households.
With regard to the willingness to pay (WTP) for health insurance it was hypothesized
that:
4     Higher risk exposure of households and higher socio-economic status are re-
lated to higher levels of WTP.
H4a: Higher wealth and income levels result in a higher level of WTP (Ability to
pay).
H4b: Higher educational level and better understanding of insurance (awareness
of insurance) result in a higher level of WTP.
H4c: Higher household general (non-health) risk exposure leads to a higher level
of WTP.
H4d: High-risk households are related to a higher level of WTP.
H4e: High-cost households (in the last three months) are not related to changes of
WTP levels.
H4f: The application of other SRM strategies is related to a reduced WTP level
(crowding-out effect)
H4g: Households in Ghana that have health insurance (NHIS) show a higher WTP
than uninsured households.
With regard to health insurance as an SRM strategy it was hypothesized that:
5      Health insurance membership of households depends on risk exposure and
the complexity of sets of SRM strategies.
H5a: High (non-health) general risk exposure is positively related to health insur-
ance membership.
H5b: High-risk (health) households are more likely to have health insurance mem-
bership.
H5c: High-cost households are negatively related to health insurance membership
(financial protection of health insurance)
H5d: The complexity of SRM strategy sets (without health insurance) is negatively
associated with health insurance membership (crowding-out effect)
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6.3. Operationalization of variables
All variables from the household survey questionnaire that were required for analysis
were operationalized in order to match analytical constructs and the applied statistical
models. This process included imputation of missing values and the creation of indices.
Some variables used in the regression models contained missing values. It was de-
cided to impute these values for the independent variables where the assumption could
be made that the missing values were missing at random or missing completely at ran-
dom. There was no imputation done for the dependent variables, e.g. the level of will -
ingness to pay, in order not to distort the results. The imputations were conducted us-
ing multiple regressions (based on OLS regression, ordinal regression and multinomial
regression, respectively) with all relevant predictor variables. The imputations followed
a five-step algorithm, as suggested by Buuren et al. (1999).555
Due to the application of different methodological approaches, variations of some
variables were computed in order to match the requirements of a particular statistical
model. This section describes the computation of the dependent variables in detail, as
well as the calculation of some more complicated independent variables. Details are
given for the dependent variables Willingness to Pay (WTP), high-cost household, and
high-risk household, as well as the independent variables total household income and
the wealth level of the household/socio-economic status (SES); for an overview see ta-
ble 12. All independent variables used in analysis that did not require further descrip-
tion are described in table 13.
Tab. 12: Main (dependent) variables
Variables Measurement
Household risk exposure
High cost household (health) 0 = low or medium health care costs
1 = high health care costs (>1 standard devi-
ation higher than the mean of the logarithm 
of total health care costs)
Household classified as high (health) risk 
household (4 categories)
0 = low health risks
0.33 = low to medium health risks
0.66 = medium to high health risks
1 = high health risks
Household classified as high (health) risk 
household (binary)
0 = low or medium health risks
1 = high health risks
555 As implemented by the Stata command ado uvis/ice. See van Buuren, S.; Boshuizen, H. C.; Knook,
D. L. (1999): Multiple Imputation of Missing Blood Pressure Covariates in Survival Analysis. In:
Statistics in Medicine, vol. 18, nr. 6.
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General risks exposure of household Continuous/Count (0-11) or categories:
0 = No risk exposure
1 = 1-3 risks
2 = 4-6 risks
3 = more than 7 risks
Household exposure to non-health general 
risks with negative economic impact on 
household
Continuous/Count (0-11)
Social risk management strategies
Complexity of SRM strategies Continuous/Count (0-7)
Complexity of set of SRM strategies (with-
out health insurance)
Continuous/Count (0-6)
Health insurance membership of household 0 = no household member is insured for 
health
1 = at least one household member insured 
for health
Willingness to pay per person in € (log) Continuous
Willingness to pay per person in € (log), if 
willingness was expressed to purchase at 
final bid
Continuous
Source: author
The definition of high cost households was based on the total direct and indirect health
care costs of  all  illness episodes that were reported by the household  in the three
month recall period.556 In section  2.4.2, a few studies were mentioned that computed
variables representing "high" or "highest" cost cases. All of these studies either used a
monetary value threshold or a fix percentage (e.g. 10% of individuals counted from the
most expensive individual) to define high cost individuals. These applied measures do
neither acknowledge the distribution of the variable nor the distance from the mean.
Hence, a calculation method that takes into account these two factors was sought.  A
typical method to identify extreme values of a normally distributed variable is measur-
ing the values that are further than one standard deviation (SD) from the central point
(mean). In a normal distribution, this is the inflection point of the curve. In the case of
heavily positively skewed distributions, which is typically the case in illness costs, this
556 Direct  costs  included:  allopathic consultation,  specialist  consultation,  hospital  treatment,  tradi-
tional caregiver consultation, imaging tests, laboratory tests, Western medicine (prescribed and
non-prescribed),  traditional  medicine  (prescribed  and  non-prescribed).  Indirect  costs  included:
Transportation of patient, travel costs for accompanying persons, costs for hospital visits, food
during hospitalization, gifts to health personnel. Lost income was not included in the analysis of
indirect costs.
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approach has limitations, as the standard deviation itself, similarly to the mean, is in-
fluenced by extreme values.557 Hence, several alternative approaches were calculated to
determine high-cost households and individuals. The simplest approach – as taken by
the studies cited above – was to calculate the 10% of households with the highest
health care costs. However, this approach can be problematic with highly right-skewed
variables, as it remains unclear how much these household diverge from the mean of
the distribution. An alternative approach was calculated using a Box-Cox power trans-
formation, so that the skewness of the variable was 0. As this method alters the vari -
able  quite  extensively,  a  more  commonly  used  approach  to  correct  for  positively
skewed variables was chosen, which was the creation of the natural logarithm of the
expenditure variable. This method has shown a more reasonable selection of high-cost
households, as compared to the simple application of a percentage. Hence, applying
this method, high-cost households in this study were defined as households who had at
least health care expenditures equaling the mean plus one standard deviation of the
logarithm of the health care expenditure variable. Due to the different currencies, and
differences in  the institutional  setting,  the  dichotomous variable  defining high-cost
households was calculated separately for each country and only later merged into an
international variable. As a result, out of the 845 households who reported any illness
episode in the three months prior to the survey, a total of 88 households (10.41%), hav-
ing reported at least one illness episode, have been classified as high-cost households;
using all households as a base, the percentage is 6.16%. Out of these high-cost house -
holds, 37 originated from Ghana and 51 from Malawi.558
The construction of the variable high-risk households was based on the literature re-
view on risk adjustors in section 2.3.2. Out of the variables that had a clear effect on fu-
ture health care needs and future health care expenditures, three relevant variables
defining high-risk households  could  be  operationalized for  the construction of  the
variable: (1) number of chronic conditions in the household that existed during the last
12 months, (2) number of individuals over 55 years of age in the household and (3)
number of hospitalizations that required long hospital stays of over 3 days during the
last 24 months prior to the survey. A high-risk index was created on basis of these
three variables. In case a household had more than one occurrence of one of three vari-
ables, the original variable was discounted, using a square root transformation before
557 Wilcox (2010): Fundamentals of Modern Statistical Methods - Substantially Improving Power and
Accuracy, p. 32.
558 In Ghana this equaled 10.76% of households reporting an illness episodes and 6.7% of the Ghana-
ian sample. In Malawi this equaled 10.18% of households reporting an illness episode and 6.16% of
the Malawian sample.
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calculating the index, in order to normalize the variances between the three variables
and to avoid too strong an influence of one of the variables on the high-risk index. The
index for high-risk households was then standardized to the value range of 0 to 1, with
four categories in total. In case a dichotomous variable was needed for a particular
analysis, the households were classified as high-risk households if the index was be-
tween 0.5 and 1. The resulting index was identified to lead to more reasonable index
values than similar calculations using multiple correspondence analysis or principal
component analysis,  which had also been tested.  125 households were classified as
high-risk households, with 77 (61.60%) in Ghana and 48 (38.40%) in Malawi.559
Figure 5 shows the distribution and overlapping of high-cost and high-risk households.
Overall, 16.80% (21) of high-risk households were also found in the group of high-cost
households, which is quite a high value, confirming the relevance of the selected vari-
ables for the high risk index. Out of all households identified as high-cost households,
21 out of 88 (23.86%) were also classified as high-risk households.
559 The relatively higher percentage of high-risk cases in Ghana was consistent over all three vari -
ables used for the construction of the high-risk index. The Ghanaian sample had a higher average
age than the Malawian sample so that 73.42% of individuals over 55 years are from Ghana. Ghana
accounted for 55.45% of the long hospitalization events and 46.01% of chronic conditions. Assum-
ing an equal distribution, the expected percentages for all these variables were 42.02% according
to the sample size.
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Source: Pro MHI Africa dataset
Fig. 5: Distribution of high-risk and high-cost households in overall sample
High-risk
households
Low-risk
households
8.75%
91.25%
High-cost
households 6.16%
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The dependent variable for Willingness to Pay (WTP) reflected the value given by the
respondent as the maximum willingness to pay for the hypothetical micro health in-
surance product. This maximum WTP was divided by the number of household mem-
bers that the respondent wanted to insure, in order to get the willingness to pay per in-
dividual. Both the household willingness to pay and the individual willingness to pay
were heavily right-skewed, which may violate the homoscedasticity assumption.560 In
order  to reduce heteroscedasticity,  and to  produce a  normally  distributed variable,
transforming the dependent variable, using a natural logarithm of the variable, is sug-
gested.  Figure  35 in Appendix 1 illustrates the distribution of  the original  and log
transformed variables.  Thus, with the transformed outcome variable,  the regression
model could be described as:561
ln (WTP i)=β0+β1 x i1+…+βk xik+εi .
In the resulting regression model, the regression coefficients needed to be interpreted
differently, as compared to a model without log transformation. Due to the transforma-
tion, the coefficients multiplied by 100 could be interpreted as percentage change of
the non-transformed outcome variable.562
Tab. 13: List of independent variables and their measurements
Variables Measurement
Household characteristics
Household size continuous variable
Mean age (mean of household members) continuous variable
Child/adult ratio continuous variable. (household members 0-
17 years / household members 18+ years) 
Child/adult ratio (dichotomous) 0 = Child/adult ratio <=1
1 = Child/adult ratio > 1
Household environment 1 = Rural
2 = Semi-urban
3 = Urban
Religion (predominant in household) 1 = Christian
2 = Muslim
3 = Traditional Religion
4 = Other
Highest education level in household 1 = No formal education or not completed 
      primary
2 = Completed primary school
3 = Completed secondary school
560 Kohler et al. (2008): Datenanalyse mit Stata, p. 226.
561 Fahrmeir et al. (2009): Regression, p. 71f.; Kohler et al. (2008): Datenanalyse mit Stata, p. 238f.
562 Wooldridge, Jeffrey M (2003): Introductory econometrics, 2 edition. South-Western College Pub.
Mason, Ohio, p. 43f.
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4 = Completed tertiary education
Occupation diversification in household Continuous (0-4). Possible occupation cate-
gories of household members: Formal em-
ployment, farm earnings, business earnings, 
daily wages.
Household total monthly income (in Euro 
equivalent)
continuous
Household total monthly income (quintiles) 1 = 1st quintile (lowest)
...
5 = 5th quintile (highest)
Household wealth index (quintiles), MCA 
incl. durable assets, infrastructure, and ani-
mals (categorized) / Socio-economic status
1 = 1st quintile (lowest)
...
5 = 5th quintile (highest)
Household total monthly expenditures 
(quintiles)
1 = 1st quintile (lowest)
...
5 = 5th quintile (highest)
Characteristics of household head (and individuals)
Sex (head of household) 0 = male
1 = female
Age (of head of household or individual) in 
years
Continuous/Count
Age groups (head of household) 0 = 14-24 years
1 = 25-34 years
2 = 35-44 years
3 = 45-54 years
4 = 44-64 years
5 = 65+ years
Age groups (all household members) 00 = 0-4
05 = 5-15
16 = 16-54
55 = 55+
Marital status (head of household) 0 = Single/Not in relationship
1 = Married/In relationship
Education (of head of household or individ-
ual)
1 = No formal education or not completed 
primary
2 = Completed primary school
3 = Completed secondary school
4 = Completed tertiary education
Risk exposure variables (see also table 12)
Subjective risk exposure compared to other 
households general risks)
-2 = Much less
-1 = Less
0 = About the same
1 = More
2= Much more
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Existence of chronic illnesses (household or 
individual)
0 = No
1 = Yes
Existence of long hospitalization stays 
(household or individual)
0 = No
1 = Yes
Health care facility-related variables
Distance to closest primary care facility (in 
km)
0 = 0-<1 km
1 = 1 to <2.5 km 
2 = 2.5 to <5 km 
3 = 5 to <10 km 
4 = >=10 km
Distance to closest primary care facility >= 
5km
0 = 0- >5km 
1 = >= 5km
Distance to closest general hospital (in km) 0 = 0 to <5 km 
1 = 5 to <10 km 
2 = 10 to <25 km 
3 = 25 to <50 km
4 >=50 km
Distance to closest general hospital >= 10km 0 = 0- >10km 
1 = >= 10km
Type of normally used primary health care 
facility
0 = Public or charitable facility
1 = Private facility
Satisfaction with the quality of health care -2 = Strongly disagree
-1 = Disagree
0 = Neither agree nor disagree
1 = Agree
2 =Strongly agree
Social risk management strategies (see also table 12)
Credit/loan/borrowing use by household 0 = No
1 = Yes
Savings (formal and semi-formal) use by 
household
0 = No
1 = Yes
Household membership in microfinance 0 = No
1 = Yes
Income diversification 0-3 (count variable).563
Income diversification (binary) 0 = No identifiable income source or only one
source
1 = Two or three different income sources
Perceived likelihood of community assis-
tance
-2 = Very unlikely
-1 = Unlikely
0 = Neither likely nor unlikely
1 =Somewhat likely
563 Households could mention at maximum three main income sources out of following possible in-
come  sources  of  the  household:  Agricultural,  business,  remittances  and  cash  transfers,  daily
wages, salaries, credit/borrowing.
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2 = Very likely
Household members contributing signifi-
cantly to the household income
0 to 5 (count variable)
Household members contributing signifi-
cantly to the household income (binary)
0 = No or only one household member
1 = Two or more household members
Share of household members contributing 
significantly to the household income
0 to 1 (Share of household members)
Highest participation in decision-making of 
all community associations' memberships
0 = Does not participate in decision making
1 = Somewhat active
2 = Very active
3 = Leader
Highest participation in decision-making of 
all community associations' memberships 
(binary)
0 = No participation or somewhat active
1= Very active or leader
Highest frequency of attendance of all com-
munity associations' memberships
0 = Never
1 = Less than once a month
2 = Once a month
3 = Once per two weeks
4 = Once a week
5 = More than once a week
Highest frequency of attendance of all com-
munity associations' memberships (3 cate-
gories)
0 = Never and less than once a month
1 = Once a month and once per two weeks
2 = Once a week and more frequent
Highest frequency of attendance of all com-
munity associations' memberships (binary)
0 = Less frequent than once a week
1 = Once a week and more frequent
Total number of memberships in commu-
nity associations
0 to 7 (count variable)
Total number of memberships in commu-
nity associations (5 categories)
0 = Zero membership
1 = One membership
…
4 = 4 or more memberships
Household activity index in community as-
sociations
0 to 1 (lowest to highest activity)
Household activity index in community as-
sociations (3 categories)
0 = No or very low activity
1 = Low/Medium activity
2 = High activity
Household activity index in community as-
sociations (binary)
0 = No/low/medium activity
1 = High activity
Risk-related knowledge and attitudes
Acknowledgment of insurance as risk man-
agement tool
 -2 = Strongly disagree
-1 = Disagree
0 = Neither agree nor disagree
1 = Agree
2 =Strongly agree
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Satisfaction with current mode of health 
care financing
-2 = Strongly disagree
-1 = Disagree
0 = Neither agree nor disagree
1 = Agree
2 =Strongly agree
Knowledge of insurance 0 = No
1 = Yes
Willingness to take risks -2 = Absolutely unwilling to take risks 
-1 = Unwilling to take risks
0 = Neither willing nor unwilling to take 
risks
1 = Willing to take risks
2 = Absolutely willing to take risks
Source: author
The socio-economic status (SES) is an important independent factor for the well-being of
households, their vulnerability to shocks, as well as the accessibility of SRM strategies.
However, all relevant measures that aim to give an indication about the SES of house-
holds, such as household income, consumption expenditure and asset indices, are prob-
lematic. Wealth indices, on the basis of (mostly durable) assets of a household, have
largely been developed within the framework of  Demographic  and Health Surveys
(DHS), to be suitable for international comparisons. The computation of wealth indices
has been steadily improving over the last two decades, so that they are now perceived
to be superior to classic consumption-based measures that had proven to be problem-
atic in their measurement.564 In the statistical calculation of wealth indices, there have
been recent advances, which make the indices more robust and comparable. Early cal-
culations of wealth indices relied on factor analysis, which then was replaced by prin-
cipal component analysis (PCA).565 However, the latter has the main assumption that
the underlying variable is on a metric scale and normally distributed; using binary or
ordinal variables is a violation of the assumptions of PCA and leads to meaningless es-
timations. A solution to this is the more recent application of multiple correspondence
analysis (MCA), which puts fewer constraints on the underlying variables, allowing for
ordinal and categorical or dummy variables. It leads to similarly robust outcomes as
PCA measures, if constraints are fulfilled.566 However, it also comes with similar limita-
564 Rutstein, Shea Oscar; Johnson, Kiersten (2004): The DHS Wealth Index. DHS Comparative Reports.
Calverton,  Maryland  (USA),  p.  1.  URL:  http://www.pacificdisaster.net/pdnadmin/data/
original/undp_disaste_profiles_ldcs_31.pdf.
565 Booysen, Frikkie; van der Berg, Servaas; Burger, Ronelle; et al. (2008): Using an Asset Index to As-
sess Trends in Poverty in Seven Sub-Saharan African Countries. In: World Development, vol. 36,
nr. 6, p. 1114.
566 Ibid., p. 1114ff. and 1127.
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tions, as PCA measures focus on the first main component and can explain only a
small percentage of total variance of the assets data.567 As the variables for this study
were mostly dichotomous or ordinal, the wealth index was created on the basis of an
MCA calculation and, subsequently, the creation of wealth quintiles was done indepen-
dently for each country. In line with other studies on assets indices,568 several variables
were considered for the index, such as housing facilities, durable assets, infrastructure
and animals (all binary or categorized in quartiles).569 
Weighing the advantages and limitations of wealth indices, it was decided to use
two measures of SES for analysis: household income and the aforementioned wealth
index. Like measures based on assets, measures of household income are problematic,
but provide an angle on the SES of a household other than wealth indices, as it focuses
on the sources of livelihood. This can be of particular importance in the analysis of the
application of SRM strategies by households; generally, income is more rapidly moving
and fluctuating than asset holding,570 and household income can be more quickly used
as an SRM strategy (or to get access to other SRM strategies) compared to the sale of
assets for risk management.
In the construction of the questionnaire, the main points of criticism on measuring
household income were taken into consideration, such as recall problems and multiple
income sources with fluctuating income.571 Other problems, such as missing knowledge
of income of other household members, or the tendency to hide income from inter-
viewers, could not be manufactured in the research tool, so that a systematic bias may
exist for all households.572 In order to avoid the tendency of the respondent to neglect
the income of other household members, the income was asked in multiple steps by
567 Howe,  Laura D.;  Hargreaves,  James R.;  Huttly,  Sharon R. (2008):  Issues in the Construction of
Wealth Indices for the Measurement of Socio-Economic Position in Low-Income Countries.  In:
Emerging Themes in Epidemiology, vol. 5, nr. 1742-7622 (Electronic), p. 4.
568 Ibid., p. 2; Booysen et al. (2008): Using an Asset Index to Assess Trends in Poverty in Seven Sub-
Saharan African Countries, p. 1116ff.
569 Following variables were included in the calculation of the asset/wealth index. Housing facilities:
quality of house building material, quality of floor material, number of sleeping rooms, ownership
of buildings, land ownership. Infrastructure: electricity, access to potable water. Durable assets:
type of cooking facility, refrigerator, mattress, telephone (landline/cell phone), car, bicycle, motor-
cycle, agricultural machines, computer, TV, DVD-player, satellite dish, radio. Animals: Cattle, don-
keys (not in Malawi), goats, pigs, sheep, guinea fowls (not in Malawi), chicken, ducks. 
570 Booysen et al. (2008): Using an Asset Index to Assess Trends in Poverty in Seven Sub-Saharan
African Countries, p. 1117.
571 The authors Howe et al. 2012 and Rutstein et al. 2004 mentioned some criticism on income mea -
surement in low-income countries. Howe, Laura D.; Galobardes, Bruna; Matijasevich, Alicia; et al.
(2012): Measuring Socio-Economic Position for Epidemiological Studies in Low- and Middle-In-
come Countries. A Methods of Measurement in Epidemiology Paper. In: International Journal of
Epidemiology, vol. 41, nr. 3, p. 878; Rutstein et al. (2004): The DHS Wealth Index, p. 2f.
572 cp. Rutstein et al. (2004): The DHS Wealth Index, p. 2.
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asking first how many household members and who in the household were significant
contributors to household income. In the second step the income of the individual con-
tributor was asked starting from the most significant contributor. Additionally, often
neglected income sources, such as annual sales of products, national and international
remittances and income from government or organizations, were asked about sepa-
rately and a monthly share of those sources was added to the household income. Due
to the heavily skewed distribution of household income, quintiles were formed for
each country separately. Additional in-kind measures of income, such as subsistence or
in-kind income from farm work, were included in the research tool, containing provi-
sions to convert these to money equivalents. However, this approach was not success-
ful, as the results fluctuated extraordinarily and led to unreliable values. Therefore, the
in-kind income information was not used in the analysis.
For  some continuous  independent  variables,  such  as  the  wealth  index,  the  total
household income or health care expenditure, quintiles were created, in order to be
able to compare the different groups and to allow inter-country comparisons. All quin-
tiles were created first on a country level and only after their creation, merged into an
international variable. 
Monetary values were given in the local currency, Malawi Kwacha (MWK, MK) for
Malawi and New Ghana Cedis (GHS, Gc) for Ghana. For country comparisons, the
Euro equivalent was calculated using the average of the exchange rates for the dura-
tion of the household survey.573
7. Analysis
7.1. Descriptive analysis
The overall household survey sample consisted of 1428 households, with 7088 individ-
uals. In Ghana, 600 households with 3088 individuals were interviewed and in Malawi,
828 households with 4000 individuals (table 14).
Table  14 also shows that, in some cases, the regional differences were larger than
the international differences. In international comparison, the average household size
in Ghana (5.2 individuals) was higher than the mean in Malawi (4.8); however, regional
differences surpassed the international ones: for example, the mean of the Greater Ac-
573 The exchange was taken from OANDA Corp. providing historical exchange rates on the basis of
the Interbank rate:  http://www.oanda.com/lang/de/currency/historical-rates/. For the time frame
of 8th of March – 5th of May 2009, the average exchange rate for Malawi was 1 EUR = 182.04079
MWK, and for Ghana 1 EUR = 1.84972 GHS. 
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cra region in the South of Ghana was 4.1 individuals per household, the lowest of all
regions, while the Northern Region in Ghana had the highest mean (6.2).
Tab. 14: General sample description
Household size
(mean)
Household size
(sd)
Interviewed
households (N)
Total
individuals
Ghana
Greater Accra Region 4.11 1.89 301 1236
Northern Region 6.19 3.04 299 1852
Total Ghana 5.15 2.73 600 3088
Malawi
Central region 5.13 2.21 387 1987
Southern region 4.57 1.91 441 2013
Total Malawi 4.83 2.07 828 4000
Overall Total 4.96 2.38 1428 7088
Source: own calculation, Pro-MHI-Africa dataset
On some basic  household characteristics (table  15),  differences between Ghana and
Malawi were identified. Both, the mean age of the head of household (Gh: 45.4; Mw:
38.4 years) and the mean age of all households (Gh: 24.8; Mw: 21.3 years) in the sample
were higher in Ghana compared to Malawi. The oldest age group, 55 years or older,
had a higher share in Ghana than in Malawi (Gh: 7.2%; Mw: 3.0%). The child/adult ratio
in Malawi was slightly higher in Malawi than in Ghana (Gh: 1.13; Mw: 1.18). These
differences were consistent with the country-wide statistics, that the life-expectancy is
lower in Malawi, which was partly an effect of the HIV/AIDS crisis in Malawi (see sec -
tion  4.2.2).  The higher  share  of  female  headed  households  in  Ghana  compared  to
Malawi (Gh: 21.5%; Mw: 16.3%) was also consistent with other country studies (section
4.1). The educational level of the head of household was generally higher in Malawi,
with a median at education of completed secondary school, compared to the median edu-
cation in Ghana, which was the category no formal education or not completed primary
school.
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Tab. 15: Basic household characteristics
Ghana Malawi Total
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Age of head of household574 45.4 14.1 38.4 11.6 41.4 13.2
Share of female headed households575 21.5% 16.3% 18.5%
Education level of head of household
No formal education576 56.2% 17.6% 22.8%
Completed primary school 5.7% 28.4% 18.8%
Completed secondary school 33.5% 45.8% 40.6%
Completed tertiary school 4.7% 8.2% 6.7%
Average age of household 24.8 11.4 21.3 8.3 22.8 9.9
Share of age groups (all individuals)
0-4 14.8% 14.0% 14.4%
5-15 31.4% 32.8% 32.2%
16-54 46.5% 50.2% 48.6%
55+ 7.2% 3.0% 4.9%
Percentage of females (all individuals) 51.8% 49.1% 50.3%
Child/adult ratio577 1.13 0.94 1.18 0.98 1.16 0.96
Religion
Christian 54.3% 89.8% 74.9%
Muslim 43.7% 7.5% 22.7%
Traditional 1.3% 1.8% 1.6%
Other 0.7% 0.9% 0.8%
Household environment
Urban 31.5% 34.7% 33.3%
Semi-urban 9.3% 25.6% 18.8%
Rural 59.2% 39.7% 47.9%
Source: own calculation, Pro-MHI-Africa dataset
Notes: N=600 (Ghana), N=826 (Malawi), N=1426 (total)
574 In 32 households the age of the head of household was imputed, because either no head was indi -
cated (18 in Ghana, 8 in Malawi) or the age of the head of household was missing (6 households).
In these cases, the age of the oldest person in the household was used as age of the household
head. Without imputation, the mean age is 45.3 (Ghana, N=580), 38.5 (Malawi, N=816), 41.3 (Total,
N=1396) 
575 In 24 households,  no head of household was indicated.  For  these households,  a male head of
household was assumed and imputed. Without the imputation, the share of female headed house -
holds is 22.2% in Ghana (N=582), 16.6% in Malawi (N=820), Total 18.9% (N=1402).
576 Lowest educational class was "No formal education or not completed primary school".
577 Child was defined as 0-17 years of age.
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In the overall  country sample from Ghana, the proportion of Christian households
(54.3%) was about 10 percent points higher than Muslim households. The two regions
in Ghana differed significantly in terms of the predominant religion: In the Northern
region, Muslim households were the majority with 83.3% and Christian households
represented 14.7%. In Malawi, there was no substantial regional difference regarding
the predominant type of  religion,  Christianity was the dominating religion (89.8%)
with Islam second (7.5%).
The typical  household  environment  (urban,  semi-urban,  rural)  of  the  sample  in
Ghana was predominantly rural (59.2%), while the share of rural households in the
Malawian sample was lower (39.7%). The household environment in Malawi differed
quite strongly between the regions: The share of rural households in the Central region
was 57.1%, while the share was lower in the Southern region (24.5%). The reason was
the catchment area  of  the  partner organization FINCA,  in  the Southern region of
Malawi, spreading out from the urban area in Limbe (near Blantyre), where the head
quarter of the partner MFI, for the Southern region, was located. The cities of Blantyre
and Limbe have grown together and form the economic centre of Malawi. FINCA's
membership spread from this central point, to the far outskirts of Limbe and Blantyre.
On the other hand, the catchment area of MUSCCO's Saving and Credit Cooperative,
in the Central Region, spread predominantly in rural areas. Also, in Ghana, there were
differences between the regions: The Northern region was more rural (64.9%) while the
Greater Accra region had a share of 53.5% of rural households.
Tab. 16: Economic characteristics of household
Ghana Malawi Total
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Total monthly 
household in-
come
Gc 226.36
(≈€ 122.41)
Gc 263.25
(≈€ 142.36)
MK 420 83
(≈€ 231.17)
MK 880962
(≈€ 488.69)
≈€ 185.41 ≈€ 386.87 
Total monthly 
household 
non-health ex-
penditure
Gc 376.51
(≈€ 203.61)
Gc 961.88
(≈€ 520.17)
MK 240652
(≈€ 135.42)
MK 250636
(≈€ 140.83)
≈€ 164.11 ≈€ 355.46 
Total annual 
household 
non-health ex-
penditure578
Gc 2883.87
(≈€ 1559.56)
Gc 6378.23
(≈€ 3449.25)
MK 3000909
(≈€ 1652.97)
MK 3010593
(≈€ 1656.73)
≈€ 1613.67 ≈€ 2567.54
Source: own calculation, Pro-MHI-Africa dataset
Notes: N=600 (Ghana), N=826 (Malawi), N=1426 (total)
578 The annual non-health expenditure was asked separately from the monthly expenditures. There-
fore, it did not equal the amount of twelve times a month.
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The arithmetic mean of the total monthly income of households579 in the sample was
relatively higher in Malawi (€ 231) than in Ghana (€ 122) (table 16). The distribution of
the monthly total household income in both countries was positively right skewed
with long right tail, leading to a mean income which was influenced by extreme val-
ues. This was particularly the case in Malawi,  where the standard deviation of the
monthly income was twice the mean value. Therefore, looking at more robust mea-
sures than the mean, gave a better overview of the income situation. The α-trimmed
mean (α=0.5) of the monthly income in Malawi only showed MWK 280999 (≈€ 159.30)
and an even lower median of MWK 200 00 (≈€ 109.87). In Ghana, the income distribu-
tion was not  as  right  skewed as  in  Malawi,  but  the  α-trimmed mean of  the  total
monthly  income GHS 190.93  (≈€ 103.25)  was still  lower  than the mean value,  but
slightly higher than the median of GHS 152.08 (≈€ 82.24). Table 17 gives an overview
of the quintiles of the total household income. In all quintiles, the mean of the total in-
come of households in Malawi was consistently above the mean income in Ghana,
with the largest relative difference in the richest 5th quintile.
Tab. 17: Monthly total household income (quintiles)
Ghana Malawi
Quintile N Mean Min Max N Mean Min Max
1st  
quintile
122 Gc 40.92
(≈€ 22.13)
0
(0)
70
(37.85)
166 MK 4957
(≈€ 27.23)
0
(0)
8653
(47.53)
2nd
quintile
120 Gc 96.82
(≈€ 52.36)
70.83
(38.31)
120
(64.89)
174 MK 110783
(≈€ 64.73)
8667
(47.61)
150 00
(82.40)
3rd
quintile
131 Gc 162.93
(≈€ 88.11)
121.67
(65.80)
200
(108.16)
157 MK 200112
(≈€ 110.48)
150 08
(82.44)
250750
(141.45)
4th
quintile
107 Gc 250.60
(≈€ 135.52)
201.67
(109.06)
303.33
(164.04)
170 MK 350562
(≈€ 195.35)
250833
(141.91)
500 00
(274.66)
5th  
quintile
(highest)
120 Gc 592.08
(≈€ 320.19)
306.67
(165.84)
3204.50
(1732.95)
161 MK 1410162
(≈€ 775.44)
510250
(281.53)
101060667
(6079.21)
Source: Pro MHI Africa dataset
579 The total monthly household income included monthly income as well as 1/12 of other (more ir -
regular) income sources during the past 12 months. Therefore, it might be higher than other coun-
try data that only considered the income in one month.
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7.2. Household exposure to general risks
As introduced in section 2.2, households are exposed to a variety of risks that can be
categorized in social, political and economic, natural and environmental risks, as well
as health risks. Poor or near-poor households in low-income countries are particularly
exposed and affected by risks. In the sample of the household survey, the vast majority
of households, 1191 (=83.40%), reported that they faced at least one of the 15 general
household risks (listed in figure 6) in the last three years, with an average of 2.76 (me-
dian 3) risks in all households. About eleven percent points fewer households, 1030
(=72.13%) out of all households, were facing an array of severe general risks, those that
were reported to have negative economic impact on the household, such as asset re-
duction, loss of income, reduction in consumption or indebtedness. Many households
reported an exposure to more than one type of risk that, altogether, caused negative
economic impact on the household (table 18). On average, a household was exposed to
2.38 severe general risks (within the last three years) with a median of 2 types of risk.580
Tab. 18: Household exposure to general risks (all and severe risks)
Frequency Percent
Frequency
(negative eco-
nomic impact)
Percent (nega-
tive economic
impact)
No risk exposure 237 16.60% n/a n/a
1-3 risks 748 52.38% 655 45.87%
4-6 risks 358 25.07% 305 21.36%
more than 7 risks 85 5.95% 70 4.90%
Total of households with 
risk exposure 1191
83.40% 
(out of all)
1030
72.13%
(out of all)
Source: Pro MHI Africa dataset. Household data. N=1428 households.
It was hypothesized (hypothesis 1) that types of general risk, as well as the extent of
general risk exposure, showed a significant geographic variation between countries,
regions and between categories of the household environment.  The sub-hypotheses
were analyzed using bivariate and multivariate methods.
The mean number of severe general risks (in brackets severe non-health related gen-
eral risks) significantly differed between both countries:581 The mean for Ghana was
580 The variable on general risks comprised 15 types of risks (see figure 6). In the case of the variable
severe general risks, they were counted if the household indicated that the risk exposure with the
mentioned risks had a negative economic impact on the household.
581 A t-test showed a highly significant difference between the two countries for the means of severe
risks t(1426)=6.550,p<0.001 and severe non-health related risks: t(1426)=7.478,p<0.001.
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2.81 (2.67), higher than the mean for Malawi 2.07 (1.88). The total mean for the severe
non-health related general risks in the entire sample was 2.21.582 Also, the types of risks
reported by households substantially differed between Ghana and Malawi. Figure  6
gives an overview of the frequency of risk types that had a negative economic impact
as reported by households.583
Economic risks were the type of risk affecting most of the households in the sample:
dramatic price fluctuations and price increases of fuel and transportation costs were
the two most frequently mentioned risks, by 56.3% and 47.0% of households in Ghana
and 40.4% and 40.7% in Malawi, respectively. The lack of functioning markets, in the
form of being unable to sell products, was a major concern for Ghanaian households
(42.3%), but much fewer households in Malawi (11.6%) were affected. Shocks related to
582 The variable on (severe) non-health related general risks included 13 types of risks, excluding the
household-level risks of "HIV/AIDS" and "Serious illness or disablement of working hh member".
583 The analyses of section 7.2 referred to all reported risks, including two generalized health risks:
HIv/AIDS and  serious illness / disablement of working household member. The analyses in subse-
quent sections were based on the same variable without the two health-related general risks in or -
der to avoid overlapping and circular argument.
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Fig. 6: Household exposure to general risks with negative economic impact, by country
Source: Pro MHI Africa dataset. Household data. Ghana N=600, Malawi N=828, total N= 1428
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unemployment  or  job  loss  were  reported  by  8.2%  in  Ghana,  while  households  in
Malawi faced a higher prevalence (20.8%). 
Natural  and  environmental  risks  were  also  experienced  by  many  households:
Drought was mentioned by 26.5% of households in Ghana and by 24.7% in Malawi.
Ghana respondents had a much higher exposure to other natural and environmental
risks compared to Malawi respondents: In Ghana, flood was reported by 17.0% (Malawi
1.7%) of households, erosion of soil by 10.5% (Mw. 3.0%) and fire by 10.5% (Mw. 3.0%).
Crime, as a social risk, was the next frequent risk reported at 18.2% in Ghana and 22.4%
in Malawi.
Experience with death of a household member was reported by over 22% of house-
holds, independent of the country, but death of a working adult was mentioned more
often in Malawi at 9.4% compared to Ghana at 6.8%.584 In both countries, not only the
psychological and economic burden of losing a person, but also considerable funeral
costs put an additional financial burden on affected households.585
Severe  health-related  household  shocks,  such  as  disabilities  or  serious  illnesses,
were mentioned by over 13% of households in both countries. The risk of HIV/AIDS
was a minor risk in Ghana (0.3%), but high in Malawi (4.8%); a figure which was still
prone to under reporting, as it was approximately half of the national average of 10.6%
prevalence rate among adults.586
Tab. 19: Household exposure to general risks with negative economic impact by 
regions and household environment (% of households)
Ghana regions Malawi regions HH environment
Greater 
Accra Northern Central Southern Rural
Semi-
Urban Urban
Drought 17.2 52.8 49.6 24.2 38.6 48.3 24.3
Flood 3.4 40.4 2.9 2.0 17.7 5.1 5.5
Erosion of soil 8.3 19.6 8.8 1.1 11.8 6.8 5.0
Fire 2.9 21.3 8.8 1.1 11.2 2.8 5.8
Crime 17.6 31.1 46.7 20.8 27.6 31.8 28.2
Dramatic changes of 
prices 73.5 80.0 41.3 67.0
65.4 49.4 72.7
584 Like for the other general risks, deaths in the household were only counted in this analysis, if the
household indicated that the array of general risks had negative economic impact on the house -
hold.
585 Hougaard, Christine; Chamberlain, Doubell (2012): Funeral Insurance. In: Churchill, Craig; Matul,
Michal (eds.): Protecting the Poor. A Microinsurance Compendium, vol. 2. International Labour
Office / Munich Re Foundation. Geneva/Munich, p. 221; Flory et al. (2009): The Poor and Their
Management of Shocks, p. 32f.
586 Government of Malawi (2012): 2012 Global AIDS Response Report. Malawi Country Report for
2010 and 2011.
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Inability to sell products 74.0 43.8 20.8 13.1 40.9 25.0 29.0
Loss of job/unemploy-
ment 15.7 7.2 15.4 14.8 12.8 14.2 13.8
High increase in 
fuel/transportation costs 45.1 80.9 50.4 61.5 58.9 51.7 65.7
Death of work. adult in hh 2.9 14.9 14.2 12.5 10.2 13.1 12.7
Death of other hh member 24.5 17.9 17.5 18.2 20.9 18.2 17.4
Serious illness or disease 6.4 29.4 15.4 21.9 20.9 14.8 18.5
HIV/AIDS 0.0 0.9 4.2 8.5 2.0 3.4 7.2
Divorce/Separation 5.9 4.7 10.0 6.3 7.9 7.4 4.7
Other 2.5 11.9 4.2 2.0 6.3 5.1 2.8
Pro MHI Africa dataset. Household data. N= 1428 
Table 19 shows not only strong international differences in risk exposure, but also re-
markable regional differences and differences depending on the type of environment
where the household was located.587 
The overall number of severe general risks differed significantly between the types
of environment: Semi-urban households were least exposed, with a mean of 1.95, while
rural (2.54) and urban (2.38) had exposure to a higher number of risks.588 When looking
at details on the type of risks to which the households in the different environments
were exposed, it was identified that rural households were substantially more often af-
fected by flood, erosion of soil, and fire. Drought was a concern of all three types of
household environments and most often reported by semi-urban households, followed
by rural households. The inability to sell products was a larger concern by rural house-
holds, pointing to difficult commodity markets in rural areas. 
In the comparison between regions, the Northern region in Ghana differed signifi-
cantly from all other regions. First, the mean of total reported severe risks that the
households were exposed to was higher in the Northern region of Ghana (3.59), com-
pared to the other regions (Gh. Greater Accra = 2.03; Mw. Central region = 1.92; Mw.
Southern region = 2.19). The Northern region in Ghana was the only region that was
statistically different from each of the other regions (Bonf., p<0.001) using the Bonfer-
roni  multiple-comparison  adjustment.589 Households  in  this  region  also  reported  a
587 The variable household environment was recorded in the categories urban, semi-urban and rural.
588 The F-test of the overall ANOVA model was highly significant F(2,14275)=7.32, p<0.001. However,
Bonferroni multiple-comparison test showed that urban and rural households did not significantly
(Bonf. p=0.642) differ in terms of number of severe general risks exposed to. On the other hand,
the difference between semi-urban households and rural households was highly significant (Bonf.
p<0.001), while the difference to urban households was significant (Bonf. p<0.05).
589 The presented significance levels referred to the comparisons of the Northern region with each of
the other regions. The differences between the other regions were not statistically significant. An-
alyzing more in-depth the concentration of households reporting large numbers of severe risks
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higher exposure to drought, flood, erosion of soil, fire, dramatic changes in prices, high
increase in fuel/transportation costs, death of working adult in household, serious ill-
ness  or  disease,  and  other  risks,  in  comparison to  the  other  regions.  Also,  within
Malawi, the regions strongly differed in terms of the type of risks households were ex-
posed to: for example, in the Central region drought (49.6%) and crime (46.7%) were
mentioned more than twice as often as in the Southern region (24.2% and 20.8%).
Tab. 20: Relationship of wealth quintiles and exposure to severe non-health related 
general risks (both countries)
Wealth index (quintiles); MCA incl. Durable assets, infrastructure, ani-
mals
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Total
No risk exposure 25.17 31.49 23.76 29.02 32.28 28.36
1-3 risks 46.50 49.48 47.87 48.60 51.58 48.81
4-6 risks 20.98 14.53 24.47 20.63 15.44 19.19
>=7 risks 7.34 4.50 3.90 1.75 0.70 3.64
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N = 1428 households. τb=-0.063 z=2.74, p<0.01. χ2(12)=37.76, 
p<0.001 
Looking at the relationship of the wealth status of households and the pure general
risk exposure (i.e. number of severe non-health related risks), there was only a weak
negative relationship, if aggregated over both countries (τb=-0.063 z=2.74, p<0.001) (see
table 20), concluding that wealthier households were only slightly less exposed to se-
vere general risks.590 Looking at the Ghana sub-sample, the relationship substantially
increased (τb=-0.147 z=4.46, p<0.001), but  τb  still indicated a weak relationship, while
the relationship completely lost significance in the Malawian sub-sample (τb=-0.013
z=0.45, not sig.). On the other hand, in the Ghanaian case, the wealthiest quintile of
households had a mean risk exposure to general non-health related risks, which was
1.6 points lower than the mean of the least wealthy quintile, a difference which was
highly significant (Bonf. p<0.001).591 Cohen's d (δ=0.68) confirmed a medium to strong
effect size between the lowest and the highest wealth quintiles regarding general risk
that they were exposed to, they were clustered in five out of ten villages in the Northern region of
Ghana, predominantly rural with a share of 88.7% of rural households in these villages/communi -
ties.  The F-test  of  the  overall  ANOVA model  was  highly  significant,  F(2,14274)=45.02,  p<0.001,
meaning that there was a highly significant statistical difference between the means of the re -
gions, which mostly needed to be attributed to the distinct Northern region in Ghana.
590 The overall ANOVA model confirmed statistically significant differences between the wealth quin-
tiles: F(4,14273)=5.34, p<0.001.
591 The ANOVA model on the Ghanaian sub-sample confirmed statistically significant differences be-
tween the wealth quintiles: F(4,14273)=5.34, p<0.001.
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exposure in Ghana. Comparing these two groups in the Malawian sub-sample, there
was a slight, but not significant relationship in the same direction.592
Contrary to the wealth index, the monthly total household income had no signifi-
cant relationship with household exposure to severe non-health related risks in the ag-
gregated view over both countries and also not in the case of Malawi. 593 For the case of
Ghana, τb  was not significant, but the χ2  -test was (χ2(12) = 34.45, p<0.01). Comparing
the lowest and highest income quintile indicated a slight negative relationship, which
was not significant for any sub-sample.
Tab. 21: Relationship of education of head of household and exposure to severe non-
health related general risks (both countries)
No formal
education
Completed
primary school
Completed sec-
ondary school
Completed
tertiary school Total
No risk exposure 24.64 33.33 30.65 19.35 28.36
1-3 risks 45.17 46.97 50 65.59 48.81
4-6 risks 22.79 18.56 17.29 13.98 19.19
>=7 risks 7.39 1.14 2.05 1.08 3.64
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N = 1428 households. τb=-0.078 z=3.26, p<0.01. χ2(9)=50.30, 
p<0.001 
Similar to the relationship of wealth and household exposure to severe non-health re-
lated general risks, the educational level of the head of household showed (table 21) a
weak negative relationship for the total sample (τb=-0.076 z=3.31, p<0.01). Comparing
the mean of severe non-health related general risks of households with the lowest edu-
cational level of the head of household (mean 2.645) to those households whose head
completed secondary education (mean 2.017), showed that exposure was reduced by
0.628 points (Bonf.,  p<0.001) for higher educated head of households in the overall
sample; the mean of those households whose head completed tertiary education (2.149)
was still 0.50 points lower, but not statistically significant.594 In the case of Ghana, the
592 The overall ANOVA model on the Malawian sub-sample did not show significant differences be-
tween the wealth quintiles: F(4,823)=1.55, p=0.18574. Between lowest and highest wealth quintile:
Bonf. p=1.000, but Cohen's δ (0.19) indicated a small effect size.
593 The  ANOVA  model  did  not  show  significant  differences  between  the  income  quintiles:
F(4,14273)=0.92, p=0.44878.
594 The same comparison in the Ghana or the Malawi sub-sample did not lead a satisfying signifi -
cance level. In the case of completed tertiary education, it could be a result of lower frequencies in
this category. The overall ANOVA model showed highly significant differences between the educa-
tional levels: F(3,14274)=12.36, p<0.001).
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strength of the overall relationship slightly increased to (τb=-0.092 z=2.62, p<0.001), but
in the case of Malawi (τb=0.0037  z=0.01, not sig.), it lost relationship and significance.595
The multivariate analysis of the determinants on the number of severe non-health
risks as reported by households is displayed in table  22 and 23. Since the dependent
variable showed some level of skewness and the models revealed some level of het-
eroscedasticity, the Huber-White sandwich estimator was used for the regression mod-
els, in order to get more robust coefficients.596 All indicators in the five estimated mod-
els showed a negligible level of collinearity, so that no further adjustment had to be
made. Generally, it should to be noted that the number of different severe risks was a
relatively weak proxy for general risk exposure. This was because repeated shocks of
the same type were not counted more than once in this variable and different levels of
severity were not taken into consideration. However, the results of the presented mul-
tivariate models gave first insights into the relevance of factors.
The  model  1a597 focused  on  factors  related  to  socio-economic  characteristics  of
households. The factors included in the model explained only 8.7% (adj. R2) of the vari-
ance in the dependent variable. The model showed that being located in Malawi re-
duced the general risk exposure by about 0.5 points, compared to Ghana. Household
size and the age of the head of household showed a small but statistically significant
positive effect (=increase) on risk exposure. It was surprising that the predominant reli-
gion in the household was strongly related to general risk exposure; predominantly
Muslim households, or members of another religion, had significantly increased risk
exposure compared to Christian households, by 0.65 and 1.17 points, respectively. 
Overall, the measure ω2 showed that only three variables in the model were relevant
contributors to the explained variance of the model:  Household country (ω2=0.01371),
predominant religion of the household (ω2=0.01779) and the wealth quintile of the house-
hold (ω2=0.01071), all three variables with a small effect size.598 Model 1b added the two
variables of health risk exposure and self-perceived general risk exposure; both were
595 The overall ANOVA model for Ghana was significant F(3,596)=2.81, p<0.05), for Malawi only at
10% significance level F(3,824)=2.28, p<0.1. Bonferroni multiple-comparison test did not show sig-
nificant differences between single groups in neither Ghana nor Malawi.
596 The null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan test (model 1c) for heteroscedasticity could not be re-
jected (χ2(1)=112.14, p<0.001). The test for normality showed a highly significant level of skewness
(p<0.001). The dependent variable had a values range only from 0 to 11 and the skewness partially
stemmed from 28.4% of households reporting zero non-health risks with negative impact, it was
decided not to perform any further transformations to the dependent variable itself.
597 Specification of regression model 1a: F (18,14079)=6.59, p<0.001.
598 The thresholds for omega^2 values is >=0.01 representing a small effect, >=0.06 a medium effect
and >=0.14 is considered to be a large effect. Acock (2012): A Gentle Introduction to Stata, p. 231.
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not significant and the adjusted R2 even slightly decreased.599 Model 1c added a variety
of factors representing social risk management strategies. The adjusted R2 significantly
increased to 11.1%, still a weak to moderate explanatory power.600 However, the factors
added in model 1c may have been both cause and effect of higher general risk exposure
and, therefore, needed to be carefully interpreted. Three SRM-related variables showed
a statistically significant relationship: A higher level of income diversification was re-
lated to higher general risk exposure, as a 1-unit change was associated with a 0.170
change in the dependent variable; similarly, a positive relationship existed with a high
activity level in community associations (0.942) and the use of credit or loans by the
household (0.282). Households who acknowledged that health insurance helped pay
for costly health events showed a significantly higher general risk exposure, by 0.296. 
Calculating ω2 showed that only two variables substantially contributed to the ex-
plained variance in model 1c: Household wealth (ω2=0.01173) and predominant religion in
the household (ω2=0.01475), both with a small effect size.
Tab. 22: Determinants of number non-health risks with negative economic impact 
exposed to (multivariate linear regression)
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c
Country Malawi (base: Ghana)c -0.551*** (0.11975) -0.548*** (0.11974) -0.605*** (0.17476)
Education level of head of 
household
0.09475 (0.06475) 0.09379 (0.06478) 0.08375 (0.06474)
Household size 0.08178*** (0.03078) 0.08175*** (0.03171) 0.06970* (0.03975)
Age of head of household 0.008796* (0.00476) 0.008762* (0.0047 ) 0.008751* (0.0047 )
Predominant religion: Muslimc 
(base: Christian)
0.646*** (0.15479) 0.644*** (0.15575) 0.540*** (0.15772)
Predominant religion: Otherc 
(base: Christian)
1.174*** (0.36575) 1.178*** (0.36670) 1.184*** (0.34676)
Child/adult ratio -0.007725 (0.05879) -0.007720 (0.05879) -0.001791 (0.06178)
Wealth index 2nd quintile (base:
1st) 
-0.368** (0.17370) -0.370** (0.17370) -0.401** (0.17174)
Wealth index 3rd quintile (base: 
1st) 
-0.002735 (0.17571) -0.006709 (0.17579) -0.06573 (0.1717 )
Wealth index 4th quintile (base: 
1st) 
-0.366* (0.1887 ) -0.372** (0.18973) -0.456** (0.18676)
Wealth index 5th quintile (base: 
1st) 
-0.682*** (0.19875) -0.686*** (0.1987 ) -0.753*** (0.20171)
Total monthly hh income 2nd 
quintile (base: 1st)
-0.239 (0.16676) -0.240 (0.16679) -0.287* (0.16479)
Total monthly household -0.154 (0.1707 ) -0.156 (0.17170) -0.225 (0.17072)
599 Specification of model 1b: F (20,1407 )=5.95, p<0.001.
600 Specification of model 1c: F (30,1397 )=5.33, p<0.001.
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income 3rd quintile (base: 1st)
Total monthly hh income 4th 
quintile (base: 1st)
0.05875 (0.17972) 0.05472 (0.17978) -0.07171 (0.1867 )
Total monthly hh income 5th 
quintile (base: 1st quintile)
-0.09674 (0.18778) -0.100 (0.18872) -0.283 (0.19475)
Household environment: urban
(base:rural)b,c
0.105 (0.11370) 0.106 (0.11371) 0.124 (0.11372)
Type of primary health care fa-
cility: private (base: public or 
charitable)c
-0.119 (0.13279) -0.119 (0.13278) -0.120 (0.13575)
Distance to the closest hospital -0.04275 (0.05374) -0.04173 (0.05374) -0.03575 (0.05471)
High risk household (health 
risks)
0.08879 (0.26970) -0.123 (0.26470)
General risk exposure (self-
perceived)
-0.01270 (0.04471) 0.004767 (0.04574)
Income diversification 0.170* (0.08676)
Share of hh members con-
tributing significantly to the 
income
0.215 (0.3387 )
Acknowledgment of insurance 
as risk management toolb
0.296*** (0.1147 )
Household with health insur-
anceb
-0.05475 (0.16573)
Membership in microfinanceb 0.194 (0.14279)
Household use of credit/loansb 0.282** (0.11676)
Household use of savingsb 0.153 (0.10974)
Decision-making role in associ-
ationsb
-0.136 (0.12078)
Activity level in associations 0.942*** (0.35576)
Likelihood of community assis-
tancel,z
0.01473 (0.03474)
Constant 1.718*** (0.36673) 1.719*** (0.36775) 1.252*** (0.41072)
Observations 1428 1428 1428
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.086 0.111
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable: Number non-health risks with negative economic impact (exposure).
Notes: b=binary/dichotomous variable, c=categorical variable, l= likert scale, q= quintiles, z=
centered variable. Robust regression estimates were applied due to skewness of the 
dependent variable.
When model 1c was split by country (table 23), the relevance of the coefficients signif-
icantly  changed.  The explanatory  power  of  the  model  was  substantially  higher  in
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Ghana (adj. R2 16.8%) compared to Malawi (adj. R2 3.4%).601 Compared to the three gen-
eral models, in the Ghanaian model education of the head of household (0.165), the share
of household members significantly contributing to the household income (0.966) and the
membership in MfI (0.819), became significant and were positively related. In Ghana,
five factors substantially contributed to the explanatory power of the model, similar to
the  general  model  1c,  religion  (ω2=0.01375)  and  the  wealth  level  of  the  household
(ω2=0.01970), but additionally, household size (ω2=0.0107 ), the level of income diversifi-
cation (ω2=0.01075) as well as membership in microfinance institutions (ω2=0.016710); all
significant and positively associated with general risk exposure. The finding in model
1a, that religion was an important factor, was analyzed more thoroughly in the within-
country regression in Ghana: Being predominantly Muslim or member of another reli-
gion other than Christianity remained significant, but the region, which seemed to be
a significant factor in the bivariate analysis, was rendered insignificant in the multi-
variate view. This indicated that the particular choice of two regions in Ghana was also
the predetermining factor: The Northern region, in comparison to the Greater Accra
region, was less wealthy, showed a substantially higher risk exposure and a predomi-
nantly Muslim population. These together made the distinction in the risk exposure of
households in the Northern region in Ghana.602 Hence, the economic and geographic
differences were likely to outweigh the variable predominant household religion.
In the Malawian model, which had a quite low adj. R2 of 3.4%, other factors showed
a significant relationship with the dependent variable. The direction of the factor pre-
dominant household religion was different in Malawi compared to Ghana: being of
Muslim belief reduced risk exposure (-0.440) while those who were members of other
religions increased risk exposure (base: Christianity)  by 0.689.  Being located in the
Southern region also increased risk exposure (0.243). Differing from Ghana and the
overall model, in Malawi, the wealth quintiles did not have a significant effect and –
counter-intuitively  – the lowest  income quintile  led to a  reduced risk exposure (-
0.337), which was significant on the 10% level. Contradictory was the finding of higher
self-perceived risk exposure, which corresponded to a lower risk exposure (-0.098).
The household use of credit/loans in Malawi had a positive relationship with risk expo-
sure (0.315) and a high household activity level in community associations increased the
level of risk exposure by about 1.1 risks reported. Overall, the level of household activity
in community associations (ω2=0.01772) was the only variable contributing substantially
to the explanatory power of the model in Malawi, representing a small effect size.
601 Specification of Ghana model (F (30,569)=5.26, p<0.001); Malawi model: (F (30,797)=1.92, p<0.01)
602 In the Greater Accra region, 4.3% of households were of Muslim belief, while the share was 83.3%
in the Northern region.
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Tab. 23: Determinants of number non-health risks with negative economic impact 
exposed to: Country comparison (multivariate linear regression)
Ghana Malawi
Region of household (base MW: Central 
region, base GH: Greater Accra region)
0.541 (0.33678) 0.243* (0.14272)
Education level of head of household 0.165* (0.09772) 0.01273 (0.08579)
Household size 0.133** (0.05970) -0.04375 (0.0517 )
Age of head of household 0.01376* (0.00772) 0.003757 (0.00672)
Predominant religion: Muslimc (base: Chris-
tian)
0.529* (0.3077 ) -0.440** (0.20878)
Predominant religion: Otherc (base: Christian) 1.881*** (0.57070) 0.689* (0.38778)
Child/adult ratio 0.05075 (0.13672) 0.04879 (0.06472)
Wealth index, 2nd quintile (base: 1st) -0.454 (0.30279) -0.209 (0.19575)
Wealth index, 3rd quintile (base: 1st) -0.216 (0.30276) 0.209 (0.20078)
Wealth index, 4th quintile (base: 1st) -0.637** (0.31972) -0.197 (0.22471)
Wealth index, 5th quintile (base: 1st) -1.223*** (0.3337 ) -0.198 (0.24470)
Total monthly hh income 2nd quintile (base: 1st) -0.298 (0.29172) -0.337* (0.18570)
Total monthly hh income 3rd quintile (base: 1st) -0.275 (0.28374) -0.127 (0.20479)
Total monthly hh income 4th quintile (base: 1st) -0.223 (0.32379) 0.06778 (0.22973)
Total monthly hh income 5th quintile (base: 1st) -0.311 (0.30878) -0.177 (0.25271)
Household environment: urban (base:rural)b,c 0.008755 (0.2097 ) 0.170 (0.14478)
Type of primary health care facility: private 
(base: public or charitable)c
-0.05973 (0.23771) 0.08970 (0.16970)
Distance to the closest hospital -0.0087 6 (0.09773) 0.05772 (0.06571)
High risk household (health risks) -0.332 (0.39573) 0.0907 (0.32171)
General risk exposure (self-perceived) 0.126 (0.10371) -0.09776* (0.04978)
Income diversification 0.347*** (0.12879) -0.02274 (0.11272)
Share of hh members contributing signifi-
cantly to the income
0.966* (0.54479) -0.518 (0.43370)
Acknowledgment of insurance as risk man-
agement toolb
0.297 (0.19279) 0.165 (0.14379)
Household with health insuranceb -0.218 (0.2037 ) -0.488 (0.33176)
Membership in microfinanceb 0.819*** (0.2907 ) -0.08774 (0.16872)
Household use of credit/loansb 0.296 (0.20178) 0.315** (0.14371)
Household use of savingsb 0.06671 (0.19472) 0.09179 (0.13478)
Decision-making role in associationsb -0.169 (0.20572) 0.03471 (0.14878)
Activity level in associations 0.391 (0.59179) 1.126*** (0.43075)
Likelihood of community assistancel,z -0.06975 (0.06078) 0.01075 (0.04574)
Constant -1.183 (1.25979) 0.968** (0.45471)
Observations 600 828
Adjusted R2 0.168 0.034
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Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Dependent variable: Number of non-health risks with negative economic impact exposed 
to. Notes: b=binary/dichotomous variable, c=categorical variable, l= likert scale, q= 
quintiles, z= centered variable. Robust regression estimates due to skewness of the 
dependent variable.
In conclusion, hypothesis H1a postulated a significant relationship of geographic fac-
tors, such as country, region and household environment. There was a significant dif-
ference in type and extent of  general risk exposure on all  levels:  between the two
countries and between the sampled regions, while the difference between the regions
within a country were sometimes larger than the international difference. A similar
variation was observed when analyzing the type of risks that the households were ex-
posed  to,  also  with  substantial  inter-regional  differences.  The  Northern  region  in
Ghana, which showed the highest risk exposure, also showed a significant difference
on the village/community-level (for details see footnote 589), so that the exposure in a
particular five out of the ten communities increased the average of the Northern re-
gion. In the multivariate analysis (models 1a-1c), the international differences were
highly significant. In the within-country regressions, the region was only significant in
Malawi, but also relevant in the Ghana-specific regression model, where it  was as-
sumed that the combination of  household wealth levels,  household religion and  region
made the difference (albeit the variable region did not show a significant coefficient). In
the bivariate analysis, the household environment was also a relevant factor, as semi-
urban households faced the lowest general risk exposure. However, in the multivariate
analysis, the household environment lost significance. Overall, hypothesis H1a was con-
firmed as a result of several analyses.
Furthermore, it was hypothesized that the lowest wealth quintile and the lowest in-
come quintile experienced the highest general risk exposure (H1b), and that a higher
level of education of the head of household reduced general risk exposure (H 1c). Both
hypotheses were tested using bivariate and multivariate analyses. In conclusion, analy-
ses on hypotheses H1b and H1c showed a more complex pattern than expected. 
On hypothesis H1b, the overall bivariate analysis and regression models 1a-1c con-
firmed a significant negative relationship between the wealth level of the household
and general risk exposure. In the analyses split by country, substantial differences be-
tween Ghana and Malawi were observed: While, in the bivariate analysis, the factor
household wealth level pointed in the right direction of relationship in Malawi, it was
not a significant factor of general risk exposure. On the other hand, in the case of
Ghana, it was a relevant factor with a medium to strong effect size and was statistically
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highly significant. In Ghana, the lowest wealth quintile experienced the highest gen-
eral risk exposure, which was consistent in the bivariate and multivariate analyses. In
the Malawi-specific regression model, the wealth level pointed in the same direction
without significant coefficients. In both countries, results on household income levels
confirmed the hypothesized direction, but did not show a significant relationship with
general  risk  exposure,  neither  in  the  bivariate  nor  in  the  multivariate  analysis.603
Hence, hypothesis H1b was partially accepted in that there was a negative relationship
of household wealth quintiles (with caution in the case of Malawi), while the hypothe-
sized relationship of income was rejected. 
Hypothesis H1c, on the hypothesized negative relationship between a higher educa-
tion level with general risk exposure, showed an inconsistent pattern of relationship.
In the bivariate view, there was – as it was hypothesized – a small but significant nega-
tive relationship in the overall sample that became stronger in the Ghanaian sub-sam-
ple and lost significance in the Malawian sub-sample. In all multivariate regressions,
the tendency of relationship inversed (contrary to the hypothesis), but remained in-
significant, except for the Ghana-specific regression model which showed a significant
positive relationship of educational level and risk exposure, different from expected.
Overall, the results regarding hypothesis H1c were unclear, therefore, the hypothesis
was rejected.
A highly relevant combination of factors, in the case of the overall and the Ghana-
ian model, that was previously not hypothesized, was the combination of the factors
household religion and household region, which showed a higher level of risk expo-
sure  among  households  in  the  predominantly  Muslim  Northern  region  of  Ghana.
Hence, this strong relationship referred to a combination of factors, rather than the im-
portance of religion on general risk exposure. Furthermore, this relationship was not
confirmed for the case of Malawi, and was inverted for Muslim belief, showing a sig-
nificantly lower risk exposure. The positive relationship between a high household ac-
tivity  level  in  community-associations  with  general  risk  exposure  in  Malawi  was
worth noting, although cause and effect were not clear. On the one hand, this signifi-
cant relationship might point in the direction that highly active households were less
risk averse and, therefore, more exposed to a variety of risks, but on the other hand,
households more exposed to risks seemed to build social capital that they can call upon
in times of crises.
603 Except for the second income quintile in Malawi, which had significantly less risk exposure than
the first (poorest) income quintile, Bonf. p<0.1.
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7.3. Exposure of individuals and households to high health 
risks and high health care costs
7.3.1. Exposure to health risks
As described in section 2.3.2, the risk of illness and the extent of resulting illness-re-
lated costs are randomly distributed,  but there are certain risk factors that make it
more probable that illness and health care costs occur. Out of the factors discussed in
the literature review, three relevant risk factors could be operationalized and were dis-
cussed in detail:  Age, existence of chronic or permanent diseases and experience of
hospitalization events with an inpatient stay longer than 3 days.  It was hypothesized
(hypothesis H2a) that personal characteristics, such as a higher age group (55+ years),
sex or pre-existing health condition (such as chronic or permanent diseases or long
hospitalization stays) were a significant predictor of a higher health risk occurrence
and, ultimately, high health care costs. Figure 7 shows the expected relevance of age as
antecedent variable. Although all three factors were risk factors predicting higher fu-
ture health care costs independent from each other, they were expected to be inter-re-
lated (see section 2.3.2 and 2.4.2 for a detailed discussion). In line with the literature re-
view, these three factors were used at a later stage to form a high risk index on the
household level which was helpful for multivariate analyses.
In the overall sample of 7088 individuals, 344 (4.85%) were in the highest age group
(55+ years). It was decided to choose the threshold of 55 years as risk factor in the case
of Ghana and Malawi, due to the generally lower life expectancy compared to devel -
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Fig. 7: Expected relationship between age, other risk factors and high health care costs
Source: author
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oped countries, where higher age thresholds are used in risk factor calculations. 604 The
life expectancy in Ghana was higher than in Malawi, which was also reflected in the
sample: Only 35.2% of the individuals in the highest age group stemmed from Malawi,
although 56.4% (4000) of the entire sample (7088 individuals) were from Malawi. This
lower percentage of older people in Malawi was explained by to the lower life ex-
pectancy of 49 years (as compared to 60 years in Ghana),  which was partially ex-
plained by the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Malawi having amounted to annual mortality
between 430 00 (in 2011) and 760 00 deaths (in 2005).605,606
The oldest age group reported 101 (7.5%) out of all 1352 recorded illness episodes.
Thus, the odds of having an illness episode in this age group was 1.83 times as great as
for any other age group (χ2(1) = 24.80, p < 0.001). Not only was the likelihood of facing
an illness episode increased, but also the likelihood of having chronic conditions or
long inpatient visits: The odds of reporting a chronic or permanent illness was 5.66
times greater  than any other age group (χ2(1)  = 159.74,  p < 0.001),  as 18.3% of  all
chronic conditions were reported by the highest, relatively small, age group. The re-
sults for hospitalization events of three days or longer were similar, although not as
strong. 10.6% of all hospitalization stays (>= 3 days) and the odds of facing a long inpa-
tient stay 2.41 times higher (χ2(1) = 15,82, p < 0.001) related to this age group.
Not only was the illness prevalence higher in the oldest age group, but also the av-
erage costs of illness (illness episodes in the last three months). The mean cost of the
highest age group was 35.16 Euro, more than double the cost of the other age groups,
which was 15.13 Euro. Similarly, the α-trimmed mean still showed 10.12 Euro over 4.20
Euro.  However, a t-test was only significant on the 10%-level (t(1350)=-1.43279, p<0.1),
which  was  likely  a  result  of  the  heavily  right  skewed  distribution  of  health  care
costs.607 The confidence intervals of the two groups (55+ vs. other age groups) were
overlapping.608 A measure for effect size, Cohen's d was 0.13, which represented a small
604 In the discussion on risk factors in risk adjustment schemes in Europe or North America, usually
the threshold of 60 years or 65 years was used.
605 World Health Organization (2012): Global Health Observatory Data Repository. Country Statistics.
URL:  http://apps.who.int/ghodata/?theme=country (accessed  2012/10/03),  Year  of  measurement
2009.
606 Mortality rates could be reduced in recent years due to antiretroviral therapy (ART). Government
of Malawi (2012): 2012 Global AIDS Response Report. Malawi Country Report for 2010 and 2011,
p. 4.
607 Since the variable on health care costs violated assumptions of the t-test, the nonparametric two-
tailed exact Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test was additionally calculated and confirmed a
significant relationship: K-S z=0.15, p<0.05.
608 The 95% confidence interval of the other age groups is  7.64670-22.60771,  compared with 7.77678-
62.54274 for the age group 55+. 
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effect size. After a log transformation of the individual health care costs variable,609 the
t-test was significant on the 1% level (t(1350)=2.38875, p<0.01) and Cohen's d increased
to 0.32, which was a medium effect. The result of a linear regression model with the
log transformed health care costs as dependent variable using the Huber-White sand-
wich estimator showed that the health care costs increase by 105.9%, if the individual
belonged to the oldest age group.610
Figure 8 gives an overview of the distribution of total individual illness costs in the last
three months, split by gender. The left figure was calculated on basis of the arithmetic
mean of  health care  costs.  It  was clearly  visible  that men consistently had higher
health care costs than women, in all age groups. This indicated that there seemed to be
a male bias in health care seeking and spending for treatment. However, in that figure,
a male breadwinner bias could not be confirmed in the data, as the cost gap between
male and female individuals narrowed with higher age groups and was comparatively
low for individuals who were of the income-earning household member age. Further-
more, it was anticipated that women of reproductive age (age group between 15-49)
would show higher health care costs than men. This seemed not to be the case in the
609 As the natural logarithm of a zero expenditure is not defined, it was decided to add a minimum
value of a tenth of a Euro Cent (0.001 Euro) to the health care expenditures variable.
610 Specification of regression model: F(1,13570)=5.34, p<0.05.
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Fig. 8: Total individual illness costs in Euro (illness episodes, 3 months) by gender
Source: own calculation. Dataset: Pro MHI Africa, illness episodes
Note: the left figure is based on the arithmetic mean; the right figure applies the α-trimmed mean 
(α =0.05).
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data.611 Although extreme values in health care costs were very realistic, the right fig-
ure represents the same calculation on the basis of the α-trimmed mean not taking
very extreme cases (i.e. in right skewed data this means the highest values) into the
calculation. In the right diagram, we see a different picture of the health care costs dis-
tribution.  The gender effect disappeared,  because health care expenditure levels be-
tween male and female individuals were almost identical, using the trimmed mean. 612
Also, the high average health care costs of the second age group (5-15 years) were rela-
tively much lower in the figure to the right, which was the result of a few (male and
female) high-cost cases in the second age group. These cases were not considered in
the calculation of the trimmed mean. In both graphs, consistent with the above discus-
sion,  the  age  group with  the  highest  cost  was  the  oldest  age  group,  whereas  the
youngest group (0-4 years) consistently showed the lowest health care costs. The gen-
der-difference in the left figure indicated that more male extremely high cost cases ex-
isted than female. Altogether, there was no clear gender bias in non-extreme health
care costs (and utilization), but there seemed to be a slight gender bias with regard to
very costly treatments.
611 The questionnaire collected information on pregnancy-related health care utilization within the
last five years which is not taken into consideration in this analysis.
612 That the gender-independent total health care costs were lower than the values of both genders in
the highest age group was a result of the calculation of the α-trimmed mean.
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Fig. 9: Total individual illness costs in Euro (episodes, 3 months) by country
Source: own calculation. Dataset: Pro MHI Africa, illness episodes
Note: the left figure is based on the arithmetic mean; the right figure applies the α-trimmed mean (α 
=0.05).
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The individual total health care costs in the different age groups showed quite a consis-
tent pattern, considering country differences between Ghana and Malawi (see figure 9).
In all age groups, the level of spending in Euro equivalents in Ghana was consistently
higher. As the economic situation between both countries was very different and since
the exchange rate effect was unclear, a comparison of the absolute Euro values be-
tween Malawi and Ghana could not be done. However, it was clearly visible in the
right graph that the increase in health care costs from the youngest to the oldest age
group was much steeper in Ghana than in Malawi. Partially, it could be explained by
the slightly higher mean age of the highest age group in Ghana (65.4 years), as com-
pared to Malawi (62.2 years), but it could also be assumed that it was an effect of either
epidemiological patterns or a function of the health care system. Furthermore, the left
graph showed that the extreme values distorting the total individual health care costs
in the second age group in figure 8 apparently occurred in Ghana.
Chronic and permanent diseases within the last twelve months were reported for
319 (4.50%) of 7083 individuals. Ghana had a slightly higher percentage of individuals
who reported chronic conditions (4.80%), compared to Malawi (4.28%), although the
difference was not statistically significant (χ2(1)= 1.217, p=0.270). This could partially
be the result of higher life-expectancy in Ghana, which was reflected in the slightly
older sample. 
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Fig. 10: Percentage of individuals with chronic conditions by age group
Source: Individual data, Pro MHI Africa dataset.
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Figure  16 shows that the country difference (21.5% in Ghana compared to 12.4% in
Malawi, (χ2(1)=4.369, p<0.05) particularly stemmed from the oldest age group, in which
the mean age was 3.1 years higher in Ghana (65.4 years) than in the Malawi sample.
Generally,  there  was a  substantial  increase  in  chronic  conditions  in  the  older  age
groups, with a slight increase in the third age group, where 4.97% of individuals re-
ported a chronic condition, to a much higher prevalence in the oldest age group, where
18.31% of individuals reported chronic illnesses, an about 6.5 times higher probability
compared to the two lowest age groups. Also, the sex of the individual was associated
with the prevalence of chronic conditions; women were more likely to have chronic
conditions (5.50%) than men (3.52%) (χ2(1)=16.085, p<0.001).613
Table 24 shows the results of a multivariate logistic regression with the existence of
individual  chronic  disease as the outcome variable.  In total,  five regression models
were estimated. Model 1a included all household and personal factors and showed a
low adjusted McFadden Pseudo R2 of 5.00% (unadjusted 6.26%).614 Model 1b added vari-
ables on household risk exposure and accessibility of health care facilities.  The ad-
justed Pseudo R2 slightly increased to 5.20% (7.00%).615 Model 1c added variables related
to social  risk management  strategies,  which  increased the adj.  Pseudo R2 to 5.90%
(8.45%).616 All indicators in the three estimated general models 1a to 1c showed a negli-
gible level of collinearity, so that no further adjustment had to be made. In the Ghana-
specific regression model, the variable region showed a high level of collinearity with
other variables (i.e. household religion and health facility variables). Hence, it was de-
cided to drop the variable defining the region from these two country-specific regres-
sion models.617
In all three models (1a to 1c), variables on household location, such as country and
household environment, did not show a significant relationship to individual chronic
conditions. However, several personal characteristics were highly significant. Age was
the most important predictor of chronic conditions, which was consistent in all three
models.  Compared  to  the  age  group  5-15,  both  older  age  groups,  16-54  and  55+,
showed a significantly higher likelihood of having a chronic illness. The transformed
regression coefficients in model 1c showed that belonging to the age group 15-54 in-
creased the odds of having a chronic condition by 99.8%, while the effect was stronger
for the oldest age group, 55+, which increased the odds of having a chronic condition
613 The association was significant in Ghana,  men 4.17%,  women 5.44%,  χ2(1)=2.711,  p<0.1  and in
Malawi, men 3.05% and women 5.55%, χ2(1)=15.273, p<0.001.
614 Model 1a specification: LR-χ2(16)=162.92, p<0.001. Count R2=0.955.
615 Model 1b specification: LR-χ2(22)=182.38, p<0.001. Count R2=0.955.
616 Model 1b specification: LR-χ2(32)=219.87, p<0.001. Count R2=0.955.
617 see Acock (2012): A Gentle Introduction to Stata, p. 269.
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by 793.8%. Female individuals were more likely to have a chronic condition than males,
which was highly significant in all three models: The odds of having a chronic condi -
tion was 61.0% higher for women than for men. Education became significant only in
model 1c and showed a negative relationship with chronic diseases, which means that
the odds of having a chronic condition decreased by 12.2%, if the educational level of
the individual increased by one unit. As chronic conditions are often non-communica-
ble  diseases,  a  life-style  effect  might  have  played  a  role.  Compared  to  the  middle
wealth class (3rd quintile), in all three models, the fourth and the fifth quintile, showed
a highly significantly elevated likelihood of chronic conditions. In model 1c, belonging
to the fourth quintile increased the odds of chronic conditions by 81.2% and belonging
to the fifth quintile increased the odds by 77.7%. The subjective variable, whether the
household had a comparatively higher risk exposure than other households  in the
community, was significant and positively related to individual chronic conditions; in
model  1c  a  one  standard deviation increase  of  this  variable  increased the odds of
chronic conditions by 30.8%. Two variables representing SRM strategies showed a sig-
nificant value. Like in the regression model on general risks, cause and effect in this re-
gression model 1c were not necessarily clear, concerning these variables. In this case, it
seemed to be more likely that the household variables of the  use of savings and the
share of household members contributing to the household income were a result of indi-
viduals with chronic diseases in the household.618
Tab. 24: Determinants of individual chronic diseases (multivariate logistic regression)
Model 1a Model
1b
Model 1c
Country Malawi (base: Ghana)c 0.02076 (0.14279) 0.0007043
6
(0.14871) 0.05870 (0.2137 )
Household environment: semi-urban 
(base:rural)c
0.131 (0.17178) 0.172 (0.17371) 0.153 (0.17473)
Household environment: urban 
(base:rural)c
0.179 (0.14271) 0.175 (0.14374) 0.217 (0.14674)
Sex of individual: Female (base: male)c 0.492*** (0.11979) 0.487*** (0.12072) 0.476*** (0.12076)
Education level of individual -0.111 (0.0737 ) -0.08776 (0.07471) -0.130* (0.07576)
Age of individual: Age group 0-4 
years (base: 5-15 years)
0.150 (0.23571) 0.167 (0.23575) 0.127 (0.23674)
Age of individual: Age group 16-54 
years (base: 5-15 years)
0.691*** (0.16076) 0.703*** (0.1607 ) 0.692*** (0.16174)
618 An increase of the variable of "Share of hh members contributing significantly to the income" was
associated with a 22.5% increase in the odds of chronic conditions. A household using savings was
associated with an increase in the odds of chronic conditions by 65.2%.
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Age of individual: Age group 55+ 
years (base: 5-15 years)
2.217*** (0.20773) 2.241*** (0.20872) 2.190*** (0.21078)
Predominant religion: Muslimc (base: 
Christian)
-0.102 (0.15674) -0.147 (0.16671) -0.117 (0.17475)
Predominant religion: Otherc (base: 
Christian)
-0.529 (0.47570) -0.562 (0.47778) -0.554 (0.48172)
Child/adult ratioz 0.004713 (0.06373) 0.003780 (0.06379) 0.05879 (0.06679)
Wealth index: 1st quintile (base: 3rd 
quintile)
0.227 (0.2087 ) 0.163 (0.21076) 0.188 (0.21570)
Wealth index: 2nd quintile (base: 3rd 
quintile)
0.06274 (0.20572) 0.03373 (0.20678) 0.05173 (0.20779)
Wealth index: 4th quintile (base: 3rd 
quintile)
0.516*** (0.1937 ) 0.531*** (0.19573) 0.594*** (0.19876)
Wealth index: 5th quintile (base: 3rd 
quintile)
0.537*** (0.20873) 0.576*** (0.21073) 0.575*** (0.21379)
Total monthly hh income (quintiles) 0.03672 (0.04670) 0.0337 (0.04672) -0.003738 (0.04879)
General risks exposurez 0.004701 (0.02975) -0.006715 (0.03076)
Travel time to closest hospital >= 
3hrsb
0.0047 8 (0.05475) 0.01074 (0.05078)
Travel time to closest primary facility 
> 1hb
0.006765 (0.00478) 0.005786 (0.00478)
Type of primary health care facility: 
private (base: public or charitable)c
-0.235 (0.17171) -0.255 (0.17372)
Satisfaction with quality of carel,z -0.0487 (0.05176) -0.06979 (0.0527 )
General risk exposure compared to 
other householdsl.z
0.210*** (0.0537 ) 0.247*** (0.05478)
Share of hh members contributing 
significantly to the incomez
1.195*** (0.33479)
Income diversification -0.06572 (0.09575)
Acknowledgment of insurance as risk
management toolb
0.233 (0.14370)
Individual with health insuranceb 0.150 (0.19072)
Membership in microfinanceb 0.245 (0.15279)
Household use of credit/loansb 0.07178 (0.13171)
Household use of savingsb 0.502*** (0.13270)
Decision-making role in associationsb 0.08979 (0.13578)
Activity level in associations -0.277 (0.27175)
Likelihood of community assistancel.z -0.03778 (0.04478)
Constant -4.166*** (0.30370) -4.085*** (0.30674) -4.408*** (0.35975)
Observations 7082 7082 7082
175
7. Analysis
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.070 0.085
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable: Individual with chronic or permanent illness (binary)
Notes: b=binary/dichotomous variable, c=categorical variable, l= likert scale, q= quintiles, z= centered 
variable
Model 1c, split by countries (table  25), again showed that determinants of individual
chronic conditions significantly differed between Ghana and Malawi.619 Compared to
the general model 1c, the adj. pseudo R2 increased to 9.10% (14.48%) in the Ghana-spe-
cific model, but decreased to 2.60% (7.11%) in the Malawi model. Consistent with the
general model 1c, the following variables remained significant in both country-specific
regression models: the two highest age groups, the 4th and 5th wealth quintiles, the
subjective risk experience compared to other households in the community and the use of
savings.620 Female individuals showed a highly significant relationship with chronic
conditions in Malawi, which increased the odds by 86.2%, but stayed insignificant in
Ghana. Similarly,  a significant negative effect of the educational level on individual
chronic conditions was observed only in the Malawi model; a one unit higher educa-
tional level decreased the odds of chronic conditions by 26.4%. As in the general model
1c, Ghana and Malawi both showed a significant positive relationship of self-perceived
relative  household  risk  exposure  with  individual  chronic  conditions  (see  section
7.2).621,622 In Malawi, individuals who lived a greater distant from the next hospital (>=
3hrs) showed a significant relationship with chronic diseases: their odds for chronic
diseases increased by 46.5%. In Ghana, where health insurance was accessible to a
large share  of  society through the NHIS,  individuals  in those households  who ac-
knowledged health insurance as a tool to pay for expensive health care costs, showed a
significant increase (by 57.1%) in odds of having a chronic condition, which may be
attributed to either adverse selection or better diagnosis among NHIS members.
619 Ghana model specification: LR-χ2(31)=172.04, p<0.001. Count R2=0.953. Malawi model specifica-
tion: LR-χ2(31)=100.38, p<0.001. Count R2=0.957. 
620 If the individual belonged to the age group 15-54, the odds for chronic conditions increased by
139.0% in Ghana and 79.1% in Malawi. In the age group 55+, the odds increased by 1310.3% in
Ghana and 277.1% in Malawi.  The use of savings increased the odds of chronic conditions by
110.2% in Ghana and by 43.6% in Malawi.
621 An increase of one standard deviation in the subjective general risk exposure of the household in -
creased the odds of chronic conditions by 28.5% in both countries.
622 The factor general risk exposure which was insignificant in the general models 1a-1c, but a 1 SD in-
crease showed inconsistent significant effects in Ghana (17.4% decrease in the odds) and Malawi
(14.9% increase in the odds of chronic conditions).
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Tab. 25: Determinants of individual chronic diseases: Country comparison 
(multivariate logistic regression)
Ghana Malawi
Household environment: semi-urban (base:rural)c -0.325 (0.37275) 0.395* (0.21673)
Household environment: urban (base:rural)c 0.291 (0.21375) 0.257 (0.20772)
Sex of individual: Female (base: male)c 0.270 (0.1817 ) 0.622*** (0.16571)
Education level of individual 0.03878 (0.10676) -0.306*** (0.10874)
Age of individual: Age group 0-4 years (base: 5-15
years)
0.03872 (0.39972) 0.199 (0.29674)
Age of individual: Age group 16-54 years (base: 5-
15 years)
0.871*** (0.27472) 0.583*** (0.20273)
Age of individual: Age group 55+ years (base: 5-
15 years)
2.646*** (0.30871) 1.563*** (0.34874)
Predominant religion: Muslimc (base: Christian) -0.007790 (0.2397 ) -0.120 (0.3317 )
Predominant religion: Otherc (base: Christian) -0.004742 (0.65773) -0.996 (0.74275)
Child/adult ratioz 0.07272 (0.12276) 0.01378 (0.08472)
Wealth index: 1st quintile (base: 3rd quintile) 0.410 (0.32776) 0.008759 (0.30073)
Wealth index: 2nd quintile (base: 3rd quintile) 0.130 (0.32174) 0.04172 (0.28070)
Wealth index: 4th quintile (base: 3rd quintile) 1.073*** (0.30176) 0.229 (0.28376)
Wealth index: 5th quintile (base: 3rd quintile) 0.353 (0.35475) 0.720** (0.2797 )
Total monthly hh income (quintiles) -0.06673 (0.07073) 0.08674 (0.07174)
General risks exposurez -0.08375* (0.04774) 0.07271* (0.04372)
Travel time to closest hospital >= 3hrsb -0.0237 (0.15976) 0.382* (0.22170)
Travel time to closest primary facility > 1hb 0.002781 (0.00479) -0.199 (0.19970)
Type of primary health care facility: private (base:
public or charitable)c
-0.06873 (0.29272) -0.347 (0.22875)
Satisfaction with quality of carel,z -0.01275 (0.10370) -0.08970 (0.06470)
General self-perceived risk exposure compared to 
other householdsl.z
0.273** (0.10671) 0.209*** (0.06676)
Share of hh members contributing significantly to
the incomez
1.517*** (0.46873) 0.741 (0.53275)
Income diversification -0.07771 (0.13978) -0.02275 (0.14278)
Acknowledgment of insurance as SRM toolb 0.452** (0.21471) 0.06872 (0.19675)
Individual with health insuranceb 0.128 (0.21676) -0.365 (0.7447 )
Membership in microfinanceb 0.145 (0.25578) 0.236 (0.2177 )
Household use of credit/loansb 0.166 (0.1967 ) 0.175 (0.19371)
Household use of savingsb 0.743*** (0.2237 ) 0.362** (0.1707 )
Decision-making role in associationsb 0.260 (0.19671) -0.153 (0.19773)
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Activity level in associations 0.341 (0.4067 ) -0.571 (0.41171)
Likelihood of community assistancel.z -0.007705 (0.07976) -0.08178 (0.05675)
Constant -5.243*** (0.55670) -3.877*** (0.47773)
Observations 3085 3997
Pseudo R2 0.145 0.071
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Individual with 
chronic or permanent illness (binary). Notes: b=binary/dichotomous variable, c=categorical variable, l= 
likert scale, q= quintiles, z= centered variable
Hospitalization events in the 24 months prior to the survey were reported by 4.57% of
individuals (5.41% in Ghana and 3.92% in Malawi). In this study, hospitalization was
defined as an inpatient stay with at least one night at the hospital, excluding hospital
stays due to maternity events. As discussed in section 2.3.2, particularly long hospital-
ization stays have been found to be a good predictor of higher future health care costs.
Therefore, longer hospitalization stays requiring more than three days at the hospital
were analyzed further in detail.  Such longer hospitalization stays were reported by
3.08% of  individuals  in  the sample,  whereas reporting  of  longer inpatient  stays in
Ghana (4.05%) was over one third more than in Malawi (2.33%) (χ2(1)= 17.33, p<0.001).
This was likely a result of the availability of health care providers and health staff; al-
though Malawi with 11 hospital beds per 100 00 population (in the year 2007), had
better availability of health care facilities than Ghana, with 9 beds (in the year 2009);
medical staff was heavily constrained in Malawi, which only had one fourth of the
physician density per 100 00 population (0.019, year 2009) compared to Ghana (0.085,
year 2009); Malawi also had only one third of the nursing and midwifery personnel per
1000 population (Malawi 0.343, Ghana 1.046, both in the year 2009), but five times as
many other, often low skilled, health workers per 1000 population (Malawi 0.138 (year
2009), Ghana 0.026 (year 2008)).623
Similar to chronic conditions, the occurrence of longer hospitalization events de-
pended heavily upon the age of the individuals (figure 11). Individuals in the oldest age
group reported the most hospitalizations with 6.69%, followed by small children be-
tween 0-4 years (4.42%). The two middle age groups showed the lowest likelihood for
longer hospitalization stays, with 1.93% in the 5-15 years cohort and 3.08% in the 16-54
years cohort  (χ2(3)= 31.31,  p<0.001).  Consistently in each age group,  individuals  in
Ghana were more likely to report longer hospitalizations than in Malawi. However,
623 World Health Organization (WHO) (2014): World Health Statistics.  Health Workforce. Data by
country.; World Health Organization (WHO) (2014): Health systems: Essential health technologies
-  Data  by  country.  URL:  http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.70?lang=en (accessed
2014/05/25).
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this  country  difference  was  only  statistically  significant  for  the  age  groups  16-54
(χ2(1)= 12.66, p<0.001) and 55+ years (χ2(1)= 3.42, p<0.1).
By analogy with the analysis of  individual chronic conditions,  the determinants of
long hospitalization stays were also analyzed using five regression models. In compari-
son, the general three models 1a-1c and the Ghanaian model showed a lower explained
variance (McFadden Pseudo R2) compared to the models for individual chronic condi-
tions,624 which indicated that the occurrence of longer hospitalization stays were less
explainable by the available factors and more likely randomly distributed than the oc-
currence of chronic conditions.625 For the regression models 1a-1c, no significant levels
of collinearity were detected, so that no further adjustments had to be made. However,
in the Ghana-specific regression model,  the variable  region showed a high level  of
collinearity with other variables (i.e. religion and health facility variables). Hence, it
was decided to drop the regional  distinction from both country-specific regression
models.
624 Model specification 1a: LR-χ2(16)=57.16, p<0.001. Count R2=0.969, Adj. Pseudo R2=0.012 (0.029).  
Model specification 1b: LR-χ2(22)=63.24, p<0.001. Count R2=0.969, Adj. Pseudo R2=0.009 (0.032).  
Model specification 1c: LR-χ2(32)=150.10, p<0.001. Count R2=0.969, Adj. Pseudo R2=0.043 (0.077). 
625 The explained variance in the Malawi model was slightly higher for long hospitalization stays
compared to individual chronic conditions.
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Fig. 11: Percentage of individuals reporting hospitalization (> 3 days) by age group
Source: Individual data, Pro MHI Africa dataset.
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7. Analysis
In the general models 1a-1c (table 26), relatively few factors showed a significant rela-
tionship with long hospitalization stays. Households in Malawi experienced fewer long
hospitalization stays compared to Ghana; this finding was significant in model 1a and
1b, where the odds of long hospitalization stays were reduced by 37.1% and 34.7%, re-
spectively,  but  lost  significance  in  model  1c.  Consistently  over  the  three  models,
women experienced a higher likelihood of facing long hospitalization stays, with the
odds increased by 29.5% in model 1c.626 The age group 5-15 years had the least hospital-
ization events. In all three models, the higher age groups showed a highly significant
increase in long hospitalization events, while the relationship of the oldest age group,
55+ years, was the highest with a 266.8% increase in the odds in model 1c. 627 In these
three models, wealth had no significant relationship with long hospitalization stays,
but higher income significantly increased the occurrence of long hospitalization stays
in model 1a and 1b,628 which might have been an indicator of low accessibility to inpa-
tient services for low-income households. This finding was in line with the factor of
health insurance membership of the individual which showed a significant positive re-
lationship with hospitalization stays, which referred to an increase in odds by 72.1% in
model 1c. This was another indication that the NHIS seemed able to improve access to
inpatient services. Other SRM strategies also resulted in a significant increase in long
hospitalization stays, which was a decision-making role in community associations (in-
crease  of  33.1% in  odds of  the  dependent variable),  the  use of  savings  (increase of
295.1% in odds) and use of credit/loans (increase of 58.1% in odds). The latter two were
again unclear regarding the direction of the relationship, as they could have been the
result of high costs incurred through long hospitalization stays.
Tab. 26: Determinants of long hospitalization stays (multivariate logistic regression)
Model
1a
Model
1b
Model
1c
Country Malawi (base: Ghana)c -0.464*** (0.17272) -0.426** (0.18173) -0.01872 (0.25979)
Household environment: semi-urban 
(base:rural)c
0.156 (0.20074) 0.141 (0.20270) 0.190 (0.20678)
Household environment: urban 
(base:rural)c
-0.07479 (0.17476) -0.104 (0.1757 ) -0.02071 (0.18172)
Sex of individual: Female (base: male)c 0.271* (0.1397 ) 0.270* (0.13978) 0.259* (0.14079)
Education level of individual 0.09776 (0.08578) 0.112 (0.08674) 0.08379 (0.0887 )
626 The hospitalization events excluded explicit maternity-related hospitalization stays, which were
recorded in a separate section of the questionnaire.
627 In model 1c, belonging to the age group 0-4 it increased the odds of long hospitalization stays by
128.7%, in the age group 16-54 by 67.8%.
628 One standard deviation increase in income quintiles increased the odds of long hospitalization
stays in model 1a by 14.9% and in model 1b by 15.1%.
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Age of individual: Age group 0-4 years 
(base: 5-15 years)
0.865*** (0.21678) 0.860*** (0.21770) 0.827*** (0.21878)
Age of individual: Age group 16-54 
years (base: 5-15 years)
0.517*** (0.18771) 0.516*** (0.18771) 0.518*** (0.18872)
Age of individual: Age group 55+ years 
(base: 5-15 years)
1.274*** (0.2757 ) 1.261*** (0.27672) 1.300*** (0.28073)
Predominant religion: Muslimc (base: 
Christian)
0.309* (0.17371) 0.204 (0.18779) -0.04271 (0.20170)
Predominant religion: Otherc (base: 
Christian)
0.318 (0.43570) 0.292 (0.43875) 0.201 (0.44578)
Child/adult ratioz 0.04475 (0.06975) 0.03578 (0.07070) 0.04579 (0.0737 )
Wealth index: 1st quintile (base: 3rd 
quintile)
-0.186 (0.22679) -0.193 (0.2287 ) -0.0847 (0.23679)
Wealth index: 2nd quintile (base: 3rd 
quintile)
-0.07775 (0.2097 ) -0.08676 (0.21078) -0.01975 (0.21279)
Wealth index: 4th quintile (base: 3rd 
quintile)
-0.375 (0.22973) -0.347 (0.23070) -0.213 (0.23470)
Wealth index: 5th quintile (base: 3rd 
quintile)
-0.230 (0.2387 ) -0.218 (0.24171) -0.154 (0.24578)
Total monthly hh income (quintiles) 0.09874* (0.05374) 0.09975* (0.05376) 0.02174 (0.0567 )
General risks exposurez 0.03875 (0.03279) 0.007736 (0.03470)
Travel time to closest hospital >= 3hrsb -0.115 (0.25575) -0.120 (0.26070)
Travel time to closest primary facility >
1hb
-0.238 (0.21571) -0.286 (0.21870)
Type of primary health care facility: 
private (base: public or charitable)c
-0.145 (0.2107 ) -0.231 (0.21472)
Satisfaction with quality of carel,z 0.04979 (0.06873) -0.01878 (0.0697 )
General risk exposure compared to 
other householdsl.z
0.06276 (0.0677 ) 0.04974 (0.06978)
Share of hh members contributing sig-
nificantly to the incomez
0.687 (0.44476)
Income diversification -0.01171 (0.11179)
Acknowledgment of insurance as risk 
management toolb
0.01079 (0.16779)
Individual with health insuranceb 0.543** (0.21470)
Membership in microfinanceb -0.212 (0.18774)
Household use of credit/loansb 0.458*** (0.15775)
Household use of savingsb 1.374*** (0.19972)
Decision-making role in associationsb 0.286* (0.15771)
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Activity level in associations -0.04773 (0.29970)
Likelihood of community assistancel.z 0.02579 (0.06275)
Constant -4.335*** (0.34170) -4.305*** (0.34572) -5.630*** (0.43870)
Observations 7082 7082 7082
Pseudo R2 0.029 0.032 0.077
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable: Hospitalization longer than three days (binary)
Notes: b=binary/dichotomous variable, c=categorical variable, l= likert scale, q= quintiles, z= centered 
variable
Regression model 1c, split by country (table 27), again showed some interesting differ-
ences between Ghana and Malawi.629 The only variable which was consistent with the
general models 1a-1c was the relationship of household use of savings with long hospi-
talization stays.630 On the other hand, women only had a significant positive relation-
ship (base: male) in Malawi, referring to an increase of odds by 71.2%. Age was incon-
sistent: As expected, both countries showed a higher occurrence of long hospitaliza-
tion stays among the youngest age group (0-4 years),631 but the older age groups (15-54
and 55+) only showed a significant positive relationship in Ghana, not in Malawi. 632
This is an unexpected finding, because this relationship was consistent in the literature
(cp. section 2.3.2). The relationship of the level of household income did not show sig-
nificant levels in any country. Also, the different wealth quintiles did not show consis-
tent results in the country-specific models.
A result of the country comparison indicated that individual and household level
SRM strategies played a larger role in Ghana compared to Malawi: Evidently, access to
health insurance was greater in Ghana and, hence, health insurance membership of the
individual showed a significant positive relationship with long hospitalizations stays,
increasing the odds by 61.7%. Health insurance in Malawi, which played a minor role,
did not show a significant relationship. In Ghana, the use of credit/loans (resulting in an
increase in odds by 79.1%) and the involvement of a higher share of household members
significantly contributing to the hh income (a one sd higher level increases the odds by
22.5%) as well as having a decision-making role in community associations (increase in
629 Model  specification  Ghana:  LR-χ2(31)=108.50,  p<0.001.  Count  R2=0.959,  Adj.  Pseudo  R2=0.043
(0.104).
Model  specification  Malawi:  LR-χ2(31)=74.61,  p<0.001.  Count  R2=0.977,  Adj.  Pseudo  R2=0.012
(0.084).
630 The use of savings was associated with an increase of odds in long hospitalization stays of 345.9%
in Ghana and 260.5% in Malawi.
631 Belonging to the age group 0-4 increased the odds of long hospitalizations stays by 158.4% in
Ghana and 99.3% in Malawi. 
632 In Ghana, the age group 16-54 indicated an increase in odds of 98.2% in long hospitalization stays
and belonging to the age group 55+ increased the odds by 383.8%.
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odds by 50.8%) was significantly associated with long hospitalization stays. These vari-
ables pointing at applied SRM strategies remained insignificant in Malawi. Out of the
SRM strategies in Malawi, only household use of savings was highly significant (leading
to an increase in odds by 260.5%), which was also the case in Ghana (increase in odds
by 345.9%). The finding that households in Malawi tended to utilize fewer hospitaliza-
tion stays (models 1a-1b) coupled with the much lower availability of skilled health
personnel in Malawi compared to Ghana (section 4.3.6.3), seemed to be related to the
inconsistent significant factors in the Malawi model. Few personal and household so-
cio-economic factors or SRM strategy-related factors were related to the use of long
hospitalization stays, potentially indicating equitable but restricted access to inpatient
services in Malawi.
Tab. 27: Determinants of long hospitalization stays: Country comparison (multivariate 
logistic regression)
Ghana Malawi
Household environment: semi-urban 
(base:rural)c
0.516 (0.33372) 0.06479 (0.27570)
Household environment: urban (base:rural)c -0.117 (0.2427 ) 0.01176 (0.28074)
Sex of individual: Female (base: male)c 0.07470 (0.18872) 0.538** (0.21876)
Education level of individual 0.07370 (0.1137 ) 0.09674 (0.1477 )
Age of individual: Age group 0-4 years 
(base: 5-15 years)
0.950*** (0.31476) 0.689** (0.31171)
Age of individual: Age group 16-54 years 
(base: 5-15 years)
0.684** (0.27473) 0.301 (0.26575)
Age of individual: Age group 55+ years 
(base: 5-15 years)
1.576*** (0.35479) 0.912 (0.57678)
Predominant religion: Muslimc (base: Chris-
tian)
-0.01578 (0.25378) -0.223 (0.44375)
Predominant religion: Otherc (base: Chris-
tian)
0.332 (0.65272) -0.225 (0.6487 )
Child/adult ratioz 0.005791 (0.12673) 0.03670 (0.09375)
Wealth index: 1st quintile (base: 3rd quin-
tile)
-0.263 (0.31370) 0.324 (0.37975)
Wealth index: 2nd quintile (base: 3rd quin-
tile)
-0.619* (0.31679) 0.719** (0.31975)
Wealth index: 4th quintile (base: 3rd quin-
tile)
-0.187 (0.31075) -0.179 (0.38078)
Wealth index: 5th quintile (base: 3rd quin-
tile)
0.213 (0.32175) -0.658 (0.42976)
Total monthly hh income (quintiles) 0.107 (0.0767 ) -0.0467 (0.09072)
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General risks exposurez -0.01173 (0.04778) 0.08274 (0.05370)
Travel time to closest hospital >= 3hrsb -0.933 (0.60776) 0.05370 (0.3007 )
Travel time to closest primary facility > 1hb -0.155 (0.33870) -0.458 (0.31471)
Type of primary health care facility: private 
(base: public or charitable)c
-0.527 (0.37775) 0.01973 (0.27779)
Satisfaction with quality of carel,z 0.03774 (0.12079) -0.04372 (0.09078)
General risk exposure compared to other 
householdsl.z
0.01671 (0.1147 ) 0.05270 (0.09570)
Share of hh members contributing signifi-
cantly to the incomez
1.078* (0.55373) -0.610 (0.87472)
Income diversification -0.119 (0.14674) 0.169 (0.19471)
Acknowledgment of insurance as risk man-
agement toolb
0.07676 (0.2277 ) -0.06376 (0.25670)
Individual with health insuranceb 0.481** (0.24171) -0.07172 (1.04878)
Membership in microfinanceb -0.318 (0.28079) 0.117 (0.28775)
Household use of credit/loansb 0.583*** (0.20971) 0.426 (0.26274)
Household use of savingsb 1.495*** (0.31275) 1.282*** (0.26770)
Decision-making role in associationsb 0.411** (0.20474) 0.09476 (0.27275)
Activity level in associations -0.248 (0.43873) -0.005722 (0.4557 )
Likelihood of community assistancel.z 0.113 (0.10274) -0.02675 (0.08472)
Constant -5.980*** (0.60479) -5.832*** (0.67772)
Observations 3085 3997
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.084
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable: Hospitalization longer than three days (binary)
Notes: b=binary/dichotomous variable, c=categorical variable, l= likert scale, q= quintiles, z= centered 
variable
A variety of analyses were conducted to understand the interdependencies of variables
relevant for testing hypothesis H2a. The outcomes were also relevant for further high-
risk analyses on the household level in subsequent sections. Regarding hypothesis H2a,
it was shown that chronic conditions significantly depended on several personal char-
acteristics that had the potential to predict future high health care utilization. Signifi-
cantly,  a higher prevalence of  chronic  conditions was found among the oldest  age
group (55+ years),  which was significant in all  bivariate and multivariate analyses.
Also, the third age group (16-54 years) showed a significant increase in chronic condi-
tions. The increase in total individual health care costs was analog to the prevalence of
chronic conditions and, hence, significantly increased with the third (16-54 years) and
the highest age group (55+ years). The country of residence itself was not a significant
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factor, except for the oldest age group (which was likely an effect of the higher life ex -
pectancy in Ghana). Women appeared more likely to have chronic conditions than
men, which was significant in all bivariate analyses and in the general multivariate
models 1a-1c. The same effect could be confirmed in the Malawi-specific regression
model, but not in the Ghana-specific regression model; where the coefficient became
insignificant. However, women were shown not to have higher health care costs than
men in the same age group, as it was more likely that men accounted for the very
costly health care cases. In the general regression models, a higher wealth quintile was
positively associated with chronic conditions, a relationship which was weaker and
partially significant in the country-specific models. 
Generally, long hospitalization stays could not be well explained by the available
factors; however, age was a significant factor. Particularly, the highest age group, 55+,
had a significant relationship with long hospitalization stays, but the lowest group (0-4
years) also showed increased levels. This was significant in all regression models, ex-
cept  for  the  coefficient  for  the  oldest  age  group in  the Malawi-specific  regression
model, where it lost significance. Women tended to have more long hospitalization
stays than men, which was confirmed in the general regression models and in the
Malawi-specific model, but not in the Ghana model. The country of residence was a
less important factor, but showed a significantly higher likelihood for long hospitaliza-
tion stays in Ghana in model 1a and 1b.
Health insurance membership was a relevant factor in Ghana, where it was signifi-
cantly related to an increase in longer hospitalization stays, probably an effect of im-
proved access to inpatient care through health insurance.  Health insurance did not
have a significant relationship with regard to the likelihood of chronic conditions.
Overall, hypothesis H2a was confirmed. The personal characteristics old age and sex
of the individual were related to prevalence of chronic conditions and long hospitaliza-
tion stays. Belonging to the highest age group 55+ years was a highly relevant factor
for high health care costs in the sample.
7.3.2. Individual and household exposure to high health care costs
As discussed in section 2.4.1, and hypothesized in H2b, the distribution of health care
costs could be expected to be heavily positively skewed with a concentration of health
care  costs  on  relatively  few individuals.  Generally,  such  high-cost  households  and
high-cost individuals are vulnerable, as the likelihood is high that SRM strategies on
individual- or household level are overburdened by catastrophic health care costs.
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Figure 12 shows the concentration curve of total individual health care costs in illness
episodes (3 months recall period) in Malawi. The Gini coefficient, a measure of dispar-
ity, was very high in Malawi at 0.84, representing a very strong relative concentration
of the health care costs. In other words, it  showed that the illness costs of the entire
group of people facing an illness were concentrated among a few individuals. Only
5.60% of high-cost individuals carried over 50% of the total individual treatment costs
of the entire Malawian sample.633
In Ghana, the Gini coefficient was even higher at 0.91, showing that the health care
costs were more concentrated among fewer individuals than in Malawi. Only 0.9% of
individuals carried 50% of the total individual health care costs and 86.92% were car-
ried by the 10% of individuals with the highest costs (out of those having reported an
illness episode). Comparing figure 12 and 13 showed that the concentration curve was
substantially steeper in Ghana compared to Malawi. However, if the individuals who
reported an illness episode in Ghana were separated by those who were insured with
the NHIS and those without insurance (figure 13), two clear differences were noticed.
633 The 10% of individuals with the highest costs (out of the 804 individuals reporting an illness) com -
prised 72.9% of aggregated total individual health care costs in Malawi.
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Fig. 12: Concentration curve of total individual treatment costs (Malawi)
Source: own calculation. Dataset: Pro MHI Africa, illness episodes, Malawi. N=804 individuals who 
reported at least one illness episode in the last three months, out of 4000 individuals in the Malawian 
sample.
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7.3. Exposure of Individuals And Households to High Health Risks And High Health Care Costs
Firstly, the concentration curve of the insured individuals was less steep. Secondly, the
total share of health care costs borne by the insured individuals was lower (47.5% of to-
tal health care costs) than the total health care costs borne by the uninsured house-
holds (52.5% of total health care costs). Additionally, the group of insured among the
individuals reporting an illness was much larger (400 individuals) than those who were
uninsured (148 individuals). After standardizing for the different group sizes, the mean
health care costs of the uninsured was almost three times the mean health care costs of
the insured: GHS 117.15 (63.35€) versus GHS 39.19 (21.19€). This difference not only
stemmed from the individuals experiencing high costs, but also those with low health
care costs as the median of the uninsured was more than four times higher than the
median of the insured: GHS 12.50 (6.76€) vs. GHS 3 (1.62€). 
A core-density estimation graph of the distribution of health care costs split by insured
and uninsured individuals (figure 14) showed that the density curve of the uninsured
was, almost on all expenditure levels, higher than the curve of the insured. An excep-
tion of this was the highest cost cases, where 3 out of the 10 most expensive cases were
individuals insured at the NHIS, including the single most expensive case.
187
Fig. 13: Concentration curve of total individual treatment costs (Ghana)
Source: own calculation. Dataset: Pro MHI Africa, illness episodes, Ghana. N=548 individuals who 
reported at least one illness episode in the last three months out of 3086 individuals in the Ghanaian 
sample.
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7. Analysis
These results indicated that the NHIS was able to provide considerable protection from
high as well as low/medium health care costs. This partially confirmed hypothesis H2c,
that  health  insurance  protected  individuals  and  households  from high  health  care
costs. Members of the NHIS were eligible to receive a wide variety of health care for
free, which seemed to successfully reduce all levels of health care spending.
In the next analytical step, the individual direct and indirect health care costs were ag -
gregated on household level. The household was seen as the economic unit dealing
with health care costs and one of the main providers of social risk management strate-
gies. Hence, in the multivariate analysis, several factors were tested by using the di-
chotomous variable of high-cost households as dependent variable: several household-
related factors, risk exposure variables and variables representing SRM strategies. The
determinants for high-cost households were analyzed in five logistic regression mod-
els, three general step-wise regression models 1a-1c and two regression models, split
by country. The variable country could not be included in the regression models 1a-1c,
because the creation of the dependent variable was done independently for each coun-
try and then aggregated into one international variable, so that an influence of the
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Fig. 14: Core-density estimation of health care costs in Ghana
Source: own calculation. Dataset: Pro MHI Africa, illness episodes, Ghana. N=548 individuals reporting 
at least one illness episode out of 3086 individuals.
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household country was logically eliminated.634 No significant level of collinearity could
be observed in the general models 1a-1c. However, in both country specific regression
models, the variable region showed a high level of collinearity with other variables (e.g.
religion, household environment and health facility variables). Hence, it was decided
to drop the variable defining the region from these two regression models.
The general multivariate regression models 1a-1c (table 28) showed that a relatively
large share of high-cost households could be estimated by the independent variables,
amounting, in model 1c, to 22.3% (Adj. McFadden pseudo R2).635 As expected, a variety
of household-related variables showed a significant relationship with high health care
costs.  Consistently  over  all  three  general  models,  the  household  size  and  the
child/adult ratio were significant and positively associated with high household health
care costs. This was not surprising, because the dependent variable represented the
household total of direct and indirect health care costs and was not discounted by the
number of household members. In model 1c, the odds of being a high-cost household
increased by 16.7% with one additional household member (if the increase was by one
sd,  the  odds  increased  by 44.3%).  Similarly,  the  child/adult  ratio  was significant,  a
change by one sd indicated an increase in the odds of being a high cost household by
28.1%. The total monthly household income was significant in models 1a and 1b, but
lost significance in model 1c, probably because some SRM strategies also indirectly de-
pended on the income situation of the household. In model 1b, the odds of the depen-
dent variable increased by 24.3% if the household was in an income quintile one level
higher. 
Model 1b introduced variables on health care access and risk exposure, which sub-
stantially increased the adj. McFadden pseudo R2  from 3.7% (non-adj. 8.0%) to 15.7%
(21.7%). A one sd increase in the household-level high-risk variable636 increased the
odds  of  being  a  high-cost  household  in  model  1b  by  82.1%  (one  unit  change  by
1327.8%) and in model 1c by 60.3% (one unit change by 712.4%), while the relationship
was highly significant in both models. 
High health care costs in the household may have come from one single treatment
case, but were more likely the aggregate costs from a number of illness events that ac-
634 The share of high-cost households in Ghana was 6.17% (37 hh) and in Malawi 6.16% (51 hh), a
comparable share as result of the computation of the variable.
635 Model specification 1a: LR-χ2(13)=52.59, p<0.001. Count R2=0.938, Adj. Pseudo R2=0.037 (0.080).  
Model specification 1b: LR-χ2(19)=143.57, p<0.001. Count R2=0.939, Adj. Pseudo R2=0.157 (0.217).  
Model specification 1c: LR-χ2(29)=207.07, p<0.001. Count R2=0.940, Adj. Pseudo R2=0.223 (0.313). 
636 The household high-risk variable had the values range from 0 to 1 (in total four steps), mean 0.130,
sd 0.225, was based on exposure of household members to long hospital stays, chronic conditions
and high age of household members. For details, see sections 6.3.
189
7. Analysis
cumulated to a high cost situation. An increase of one sd in the average illness events
per household member637 increased the odds of being a high-cost household in model 1b
by 125.3% (one unit change by 2739.9%) and in model 1c by 87.9% (one unit change by
1243.8%). Also, the variables related to health care facilities were consistently signifi-
cant in model 1b and model 1c. If the household normally used a private primary facil-
ity, this increased the odds of being a high-cost household by 99.7% in model 1b and
83.0% in model 1c. The distance to the closest hospital638 also had a significant influence
on the dependent variable, one category further from the closest hospital increased the
odds of being a high-cost household by 40.2% in model 1b and 41.8% in model 1c. The
self-perceived relative exposure to general risks and the number of general risks ex-
posed did not have a significant relationship with the dependent variable.
Tab. 28: Determinants of high cost households (multivariate logistic regression)
Model
1a
Model
1b
Model
1c
Household environment: semi-urban 
(base:rural)c
0.521* (0.29475) 0.383 (0.31474) 0.417 (0.34078)
Household environment: urban 
(base:rural)c
0.201 (0.27972) 0.363 (0.31773) 0.392 (0.34170)
Education level of head of household 0.0177 (0.14272) 0.01273 (0.14970) -0.04879 (0.1657 )
Household sizez 0.167
*** (0.05071) 0.248*** (0.05674) 0.154** (0.07371)
Age of head of householdz 0.02271
** (0.00976) 0.003721 (0.01076) 0.01474 (0.01171)
Predominant religion: Muslimc (base: 
Christian)
-0.173 (0.29479) -0.220 (0.33472) -0.228 (0.38179)
Predominant religion: Otherc (base: 
Christian)
0.06174 (0.76379) 0.397 (0.83075) 0.339 (0.86078)
Child/adult ratioz 0.214
** (0.10171) 0.209* (0.11076) 0.246** (0.12173)
Wealth index: 1st quintile (base: 3rd 
quintile)
-0.585 (0.42479) -0.583 (0.45478) -0.569 (0.48175)
Wealth index: 2nd quintile (base: 3rd 
quintile)
0.321 (0.32776) 0.363 (0.35172) 0.338 (0.37170)
Wealth index: 4th quintile (base: 3rd 
quintile)
-0.09476 (0.35370) -0.0917 (0.38278) 0.132 (0.40679)
Wealth index: 5th quintile (base: 3rd 
quintile)
-0.465 (0.40176) -0.419 (0.43172) -0.181 (0.46271)
Total monthly hh income (quintiles) 0.208** (0.09071) 0.217** (0.09770) 0.05572 (0.10775)
637 The variable average illness events per household member had a value range from 0 to1, mean
0.207 and sd 0.243 (for the inclusion into the regression models, the variable had been centered
which did not alter the standard deviation).
638 The variable was classified in five distance classes. For details see section 6.3.
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Type of primary health care facility: 
private (base: public or charitable)c
0.692** (0.30678) 0.604* (0.32771)
Distance to the closest hospital 0.338*** (0.12876) 0.350** (0.13873)
High risk household 2.659*** (0.47176) 2.095*** (0.49574)
Average illness events per hh memberz 3.346
*** (0.48975) 2.598*** (0.58074)
General risks exposurez -0.00273 (0.05771) -0.03476 (0.06073)
General risk exposure compared to 
other householdsl.z
0.05972 (0.11373) 0.110 (0.1217 )
Income diversification 0.393* (0.20274)
Share of hh members contributing sig-
nificantly to the incomez
-0.421 (0.97072)
Acknowledgment of insurance as risk 
management toolb
0.03674 (0.29874)
Household with health insuranceb -0.636
* (0.34975)
Membership in microfinanceb 0.004738 (0.3277 )
Household use of credit/loansb 0.953
*** (0.31174)
Household use of savingsb 2.339
*** (0.54079)
Decision-making role in associationsb 0.235 (0.29772)
Activity level in associations 0.710 (0.43676)
Likelihood of community assistancel.z 0.04673 (0.10970)
Constant -3.626*** (0.49578) -5.376*** (0.68176) -7.828*** (0.95474)
Observations 1428 1428 1428
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.217 0.313
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable: High-cost household (binary, 1sd higher than mean of log total hh health care costs)
Notes: b=binary/dichotomous variable, c=categorical variable, l= likert scale, q= quintiles, z= centered 
variable
Model 1c, that adds variables on SRM strategies to the model, increased the explana-
tory power of the regression models to an adj. McFadden pseudo R2 of 22.3% (non-adj.
31.3%). Again, the causal relationship of these variables needs to be taken with a grain
of salt. On the other hand, the SRM strategy health insurance was a factor that was able
to reduce the amount of health care costs that had to be paid by the household. As ex-
pected, the general model 1c showed a negative relationship with high cost house-
holds: A household insured for health reduced the odds of being a high-cost household
by 47.1%. In the general model 1c, three other SRM strategies had a significant positive
relationship with the high-cost household variable: An increase in income diversifica-
tion639 by one sd increased the odds of high-costs of the household by 30.7% (one unit
639 Income diversification was measured in 4 categories on a scale from 0 to 3, mean 1.357, sd 0.682.
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increase by 48.1%). The household use of savings was highly significant and related to
an increase in odds by 936.6% and the use of credit/loans was related to an increase in
odds by 159.3%, which was highly significant.
As for the regression models in previous sections, model 1c was also estimated sepa-
rately for each country (table  29).640 The explanatory power of the regression models
was comparable, but differences between the relevant factors in Ghana and Malawi
could be observed. The variables on general household characteristics were inconsis-
tent in both country-specific regression models, with the general models 1a-1c: House-
hold size and the child/adult ratio was significant only in the case of Ghana; they were
positively associated with high cost households and an increase of the household size
by one household member increased the odds by 21.6% (increase of one sd by 70.7%)
and an increase of the child/adult ratio by one sd increased the odds by 90.7%. The
semi-urban household environment, which was significant in model 1c,  was highly
significant in Ghana, leading to an increase in odds by 577.7%, but it was not signifi-
cant in Malawi.
Consistent with the general models, the variable high-risk household was highly sig-
nificant in both countries: an increase by one standard deviation increased the odds by
75.0% (one unit increase by 760.8%) in Ghana and by 42.0% in Malawi (one unit in-
crease by 1034.7%). Also, the  average number of illness events per household member
was significantly positively related to high cost households: an increase by one sd in-
creased the odds by 213.7% in Ghana, but just 42.0% in Malawi. These results, together
with the bivariate discussion in section 6.3 on the computation of the high-risk house-
hold variables, showed that 17.50% of high-risk households also belonged to the high
cost households, while only 5.12% of low/medium risk households could be categorized
as high-cost  households.  Hence,  high-risk  households  were  more  than three  times
more likely to incur high health care costs than other households.
With regard to the variables  representing SRM strategies,  the  use of  savings re-
mained  significant  in  both  countries,  leading  to  an  increase  in  odds  by 299.1% in
Ghana and by 2015.3% in Malawi. The use of credit remained significant only in Ghana
and increased the odds by 397.6%, but lost significance in Malawi. This could have been
an artifact, mirroring the fact that the partner organizations in Malawi were microfi-
nance institutions,  so that members had access to credit  for  a variety of  purposes.
640 Model  specification  Ghana:  LR-χ2(29)=102.93,  p<0.001.  Count  R2=0.950,  Adj.  Pseudo  R2=0.155
(0.371).  
Model  specification  Malawi:  LR-χ2(29)=136.76,  p<0.001.  Count  R2=0.943,  Adj.  Pseudo  R2=0.200
(0.357). 
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Health insurance was significant only in Ghana and decreased the odds by 64.6%. In-
come diversification lost significance in both countries.
Tab. 29: Determinants of high cost households: Country comparison (multivariate 
logistic regression)
Ghana Malawi
Household environment: semi-urban (base:rural)c 1.914
*** (0.67579) 0.157 (0.46472)
Household environment: urban (base:rural)c 0.604 (0.62671) 0.343 (0.46073)
Education level of head of household -0.01378 (0.25672) -0.191 (0.25479)
Household sizez 0.196
* (0.11878) 0.158 (0.11773)
Age of head of householdz 0.02373 (0.01678) 0.009790 (0.01873)
Predominant religion: Muslimc (base: Christian) -0.625 (0.58979) 0.07779 (0.64676)
Predominant religion: Otherc (base: Christian) 1.257 (1.27475) -0.133 (1.24673)
Child/adult ratioz 0.689
*** (0.23970) 0.02679 (0.1627 )
Wealth index: 1st quintile (base: 3rd quintile) -0.512 (0.7767 ) -0.06573 (0.69973)
Wealth index: 2nd quintile (base: 3rd quintile) 0.546 (0.63979) 0.698 (0.53178)
Wealth index: 4th quintile (base: 3rd quintile) 0.449 (0.67970) 0.328 (0.56472)
Wealth index: 5th quintile (base: 3rd quintile) 0.749 (0.79476) -0.692 (0.63371)
Total monthly hh income (quintiles) -0.164 (0.17376) 0.240 (0.15574)
Type of primary health care facility: private 
(base: public or charitable)c
-0.338 (0.74172) 0.656 (0.41474)
Distance to the closest hospital 0.421 (0.26274) 0.156 (0.18975)
High risk household 2.153*** (0.80976) 2.429*** (0.75670)
Average illness events per hh memberz 4.637
*** (1.02970) 1.460* (0.83576)
General risks exposurez -0.06775 (0.10471) -0.03679 (0.08976)
General risk exposure compared to other house-
holdsl.z
0.05578 (0.23974) 0.205 (0.1517 )
Income diversification 0.414 (0.33675) 0.281 (0.29978)
Share of hh members contributing significantly to
the incomez
-1.010 (1.52379) -0.109 (1.62779)
Acknowledgment of insurance as SRM toolb -0.01873 (0.5147 ) -0.002789 (0.43875)
Household with health insuranceb -1.039
** (0.50774) 0.883 (0.90976)
Membership in microfinanceb -0.566 (0.64979) 0.381 (0.51979)
Household use of credit/loansb 1.605
*** (0.53274) 0.601 (0.46970)
Household use of savingsb 1.384
* (0.80574) 3.052*** (0.78374)
Decision-making role in associationsb 0.592 (0.45971) 0.229 (0.48178)
Activity level in associations 0.780 (0.79873) 0.354 (0.62173)
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Likelihood of community assistancel.z -0.09679 (0.17972) 0.278 (0.17470)
Constant -7.279*** (1.58275) -8.443*** (1.36771)
Observations 600 828
Pseudo R2 0.370 0.357
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable: High-cost household (binary, 1sd higher than mean of log total hh health care costs)
Notes: b=binary/dichotomous variable, c=categorical variable, l= likert scale, q= quintiles, z= centered 
variable
The analyses  in this  section refer  to three sub-hypotheses of  H2:  H 2b,  H2c and H2d.
Analyses in both countries showed that health care costs were heavily right skewed
and only a small percentage of individuals carried the largest share of health care costs
of the entire country-sample. Therefore, hypothesis H2b was confirmed. The concentra-
tion of health care costs – in both countries using real data – by far surpassed the hy-
pothesized concentration of health care costs, based on the literature review in section
2.4.
Hypothesis  H2c  stated that  the  financial  protection mechanism health insurance,
which is based on risk-pooling, resulted in a lower likelihood of insured households in-
curring high health care costs. In the bivariate analysis, the concentration curve of in-
dividual health care costs in Ghana, and also the multivariate regression models 1c and
the Ghana-specific model, confirmed that households with health insurance were less
likely to experience high health care costs than uninsured households. 
The results of the relationship of high risk households and high cost households
confirmed hypothesis H2d showing that the likelihood of facing high health care costs
by high risk households was more than three times as high as for low/medium risk
households.
Additionally,  it  was  somewhat  surprising  that  wealth  and  income  quintiles  of
households had no significant relationship to high cost households in model 1c and the
country-specific models, which indicated that high health care costs occurred out of
need for health care and were partially the result of patients' lack of negotiation power
in the market for health services coupled with high willingness to pay in times of ill-
ness.
7.4. Application of social (health) risk management strategies
The literature review in section  4 showed evidence of numerous SRM strategies that
were  applied  on  the  individual,  household  and  community-levels  in  Sub-Saharan
Africa. The empirical analysis of the application of SRM strategies incorporated some
previously discussed SRM strategies and followed three steps. The first one analyzed
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the complexity of SRM strategy sets, looking at the aggregated number of strategies
applied by households. The second one looked at the use of single SRM strategies by
households without considering which other strategies were used. It was briefly shown
which strategies households usually coupled and frequently applied in combination.
The third step was the most complex, looking at all SRM strategy sets most frequently
used by households. In all three steps, univariate and bivariate statistical methods were
used. In a final step, multivariate OLS regression models, on the complexity of SRM
strategy sets, were estimated in order to identify the significant factors explaining SRM
strategy use. 
Households used a wide variety of mechanisms which were directly, or only indi-
rectly, used for the purpose of risk management. For example, if a household took out a
loan, it could have been for investment or risk management purposes. In the data set
used, the purpose of the application of these mechanisms was not always clear.  In
some instances,  the  purpose was specified,  as  the  household  indicated that  it  paid
health care expenditures and specified a 'loan' as the source of the money. As low-in-
come households  often pooled  money from different  sources,  these  variables  were
treated as purpose-agnostic in analysis, meaning that, for example, any loan taken was
considered a risk management  strategy,  even without a specified purpose.  Further-
more, due to the use of cross-sectional data, the causal relationship could not always
be extracted. For example, income diversification could be a proactive strategy to re-
duce income fluctuations, but it could also be the result of shocks, when a household
needed to engage in different, non-specialized and low-return activities, in order to
make its living and to relieve the impact of the shock. Independently, whether a strat-
egy was directly or indirectly set for the purpose of SRM, households tended to main-
tain SRM strategy sets over a longer period, even if there was no acute need to react to
a shock.
Table 30 gives an overview of the SRM strategies that were considered for the calcu-
lation of complexity of SRM strategies. The SRM strategies fell into the categories of
(micro-)financial services, income-diversification mechanisms and measures of social
capital (density, frequency of interactions and value of networks). The household's as-
sets were analyzed separately, because pure asset-holding is also a measure for wealth,
which – like household income – influences the access to almost every other SRM
strategy.
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Tab. 30: Social risk management strategies used for the analysis
SRM classification Variable Type of vari-
able(s)/vari-
ants
(Micro-) Financial 
services
Credit/loan/borrowing use by household binary
Savings (formal and semi-formal) use by household binary
Health insurance membership of household binary
Income smoothing Income diversification count (metric)
binary
Household members contributing significantly to the 
household income
Count (metric)
binary
share (metric)
Social networks 
(density, fre-
quency, value) / 
social capital
Highest participation in decision-making of all mem-
berships in community associations
ordinal
binary
Highest frequency of attendance of all community as-
sociations' memberships
ordinal (2 vars)
binary
Total number of memberships in community associa-
tions
Count (metric)
ordinal
Household activity index in community associations 
(an index based on the two variables "frequency of at-
tendance" and "total number of memberships")
share (metric)
ordinal
binary
Additional relevant variables
Assets Household wealth index (quintiles), MCA incl. durable
assets, infrastructure, and animals (categorized)
ordinal
Microfinance Household membership in microfinance binary
Partner organiza-
tion
Membership in a partner organization of the project binary
Source: author
Seven strategies were dichotomized, in order to create an aggregate variable of SRM
use in households. The strategies considered in analysis were: the use of health insur-
ance, use of savings, use of credit, existence of income diversification, existence of multiple
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significant income earners in the household, a decision-making role in community associ-
ations, and a high activity level in social networks/community associations.641 
Figure 15 showed that the households in this study applied a variety of SRM strate-
gies, while the complexity of the SRM strategy sets differed highly between house-
holds. The average number of SRM strategies applied by households was 2.76, with a
median and mode of distribution of 3.
The majority of households (56.02%) applied at least three different SRM strategies, but
10.43% of households did not apply any of the seven SRM strategies presented. Figure
16 provides details on the use of several social risk management strategies by house-
holds. The foremost SRM strategy employed was the use of formal and informal sav-
ings (51.33%), followed by the use of formal and informal credit (47.9%). In total, health
insurance was used by 30.53% of households, predominantly in Ghana. As result of the
sampling strategy, health insurance uptake was very high in Ghana, with 410 (68.3%)
out  of  600  households  having  at  least  one  household  member  insured  for  health,
641 Two variables which were used in other calculations on SRM strategies were not integrated in this
aggregate variable: The variable on membership in microfinance was biased towards Malawi, be -
cause the partner institutions of the study in Malawi were microfinance institutions. The other
variable not used in this aggregate measure was the wealth index, because wealth (like income)
reduces vulnerability to economic shocks per se and would have distorted the aggregate measure
on SRM use towards wealthier/richer households.
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Fig. 15: Number of applied SRM strategies as percentage of households
Source: own calculation. Dataset: Pro MHI Africa. N=1428 households.
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through any health insurance. The majority of insured households in Ghana were in-
sured through the NHIS (99.0%), with just 4 (1.0%) households insured by any other
health insurance scheme. On the other hand, health insurance uptake in Malawi was
generally very low. Only 26 (3.1%) out of 828 households had at least one household
member insured for health.642
In 45.66% of  all  households,  more than one person significantly contributed to the
household income. 42.86% of households had two income earners, but only 2.80% of
households had three or more (maximum 5). Similarly, 42.57% applied income diversi-
fication, with 35.57% having had two relevant types of income sources and only 7%
having had more than two different relevant income sources (maximum 3).643
Two proxy measures for social capital were taken into consideration as SRM strate-
gies. The first was the decision-making role of households in community associations
and social networks, including decision-making roles in the local partner organiza-
tions. 41.75% of households reported that they were very actively involved in decision-
642 The partner schemes in Ghana were district-wide mutual health insurance schemes (DMHIS).
Therefore, the quota for membership in the local partner organization equaled health insurance
policy holding by the household. This distorted the figure for health insurance in Ghana. A slight
bias towards credit use in Malawi stemmed from the local partner organizations in Malawi who
were microfinance institutions. 37.43% of all households using credit stemmed from Ghana and
62.57% from Malawi, although the expected percentages were 42.0% (Ghana) and 58.0 (Malawi),
when corrected for the sample distribution between the countries.
643 The households were asked to mention up to three relevant income sources, such as agricultural
income, business income, salaries, wages, remittances, credit/loans.
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Fig. 16: Social risk management strategies as used by households (in percent)
Source: own calculation. Dataset: Pro MHI Africa. N=1428. Sorted by percentage of use.
Note: The lowest level of SRM use (below analytical threshold) was not considered in further analysis 
using binary variables: decision-making role is "somewhat active"; household activity level is medium.
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making (30.54%) or even had a leadership role (11.21%) in community associations and
social networks. The second variable was a combined variable measuring the overall
activity level of households in community associations and social networks, with the
aim of  measuring actual  and active household participation in community associa-
tions.644 The variable was calculated by first multiplying the highest level of the ordinal
variable  group attendance of  the household  (ranging from 0  "Never"  to 5  "Once a
week") by the number of household memberships in community associations (ranging
from 0 to 7) and then categorizing the resulting value into three activity levels. For the
calculations concerning SRM strategies, the variable was dichotomized as households
with high activity levels versus households with low/medium activity levels.
Most of the single SRM strategies correlated to some extent. Table 52 (in Appendix
2) presents a pairwise correlation matrix using the measure Φ. The table shows weak
but significant relationships between the SRM strategies. Health insurance and income
diversification were moderately related, as was credit use and decision-making role in
community associations, income diversification and multiple income earners, as well
as a decision-making role and high household activity levels in community associa-
tions or social networks.645
As we saw in figure 15, most households applied more than one strategy. Therefore,
it was of interest which pairs of SRM strategies were combined by the households. Ta-
ble 31 shows the most popular pairs of SRM strategies applied by households. As the
calculation base was the entire sample of all 1428 households, it was possible in the ta-
ble to identify the strategy pairs absolutely applied most often as well as those rela-
tively applied most often. 
In absolute terms, the pair  of  strategies  credit  and savings was popular  (6.93%),
which might have had two reasons. First, many institutions that provided credit, also
provided savings accounts; for example, microfinance institutions and rotating savings
644 The respondents were asked to give information on participation in nine difference types of com -
munity associations and social networks, including the partner organizations. Additionally,  the
households had the possibility to mention up to three additional groups in which the household
was a member.
645 The identified strong relationship between these pairs of SRM strategies was expected. Decision-
makers in community associations were more likely to show a high activity level in these associa -
tions and,  particularly in Malawi,  the partner organizations  maintained group-lending mecha-
nisms, so that in these organizations leadership/decision-making role and credit use was highly
correlated. The relationship between income-diversification and multiple income earners was a
calculation artifact, as single and very small households were unable to provide both. The moder-
ate relationship of health insurance and income diversification was not expected, but both could
be additionally related to the wealth level of the household. Some SRM strategy pairs were not
significantly correlated: Health insurance and credit use; health insurance and high household ac-
tivity level; income diversification and high household activity level in community associations.
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and credit  associations (ROSCAs).  Second, savings (which included cash savings at
home) are available relatively quickly, so that the sequence might have been that first
the savings were dissolved and then the credit was taken. Also, the combination of
credit and household's decision-making role in community associations was common
(6.68%), which might have been partially an effect of membership in the Malawian
partner institutions, which were community-based MFIs who relied on decision-mak-
ing processes within their loan groups. Being an MFI member could have also resulted
in higher roles in other community associations: 65.50% of households who combined
these two strategies were members in the partner institution in Malawi, although their
share in the overall sample was 20.10%. For this reason, the variable MfI membership
was not considered in further bivariate analyses. Another common pair was income
diversification and multiple income earners (6.55%), which likely, to some extent, de-
pended on a third variable, which was household size, as it is a predictor of both SRM
strategies: The mean size of households using this combination was 5.63, compared to
4.32 for all other households. Also, the popular combination of multiple income earn-
ers and the use of savings was not surprising (5.87%).
Tab. 31: Frequency of pairs of SRM strategies
Health in-
surance
Credit Savings Income di-
versifica-
tion
Multiple 
income-
earners
Decision-
making 
role
High hh 
activity 
level
Health in-
surance 1.82% 2.51% 4.33% 3.84% 2.98% 2.05% 0.84%
Credit 2.51% 3.29% 6.93% 4.04% 4.42% 6.68% 1.47%
Savings 4.33% 6.93% 4.41% 4.73% 5.87% 4.46% 1.23%
Income 
diversifi-
cation
3.84% 4.04% 4.73% 1.33% 6.55% 2.98% 0.86%
Multiple 
income-
earners
2.98% 4.42% 5.87% 6.55% 1.68% 3.97% 1.27%
Decision-
making 
role
2.05% 6.68% 4.46% 2.98% 3.97% 2.38% 2.37%
High 
household
activity
0.84% 1.47% 1.23% 0.86% 1.27% 2.37% 0.28%
10.43% of households apply no SRM strategy out of the measured SRM strategies. All strategy 
combinations equal 89.57%; together with those household not applying any SRM strategy it equals 100%.
N=1428 households. In households applying strategy combinations > 2, the applied strategy was divided 
by the factorial of the number of applied strategies in the set in order to not double-count strategy pairs 
in the table.
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data.
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In relative terms, it was obvious that households having a high level of activity in com-
munity associations were also more likely to have had a decision-making role (2.37%),
relatively the most frequently paired strategies for households with high activity. For
those households insured for health, the most frequently coupled strategy was savings
(4.33%),  followed  by  income  diversification  (3.84%)  and  multiple  income  earners
(2.98%). The combination of health insurance with credit was less frequent (2.51%). This
could have been an indication that households applying health insurance had less need
to take out credit, in order to pay for health care. The gray shaded diagonal in the dia -
gram shows the SRM strategies when they were not used by households in combina-
tions with other SRM strategies. Savings, if applied as the only SRM strategy, was used
by 4.41% of households, followed by 3.29% credit use as the only SRM strategy.
The above figures allowed the comparison of the complexity of SRM strategy sets,
using the total number of applied strategies in a household, as well as the percentage
of households using a particular SRM strategy. However, an important additional ele-
ment in the analysis of SRM strategy sets was the combination and use of multiple
strategies at the same time, which gave some insights into the question which strate-
gies were accessible in combination, and for the question which SRM strategy was
used first and which SRM strategies were used later, with increasing severity of shock
(sequence of application). Generally, the identified strategy sets were very diverse, as
the households in the sample applied a total of 119 different combinations of SRM
strategies. For this reason, the analysis of the sets was limited to the most often applied
strategy sets covering more than 50% of households in the different sub-groups ob-
served. For this reason, depending on the N of the observed group, between 5 and 19
SRM sets were displayed in the following figures in order to be able to compare the rel-
evant sub-groups.
First, looking at all households (figure 17), the 19 most frequently applied sets of SRM
strategies covered 50.77%.646 By far the most frequent 'set' used, by 149 households, was
the application of no SRM strategy at all. This was somewhat surprising, because – as
initially  noted – the study could  not  clearly  distinguish  between the purposes  for
which the strategies were originally put into practice. For example, the strategy multi-
ple income earners could have had several reasons and the primary reason was not nec-
essarily risk management.  Those households not applying any of  the selected SRM
646 In these 19 most frequently used sets of SRM strategies by all households, 239 Ghanaian house -
holds (33.01%) and 485 (66.99%) Malawian households were represented. Adjusting for the differ-
ent sample sizes, Ghana was underrepresented in this overview (adj. 39.28% instead of expected
50%) suggesting that sets of SRM strategies in Malawi were more homogeneous as compared to
Ghana. The higher uptake of insurance in Ghana and therefore more potential SRM set combina-
tions could be a reason for this.
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strategies  over-proportionally  belonged to the lowest  wealth  quintile  (34.90% com-
pared to 18.30% of all other households (χ2(4)=29.270, p<0.001)) and to the lowest in-
come  quintile  (40.27%  compared  to  17.83%  of  all  other  households  (χ2(4)=73.148,
p<0.001)). Particularly, the smaller households did not show any application of SRM
strategies: 10.07% of those households were single households, although single house-
holds comprised only 4.13% of the overall sample. Another 64.43% of the households
not applying any SRM strategy had 2-4 household members (compared to 42.79% in
the sample). The majority of those households not applying any strategy were located
in Malawi (89.93%).647
Only five (26.3%) of the 19 most frequently used SRM strategy sets included health
insurance, which could have been a result of the higher representation of Malawian
households in these sets. None of the 19 sets included very high levels of household ac-
tivity. Although credit (in 42.1% of sets) and savings (57.9% of sets) were two of the
most popular single SRM strategies in general, they were only found together in six of
647 The sample size in Malawi (828 hh) was 38% higher than the sample size in Ghana (600 hh). 2.50%
of all Ghanaian households and 16.18% of all Malawian households did not apply any of the in-
cluded SRM strategies.
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Fig. 17: Most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies of all households (over 50% of 
households)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=1428 households. 19 SRM sets, total of 119 SRM sets.
Note: Column percentages/means refer to the share of strategy sets and are not weighted by the number 
of households applying a particular set of SRM strategies.
Credit Savings
149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
63 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
47 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
40 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 5
40 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2
35 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
34 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
30 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 4
30 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3
30 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
27 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5
27 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 4
27 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3
26 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
26 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
25 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
24 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 3
24 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
21 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 4
26.3% 42.1% 57.9% 36.8% 52.6% 26.3% 0.0% 2.42
Number of 
households 
applying this 
SRM set
Health insur-
ance
Income diver-
sification
Multiple in-
come earners
Decision-mak-
ing role
Household 
activity level
Σ of SRM 
strategies
725 hh (= 
50.77% of all 
hh)
7.4. Application of Social (Health) Risk Management Strategies
the 19 sets (31.6%). This was another indication that the use of savings was a default
strategy and (formal or informal) credit became necessary in fewer cases where sav-
ings sources were exhausted. Income diversification (in 36.8% of sets) and multiple in-
come earners (52.6% of sets) went hand in hand and were a combined strategy in seven
out of the 19 sets, whereas the strategy multiple income-earners was only used three
times independently from income diversification. Decision-making roles in community
associations and health insurance were applied in five sets (26.3%), but without clear
association to other strategies.
7.4.1. Main country-specific differences in the application of SRM strategies
As already indicated in the discussion of figure 16, country-specific differences played
an important role in the application of SRM strategies (see table 32). The difference in
the mean of applied SRM strategies between the countries was close to one (3.34 (me-
dian 3) in Ghana and 2.34 (median 2) in Malawi), which was mostly the result of the
higher uptake of health insurance in the Ghanaian sample, with 68.33% compared to
3.14% in Malawi. Hence, the existence of the NHIS complemented other SRM strategies
in Ghana and did not replace them. Generally, different SRM strategies were used in
Ghana and Malawi. Particularly remarkable was the much higher level of income di-
versification in Ghana, at 61.33%, compared to Malawi, at just 28.99%, and similarly,
the strategy of multiple income-earners per household (54.5% Ghana, 39.25% Malawi).
This  large  difference  could  have been explained  – to  some extent  – by  a  slightly
smaller  household  size  and  slightly  lower  average  age  of  household  members  in
Malawi.648 Credit was more often used in Malawi (51.69% compared to 42.67%), but sav-
ings were more often used in Ghana 61.17% (Malawi 44.32%). Another clear difference
was found in the decision-making role in community associations, which seemed to be
more frequently used by households in Malawi with 49.52% (Ghana 31.00%).
Tab. 32: Application of SRM strategies by country
Country Health insur-
ance
Credit use Savings use Income diver-
sification
Multiple in-
come earners
Decision-
making role
High hh ac-
tivity level
Ghana 68.33% 42.67% 61.17% 61.33% 54.50% 31.00% 14.83%
Malawi 3.14% 51.69% 44.32% 28.99% 39.25% 49.52% 17.51%
 Δ 65.19%*** 9.02%** 16.84%*** 32.35%*** 15.25%*** 18.52%*** 2.68%
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=1428 households, Ghana N=600, Malawi N=828. Δ is in 
absolute values. Sorted by groups of SRM strategies: financial strategies, diversification strategies, social capital
strategies. χ2-test, significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
648 Average household age in Ghana was 24.75 years compared to 21.28 years in Malawi. Average
household size in Ghana was 5.15 compared to 4.83 in Malawi.
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The misrepresentation  between Ghanaian and  Malawian households  in  the  overall
view of the applied SRM sets (figure  17) suggested analyzing the most frequent sets
separated by country. The figures 18 (Ghana) and 19 (Malawi) show clear differences
between SRM-related behavior in the two countries. The first and most important dif-
ference  was the existence of  health  insurance targeting  low-income households  in
Ghana, in the form of the NHIS. In 11 out of the 17 most frequently used SRM sets in
Ghana (64.7%),  health insurance  was part  of  the  strategy set.  As discussed earlier,
health insurance was almost inaccessible to the informal sector in Malawi and the gov-
ernment  pursues a tax-based and donor-based health care system. In Ghana,  those
SRM strategy sets played a major role that were based on health insurance, savings, in-
come diversification and – with a  smaller  concurrence – multiple  income earners.
Credit was employed in six out of the 17 (35.3%) most frequently used sets. Decision-
making roles was of less importance (17.6%) and high household activity level played
no role at all. On the other hand, due to the absence of health insurance in Malawi,
SRM strategy sets combining credit, savings and decision-making roles dominated the
ten most frequently used sets, with only minor focus on high household activity level
(10%), income diversification (10%) and multiple income earners (20%). The higher use
of social capital related strategies in Malawi could point to a higher need for risk-shar-
ing in the absence of risk-pooling (health insurance). However, the reliance of Malaw-
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Fig. 18: Most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies in Ghana (over 50% of 
households)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=600 households (Ghana). 17 SRM sets, total of 101 SRM sets.
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ian households on credit, savings and decision-making role could also have been an ar-
tifact  of  the  applied 50% quota  on the  sample  for  microfinance membership.  Both
Malawian partner institutions, FINCA and MUSCCO offered credit and savings and
centered on a group-lending concept. Hence, a separation of households who were
members in one of the partner organizations and non-member households was neces-
sary to understand the influence of this sampling artifact. 
Indeed, the number of SRM strategies applied by members of a local partner institu-
tion in Malawi (mean of 3.24 (median 3)) exceeded the application of SRM strategies by
non-member households (mean 1.56 (median 1)). Also, the composition of strategies
differed as depicted in table  33, particularly the use of credit and a decision-making
role  of  households;  non-member  households  demonstrated  relatively  high  levels
(29.25% and 29.71%, respectively) which were actually increased in the member house-
holds (77.26%, +48,01, and 72.09%, +42.39, respectively). At first glance, this could be re-
flective of the group lending processes in the Malawian partner institutions, that in-
volved local meetings and decision-making. However, even excluding decision-making
roles of households in local partner institutions, member households still held deci-
sion-making roles in community associations (69.00%) more often than non-member
households (29.02%). Hence, one can speak of the privileged role households who were
members of FINCA and MUSCCO played in their communities. However, the causal
effect was unclear, whether membership in the partner institutions empowered house-
holds in the social sphere (beyond the increased access to credit and potential eco-
nomic empowerment) or whether more influential households were more likely to be-
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Fig. 19: Most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies in Malawi (over 50% of 
households)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=828 households (Malawi). 10 SRM sets, total of 75 SRM sets.
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come members of one of the partner institutions. Drawing such conclusions was not
possible using data from a cross-sectional household survey. 
Tab. 33: SRM strategies by membership in local partner institution (Malawi)
Health 
insur-
ance
Credit 
use
Savings 
use
Income 
diversi-
fication
Multiple 
income 
earners
Decision-
making 
role
High hh 
activity 
level
Non-Member
household 0.91% 29.25% 39.46% 20.41% 26.76% 29.71% 9.07%
Member 
household 5.68% 77.26% 49.87% 38.76% 53.49% 72.09% 27.13%
 Δ (absolute 
values) 4.78%*** 48.01%*** 10.42%** 18.35%*** 26.73%*** 42.39%*** 18.06%***
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=828 households in Malawi. Δ is in absolute values. χ2-test, 
significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Being a member of a partner institution also corresponded with a high household ac-
tivity level  in community associations and social  networks,  which significantly in-
creased (+18.06%) with membership in the partner organizations, as did income diver-
sification (+18.35%) and multiple income-earners (+26.73%).
Differences between member and non-member households were confirmed, when the
most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies were studied. Figures 20 and 21 show
that there was a significant difference between member households and non-member
households in Malawi, in terms of their use of sets of SRM strategies. In comparison,
membership in the local partner institutions in Ghana led to a much lower difference
in the application of SRM strategies (see appendix 2) compared to Malawi. In Malawi,
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Fig. 20: Most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies of member households in the 
local partner organizations in Malawi (over 50% of households)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=387 member households (Malawi). 10 SRM sets, total of 68 
SRM sets.
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non-member households showed a lower complexity of SRM sets than member house-
holds. Income diversification, multiple income-earners and a high household activity
level in community associations were not applied in any of the most frequently used
five SRM sets that covered over 50% of the non-member households. A decision-mak-
ing role in community associations was found in only one SRM set. The only relevant
SRM strategies in these sets were savings (40%) and credit (40%), which were only ap-
plied together in one of the five SRM sets. In contrast, member households applied a
wide variety of SRM strategies in the most frequently used sets. Particularly, the com-
bination of credit and a decision-making role in community association was visible, as
they were always used together (9 out of 10 SRM sets), in six sets combined with sav-
ings and in six combined with multiple income-earners.  Income diversification and
high household activity level played a smaller role in three of the ten sets, respectively.
Both analyses, the one regarding the application of single SRM strategies and the one
regarding strategy sets, suggested a more in-depth look at potential socio-economic
differences between member and non-member households.  Analysis  confirmed that
there were socio-economic differences between member and non-member households
in Malawi. Households who were members in the local partner organizations were
wealthier  (mean 3.41,  median 4)  than non-member households  (mean 2.63,  median
3)649, according to the asset index, and had a higher mean in monthly total household
income: 3.44 (median 4) compared to 2.58 (median 2).650 On average, member house-
holds had a larger household size (mean 5.40 compared to 4.33 for non-member house-
holds). As already mentioned above, due to limitations of the study, it remained un-
clear whether more wealthy households had a better chance to become members in
649 Wealth index in quintiles.
650 Monthly total household income in quintiles.
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Fig. 21: Most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies of non-member households of 
the local partner organizations in Malawi (over 50% of households)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=441 non-member households (Malawi). 5 SRM sets, total of 51 
SRM sets.
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both partner institutions or whether the membership had significantly improved their
wealth status. Still, the higher socio-economic status of member households could not
fully explain the substantially higher use of SRM strategies. According to the most fre-
quently applied SRM sets, the partner organizations FINCA and MUSCCO seemed to
effectively improve access to credit and savings, compared to non-member households.
As nine out of ten SRM sets contained a decision-making role, they also seemed to be
effective in empowering households to take active roles in community associations, as
well as to increase activity levels of households in community associations, although
some of this might have been as a result of participation in the organization's own
committees. In these SRM sets, member households also showed a slightly higher eco-
nomic activity, as income diversification was part of three SRM sets and multiple in-
come earners were found in six sets among the member households. Hence, a gener-
ally higher reliance on social capital related SRM strategies could not be confirmed in
Malawi, as such differences were limited to member households.
7.4.2. Household characteristics and application of SRM strategies
Socio-demographic factors influenced the complexity and composition of SRM strate-
gies of a household. The age of the head of household corresponded to the complexity
of SRM sets and indicated that the sets of SRM needed to be built over lifetime, with a
decreasing slope reaching a peak at a certain age (see figure 22). The peak was reached
in the age group 55-64, which showed an increase of 72.73% over the youngest age
group of head of households (14-24 years) and 36.67% over the second age group (25-34
years) (Bonferroni multiple-comparison test (Bonf.), p<0.001). The reduction from the
second-oldest to the oldest age group (65+) was not statistically significant; the differ-
ence  from  the  oldest  to  the  youngest  group  was  smaller  and  significant  (Bonf.,
p<0.001). Interestingly, the household size showed a similar relationship with the com-
plexity of SRM sets. The peak was reached at the household size 8-10 and complexity
was 258.22% higher than that of single households (Bonf., p<0.001). The reduction from
the second-largest household size to the largest (>10 members) was not significant, but
the  difference  between  single  households  and  the  size  2-4  was  significant,  albeit
smaller (Bonf., p<0.001). Part of the difference in the household size was certainly a
calculation artifact,  because some SRM strategies  could not  be  pursued in a single
household (e.g. multiple income earners) or had an increasing probability with larger
household size (e.g. the definition of health insurance in a household was that at least
one household member was insured for health). Also, household size and age of head
of  household  were  moderately  correlated  (0.249  Pearson  correlation  coefficient,
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p<0.001), one year of additional age of the head of household added 0.045 SRM strate -
gies to the set (OLS regression, t(1426)=9.69, p<0.001).
Tab. 34: Application of SRM strategies by age of head of household and hh size
Group#
Age 
group
Health in-
surance Credit use
Savings 
use
Income 
diversifi-
cation
Multiple 
income 
earners
Decision-
making 
role
High hh 
activity 
level
1 14-24 20.00% 34.29% 51.43% 28.57% 25.71% 25.71% 5.71%
2 25-34 19.73% 45.74% 48.88% 33.86% 41.93% 38.57% 11.88%
3 35-44 30.00% 51.79% 54.36% 44.87% 50.77% 46.15% 17.69%
4 45-54 36.30% 51.25% 49.82% 47.33% 47.33% 44.84% 18.86%
5 55-64 43.66% 48.59% 51.41% 56.34% 51.41% 52.82% 23.24%
6 >=65 53.13% 39.58% 53.13% 47.92% 42.71% 31.25% 20.83%
 Δ (g5-g1) 23.66%*** 14.31% -0.02% 27.77%*** 25.69%*** 27.10%*** 17.53%**
Group#
House-
hold size
Health in-
surance Credit use
Savings 
use
Income 
diversifi-
cation
Multiple 
income 
earners
Decision-
making 
role
High hh 
activity 
level
1 Single 33.90% 23.73% 23.73% 22.03% 0.00% 30.51% 10.17%
2 2-4 27.00% 39.44% 44.35% 36.99% 39.44% 33.39% 12.11%
3 5-7 28.82% 53.99% 55.56% 46.18% 54.34% 48.61% 18.06%
4 8-10 42.36% 67.36% 70.14% 56.25% 56.25% 57.64% 27.78%
5 > 10 63.16% 55.26% 71.05% 57.89% 47.37% 42.11% 23.68%
 Δ (g4-g1) 8.46% 43.63%*** 46.41%*** 34.22%*** 56.25%*** 27.13%*** 17.61%**
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data.
Bonferroni multiple-comparison test, significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 34 shows the relationship of the usage of single SRM strategies with age of the
household head and the household size. The age of the head of household had a clear
and  significant  effect  on  all  social  capital  variables,  such  as  decision-making  role
(+27.10%) and  high household activity level in community associations (+17.53%). With
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Fig. 22: Relation of age of head of household and household size to complexity of SRM 
strategies
Source: own calculation. Dataset: Pro MHI Africa
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over 25% percentage points difference between age group #5 and #1, income diversifica-
tion and multiple income earners showed a clear relationship with the age of the head of
household. The difference in credit/loan use by the household was not significant.651 The
increase in  health insurance usage (+33.13%) from the lowest to the oldest age group
was partially an effect of the higher relative age of the head of households in Ghana,
and a result of lower life expectancy and the HIV/AIDS crisis in Malawi. In Malawi,
only 27.18% were 45 years or older (in Ghana: 49.25%) and only 3.26% were 65 years or
older (Ghana: 11.56%). This led to an over-representation of Ghana in these age groups,
and, therefore, the provision of the NHIS in Ghana was more visible in these groups.
The household size had a strong relationship with usage of single SRM strategies. All
SRM strategies  were  increasingly  used  with  increasing  household  size,  except  for
health insurance which showed a small but insignificant increase.652 The sex of the
head of household had a weak relationship with the use of SRM strategies, households
with a female head had 2.47 (median 2), a slightly lower mean than the number of SRM
strategies in households with a male head, 2.83 (median 3) (Φ=0.12075, χ2(7) = 20.74370, p
< 0.01). In terms of usage of particular SRM strategies, most strategies had less than
five percent difference (see table  35), except for  multiple income-earners, which was
used by female headed households at only 16.23% (-36.14% percentage points) and in-
come diversification at 37.36% (-6.41%). This could have been partially an effect of the
smaller mean household size of 4.06, compared to 5.17 household members in a house-
hold with a male head. In contrast, female headed households more often showed a high
household activity level in community associations at 20.75% (+5.36%).
Tab. 35: SRM strategies by sex of head of household
Health in-
surance Credit use Savings use
Income di-
versifica-
tion
Multiple 
income 
earners
Decision-
making 
role
High hh 
activity 
level
Male 29.75% 48.15% 51.85% 43.77% 52.36% 41.36% 15.39%
Female 33.96% 46.79% 49.43% 37.36% 16.23% 42.26% 20.75%
Δ (F-M) 4.21% -1.36% -2.41% -6.41%* -36.14%*** 0.91% 5.36%**
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=1428 households. 265 households are with a female head of 
household. χ2-test, significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In addition to the household size and the sex of the household head, the child/adult ra-
tio of the household also had an effect on the consistency of SRM strategies. The differ-
ence here was tested with the dichotomous form of the variable, which was 1 when the
number of children (<18 years) equaled or was higher than the number of adults (>= 18
651 Comparison between the second-oldest age group #5 and the youngest group #1.
652 Comparison between the second-largest household size 8-19 and single households.
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years) in a household, and had the value 0 if the number of adults exceeded the num-
ber of children. The mean of the number of SRM strategies applied was slightly higher
among households with a child/adult ratio >=1, a mean of 2.93 compared to 2.65 (both
median 3). Although this difference seemed to be small, the measure of association Φ
still  indicated  a  weak  but  statistically  significant  relationship  (Φ=0.13071,  χ2(7)  =
24.17774, p < 0.01). The main differences (table 36) stemmed from the higher use of fi-
nancial services among those households with a high child/adult ratio: health insur-
ance (+5.75%), credit use (+10.51%) and savings use (+8.35%). With a child/adult ratio
(<1) and a consistently lower average age of household members (17.54 compared to
26.02  years)  the  strategies  income  diversification and  multiple  income  earners were
slightly reduced. Generally, the mean household size (6.21) was higher than for house-
holds with a low child/adult ratio (4.18). This clearly showed that the relationship of
pure household size with these two different diversification strategies was decoupled,
when the age distribution of the household was integrated into the equation.
Tab. 36: SRM strategies by child/adult ratio (dichotomous: <1; >=1)
Health in-
surance Credit use
Savings 
use
Income di-
versifica-
tion
Multiple 
income 
earners
Decision-
making 
role
High hh 
activity 
level
< 1 28.31% 43.84% 48.17% 43.26% 46.35% 39.95% 15.53%
>=1 34.06% 54.35% 56.52% 41.49% 44.57% 44.02% 17.75%
 Δ 5.75%** 10.51%*** 8.35%*** -1.78% -1.78% 4.07% 2.23%
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=1428 households. 552 households have a child/adult ratio >=1.
χ2-test, significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
As risk awareness and the financial means of a household were correlated with the ed-
ucational level of the household head, it had been hypothesized that the use of SRM
strategies increased with higher educational level of the head of household. However,
the data did not confirm a linear relationship between the four levels of education and
the number of SRM strategies (see table 37). The mean decreased from "no formal edu-
cation or not completed primary school" (mean 2.95, median 3) to "completed primary
school" (mean 2.31, median 2) in order to increase again with "completed secondary
school" (mean 2.73, median 3). Only the highest educational level "completed tertiary
education" (mean 3.23, median 3) exceeded the lowest educational group. 
All  the  increases  in  the  mean,  from the  second  lowest  educational  level  to  the
higher levels, were statistically significant (p<0.01 Bonf.).  With regard to the single
SRM strategies, the only strategy that showed a consistent increase over the four edu-
cational levels was a household decision-making role, which was in the highest educa-
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tional group, 56.84%, an increase of 23.03% percentage points compared to the lowest
educational group.
Tab. 37: SRM strategies by educational level of head of household
Health in-
surance Credit use Savings use
Income di-
versifica-
tion
Multiple 
income 
earners
Decision-
making 
role
High hh 
activity 
level
Level 1 47.22% 48.87% 55.88% 49.28% 43.92% 33.81% 16.08%
Level 2 8.37%*** 50.57% 47.15% 29.66%*** 37.26% 42.21% 15.97%
Level 3 25.30%*** 45.47% 49.74% 42.05%* 48.55% 45.13%*** 16.41%
Level 4 38.95% 50.53% 50.53% 47.37% 60.00%** 56.84%*** 18.95%
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=1428 households. 
Notes: Level 1 = "no formal education or not completed primary school" (485 hh), level 2 "completed 
primary school" (263 hh), level 3 ="completed secondary school" (585hh) and level 4="completed tertiary 
education" (95 hh). Bonferroni multiple-comparison test, significance level (vs. base level: Level 1): * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The predominant religion of the household had an effect on the use of SRM strategies.
With an average of 3.56 (median 4), Muslim households applied more strategies in rela-
tion to predominantly Christian households, with a mean of 2.53 (median). The mean
of "other or no religion", which comprised only 34 households, was the lowest at 2.29
(median 2).653 Again,  this  is  partially  a  result  of  a  country/regional  effect,  because
80.86% of Muslims in the sample lived in Ghana (particularly in the Northern region
sub-sample which was mainly (87.86%) Muslim) and, therefore, had better access to
health insurance as an SRM strategy. The assumption of a regional effect was con-
firmed by the difference in the uptake of health insurance shown in table  38, which
was  much  higher  among  Muslim  population  (65.74%)  compared  to  the  other  two
groups.
Tab. 38: SRM strategies by predominant household religion
Health in-
surance Credit use
Savings 
use
Income di-
versifica-
tion
Multiple 
income 
earners
Decision-
making 
role
High hh ac-
tivity level
Christian 20.19% 44.58% 46.82% 38.32% 44.77% 42.80% 15.61%
Muslim 65.74%*** 59.26%*** 66.67%*** 58.64%*** 49.07% 37.96% 19.14%
Other 20.59% 44.12% 50.00% 23.53% 41.18% 35.29% 14.71%
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=1428 households. Households: 1070 Christian, 324 Muslim ,34 
other. Bonferroni multiple-comparison test, significance level (vs. base level: Christian): * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Category 'other religion' was not significant in any oneway comparison.
653 The difference between "other or no religion" and "Christian" was not significant, whereas the dif -
ference with "Muslim" was significant (Bonf., p<0.001).
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As previously discussed, the wealth level of households may be essential for social risk
management in two ways. First, it reduces the vulnerability of households and second
it enables households to have better access to other SRM strategies. As it influenced
both, it can be assumed that there was a relationship between the wealth quintile of a
household and the number of applied SRM strategies. In the sample, the lowest wealth
quintile was able to maintain a mean of 2.37 (median 2) SRM strategies, whereas the
wealthiest quintile applied a mean of 3.2 (median 3) SRM strategies.654 The difference in
SRM strategy  application between the wealth  quintiles  was  statistically  significant
(χ2(28) = 68.789, p < 0.001). Table 39 shows the dependency of SRM strategies on the
wealth quintile of the household. Strong, statistically significant differences between
the 5th quintile (wealthiest) and the 1st quintile (poorest) were found for the variables
multiple income earners in the household (+25.04% percentage points) and income diver-
sification (+12.06%). Similarly, the uptake of health insurance was associated with the
wealth quintile of the household (+12.38%). The data also confirmed that the wealthiest
quintile of households was more influential in community associations as they had
more  very  active  or  leadership  decision-making  roles  in  community  associations
(+17.66%), as compared to the least wealthy quintile. The use of credit and the use of
savings as well as  high household activity level in community associations were higher
with the wealthiest quintile of households, but they were not statistically significant.
Tab. 39: Application of SRM strategies by wealth quintiles
Quintiles
Health in-
surance Credit use
Savings
use
Income di-
versifica-
tion
Multiple
income
earners
Decision-
making
role
High hh
activity
level
Quintile 1 25.87% 43.36% 48.25% 36.01% 36.36% 33.92% 12.94%
Quintile 2 29.41% 51.56% 53.98% 39.45% 40.83% 40.83% 15.22%
Quintile 3 28.37% 50.71% 53.19% 40.78% 42.55% 38.65% 13.83%
Quintile 4 30.77% 46.15% 48.25% 48.60% 47.20% 43.36% 19.93%
Quintile 5 38.25% 47.72% 52.98% 48.07% 61.40% 51.58% 20.00%
 Δ (Q5-Q1) 12.38%** 4.36% 4.73% 12.06%** 25.04%*** 17.66%*** 7.06%
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=1428 households. Bonferroni multiple-comparison test, 
significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The uptake of health insurance by wealth quintile needed to be viewed separately by
country, due to the systemic differences in health care financing between Ghana and
Malawi.  In  Malawi,  health  insurance  membership  was severely  limited to  wealthy
households. The majority of insured households fell into the highest wealth quintile
654 2nd quintile: mean 2.71 (median 3), 3rd quintile: 2.68 (3), 4th quintile: 2.84 (3).
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with a mean of 4.5 (median 5), whereas the uninsured households averaged a mean
wealth quintile of 2.9 (median 3).655 In Ghana, on the other hand, the findings con-
firmed the pro-poor orientation of the NHIS: The mean wealth quintile of uninsured
households was 2.8 (median 3) and, hence, only slightly lower than the mean wealth
quintile of insured households which was 3.1 (median 3).656
A general assumption of the hypothesis group H3 was that households applied a
wide array of  social  risk  management  strategies.  The majority  of  households  used
three or more of the selected SRM strategies, although a tenth of the households did
not apply any of the tested SRM strategies. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that sev-
eral socio-economic and geographic characteristics had a significant relationship with
the complexity of SRM strategies, as well as the use of particular sets of SRM strategies
(hypothesis H3a). Several socio-economic and geographic variables have been found to
be significant factors, but also some SRM strategies themselves had levels of correla-
tion with each other.
Between Ghana and Malawi, a significant difference was identified. Households in
Ghana applied significantly more SRM strategies than in Malawi. This difference can
be largely attributed to the SRM strategy health insurance, which had a wide outreach
in Ghana, but was barely existent in the Malawian sample. Also, the composition of
SRM strategies significantly differed between the countries: While health insurance, use
of savings, income diversification and multiple income earners were significantly higher
in Ghana, in Malawi  credit use and  decision-making roles in community associations
were used significantly more often. In Malawi, a significant difference was detected be-
tween members and non-members of the partner organizations, which were microfi-
nance institutions.
There was also a significant relationship between the complexity of SRM strategies
and the age of the head of household and household size, respectively. With both age
of head and household size, the complexity of SRM strategies steadily increased, but
reached a peak in the age group (55-64 years) and household size (8-10), respectively.
This finding was consistent with the increased use of most of the single SRM strate-
gies. Other factors were also related to the complexity of SRM strategies in the house-
hold. Female headed households showed slightly less complex SRM strategy sets com-
pared to other households. Also, female headed households showed a reduced income
diversification and fewer multiple income earners, while high household activity level in
655 The mean of quintiles (1 lowest quintile, 5 highest quintile) equaled always 3.
656 Leaving out the four households who were insured with other health insurance schemes did not
make any difference regarding the wealth status of households insured with the NHIS vs. unin-
sured households.
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community associations and social networks was increased. The education of the head of
household did not have a significant relationship with the complexity of SRM strate-
gies. Some single SRM strategies were significant when comparing single educational
levels,  but  no  linear  relationship  was  confirmed.  The  predominant  religion  of  the
household was, again, a highly significant factor, as Muslim households used signifi-
cantly more complex SRM strategy sets; although it was assumed that the real effect
resulted from a country/regional difference, particularly an effect stemming from the
Northern region in Ghana, which was the only predominantly Muslim region. The
household wealth quintiles were highly significant and positively related to the com-
plexity of SRM strategies. In Ghana, no relationship between the uptake of health in-
surance (in the NHIS) and the household wealth quintiles was found, indicating equi-
table access to the scheme. 
In conclusion, hypothesis H3a was confirmed with regard to a variety of variables
that had a relationship with both the complexity of SRM strategies and the use of sin-
gle SRM strategies and certain SRM strategy sets: household country, membership in
local partner organization (Malawi), age of head of household, household size, sex of
head of household, household religion and the wealth quintile.
7.4.3. High risk exposure and household's SRM strategies
It was hypothesized that households exposed to high health risks and those having ex-
perienced high health shocks, such as high health care costs, changed their behavior
with regard to social risk management (hypotheses H3b-H3e). In this section, the rela-
tionship between the complexity and sets of SRM strategies with the household expo-
sure to general risks and high health risks was analyzed (hypotheses  H3b and  H3c). It
was assumed that high-risk households built more complex sets of SRM strategies and
also focused on different kinds of sets of SRM strategies depending on their risk status.
Depending on  the level  of  household  exposure  to  general  risks  (without  health
risks) it  was expected that households adopted their risk management behavior ac-
cordingly. The variable for exposure to general risks was the simple total number of
different kinds of risks (without health risks) that the household had experienced over
the last 3 years which had a negative economic impact on the household. The resulting
total was grouped into four categories. Depending on the risk class of household's ex-
posure to the reported general risks, a clear and continuous change in the complexity
of applied sets of SRM strategies was identified (figure 23). Households reporting zero
risks had a mean of 2.61 (median 3) strategies, a mean of 2.60 (median 3) in the risk
class "1-3 risks", a mean of 3.15 (median 3) in the risk class "4-6 risks" and a mean of
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4.12 (median 4) in the highest risk class ">= than 7 risks". Using the Bonferroni multi -
ple comparison test, only the difference between the risk class of "1-3 risks" and "no
general risk exposure" was not statistically significant, whereas all other differences
were highly significant (Bonf., p<0.01). Figure 23 shows the changes in the complexity
of SRM strategies graphically. The Gaussian kernel density plot in the figure shows
that with increasing risk exposure, the highest density moved to more complex SRM
strategy sets (in the graph to the right side) and the entire distribution changed from a
right skewed distribution in the lowest risk class to a left skewed distribution in the
highest  risk  class.  Further  comparison  of  these  two  extreme  groups,  showed  that
12.84% of the lowest class applied none of the measured risk management strategies,
compared to zero percent in the highest risk class. No household in the lowest risk
class applied a set with seven SRM strategies, compared to 1.92% in the highest risk
class. The analysis on the relative use of each of the SRM strategies painted a similar
picture in table 40. The use of all single SRM strategies increased from the lowest to the
highest risk class, except for the variable  decision-making role in community associa-
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Fig. 23: Number of SRM strategies by exposure of households to severe general risks, 
without health risks (4 classes)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N= 1428 households. 405 hh in class "no risk exposure", 697 hh in
"1-3 risks", 274 hh in "4-6 risks" and 52 hh in class ">=7 risks".
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tions, which decreased from 45.43% to 44.23% (-1.20%). There was only a small increase
from the second lowest risk class to the highest risk class (+4.92%), but both were not
statistically significant (Bonf., p=1.00). For all other SRM strategies, there was a strong
increase, ranging from +16.32% (income diversification) to +30.73% (health insurance).
Tab. 40: SRM strategies by household exposure to general risks, without health risks
Health in-
surance Credit use
Savings
use
Income di-
versifica-
tion
Multiple
income
earners
Decision-
making
role
High hh
activity
level
#1
No risk 
exposure 28.89% 42.47% 50.12% 37.53% 43.21% 45.43% 13.09%
#2 1-3 risks 25.11% 46.63% 48.64% 41.03% 44.62% 39.31% 14.78%
#3 4-6 risks 41.24% 55.11% 54.74% 51.82% 48.18% 42.70% 21.17%
#4 >= 7 risks 59.62% 69.23% 80.77% 53.85% 67.31% 44.23% 36.54%
Δ (g4-g1) 30.73%*** 26.76%*** 30.65%*** 16.32% 24.10%*** -1.20% 23.45%***
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N = 1428 households.
Bonferroni multiple-comparison test, significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Δ (g4-g1) for income diversification not statistically significant. Δ (g3-g1) is statistically 
significant at p<0.01 and Δ (g3-g2), p<0.05. 
The finding that the complexity of SRM strategy sets consistently increased with in-
creasingly severe general risk exposure (without health risks) led to the initial confir-
mation of the hypothesized positive relationship of high risk households and their ap-
plication of more complex sets of SRM strategies (hypothesis H3b).
Further analyses concentrated on the high (health) risk variable at household level
that had been conceptualized in section 6.3 and discussed further in section 7.3. Similar
to the exposure of households to general risks, it was expected that households who
carried high health risks anticipated higher future health shocks and associated health
care costs, higher than the average. Therefore, for those households classified as high-
risk households, it was assumed that they built up SRM strategies in anticipation of
shocks. The analysis confirmed this hypothesis: The complexity of SRM sets signifi-
cantly differed between low or medium risk households (mean 2.67,  median 3) and
high-risk households (mean of 3.78 and a median of 4) (t(1426)=-7.01, p<0.001). 
Table  41 shows  the  details  of  the  differences  between  SRM  strategies  used  by
low/medium risk households and high-risk households. All single SRM strategies were
more likely to be used by high-risk households. The strongest, statistically significant
increases resulted from health insurance usage (+24.40% percentage points),  savings
usage (+25.21%),  income diversification  (+22.60%)  and  credit  usage  (+15.02%).  Also,
high-risk households more often had statistically significantly higher household activ-
ity levels in community associations (+13.68%) and slightly more decision-making roles
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in community associations (+8.46%),  which was statistically significant on the 10%-
level. There was a minor, not statistically significant, higher percentage of multiple in-
come-earners. The latter was somewhat surprising, because the mean household size of
high risk households (5.98)  was higher when compared to low/medium risk house-
holds (4.87) and a logistic regression of household size on the existence of multiple in-
come-earners in a household showed that there was a 19.5% increase in odds of having
multiple-income earners if there was one additional person in the household (LR-χ 2-
test(1),  p<0.001).  Hence,  this  result  indicated that high health risks  in a household
might have hampered household members from starting income-earning activities. 
Tab. 41: SRM strategies by health risk classification of household
Health in-
surance Credit use
Savings
use
Income di-
versifica-
tion
Multiple
income
earners
Decision-
making
role
High hh
activity
level
Low/medium
risk 28.40% 46.58% 49.19% 40.60% 45.59% 41.14% 15.12%
High risk 52.80% 61.60% 74.40% 63.20% 47.20% 49.60% 28.80%
Δ (high-low) 24.40%*** 15.02%*** 25.21%*** 22.60%*** 1.61% 8.46%* 13.68%***
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N = 1428 households. 125 households classified as high-risk 
households. χ2-test, significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In the sample, the combination of SRM strategies strongly differed between high-risk
households and those with low or medium health risk (see figures 24 and 25). The 125
(=8.75%)  high-risk  households  applied  57  different  sets  of  SRM strategies  in  total,
whereas the much larger group of low/medium risk households (91.25%) applied 118
different sets. Comparing the most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies, covering
over 50% of the two sub-groups, high-risk households applied all single SRM strategies
substantially more often than low or medium risk households, except for multiple in-
come-earners, which showed a slightly lower percentage. Particularly, the combination
of credit and savings was much more popular among high-risk households (in 11 of
the 16  sets  (68.8%)),  in  connection with  health  insurance  (in  7  out  of  the  16  sets
(43.8%)),  but  played  only  a  minor  role  in  the  most  frequently  applied sets  among
low/medium risk households. These three strategies were also frequently applied in
connection with income diversification (in 8 out of the 16 sets (50%)), which was also
applied much more often in high-risk households than in low/medium risk households.
A remarkable six SRM sets used by high-risk households included a high household
activity level (none in the low/medium-risk group) and a slightly higher use of deci-
sion-making roles in community associations. Multiple income earners seemed to be
applied slightly more often by low-risk households. The most frequently used 'set' of
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Fig. 24: Most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies of high-risk households (over 
50% of households)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=125 high-risk households. 16 SRM sets, total of 57 SRM sets.
Note: Column percentages/mean are not weighted by the number of households applying a particular set 
of SRM strategies.
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Fig. 25: Most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies of low-risk households (over 
50% of households)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=1303 Low/Medium risk households. 18 SRM sets, total of 118 
SRM sets.
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7. Analysis
SRM strategies among low/medium risk households was the application of none of the
tested SRM strategies at all.
As previously discussed, old age was included as one of the variables in the high-
risk household indicator and the Ghanaian sample contained more individuals in the
older age groups.  Therefore,  it  was important to analyze the country-related differ-
ences within the high-risk group. Figures  26 (Ghana) and  27 (Malawi) showed that
there was a clear difference between high-risk households in Ghana and Malawi, with
regard to their SRM sets.
While in Ghana health insurance was applied in 90.0% of the most frequent sets of
SRM strategies by high-risk households, health insurance was not an accessible SRM
strategy for high-risk households in Malawi (0.0%). While savings use in the SRM sets
in Malawi was higher (88.9% of sets compared to 60.0% in Ghana), the strategies credit
use  and  income diversification were  approximately  equal.  Multiple  income-earners
were more commonly part of the most frequent sets in Ghana (50.0%) than in Malawi
(33.3%), while the social capital-related strategies  decision-making role in community
associations (Gh: 50.0%; Mw: 77.8%) and high household activity level (Gh: 30.0%; Mw:
44.4%) were more frequently part of the set in Malawi than in Ghana.
The analysis of high-risk households confirmed hypothesis H3b, that high-risk expo-
sure of households was related to a significantly higher complexity of SRM strategy
sets. The interpretation of the findings regarding hypothesis H3c was more complicated;
the hypothesis stated that the high-risk exposure of households was related to higher
application of those SRM strategies that could have been considered pro-active strate-
gies, compared to other groups. 
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Fig. 26: Most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies of high-risk households in 
Ghana (over 50% of households)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=77 high-risk households in Ghana. 10 SRM sets, total of 36 
SRM sets.
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7.4. Application of Social (Health) Risk Management Strategies
In the general analysis, it was seen that high-risk households were significantly more
likely to use a wider variety of SRM strategies.  Particularly,  the use of those SRM
strategies, that could be considered proactive, significantly increased. Results showed a
significant increase of over 20% in usage of health insurance and income diversifica-
tion, two strategies that could be considered pro-active. The use of savings had a simi-
lar increase and a strong pro-active component, although savings could also be used as
a reactive SRM strategy. The mostly reactive strategy use of credit increased by about
15%. Two more proactive strategies that were more often used by high-risk households
were a high household activity level in community associations with an increase of about
14 percentage points and a decision-making role in community associations with an in-
crease of about 8 percentage points. These differences were also confirmed by analyz-
ing the most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies. Particularly, a high household
activity level increased from 0% of sets among low/medium households to 31% of sets
among high-risk households. A remarkable finding in the most frequently applied sets
of  SRM strategies of high-risk households in Ghana was that 90% of sets included
health insurance as a strategy. This indicated an above average uptake of health insur-
ance by high-risk households. It also indicated that high-risk households were – to
some extent – aware of their high health risk status and acted accordingly, in a proac-
tive manner, in order to protect the household from high health care costs. It also indi -
cated a level of adverse-selection from the viewpoint of the insurer. Generally, hypoth-
esis H3c was confirmed.
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Fig. 27: Most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies of high-risk households in 
Malawi (over 50% of households)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=48 high-risk households in Malawi. 9 SRM sets, total of 27 
SRM sets.
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7. Analysis
7.4.4. Exposure to high health care costs and household's SRM strategies
It  was hypothesized that the experience of high health shocks, particularly of high
health care costs, was related to the application of more complex sets of SRM strate-
gies. This was confirmed in analysis: High-cost households had a mean of 4.07 (median
4) SRM strategies,  compared to 2.67 (median 3)  in low or medium cost households
(t(1426=-7.734, p<0.001).
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Fig. 28: Most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies of high-cost households (over 
50% of households)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=88 high-cost households. 8 SRM strategies, total of 36 SRM 
strategies.
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Fig. 29: Most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies of low/medium-cost households
(over 50% of households)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=1340 low/medium cost households. 19 SRM sets, total of 119 
SRM strategies.
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7.4. Application of Social (Health) Risk Management Strategies
Figures  28 and 29 show the most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies for high-
cost households and low/medium cost households, respectively. An important finding
was that the strategy health insurance was not among the most frequently applied
SRM strategy sets of high-cost households. This could have been an indication that the
aim of social and micro health insurance, to protect households from high health care
costs, was successful. 
The most frequently used SRM strategy sets of high-cost households included the
use of savings (used in all eight sets (100%)) and credit (used in seven out of the eight
sets (87.5%)). These seemed to be the typical SRM strategies used in case of a health
shock and associated treatment costs. The SRM sets of high-cost households often in-
cluded a decision-making role of the household and multiple income-earners, both at
62.5%. Income diversification played a role in 50% of sets, but high activity levels in
community associations could only be found in two out of the eight most frequent
SRM sets (25%).
Given this absence of health insurance in the most frequently applied sets of SRM
strategies of high-cost households, the question became whether this was, rather, the
result of a country-effect. Figures 30 (Ghana) and 31 (Malawi) show that there was, in
fact, a significant country-effect. High-cost households in Ghana used health insurance
in 4 out of 6 of the most frequent SRM sets,  whereas the high-cost households in
Malawi did not use health insurance.
In both countries, credit and savings were the main SRM strategies for these health
shocks. In Ghana, income diversification was used much more often (100%) than in
Malawi (50%). In Malawi, high-cost households more frequently had a decision-making
role in community associations (83.3%) compared to Ghana (50%). 
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Fig. 30: Most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies of high-cost households in 
Ghana (over 50% of households)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=37 high-cost households in Ghana. 6 SRM strategies, total of 
21 SRM strategies.
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7. Analysis
When restricting the focus on SRM strategies only on those applied during illness
episodes, the sequence of the application of household SRM strategies could be ana-
lyzed, depending on the extent of health care costs. This gave a better understanding in
which order SRM strategies were applied as the intensity of a health shock increased.
Figure 32 shows the use of the main SRM strategies that paid for the reported house-
hold illness episodes in the last three months (allowing for multiple responses).
The graphs in figure  32 show a main difference between Ghana and Malawi. In the
Ghanaian sample, health insurance (mostly in the NHIS) was the most frequent SRM
strategy in the first quartile of illness costs. The relative use of health insurance de-
creased in higher cost quartiles, but was still around 50% in the third and fourth quar-
tile. This – in conjunction with the steep rise in the use of savings between the first
and second quartile – indicated that health insurance effectively reduced overall health
care expenditures at the household level. As expected, in Malawi, health insurance us-
age was very low. It is interesting, in the Malawian case, that the first quartile was
dominated by no payment source. When the illness costs of the households in the first
quartile were analyzed in more detail, all of these households reported zero health care
costs  (204  households  equal  40.72%  of  all  Malawian  households  reporting  illness
episodes). In comparison, in Ghana, only 61 households (equals 17.73% of all Ghanaian
households  reporting  illness  episodes)  reported  zero  cost.  This indicated that  basic
health care in Malawi was apparently provided without additional cost, as promised by
the Malawian government, albeit it was unclear how large the difference was in self-
treatment and non-utilization of health care facilities, in the comparison of Malawi and
Ghana.
224
Fig. 31: Most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies of high-cost households in 
Malawi (over 50% of households)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=51 high-cost households in Malawi. 6 SRM strategies, total of 
21 SRM strategies.
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7.4. Application of Social (Health) Risk Management Strategies
In both countries, savings seemed to be the most quickly available SRM strategy. When
health care costs increased, the use of savings was strongly increasing, with a descend-
ing slope reaching 78.57% in Ghana and 90.98% in Malawi, in the highest quartile. On
the other hand, the use of borrowing slowly grew with an increasing slope, reaching
33.33% in Ghana and 26.23% in Malawi. Selling assets constantly increased in Ghana
from the first to the highest quartile, reaching 21.43%; in Malawi, on the other hand,
assets sales remained very low and only significantly increased in the fourth quartile
to 8.20%. In-kind payments did not show a clear direction in either country and aver-
aged 10.71% in Ghana and 4.10% in Malawi, in the second to fourth quartile. These
findings on the sequence of SRM strategies in use, confirmed the observation by Dev-
ereux that several SRM strategies were used in multiple iterative layers with increasing
intensity (see section 4.3).
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Fig. 32: SRM strategies by health care costs quartiles (illness episodes)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=845. Illness episodes
Note: The source "other" was omitted in the chart, as it was reported only by 5 households.
7. Analysis
While figure 32 shows the high relevance of savings in paying for health care, figure
33 shows the details of the sources of savings, out of all households having used sav-
ings as a strategy (allowing for multiple responses). Clearly, cash stored at home was
the most frequently used strategy in all health care expenditures quartiles. While the
use of cash stored at home as one of the savings sources remained close to 100% in
Ghana, with increasing health care costs, it seemed to be increasingly substituted by
other savings sources in Malawi. Similarly, while the use of savings accounts (from
formal  sources  such  as  banks  and  MFIs,  but  also  from  informal  sources  such  as
ROSCAs) hovered around 25% in Ghana, it increased in Malawi from 0% in the first
quartile to 19.82% in the highest quartile. The use of other savings sources, which in-
cluded business savings, current income/salaries, sales of farm or other products, and
other not further specified sources, increased from the first to the highest quartile. In
Ghana, it increased from 5.26% in the first quartile to 16.67% in the highest quartile, in
Malawi from 15.79% to 24.32%, respectively.
Figure 34 shows the details of borrowing sources. Generally, borrowing was used by
a smaller number of households (96 hh) compared to savings (483 hh). Due to this
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Fig. 33: Details on the use of savings by health care costs quartiles (illness episodes)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=483 (household using savings in illness episodes). Ghana 
N=212, Malawi N=271. Savings is base at 100%. Multiple response in savings details.
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smaller number, figure 34 shows the details of borrowing sources for both countries to-
gether. The main source of borrowing was informal, through friends or relatives. It in-
creased (with a peak of 100% in the second quartile) from 62.5% in the first to 85.0% in
the fourth quartile. Borrowing from formal sources, such as banks and MFIs, or from
informal sources, such as credit clubs, for the explicit use to pay for health care expen-
ditures  did  not  seem to  be  widespread,  as  only  14  households  made  use  of  these
sources. Their use increased from 0% in the first quartile to 18.3% (11 households) in
the highest quartile. Eight out of these households borrowed from one of the local
partner organizations in Malawi. The category other borrowing sources was only rele-
vant in the first quartile, used by 37.5% of borrowing households, but played only a mi -
nor role in the higher quartiles.
It  was hypothesized that  high-cost  households  used more complex  sets  of  SRM
strategies than other households (hypothesis H3d), which was confirmed in analysis.
High-cost households showed a substantial and significant increase in the complexity
of SRM strategy sets. Additionally, it was seen in the general analysis that health insur-
227
Fig. 34: Details of borrowing by health care costs quartiles
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=96 (household usings borrowing in illness episodes). 
Borrowing is base at 100%. Multiple response in borrowing details.
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ance could not be found among the most frequent sets of SRM strategies of high-cost
households. In the Ghana-specific analysis, high-cost households used health insur-
ance in about 67% of most the frequently used SRM sets.657 Not only did this indicate
that high-cost households were not more likely to use health insurance than other
households, but it also showed that the financially protective effect of health insurance
(i.e. NHIS) was limited. Generally, it should be noted that use of credit (in 88% of most
frequently used SRM strategy sets) and use of savings (in 100% of sets) were used sub-
stantially more often than other strategies; credit and savings also had the highest per-
centage point increase from low/medium cost households to high-cost households. The
analysis on the application of SRM strategies, dependent on the health care costs quar-
tiles, gave a similar picture. While the use of savings steadily increased from the first
quartile, the use of credit ("borrowing") started at a low level in the first cost quartile,
but steadily increased with higher costs. In Ghana, the sale of assets also increased
with the cost quartiles, but stayed on a lower level. Health insurance in Ghana played
an important role as an SRM strategy and was the most frequently used strategy in the
lowest cost quartile. In the analysis of health care costs quartiles, health insurance had
some protective effect against higher health care costs. However, the share of insured
households remained at about 50% for the higher health care cost quartiles,  which
challenged the social protection function of health insurance in Ghana. In Malawi, an
interesting finding was the payment category no payment source, which was reported
by the majority of households in the first quartile of total household treatment costs;
as expected, with increasing cost levels, this category, indicating no elaborate payment
source, steadily decreased. This indicated that some health care in Malawi was pro-
vided for free or at rates that did not require a particular payment source, in line with
the government's promise. In comparison, in Ghana, no payment source was only rele-
vant in the first cost quartile, where it was reported by about 18% of households. 
7.4.5. Relationship of high-risk and high-cost households with SRM strategies
In the previous two sections, it has been shown that both types of households, those
who were classified as high-risk households and those who experienced high health
care costs, behaved differently than other households regarding social risk manage-
ment. 
As was already discussed in section  6.3 on the operationalization of the high-risk
variable, there was some interaction between the two variables of high-risk household
657 Overall, 68.3% of households in Ghana had health insurance. Out of those, who experienced high
costs, 56.8% held an insurance policy.
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and high-cost household. In this regard, it was hypothesized that high-cost households
who were also high-risk households had a significantly different set of SRM strategies,
compared to other high-cost households (hypothesis H3e). It was of major interest to
understand the interactions of these two variables towards social risk management. Ta-
ble 42 shows how the complexity of SRM strategy sets differed depending on the inter-
dependent influence of both of the variables.
Tab. 42: Relationship of high-risk and high-cost with complexity of SRM strategies
Low/medium risk hh High risk hh
Low/medium cost hh  2.59 (3)  3.76 (4)
High cost hh  4.13 (4)  3.86 (4)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N = 1428 households. Anova model specification f(3,1424 )=37.86,
p<0.001. Mean of number of SRM strategies, the median is given in brackets.
The data in Table 42 indicated that high-risk households that did not incur high costs,
had a considerably higher mean (3.76) of SRM strategies, as compared to low/medium
risk households that did not also face high costs (2.59); this difference was highly sta-
tistically significant (Bonf.,  p<0.001). However, the indication that low/medium risk
households that faced high costs applied a higher number of SRM strategies (4.13) than
high-cost  and high-risk households (3.86)  was somewhat  surprising.  The difference
was not statistically significant (Bonf., p=1.00). When a low/medium risk household
faced high costs, the average number of applied SRM strategies substantially increased
from 2.59 to 4.13, which was highly significant (Bonf., p<0.001). On the other hand,
comparing high-risk households that did not face high costs to those households that
did, one noticed that there was only a small increase (from 3.76 to 3.86), which was not
statistically significant (Bonf.,  p=1.00). These findings confirmed the hypothesis that
high-risk households were aware of their risk status and built more complex sets of
SRM strategies in anticipation of future costs, even without recently encountering high
costs. On the other hand, low/medium risk households seemed to be able to mobilize a
substantial  number  of  SRM strategies  when  facing  high  costs.  Assuming  that  the
household risk status was relatively stable for a longer time period than high-costs
(which corresponded to the 3 months recall period), it could be assumed that those
SRM strategies that were mobilized relatively quickly by low/medium risk households,
more likely referred to reactive SRM strategies than proactive strategies.
The analysis in table 43 went into more depth concerning this hypothesis. A variety
of SRM strategies significantly increased for low/medium-risk households that faced
high costs, compared to those low/medium-risk households that did not: Credit use
(+35.9 % (percentage points)),  savings use (+ 48.8%), income diversification (+15.4%),
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multiple income earners (+19.7%) and decision-making roles in community associa-
tions (+27.60%). In contrast, the difference in use of SRM strategies by high-risk house-
holds that faced high costs (#4) over those high-risk households that did not (#2) was
not significant, except for the use of health insurance,  which was 29.12 percentage
points lower among high-risk & high-cost households (statistically significant, Bonf.
p<0.05). This was expected, as health insurance aims for financial protection from high
costs, which was partially confirmed by this finding. 
Tab. 43: Use of SRM strategies in relationship to high-risk and high-costs
Health in-
surance Credit use
Savings 
use
Income 
diversifi-
cation
Multiple 
income 
earners
Decision-
making 
role
High hh 
activity 
level
#1 Low risk & 
low cost hh
28.56% 44.74% 46.68% 39.81% 44.50% 39.56% 14.64%
#2 High risk & 
low cost hh
57.69% 59.62% 70.19% 61.54% 47.12% 51.92% 27.88%
 Δ (#2-#1) 29.13%*** 14.87%** 23.51%*** 21.73%*** 2.62% 12.36%* 13.24%***
#3 Low risk & 
high cost hh
25.37% 80.60% 95.52% 55.22% 64.18% 67.16% 25.37%
 Δ (#3-#1) -3.19% 35.86%*** 48.84%*** 15.42%* 19.68%** 27.60%*** 10.73%
#4 High risk & 
high cost hh
28.57% 71.43% 95.24% 71.43% 47.62% 38.10% 33.33%
 Δ (#4-#1) 0.01% 26.69%* 48.56%*** 31.62%** 3.12% -1.47% 18.69%
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N = 1428 households. Bonferroni multiple-comparison test, 
significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Above,  more  detailed  analysis  confirmed the  hypothesis  that  high-risk  households
built their set of SRM strategies on a longer term, while those low/medium risk house -
holds facing high costs more rapidly changed their SRM-related behavior. In the case
of high costs for low/medium risk households, the use of several SRM strategies was
heavily increased (compared to group #1) and exceeded the use by high-risk & high
cost households in some strategies: credit use, savings use, multiple income earners
and decision-making roles in community associations. While the first three strategies
were more likely to be reactive strategies, the increased use of decision-making roles
for those households could be considered a proactive strategy. In comparison, high-
risk & high cost households more often used health insurance, income diversification
and  high  household  activity  levels  in  community  associations,  compared  to
low/medium risk households facing high costs. These findings referred back to hypoth-
esis H3c, regarding the hypothesized relationship that high-risk exposure of households
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led to higher application of pro-active SRM strategies, compared to other groups. Gen-
erally, the hypothesis was confirmed. Additionally, through this analysis, it was con-
firmed that  high-risk  households  did  not  significantly  change  (or  did  not  have  to
change) their SRM-related behavior when faced with high costs. However, the hypoth-
esis could not necessarily be confirmed with regard to low/medium risk households
that faced high costs. While the higher use of the strategies  health insurance,  income
diversification and  high  activity  levels  in  community  associations among  high-risk
households pointed in this direction, the fact that low/medium risk households facing
high costs more often had decision-making roles in community associations did not sup-
port this hypothesis. On the other hand, the lower use of the – assumingly – ad hoc
and reactive strategies  use of credit and  multiple income earners by high-risk & high-
cost  households,  compared  to  low/medium risk  households  facing  high-costs,  sup-
ported the hypothesis. The differences between the two groups, regarding the use of
single SRM strategies, was not significant.658
Tab. 44: High-risk / high-cost hh and complexity of SRM strategies by country
Ghana Malawi
mean (median) SRM 
strategies
mean (median) SRM 
strategies
#1 Low/medium risk and cost household 3.16 (3) 2.20 (2)
#2 High-risk, but low/medium cost 
household
4.19*** (4) 2.94** (3)
#3 Low/medium risk but high-cost 
household
4.18*** (4) 4.10*** (4)
#4 High-risk&high-cost-household 4.11 (4) 3.67** (4)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N = 1428 households, Ghana N=600, Malawi N=828. Bonferroni 
multiple-comparison test (base: #1), significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In table 44 the application of SRM strategies was broken down by country and the high
risk / high cost status of the household. In both countries, low/medium risk households
applied highly significantly more SRM strategies when they faced high costs. High-
risk households, even when they did not experience high costs, applied significantly
more SRM strategies on average than low/medium risk households who also did not
face high costs. Comparing high-risk households who faced high costs with those that
did not was not significant in neither country (Bonf., p=1.00). Hence, the country-spe-
cific analyses confirmed the general findings. 
658 Both groups were rather small: Group #3: 67 households, group #4: 21 households. Testing single
SRM strategies between the two groups with Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also did not show signifi -
cant results.
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Tab. 45: Use of SRM strategies in relationship to high-risk and high-costs in Ghana
Relationship of 
high-risk and 
high-cost
Health 
insur-
ance
Credit 
use
Savings 
use
Income 
diversi-
fication
Multiple
income 
earners
Deci-
sion-
making 
role
High hh
activity 
level
#1 Low/medium risk 
and low/medium 
cost household
66.67% 38.79% 56.57% 58.99% 53.74% 28.48% 12.73%
#2 High-risk, but 
low/medium cost 
hh
86.76% 52.94% 76.47% 70.59% 55.88% 47.06% 29.41%
 Δ (#2-#1) 20.10%*** 14.15% 19.90%*** 11.60% 2.15% 18.57%** 16.68%***
#3 Low/medium risk 
but high-cost 
household
53.57% 71.43% 92.86% 75.00% 67.86% 42.86% 14.29%
 Δ (#3-#1) -13.10% 32.64%*** 36.29%*** 16.01% 14.12% 14.37% 1.56%
#4 High-risk&high-
cost-household
66.67% 88.89% 100.00% 77.78% 44.44% 11.11% 22.22%
 Δ (#4-#1) 0.00% 50.10%** 43.43%** 18.79% -9.29% -17.37% 9.49%
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. Households in Ghana, N=600. Bonferroni multiple-comparison 
test (base: #1), significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Analog to table 43, tables 45 and 46 analyzed the effect of household's high risk / high
cost status on the application of SRM strategies more in detail, but split by country. 
Tab. 46: Use of SRM strategies in relationship to high-risk and high-costs in Malawi
Relationship of 
high-risk and 
high-cost
Health 
insur-
ance
Credit 
use
Savings 
use
Income 
diversi-
fication
Multi-
ple in-
come 
earners
Deci-
sion-
making 
role
High hh
activity 
level
#1 Low/medium risk 
and low/medium 
cost household
3.10% 48.72% 40.08% 26.99% 38.33% 46.96% 15.92%
#2 High-risk, but 
low/medium cost 
hh
2.78% 72.22% 58.33% 44.44% 30.56% 61.11% 25.00%
 Δ (#2-#1) -0.33% 23.50%** 18.25% 17.45% -7.77% 14.15% 9.08%
#3 Low/medium risk 
but high-cost 
household
5.13% 87.18% 97.44% 41.03% 61.54% 84.62% 33.33%
 Δ (#3-#1) 2.02% 38.46%*** 57.35%*** 14.04% 23.21%** 37.65%*** 17.41%**
#4 High-risk&high-
cost-household
0.00% 58.33% 91.67% 66.67% 50.00% 58.33% 41.67%
 Δ (#4-#1) -3.10% 9.62% 51.59%*** 39.68%** 11.67% 11.37% 25.74%
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. Malawian households N = 828.
Bonferroni multiple-comparison test (base: #1), significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
232
7.4. Application of Social (Health) Risk Management Strategies
Comparing the differences between Ghana and Malawi in the SRM-related behavior of
high-risk households  that  did  not  encounter  high  costs  (#2)  and  low/medium risk
households that did not encounter high costs (#1), substantial differences could be ob-
served. While the use of five out of the seven SRM strategies increased when a house-
hold was at high-risk in Malawi, only the increase in credit use (+23.50 percentage
points) was statistically significant. In Ghana, on the other hand, high-risk households,
even without high cost exposure, significantly increased the use of health insurance
(+20.10%), savings (+19.90%), decision-making roles (+18.57%) and high household ac-
tivity levels (+16.68%). No significant differences were detected in either country be-
tween those high-risk households (#4) that incurred high costs compared to high-risk
households that did not (#2). These results were consistent with the international view
in table 43. Again, these results indicated that the household's awareness of the poten-
tial for high health risks went along with building more complex sets of SRM strate -
gies. This was the case in Malawi (although only the difference in credit use was sig-
nificant), but particularly true in Ghana. With regard to the use of health insurance,
the use in Malawi was very low in both groups (#2 and #1), but there was a large in-
crease in health insurance use in the group high-risk, low-cost households (+20.10%) in
Ghana. This could have been either the result of adverse selection that high-risk house-
holds were more likely to become members of a health insurance scheme, or it was the
result of better access to health care and, with it, better diagnosis of chronic conditions
and improved access to inpatient care.
Similar to the findings in table 43, low/medium-risk households that were exposed
to  high  costs  (group  #3)  drastically  changed  SRM-related  behavior,  compared  to
low/medium-risk households that did not experience high costs (group #1): In Malawi,
a substantial number of SRM strategies (five out of seven) showed a significant in -
crease: Credit use (+38.46%), savings use (+57.35%), multiple income earners (+23.21%),
decision-making roles (+37.65%), high household activity in community-associations
(+17.41%). In Ghana, on the other hand, only credit (+32.64%) and savings use (+36.29%)
increased significantly. 
There were no significant differences in either country regarding the use of SRM
strategies between high-risk households facing high costs (group #4) and low/medium-
risk households facing high costs (#3). Generally, it  should be noted that the entire
high-risk and high-cost group was a rather small sub-group (9 households in Ghana,
12 households in Malawi) and, therefore, not all differences showed statistical signifi-
cance. Looking in more detail at group #3, one can see that apparently low/medium-
risk households could mobilize a substantial number of SRM strategies when faced
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with high costs, although the strongest increases were among credit and savings. This
was consistent in both countries.
Analyzing the interactions of the high-risk and high-cost household variables with
the applied social risk management strategies, allowed for a more detailed discussion
of  hypothesis  H3e.  The hypothesis  stated that  high-cost  households  who were also
high-risk households had a significantly different set of SRM strategies, compared to
other high-cost households. The first part of the hypothesis was not confirmed, as no
significant difference in the complexity of SRM sets could be found between high-risk
& high-cost households and low/medium risk households facing high costs. In fact, the
mean in complexity of SRM strategy sets of the latter group was even slightly higher.
With regard to the use of the single SRM strategies, no significant differences could be
found between high risk & high cost households and low/medium risk households fac-
ing high costs. There were variations between the two groups in both the general and
in the country-specific analyses, but these differences remained insignificant. Hence,
hypothesis H3e was rejected.
7.4.6. Multivariate analysis on complexity of SRM strategies
After the bivariate analysis of the complexity of SRM strategies, five multivariate OLS
regression models were estimated, three models (1a-1c) that added variables step-wise
(see table  47), and two country-specific regression models (table  48). While the first
model 1a (adj. R2 28.6%) included core household characteristics and variables related
to the socio-economic status of the household,659 model 1b added risk exposure and
risk experience variables (adj. R2 35.1%).660 Model 1c added perception variables and in-
surance-related variables (adj. R2 36.6%).661 Since the distribution of the dependent vari-
able was not skewed and the homoscedasticity assumption was not violated, standard
OLS estimators were used.662 All indicators in the five estimated models showed a neg-
ligible level of collinearity, so that no further adjustments had to be made.663 
Model 1a showed that a variety of household characteristics influenced the com-
plexity of applied SRM strategies. First of all, the country variable was highly signifi-
cant; Malawi showed a 0.776 points lower complexity in SRM strategies than in Ghana.
Since health insurance was one of the factors used for the SRM complexity index, this
659 Specification of model 1a: F(11,14176)=52.89, p<0.001.
660 Specification of model 1b: F(19,14078)=41.65, p<0.001.
661 Specification of model 1c: F(24,14073)=35.27, p<0.001.
662 The null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan test (model 1c) for heteroscedasticity had to be rejected
(χ2(1)=0.02, p=0.89379). The test for normality showed an insignificant level of skewness (p=0.20278).
663 In the Ghana regression model 1c, the factor region had a VIF of 6.58, which was still negligible,
but was again a sign for relationship between predominant type of religion and region in Ghana.
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could be largely attributed to the existence of the NHIS in Ghana. This country differ-
ence was highly significant in all three general models 1a-1c. A consistently significant
level in all general models was also found in the educational level of the head of house-
hold; an increase by one educational level increased the SRM complexity by 0.140 in
model 1a and 0.099 in model 1c. The difference in the complexity of SRM sets between
religions was highly significant: A predominantly Muslim household was related to an
increase of 0.553 in model 1a and 0.316 in model 1c, but belonging to another religion
did not show a significant relationship. Household size was also consistently highly
significant and positively associated with SRM complexity, as one additional household
member increased complexity by 0.188 in model 1a and 0.176 in model 1c. Total house-
hold income was another consistent factor which was highly significant in all three
general models: If a household reached a higher income quintile, the SRM complexity
increased by 0.318 in model 1a and by 0.297 in model 1c. Household wealth levels were
not significant in any of the general models. The use of more complex sets of SRM
strategies seemed to be more income-dependent and less wealth-dependent. Appar-
ently, income improved access to other SRM strategies, while wealth could be seen as
an SRM strategy itself, by accumulating assets.
Several factors added in model 1b proved to be significant, which indicated that the
factors related to risk exposure and health care provider choice influenced the social
risk management behavior. If the primary health care facility normally used was a pri-
vate facility, this had a significant positive effect on the complexity of applied SRM
strategies by 0.250 points in model 1b and 0.216 points in model 1c. An increase by one
point in satisfaction with the quality of health care (measured on a five-point Likert
scale) increased the complexity of SRM strategies by 0.088 in model 1b and 0.076 in
model  1c.  Both  high-cost  experience  and  high-risk  experience  of  households  were
highly significant factors for an increase in SRM strategies: If a household belonged to
the high-cost group, the complexity of applied SRM strategies went up by 0.661 in
model 1b and 0.668 in model 1c. An increase in one unit664 of the high-risk status of a
household produced an increase in the complexity in SRM strategies by 0.661 in model
1b and 0.668 in model 1c. The household exposure to general risks (last three years)
had a significant positive relationship with the SRM complexity, so that one additional
general risk to which the household was exposed, increased the SRM complexity by
0.0987  in model 1b and 0.08579 in 1c.665 As mentioned above, several villages or commu-
664 As mentioned above, the high-risk variable had a value range from 0 to 1 with four categories in
total.
665 The variable household exposure to general risks had a value range from 0 to 11 and a mean of 2.76,
sd 2.09.
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nities had an extraordinarily high general risk exposure. The village-level risk exposure
had a significant positive relationship with the use of SRM strategies. A one point in -
crease in the variable  villages classified by general risks increased the complexity of
SRM strategies by 0.250 in model 1b and 0.216 in model 1c.666 Model 1c that added vari-
ables on risk and insurance perception slightly increased the adj. R2, by 1.5 percentage
points to 36.6%. The variable  self-perceived relative household exposure to general risks
compared to other households in the community (measured on a five point Likert scale)
showed a highly significant,  but negative relationship with SRM complexity;  a one
point increase of this relative risk exposure decreased the SRM complexity by 0.109.
This subjective measure could have been an indication of some form of desperation
and, therefore, a stronger reliance on reactive SRM strategies and limited access to
proactive strategies.667 The variables on perception of health insurance as a risk manage-
ment tool (0.188) and knowledge of the functioning of health insurance (0.272) were sig-
nificantly associated with a higher complexity of SRM strategies and may have served
as a proxy of general risk awareness of the household.
Tab. 47: Determinants of SRM set complexity (multivariate linear regression)
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c
Country Malawi (base: Ghana)c -0.776*** (0.08878) -0.704*** (0.09476) -0.658*** (0.09775)
Household environment: 
urban/semi-urban (base:rural)b,c 0.08973 (0.08575) 0.0977 (0.08675) 0.111 (0.08576)
Age of head of household 0.005748* (0.00373) 0.0007126 (0.00372) -0.0007 1 (0.00372)
Female head of householdb 0.109 (0.10572) 0.03479 (0.1007 ) 0.03073 (0.09978)
Education level of head of house-
hold 0.140
*** (0.04876) 0.125*** (0.04675) 0.0987 ** (0.04673)
Predominant religion: Muslimc 
(base: Christian) 0.553
*** (0.10571) 0.317*** (0.11470) 0.316*** (0.11371)
Predominant religion: Otherc 
(base: Christian) -0.113 (0.25072) -0.140 (0.23978) -0.108 (0.23776)
Household size 0.188*** (0.02072) 0.176*** (0.0197 ) 0.176*** (0.01975)
Child/adult ratio -0.0357 (0.04471) -0.04573 (0.04271) -0.04476 (0.0417 )
Wealth index (quintiles) 0.005745 (0.03472) 0.02879 (0.03279) -0.005711 (0.03372)
Total monthly hh income (quin-
tiles)
0.318*** (0.03076) 0.300*** (0.02973) 0.297*** (0.02971)
666 The value range of villages classified by general risks could take the values -1, 0, 1. Seven villages
with 237 households were classified as villages with clustered high general risk exposure. Nine
villages had a clustered general risk exposure below average comprising 70 households. The other
188 villages were classified to have normal risk exposure, comprising 1119 households.
667 The mean SRM complexity of households rating themselves to be more or much more exposed to
risks compared to other households was at 2.61, while the mean of the other households was 2.80.
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Type of primary health care facil-
ity: private (base: public or chari-
table)c
0.250** (0.09874) 0.216** (0.09872)
Satisfaction with quality of carel,z 0.08872*** (0.03179) 0.07672** (0.03178)
Villages classified by general 
risks 0.258
** (0.11374) 0.216* (0.11376)
Distance to the closest hospital 0.009743 (0.0377 ) 0.01279 (0.03775)
Average illness events per hh 
member 0.930
*** (0.15373) 0.901*** (0.15274)
High cost householdb 0.694*** (0.15672) 0.682*** (0.15476)
High risk household 0.661*** (0.16878) 0.668*** (0.16778)
Exposure to number of general 
risks 0.08770
*** (0.01974) 0.08579*** (0.01975)
Self-perceived relative risk expo-
surel,z -0.109
*** (0.03376)
Willingness to take risksl,z -0.0017 1 (0.02579)
Insurance knowledgeb 0.272*** (0.08270)
Acknowledgment of insurance as
risk management toolb 0.188
** (0.08274)
Likelihood of community assis-
tancel,z 0.03974 (0.02772)
Constant 0.561** (0.22579) 0.223 (0.26674) 0.009711 (0.26770)
Observations 1428 1428 1428
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.351 0.366
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable: Complexity of SRM strategies
Notes: b=binary/dichotomous variable, c=categorical variable, l= likert scale, q= quintiles, z= centered 
variable.
Testing the contribution of the variables to the explained variance of the three general
models, in model 1a four variables were identified to substantially contribute: Income
quintiles showed a medium effect (ω2=0.07074); a small to medium effect was shown by
the variables country (ω2=0.05074) and household size (ω2=0.05679); and a small effect by
Muslim  religion (ω2=0.01875).  Analyzing  the  effect  sizes  in  model  1c  (the  results  of
which are similar but slightly lower than model 1b) showed that the contribution by
religion was reduced. In total, in model 1c, seven variables substantially contributed to
the  explained  variance:  The  income  quintiles  maintained  a  medium  effect  size
(ω2=0.06875) and household size remained at a small to medium effect size (ω2=0.05474).
The other five variables showed a small effect:  household country (ω2=0.0307 ),  average
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illness episodes per hh member (ω2=0.02376), household general risk exposure (ω2=0.01370),
high-cost household (ω2=0.01370) and high-risk households (ω2=0.01075).
The model 1c split by country showed quite similar patterns in Ghana and Malawi;
the explanatory power of the country-specific models was also comparable (see table
48).668 A variety of variables from the general model 1c remained significant factors in
the country-specific  models:  Household  size  (Gh:  0.125,  Mw:  0.211),  total  monthly
household income (Gh: 0.204, Mw: 0.335), average illness events per hh member (Gh:
0.899, Mw: 0.905), high-cost household (Gh: 0.429, Mw: 0.841), high-risk households
(Gh: 0.803, Mw: 0.467), household exposure to general risks (Gh: 0.09275, Mw: 0.07472)
and with a negative relationship, self-perceived relative risk exposure (Gh: -0.100, Mw:
-0.09571). Overall, this showed a high consistence between the country-specific models
and the general model. However, there were also differences between the general mod-
els 1c and the Ghanaian or Malawian model. While the risk level of villages lost signif-
icance in both country models, satisfaction with health care providers remained signifi-
cant only in Ghana. A number of variables lost significance in the Ghanaian model,
while retaining a significant level in Malawi: Educational level of the head of household,
Muslim religion, use of private primary providers, health insurance knowledge and health
insurance  perception.  Contrary  to  the  general  model  1c,  the  household  environment
gained significance in the Malawian model showing a higher SRM complexity for ur-
ban/semi-urban households. In Ghana, on the other hand, several household-related
variables became significant and were inversely related to SRM complexity: The age of
the head of household,  having a  female head of household, and high  child/adult ratio
were associated with a lower SRM complexity. Also, in Ghana, the willingness to take
risks and the likelihood of community assistance became significant and were positively
associated with SRM complexity.
Tab. 48: Determinants of SRM set complexity: country comparison (multivariate linear 
regression)
Model 1c: 
Ghana
Model 1c: 
Malawi
Region of household (base MW: 
Central region, base GH: Greater
Accra region)
0.356 (0.25479) 0.04072 (0.1217 )
Household environment: 
urban/semi-urban (base:rural)b,c -0.116 (0.13273) 0.294
** (0.12370)
Age of head of household -0.007790* (0.00471) 0.006769 (0.00478)
Female head of householdb -0.367** (0.14374) 0.200 (0.1387 )
668 Specification of the Ghana regression model:  F(24,575)=13.32, p<0.001, and the Malawi model:
F(24,803)=18.06, p<0.001.
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Education level of head of house-
hold 0.0477 (0.06075) 0.114
* (0.0687 )
Predominant religion: Muslimc 
(base: Christian) -0.0797 (0.17972) 0.338
* (0.18570)
Predominant religion: Otherc 
(base: Christian) -0.438 (0.37371) 0.09370 (0.30678)
Household size 0.125*** (0.02576) 0.211*** (0.03074)
Child/adult ratio -0.126** (0.06379) -0.005721 (0.05570)
Wealth index (quintiles) -0.05179 (0.04771) -0.002781 (0.04974)
Total monthly hh income (quin-
tiles) 0.204
*** (0.04178) 0.335*** (0.04173)
Type of primary health care fa-
cility: private (base: public or 
charitable)c
0.07671 (0.16074) 0.241* (0.12875)
Satisfaction with quality of carel,z 0.186*** (0.06170) 0.02476 (0.03878)
Villages classified by general 
risks 0.0207 (0.05671) -0.004762 (0.05473)
Distance to the closest hospital 0.08374 (0.19178) -0.133 (0.19376)
Average illness events per hh 
member 0.899
*** (0.22170) 0.905*** (0.20876)
High cost householdb 0.429* (0.21976) 0.841*** (0.21270)
High risk household 0.803*** (0.21172) 0.467* (0.26272)
Exposure to number of general 
risks 0.09275
*** (0.02476) 0.07472** (0.02978)
Self-perceived relative risk expo-
surel,z -0.100
* (0.06070) -0.09571** (0.04272)
Willingness to take risksl,z 0.09175** (0.04174) -0.04673 (0.03572)
Insurance knowledgeb 0.178 (0.12676) 0.244** (0.11070)
Acknowledgment of insurance as
risk management toolb -0.04873 (0.11472) 0.335
*** (0.1187 )
Likelihood of community assis-
tancel,z 0.07375
* (0.04374) 0.0007407 (0.03676)
Constant 0.662 (0.89470) -1.646*** (0.3597 )
Observations 600 828
Adjusted R2 0.331 0.331
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable: Complexity of SRM strategies
Notes: b=binary/dichotomous variable, c=categorical variable, l= likert scale, q= quintiles, z= centered 
variable.
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The estimated regression models revealed some relevant factors that added to the ex-
plained variance. Consistently, in both countries, the factor of the  household income
quintile  represented a  small  effect  (ω2=0.03871)  in  Ghana and a  medium effect  (ω2=
0.7467 ) in Malawi. Also, household size showed a small effect (ω2=0.03872) in Ghana, but
a small to medium effect (ω2=0.05573) in Malawi. Small effect sizes in both countries
were  detected  for  the  average  number  of  illness  episodes  per  household  member, in
Ghana  ω2=0.02673  and  in  Malawi  ω2=0.0217 .  High-risk  households only  substantially
contributed to the explained variance in Ghana (ω2=0.02278), while the effect size in
Malawi  was  negligible  (ω2=0.00276).  Also,  the  factors  satisfaction  with  health  care
providers (ω2=0.01473)  and  severe  general  non-health related risk  exposure (ω2=0.02273)
were only relevant in Ghana. On the other hand, the (small) effect size of  high-cost
households remained relevant in Malawi (ω2=0.01870), but not in Ghana (ω2=0.00478).
The multivariate analysis confirmed most of the hypotheses that were already dis-
cussed in the sections  7.4.1-7.4.5. Most factors tested in hypothesis H3a  remained sig-
nificant in the multivariate models:  Household country (Ghana was related to more
complex sets of SRM strategies), household size, religion and the educational level of the
head of household. The  household wealth level was not significant in the multivariate
models, but the household income level showed a highly significant relationship in all
five  regression  models.  The hypotheses  H3b stating  that  high-risk  households  used
more complex sets of SRM strategies and the hypothesis H3d  stating that high-cost
households applied more complex SRM strategies were both confirmed in the multi-
variate analysis. Hypothesis H3b was also confirmed for high exposure to general risks.
In terms of risk exposure, the  average illness episodes per household member was also
highly significant and positively associated with the complexity of SRM strategy sets in
all five models.
7.5. Health insurance as SRM strategy and demand for health 
insurance
7.5.1. Willingness to pay for health insurance
As described in section 5.2.2, the measure willingness to pay (WTP) is a proxy for the
demand for the health risk management strategy health insurance and corresponded to
the maximum willingness to pay for a hypothetical health insurance product by the
household head. The variable used in the analysis referred to the WTP for health insur-
ance per individual in the household. As described in section  6.3, the distribution of
the dependent variable on WTP was heavily right-skewed. Therefore, the natural loga-
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rithm of the variable (after conversion of the local currencies to Euro) was calculated,
in order to create a standard normal distributed outcome variable, which reduced the
level of heteroscedasticity,669 and, therefore, allowed for normally distributed residuals
in the regression model.670 After the log transformation, the Breusch-Pagan test, a test
for heteroscedasticity, still suggested heteroscedastic variances.671 Therefore, the Hu-
ber/White sandwich estimator was used in all regression models, instead of the typi-
cally used ordinary-least-square estimation, as it produced more robust estimates and
reduced heteroscedasticity.672 Variance inflation factors were calculated in order to de-
tect collinearity, but no substantial collinearity was detected for all six regression mod-
els on WTP.
Table 49 shows the three general regression models 1a-1c that introduced variables
step-wise, while table 50 adds the general regression model 2, including all factors and
the two country-specific regression models.673 A variety of factors significantly influ-
enced the willingness to pay for  health insurance per individual  in the household.
Model 1a tested household-specific variables and variables that were directly linked to
the applied WTP elicitation method. The willingness to pay level in the dependent
variable referred to the highest accepted price in the bidding game, per individual in
the household, and was the division of the total household WTP divided by the num-
ber of members that the respondent (usually the head of household) intended to insure.
Hence, the variable share of household members to be insured had to be included in the
models as a control variable, because a higher share increased the total household ex-
penditure on health insurance and, therefore, was an important factor.674 Hence, a neg-
ative relationship with the WTP per person was assumed. This assumption was con-
firmed by the four general regression models (1a-2) that showed that an increase in the
share of household members decreased the WTP per person by 100.3% in model 1c and
669 Kohler et al. (2008): Datenanalyse mit Stata, p. 238.
670 Due to the log transformation, the interpretation of the regression coefficients changed, see sec-
tion 6.3.
671 The null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan H0: constant variances (= homoscedasticity) had to be
rejected, because the p-value is close to 0, (χ2(1)=7.27, p=0.00770).
672 Fahrmeir et al. (2009): Regression, p. 131 and 135f; Stata Press (ed.) (2013): Stata user’s guide re-
lease 13, p. 309f.
673 Specification of model 1a: F(10,1397 )=24.66, p<0.001, R2=0.17071, Adj. R2=0.164.
Specification of model 1b: F(19,13878)=19.73, p<0.001, R2=0.22779, Adj. R2=0.217.
Specification of model 1c: F(24,13873)=18.44, p<0.001, R2=0.24974, Adj. R2=0.236.
674 The variable on the share of household members to be insured ranged from 0 to 4. Hence, some
respondents aimed to insure more individuals than the definition of the household in the ques-
tionnaire defined. However, out of 1415 households, only 24 aimed to insure a larger share than 1.
The mode of the distribution was 1, which was reported by 996 respondents. The mean was 0.87
and the median was 1.
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95.4% in model 2.675 A positive response to the control question, whether the household
would buy the health insurance product at the final WTP price if the product existed,
was positively associated with the WTP level; a one unit change increased the WTP
level by 31.3% in model 1c and 33.9% in the model 2. This means that those households
that did not express the intention to purchase the product at the final bid were more
likely to give lower WTP levels than the other households.676
Tab. 49: Determinants of Willingness to Pay (multivariate linear regression)
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c
Share of hh members intended to 
be insured
-1.029*** (0.18271) -1.027*** (0.16572) -1.003*** (0.1657 )
Accepting to buy insurance at 
WTP price levelb
0.345* (0.17875) 0.353** (0.17072) 0.313* (0.17170)
Country Malawi (base: Ghana)c -0.115 (0.08276) -0.134 (0.09379) -0.107 (0.09570)
Age of head of household -0.003714 (0.0027 ) -0.003762 (0.00276) -0.00572* (0.0027 )
Female head of householdb 0.149
* (0.08679) 0.236*** (0.08479) 0.212** (0.08370)
Education level of head of house-
hold
0.195*** (0.03578) 0.113*** (0.03970) 0.117*** (0.03875)
Household size -0.110*** (0.01670) -0.07674*** (0.02075) -0.07074*** (0.02075)
Predominant religion: Muslimc 
(base: Christian)
-0.471*** (0.08774) -0.288*** (0.09271) -0.302*** (0.09276)
Predominant religion: Otherc 
(base: Christian)
-0.279 (0.2087 ) -0.227 (0.19676) -0.168 (0.20079)
Child/adult ratio -0.03673 (0.03375) 0.0027 8 (0.03374) 0.004754 (0.03278)
Income diversification -0.234*** (0.0487 ) -0.228*** (0.04874)
Share of hh members contributing
significantly to the income
0.819*** (0.19275) 0.842*** (0.19172)
Wealth index (quintiles) 0.08379*** (0.02679) 0.08070*** (0.02675)
Total monthly hh income (quin-
tiles)
0.119*** (0.02476) 0.108*** (0.02470)
Type of primary health care facil-
ity: private (base: public or chari-
table)c
0.09678 (0.08474) 0.125 (0.08475)
Satisfaction with quality of carel,z 0.07878
*** (0.02571) 0.0637 ** (0.02574)
Household environment: urban -0.177** (0.07074) -0.149** (0.07075)
675 Regarding the interpretation of coefficients in a regression model with a log transformed depen-
dent variable, see section 6.3 on the WTP variable.
676 43 (3.0%) of households indicated that they would not buy the insurance product at the final bid,
out of 1428 households.
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(base:rural)b,c
Villages classified by general risks -0.177** (0.08373) -0.07871 (0.08970)
Distance to the closest hospital 0.03970 (0.03179) 0.04174 (0.03271)
Average illness events per hh 
member
0.370*** (0.13873)
High cost householdb 0.07970 (0.11171)
High risk household 0.484*** (0.14470)
General risks exposure -0.06471*** (0.01678)
Willingness to take risksl,z 0.04676
** (0.0217 )
Constant 0.553* (0.2897 ) 0.02473 (0.32979) 0.08176 (0.33671)
Observations 1408 1408 1408
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.217 0.236
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Logarithm of 
household willingness to pay in Euro equivalent (per person that is intended to be insured)
Notes: b=binary/dichotomous variable, c=categorical variable, l= likert scale, q= quintiles, z= centered 
variable
Several household-related variables showed a significant relationship with the WTP
per individual. Urban households showed a 14.9% (model 1c) and 14.4% (model 2) lower
WTP level, compared to rural or semi-urban households. The household located in a
village classified to be highly exposed to general risks was only significant in model 1a,
where it showed a negative relationship. The age of the head of household was not sig-
nificant in the models 1a and 1b, but became significant in the more comprehensive
models. The relationship was negative and, with every additional year of age, the WTP
level per individual decreased by 0.58% in model 1c and 0.76% in model 2. The educa-
tional level of the head of household, on the other hand, was consistently significant in
all models. One additional level increased the dependent variable by 11.7% in model 1c
and 10.7% in model 2. Consistently, in all regression models, a female head of house-
hold showed a significant positive relationship which increased the WTP by 21.2% in
model 1c and by 20.3% in model 2. Another household determinant was the household
size, which had a significant negative relationship in all general models, so that each
additional household member decreased the WTP, per individual, by 7.04% in model 1c
and by 6.71% in model 2. Also, the predominant religion of the household, Islam com-
pared to Christianity, had a significant negative relationship with the WTP per indi-
vidual in all three general models, but lost significance in both country-specific mod-
els; in the general model 1c, being predominantly Muslim reduced the WTP level by
30.2% and by 23.7% in model 2. The country of the household was insignificant in all
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general models except for model 2, where households in Malawi showed a 23.9% lower
WTP level per individual.
Model 1b added variables related to the economic status of the household and health
infrastructure-related variables. Both the wealth level of the household and the income
level were positively related to the level of WTP per individual, in all general models.
A one quintile higher wealth level increased the WTP by 8.0% in model 1c and 5.3% in
model  2.  The income level  of  the  households  had a stronger relationship than the
wealth level, as one quintile higher household income level increased the WTP level by
10.80% in model 1c and 10.3% in model 2. Also, the  share of household members who
contribute significantly to the household income was positively associated with the WTP
level, which was significant in all general models: a one unit increase of this variable
increased the WTP level by 84.2% in model 1c and 70.6% in model 2. 677 Only one facil-
ity-related variable showed consistently significant coefficients, which was the  satis-
faction level with quality of care: A one step increase on the five-point Likert scale in-
creased the WTP level by 6.4% in model 1c and 6.5% in model 2. This was not surpris-
ing, as the quality of health care increased or decreased the value of a health insurance
product.
Several  risk exposure variables  on the household-level  were added to model  1c.
While high-cost households did not show a significant relationship with WTP levels, the
household experience with illness episodes (average illness events per household mem-
ber) was highly significant in the models 1c and 2. A one unit increase in the house-
hold average increased the WTP level by 37.0% in model 1c and 49.1% in model 2.
High-risk households were highly significant in all  regression models,  including the
country-specific models, showing a positive relationship: A one unit increase in the
high-risk status increased the WTP by 48.4% (model 1c) and 54.9% (model 2). On the
other hand, household exposure to general risks in the last three years reduced the will-
ingness to pay level, a one unit increase in general risk exposure reduced the WTP
level by 6.41% in model 1c and 6.73% in model 2.
Model 2 added a variety of variables related to SRM strategies in order to test the re-
lationship of other SRM strategies with the demand for health insurance, with WTP as
proxy. Those SRM strategies which were a potential alternative to health insurance had
a negative relationship with the WTP level. This was the case for the proactive strat -
egy of risk diversification, in the form of the four scale variable income diversification
677 A one unit increase in the variable share of household members contributing significantly to the in-
come was logically almost impossible. The value range of the variable was from 0 to 1, but only
two households indicated to have no income earner and the 5% percentile was at a share of 12.5%
of hh members.
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which was highly significant in all models: A one unit increase reduced the WTP level
by 20.3% in model 2. The variables representing risk mitigation strategies were also
negatively related: a one unit change in the attitude variable likelihood of community
assistance678 related to a decrease in WTP by 7.4% and the household use of savings in a
decrease of 16.5%. Also, the SRM strategy household use of credit/loans had a negative
relationship, as it reduced the WTP by 25.7%. Hence, there seemed to be some substitu-
tive effect between the other SRM strategies and WTP for health insurance, so that the
application of the other SRM strategies crowded out the demand for health insurance.
On the other hand, the variable household activity level in community associations679 was
highly significant and positively related (change in WTP by +55.0%), as was the mem-
bership in microfinance institutions (change in WTP by +22.4%). Likewise, the variable
existence of insurance knowledge was positively related to WTP levels (+11.2%) as well
as the variable acknowledgment of insurance that it can help to pay for costly treatments
(+13.4%). Households that were insured for health showed the tendency (not signifi-
cant) of a negative relationship with the WTP level, compared to those households
without insurance.
As already discussed above, the experience with health insurance strongly differed
between Ghana and Malawi. For this reason, a country comparison of willingness to
pay levels (see table 50) displayed many differences between the two countries.680
A variety of factors in the country-specific regression models were consistent with
the four general models, in terms of direction of relationship and significance: The age
of the head of household, which was significant in general models 1c and 2, was nega-
tively related, so that one additional year decreased the WTP by 0.76% in Ghana and
by 0.68% in Malawi in model 2. Also, consistent with the general models were the fol -
lowing  variables:681 The  educational  level  of  the  household  head (Gh:  +11.3%,  Mw.
+10.1%), high-risk household (Gh: +80.4%, Mw. +37.2%), general risk exposure (Gh: -6.6%,
Mw: -7.3%), the level of income diversification (Gh: -17.3%, Mw: -15.4%) and the activ-
ity level in community associations (Gh: +91.0%, Mw: +33.3%). However, some signifi-
cant factors in the general models lost significance in both country-specific models:
predominant religion of the household, insurance knowledge and the SRM strategy use of
678 The variable likelihood of community assistance was measured on a five-point Likert scale.
679 The variable  household activity level in community associations had in total three categories in a
value range from 0 to 1.
680 Specification of model 2: F(33,13774)=17.41, p<0.001, R2=0.28178, Adj. R2=0.265.
Specification of Ghana-specific model: F(32,560)=14.88, p<0.001, R2=0.37374, Adj. R2=0.338.
Specification of Malawi-specific model: F(32,782)=8.93, p<0.001, R2=0.25270, Adj. R2=0.221.
681 In brackets given is the percentage change in the dependent variable after one unit change in the
independent variable.
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savings. All factors that showed significant coefficients in the country-specific models
did not change the sign, compared to the general models, so that the tendency of direc-
tion was always confirmed.
Tab. 50: Determinants of Willingness to Pay: Country comparison (multivariate linear 
regression)
Model 2 Ghana Malawi
Share of hh members intended to 
be insured
-0.954*** (0.16875) -0.406 (0.35079) -1.137*** (0.13679)
Accepting to buy insurance at WTP
price levelb
0.339* (0.17470) 1.424*** (0.35678) 0.140 (0.1707 )
Country Malawi (base: Ghana)c -0.239
* (0.12376)
Age of head of household -0.007758*** (0.0027 ) -0.01275*** (0.0037 ) -0.0067 8* (0.00379)
Female head of householdb 0.203
** (0.08179) 0.278* (0.14479) 0.09178 (0.09678)
Education level of head of house-
hold
0.107*** (0.03874) 0.113** (0.05675) 0.101** (0.05070)
Household size -0.06771*** (0.02072) -0.03574 (0.02771) -0.103*** (0.02779)
Predominant religion: Muslimc 
(base: Christian)
-0.237*** (0.09174) -0.193 (0.15870) -0.227 (0.14270)
Predominant religion: Otherc (base:
Christian)
-0.128 (0.19774) -0.373 (0.40172) -0.05278 (0.1777 )
Child/adult ratio -0.002768 (0.03372) 0.03679 (0.07074) -0.0407 (0.03375)
Income diversification -0.203*** (0.04870) -0.173** (0.06975) -0.154** (0.06472)
Share of hh members contributing 
significantly to the income
0.706*** (0.1937 ) 1.230*** (0.28570) 0.153 (0.25576)
Wealth index (quintiles) 0.0527 ** (0.0267 ) 0.006701 (0.04471) 0.07876** (0.03378)
Total monthly hh income (quin-
tiles)
0.103*** (0.02472) 0.0527 (0.04070) 0.127*** (0.03171)
Type of primary health care facil-
ity: private (base: public or charita-
ble)c
0.145* (0.08576) 0.08471 (0.15678) 0.136 (0.10272)
Satisfaction with quality of carel,z 0.06478
** (0.02575) 0.09878* (0.05971) 0.03770 (0.02774)
Household environment: urban 
(base:rural)b,c
-0.144** (0.07070) 0.08472 (0.12472) -0.264*** (0.07970)
Villages classified by general risks -0.05876 (0.08879) 0.121 (0.14373) -0.217 (0.1367 )
Distance to the closest hospital 0.02676 (0.0327 ) 0.07871 (0.0547 ) -0.03474 (0.03876)
Average illness events per hh mem-
ber
0.491*** (0.14179) 0.941*** (0.25470) 0.105 (0.15972)
High cost householdb 0.109 (0.11570) -0.123 (0.19471) 0.208 (0.15176)
High risk household 0.549*** (0.1417 ) 0.804*** (0.2047 ) 0.372** (0.18874)
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General risks exposure -0.06773*** (0.01676) -0.06675** (0.02671) -0.07370*** (0.02179)
Willingness to take risksl,z 0.0327 (0.02271) -0.04971 (0.03976) 0.09072
*** (0.02673)
Household with health insuranceb -0.105 (0.10473) -0.125 (0.12074) -0.133 (0.22375)
Insurance knowledgeb 0.112
* (0.06775) 0.177 (0.11975) 0.09676 (0.08076)
Acknowledgment of insurance as 
risk management toolb
0.134* (0.07076) 0.02078 (0.11371) 0.193** (0.0887 )
Likelihood of community assistan-
cel,z
-0.07470*** (0.02074) -0.199*** (0.03678) 0.009762 (0.02671)
Membership in microfinanceb 0.224
*** (0.07775) 0.05776 (0.14770) 0.171* (0.09475)
Household use of credit/loansb -0.257
*** (0.06570) -0.449*** (0.10673) -0.110 (0.08476)
Household use of savingsb -0.165
** (0.06873) -0.172 (0.11675) -0.101 (0.08473)
Decision-making role in associa-
tionsb
0.008715 (0.06775) -0.116 (0.11173) 0.08570 (0.08179)
Activity level in associations 0.550*** (0.16178) 0.910*** (0.27879) 0.333* (0.19174)
Constant 0.332 (0.33473) -1.529** (0.69472) 0.820** (0.32373)
Observations 1408 593 815
Adjusted R2 0.265 0.338 0.221
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Logarithm of 
household willingness to pay in Euro equivalent (per person that is intended to be insured)
Notes: b=binary/dichotomous variable, c=categorical variable, l= likert scale, q= quintiles, z= centered 
variable.
However,  there  were  also  substantial  differences  between  the  two  countries:  The
household  wealth quintile (Mw: +7.9%) and the  total household income quintile (Mw:
+12.7%) were positively related to the WTP level, which was significant in Malawi, but
not in Ghana. In Ghana, the share of hh member contributing significantly to the income
was highly significant (+123.0%), but not in Malawi. Satisfaction with quality of care
was also a significant factor only in Ghana (+9.9%). On the other hand, in Malawi, the
variable household environment was highly significant (if an urban household, the WTP
was reduced by -26.4%), but without significance in Ghana. Contrary, the average ill-
ness events per hh member was a highly significant factor in Ghana (+94.1%), while it
was insignificant in Malawi.
There were also differences in the dependency of WTP levels on SRM strategies.
While  the  likelihood  of  community-assistance (-19.9%)  and  the  household  use  of
credit/loans (-44.9%) were highly significant in Ghana, they were not significant factors
in Malawi. In Malawi, on the other hand, the acknowledgment of insurance as risk man-
agement tool (+19.3%)  and the  membership in  microfinance (+17.1%) was significant,
which were not significant factors in Ghana.
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In the estimated regression models on WTP levels, a variety of factors substantially
added to the explained variance of the models. For better comparability, only the  Ω2
values of model 2 and the two country models were presented and discussed. Analyz-
ing the factors substantially contributing to the explained variance manifested sub-
stantial differences between Ghana and Malawi, because none of the factors had a rele-
vant effect size in both countries. First, the effect sizes of the factors in the general
model 2 are presented, in order to be able to contrast them with the country-specific
results.
In model 2, the share of household members intended to be insured, a factor internal to
the WTP evaluation method, had the strongest, but still a small negative effect size
(ω2=0.0457 ). Five other factors were relevant and showed a small effect size: A negative
relationship  was  seen  in  income  diversification (ω2=0.01272),  general  risk  exposure
(ω2=0.01170) and household use of credit/loans (ω2=0.0107 ). A positive relationship, with
a small effect size, could be found for the variables  total monthly household income
(ω2=0.01179) and high-risk households (ω2=0.01074).
The relevant factors in the Malawian model were closer to the general model than
those of  the Ghana-specific model.  In the Malawian model,  the  share of household
members intended to be insured showed a medium negative effect size (ω2=0.08574). To-
gether with the relevance of the factor total household income (ω2=0.02072) and the neg-
ative relationship of the  household size (ω2=0.01670), this could be interpreted as bud-
getary constraints for higher WTP levels. Another relevant factor adding to the ex-
plained variance in the Malawi-specific regression model was the factor household en-
vironment (ω2=0.01275), showing a small negative effect in urban households compared
to rural and semi-urban households. Exposure of the household to general risks showed a
small (negative) effect of ω2=0.01475. Only in the Malawian model, the variable willing-
ness to take risks substantially added to the explained variance with ω2=0.014742.
The relevant factors for willingness to pay in Ghana were fundamentally different
from those in Malawi. Two household-related factors substantially contributed to the
explained variance: The age of the head of household, with a small negative effect size
(ω2=0.01672), and the share of household members contributing significantly to the house-
hold income, with a small positive effect (ω2=0.02770). Two variables related to risk ex-
posure with a small positive effect size were high risk household, with ω2=0.0247 , and
the average illness events per hh member, with ω2=0.02773. The application of some SRM
strategies substantially added to the explained variance in the Ghana-specific model:
likelihood  of  community  assistance (ω2=0.0397 )  and  household  use  of  credit/loans
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(ω2=0.0287 ), with a small negative effect size, while the household activity level in com-
munity associations showed a small positive effect size (ω2=0.02072).
Relationships with the WTP level have been hypothesized for risk exposure vari-
ables, several SRM strategies and socio-economic characteristics. Hypothesis H4a, stat-
ing a positive relationship of household wealth quintiles and household income quintiles
with WTP, was generally confirmed. Both, wealth and income were significantly and
positively related in all general models and in the Malawi-specific model, but both lost
significance in the Ghana regression model. The hypothesis H4b, on certain characteris-
tics of the household head, was confirmed with regards to the educational level of the
head of household; it was positively related to willingness to pay and significant in all
regression models. Insurance knowledge was positively related, but only significant in
the general model (model 2) and lost significance in the country-specific models. Simi-
larly, the  acknowledgment of health insurance as risk management strategy was posi-
tively related, but only significant in model 2 and the Malawi-specific model. Hence,
hypothesis H4b was only confirmed regarding the educational level, while health insur-
ance attitudes and knowledge showed a positive tendency, but were not significant in
all models.
The variables on risk exposure gave mixed results in relation to WTP: While it was
hypothesized  (hypothesis  H4c)  that  exposure  to  general  (non-health)  risks  lead  to
higher WTP, this could not be confirmed. Contrary to the hypothesis, general risk ex-
posure was significant in all models, with a negative relationship to WTP. Apparently,
general risk exposure did not sensitize for better protection from health risks. It could
be either that protection from other risks was valued higher by the household or the
household's risk management capacities were already bound with other types of risk.
On the other hand, hypothesis H4d,  stating that high-risk households (health risks)
were related with higher WTP, was confirmed, as it was significant in all regression
models. With regard to high-cost households (recall period 3 months), it was hypothe-
sized (H4e) that a short-term experience of high costs did not lead to changes in the
willingness to pay. This hypothesis was confirmed as the high-cost household variable
was not a significant factor in any of the regression models. 
The relationship between other applied SRM strategies and WTP levels was mixed.
It was hypothesized that (hypothesis H4f) there was a crowding out effect so that the
application of other SRM strategies reduced the level of WTP. In fact, a variety of SRM
strategies showed a negative relationship, such as income diversification, use of savings
(significant in model 2, but not in the country-specific models), use of credit/loans (sig-
nificant in model 2 and Ghana) and  likelihood of community assistance (significant in
249
7. Analysis
model 2 and Ghana). On the other hand, positively related to WTP levels were the
SRM strategies activity level in community associations, share of hh members contribut-
ing significantly to the income and the membership in microfinance (significant in model
2  and  Malawi).  Hence,  hypothesis  H4f could  not  be  confirmed as  such.  Most  SRM
strategies showed a significant relationship, but not necessarily in the same direction.
Hypothesis H4g, stating that households who were insured for health in Ghana (NHIS
member households) showed a higher level of WTP, could not be confirmed. The ten-
dency of the variable was a negative relationship with WTP, but it was not significant. 
7.5.2. Health insurance as SRM strategy in relation to risk exposure and 
other SRM strategies
While the willingness to pay level measured the potential demand for a hypothetical
product, the variable household insured for health measured the actual positive decision
to purchase health insurance coverage. This part of the analysis was also split into
three regression models, one general model and two country-specific models; but the
Malawi-specific model needed to be interpreted with caution, because micro health in-
surance or social health insurance was not available in Malawi and private health in-
surance products were barely accessible to low-income households. Therefore, only 26
households (3.14%) in the Malawian sample were insured for health, which made the
regression model  less reliable.  It  was decided not to include the WTP level  in the
model, because the WTP level on the day of the interview could not serve as an ex-
planatory variable for having a health insurance contract. Table 51 shows the three re-
gression models with health insurance membership of at least one household member
as the dependent variable. Generally, the explanatory power of the models were quite
low, as indicated by the adj. Pseudo R2, between a meager 0.6%, in the case of Ghana,
and 4.0%, in the Malawian case.682 No substantial level of collinearity was detected, so
no further adjustments had to be made.
Systemic differences between Ghana and Malawi were the reasons why the signs of
the independent variables differed. For example, the high-risk status of a household
was a significant predictor for household health insurance, with a positive relationship
in the general and Ghana model, but with a negative relationship in the Malawi-spe-
cific model. In the general model, a one unit change of the household health risk status
682 Specification of  general  model:  LR-χ2(4)=57.70,  p<0.001.  Count  R2=0.703,  Adj.  Pseudo R2=0.027
(0.328).
Specification  of  Ghana  model:  LR-χ2(4)=14.42,  p<0.01.  Count  R2=0.683,  Adj.  Pseudo  R2=0.006
(0.019).
Specification of  Malawi model:  LR-χ2(4)=19.28,  p<0.001.  Count  R2=0.969,  Adj.  Pseudo R2=0.040
(0.08374).
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increased the odds by 221.9% (a change of one sd by 30.1%) in the general model and
by 223.5% (one sd by 35.7%) in the Ghana model. Contrary to the first two models, in
the regression on Malawi, a one unit increase in the high-risk variable reduced the
odds of holding health insurance by 97.4% (of one sd by 50.6%). This indicated that
high-risk households in Malawi had less access to enter a private health insurance
scheme than other low- or medium-risk households. 
Tab. 51: Health insurance membership in relation to SRM sets and risk exposure 
(multivariate logistic regression)
General Ghana Malawi
Complexity of SRM sets (excl. health 
insurance)
0.141*** (0.03979) 0.03973 (0.06871) 0.475*** (0.12879)
General risk exposure of household 
(non-health, severe risks)
0.233*** (0.07076) 0.08376 (0.1007 ) -0.129 (0.27176)
High-risk household (health) 1.169*** (0.25878) 1.174*** (0.39874) -3.664** (1.76070)
High cost household -0.708*** (0.26672) -0.857** (0.36675) 0.01075 (0.79770)
Constant -1.549*** (0.13371) 0.449** (0.2047 ) -4.414*** (0.52279)
Observations 1428 600 828
Pseudo R2 0.033 0.019 0.083
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable: Health insurance membership (at least one household member), dichotomous
Notes: b=binary/dichotomous variable, c=categorical variable, l= likert scale, q= quintiles, z= centered 
variable.
The number of applied SRM strategies (without health insurance) was positively re-
lated to health insurance membership. This relationship was highly significant in the
general model (one additional unit increased the odds by 15.1% and one additional sd
by 24.3%) and in the Malawian model (one additional unit increased the odds by 60.8%
and one additional sd by118.1%). 
Exposure to severe general, non-health related risks was a significant predictor only
in the general model, but in none of the country-specific models; in the general model,
a one unit increase in severe general risk exposure increased the odds of being insured
for health by 26.2% (one sd change by 21.3%).
Assuming a financial protective effect from health insurance, the variable high-cost
household was more likely an effect from not being covered by health insurance than
the other way around. Hence, the interpretation of the negative relationship of high-
cost households and health insurance membership, needed to be taken with caution.
Being a high-cost household decreased the odds of holding a health insurance policy
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by 50.8% in the general model and by 57.5% in the Ghana-specific model. The relation-
ship was not significant in Malawi.
A significant relationship of variables related to SRM strategies and risk exposure
with health insurance membership was hypothesized. Regarding severe general risk
exposure (non-health) a positive relationship with health insurance membership was
expected (hypothesis H5a).  This hypothesis was partially confirmed, because general
risk exposure was significantly and positively related to health insurance membership
in the general model. In Ghana, there was a positive tendency, without significance.
Furthermore, high-risk (health) households were expected to have a positive relation-
ship with health insurance membership (hypothesis H5b), which was confirmed in the
general model and in Ghana, where high-risk households were a highly significant fac-
tor for health insurance membership. In the Malawi-specific regression model, the fac-
tor was significant, but negatively related to health insurance membership. This was
likely due to the private health insurance market in Malawi, which is accessible only
for wealthier households and formal sector employees, who were also less likely to be-
long to the high-risk group. Since health insurance aims to protect members from high
health care costs, it was hypothesized that high-cost households were less likely in-
sured for  health (hypothesis  H5c),  which was confirmed in  the case of  the  general
model and in Ghana, where the factor showed a significant negative relationship.
Regarding the relationship of other SRM strategies with health insurance member-
ship, there was a related discussion in the previous section on the determinants of will-
ingness to pay. Similarly, in this analysis, regarding health insurance membership, it
was hypothesized that a more complex set of SRM strategies was related to a lower
likelihood that the household was member of a health insurance scheme (hypothesis
H5d). This hypothesis could not be confirmed. The complexity of SRM strategies was
significant in the general and the Malawi-specific model, but showed, contrary to the
hypothesis, a positive relationship with health insurance membership in all models.
Hence, in this analysis, a crowding out effect of health insurance by other SRM strate-
gies could not be confirmed, but rather a complementary relationship may have been
present.
8. Conclusion
The scope of this study centered on the problem of the vulnerability of individuals and
households to general risks and health risks, in low-income countries. The study ana-
lyzed household's and individual's social risk management strategies to counter these
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risks. Also, higher level social risk management institutions (e.g. regional and national)
were considered. Generally, among the most vulnerable groups are those individuals
and households that are highly exposed to risks. The literature review indicated that
high risk individuals and households carried the majority of the burden of risks, chal-
lenging their existing SRM strategies. In this regard, the main research question was
posed in what ways high risk exposure is related to the application of social risk manage-
ment strategies by households and individuals in developing countries.
The core underlying conceptual framework to address this research question was
the Social Risk Management framework, originally developed by Holzmann and Jør-
gensen. As outlined in sections 3.1 and 3.2, the framework served as an excellent basis,
but had to be adapted and conceptually improved in order to address the criticism that
was raised by several researchers and in order to make the framework suitable for aca-
demic inquiry. The adapted framework (section 3.3) was improved in terms of selectiv-
ity and exclusivity of the different types of social risk management strategies. While
the main types of proactive and reactive SRM strategies from the original framework
could be kept, the sub-types were newly established, in order to capture all possible
SRM strategies.  The resulting sub-types ranged on a continuum from the proactive
sub-types reduction or elimination of the probability of a risk, to limiting the extent of the
shock or its impact, and the mitigation of the impact of the shock to the reactive sub-type
relieving the impact of the shock. 
This adapted framework allowed the author to comprehensively categorize the evi-
dence of social risk management strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa. This included an
analysis of the sequence in which different SRM strategies were applied, depending on
the severity of the risk or shock.
The main findings of the literature review on the evidence of SRM strategies in Sub-
Saharan Africa suggested a more dynamic view of social risk management than em-
ployed by other authors. Specifically, the concepts of  redundancy and  subsidiarity of
SRM strategies on multiple levels,  from the individual and household levels,  to the
community and regional levels, as well as to the national and global levels, had been
included in the framework. The principle of subsidiarity postulates that there are ad-
vantages if  SRM is pursued on the lowest possible level.  However,  redundant SRM
strategies have to be established on higher levels, so that they can start to play a role if
lower level strategies tend to fail, or if they are overburdened from an extraordinary
scope of risks and/or the severity or duration of the shock.
A static view of SRM also reaches its limits when considering iterative layers of SRM
strategies, which is commonly the case in Sub-Saharan African societies. Several SRM
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strategies may already be used in situations without or with only minor shock expo-
sure, but they are also used with an increasing intensity in the case of a higher severity
or longer duration shock. Multiple, iterative layers of risk management strategies, for
example, include mutual borrowing and gift-giving, occasionally asking for assistance
and offering help. These frequent and iterative interactions create a situation of recip-
rocal bond and the expectation of help in times of need.
Furthermore, evidence suggested that it is difficult to consider SRM strategies as gen-
erally being proactive or reactive. In this regard, the details of applied SRM strategies are
important and differentiate between strategies that are proactive and those that are re-
active. For example, income diversification (portfolio diversification), which is com-
monly seen as a proactive strategy aimed at mitigating a shock, can also fall into the
category of reactive strategies, if the household has to engage in different low-skilled
and low-yield activities to make its living in order to relieve the impact of a shock.
Similarly, borrowing can serve multiple SRM-related purposes, from proactive invest-
ments in portfolio diversification or education, to reactive borrowing, in order to en-
sure the survival of household members.
In order to answer the main research question, numerous analyses were conducted,
using  the  data  of  the  Pro  MHI  Africa  cross-sectional  internationally  comparative
household survey from Ghana and Malawi, representing 1428 households with 7088
individuals.
In order to evaluate SRM behavior of individuals and households depending on their
risk exposure, it was essential, in a first step, to evaluate individual's and household's
actual level of exposure to high general risks and high health risks. In order to better
understand the extent of risk exposure, three kinds of risk exposure were operational-
ized from the household survey dataset: (1) Risk exposure to (severe) general risks of
the household (in the last three years), (2) high health risk households (based on inter-
nationally acknowledged risk factors such as chronic or permanent illness conditions,
previous utilization patterns (long hospitalization events) and belonging to a high age
group) and (3) high-cost households (based on health care costs of illness episodes, re-
call period 3 months). Analysis of general risk exposure revealed that the vast majority
of households (72.1%) in both countries had been exposed to an array of general risks
that had negative economic impact on the household within the last three years (mean
2.4 risks).
However, section 7.2 showed that there was substantial variation in general risk ex-
posure, which significantly depended on regional factors (country, region and some-
times community-level). The socio-economic status of households was also a signifi-
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cant factor in general risk exposure, showing that the highest wealth quintile experi-
enced the least general risk exposure (a relationship which was confirmed in the gen-
eral and Ghana-specific model, but which was not significant in Malawi). The house-
hold total monthly income (quintiles) was not a significant factor. These findings con-
firmed the hypothesis that wealthier households had better means of reducing or elim-
inating general risk exposure.
Concerning health risks, the analysis in section 7.3 showed that a relatively small
percentage of households (8.75%) could be considered high-risk households and, simi-
larly a small share of individuals and households faced extraordinarily high health care
costs, carrying the majority of health care costs in the entire sample. While in Malawi
5.6% of  households  caused 50% of  total  aggregated individual  health care  costs,  in
Ghana a relatively small percentage of just 0.9% of households caused 50% of total ag-
gregated health care costs. Although, at first sight, this small percentage could indicate
outliers, the health care utilization patterns of those individuals were not unrealistic.
This high level of risk exposure made those households particularly vulnerable and
substantially challenged their SRM capacities. Although health risks were generally
randomly distributed, it was shown that certain personal characteristics, such as be-
longing to a higher age group (55+ years), sex (being female) or pre-existing health
conditions (such as chronic or permanent diseases or long hospitalization stays), were
significant predictors of a higher likelihood of future health shocks. Ultimately, these
factors  (independently  or  in  combination)  resulted  in  high  health  care  costs.  This
means that if individuals carried one or more of the risk factors, they were more likely
to show future high health care costs. The identified factors were in line with the liter -
ature review in section 2.3.2 and 2.4.2 and, therefore, were integrated into the defini-
tion of high-risk households (as mentioned above).  Analyses also confirmed the hy-
pothesis that health care costs were heavily right skewed and only a relatively small
percentage of individuals and households were exposed to high health care costs that
concentrated a large share of total aggregated health care costs on a few individuals
and households in the sample.
The analysis of high-risk households showed that they were more than three times
more likely to belong to the group of high-cost households than other households. This
led to the main assumption that the experience of such high-risk households also trig-
gered them to subsequently build up their sets of SRM strategies and change their gen-
eral risk management behavior.
The analysis of the household application of (health) risk management strategies re-
vealed that households applied a wide variety of SRM strategies. The core strategies
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that could be operationalized in the household dataset, and which were applied by
households, included (but were not limited to): Health insurance, the use of formal and
informal savings, the use of formal and informal credit/loans, income diversification, mul-
tiple income earners in the household, a decision-making role in community associations
as well as a high activity level of the household in community associations and social net-
works.  The majority  of  households  (56%)  applied  three  or  more  of  the  seven SRM
strategies tested (mean 2.76, median 3).
The complexity of SRM strategy sets, as well as the use of a particular SRM strategy
type, depended on a variety of socio-economic characteristics and geographic factors.
A significant (positive + or negative -) relationship was confirmed for the country of
the household (with a higher complexity of SRM strategies in Ghana),  membership in
local partner organization (Malawi) (+),  age of head of household  (+ with peak at age
group 55-64 years), household size (+ with a peak at 8-10), female head of household (-),
household religion (+ for Muslim households) and wealth quintiles (+). The education of
the head of household was not found to be significant. The significant factors were con-
firmed through multivariate analysis, except for household wealth quintiles, which lost
significance in the multivariate view. In this analysis, the total household income quin-
tiles were highly significant  and positively associated with the complexity of  SRM
strategy sets. As mentioned above, the complexity of SRM strategy sets was higher in
Ghana than in Malawi. The difference was largely a result of the high uptake of the
NHIS in Ghana, while health insurance outreach was very low in Malawi. This finding
indicated that health insurance did not crowd out other SRM strategies.
Multiple analyses in sections 7.4.3-7.4.6 provided evidence for the question, in what
ways were exposure to high general and high health risks associated with household's
application of particular sets of SRM strategies. Regarding general risk exposure, it was
confirmed that experience with severe general risks was highly related to more com-
plex sets of household's SRM strategies. Since the operationalized variable for general
high risk exposure referred to shocks actually experienced within the last three years,
the prospective classification of the high-risk status of households provided more in-
sights into the planned SRM-related behavior of households. As hypothesized, it was
confirmed that households classified as high-risk (health) households applied, on aver-
age, a significantly more complex set of SRM strategies. It was also confirmed that this
behavioral change referred to an increased use of several SRM strategies, with a rela -
tively clear focus on proactive SRM strategies, such as health insurance, decision-mak-
ing roles, high activity level in community associations and social networks. However, the
use of credit/loans also significantly increased among high-risk households, so that the
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general finding of a tendency towards proactive strategies needed to be interpreted
with  caution.  In  Ghana,  the  uptake  of  health  insurance  in  the NHIS by high-risk
households was substantially above average. This confirmed the hypothesis that high-
risk households were aware of their high health risk status, consequently building up
sets of SRM strategies in anticipation of high future costs. It also confirmed some level
of adverse selection in the health insurance scheme. This assumption was further es-
tablished in the split view on high-risk households that experienced high costs and
those not having experienced high costs. High-risk households did not significantly
change their SRM-related behavior when they also faced high costs. Apparently, expo-
sure to severe general risks and particularly the factor of being a high-risk household,
allowed for a longer planning time for the household to diversify and build-up their
sets of SRM strategies.
However, high-cost households (based on the health care costs in illness episodes
with a recall period of 3 months) showed a substantial and significant increase in the
complexity  of  SRM strategy  sets,  even if  they were  classified  as  low/medium risk
households. This increase was not unexpected, as high-cost households were urged to
activate and utilize their available SRM strategies, due to the experienced high costs.
Hence, the causal relationship could not be conclusively evaluated. Those strategies
that increased the most among high-cost households were the use of credit and the use
of savings, but other SRM strategies were also increased. This indicated that high-cost
households tended to apply ad-hoc SRM strategies, in order to deal with the high costs.
Being a high-cost household in Ghana was negatively associated with the use of health
insurance. Households that had at least one household member insured for health (in
the NHIS) were significantly less likely to belong to the high-cost households than
uninsured households.  The results indicated that the NHIS provided some financial
protection from high health care costs, as well as from low/medium health care costs,
although a large share of insured households still showed high health care costs. It was
also confirmed that membership in the NHIS in Ghana was not dependent on the
wealth quintile of the household. On the other hand, the Malawian tax- and donor-fi-
nanced health care system provided some protection from health care costs. Services at
public (and most CHAM) health care facilities were supposed to be free at point of ser-
vice, which was partially confirmed in analysis. 41% of households in Malawi who re-
ported at least one illness episode also reported zero health care costs, compared to
18% of households in Ghana.
However, the hypothesis that high-cost households, who are also high-risk house-
holds, have a significantly different set of SRM strategies compared to other high-cost
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households, could not be confirmed. The complexity of SRM strategy sets did not sig-
nificantly differ between the two groups and the comparison in use of single SRM
strategies showed some variation, although it was not significant. There were some in-
dications  that  high-risk  households  built  strategy  sets  containing  more  pro-active
strategies, such as  health insurance,  decision-making roles and a  high activity level in
community associations and social networks. These SRM strategies were more frequently
applied  by  high-risk  households  facing  high  costs.  However,  in  comparison  with
low/medium risk households facing high costs, the results were mixed. Differences be-
tween these two groups were not significant and showed exceptions, such as the rela-
tively higher use of the proactive  decision-making roles in community associations by
low/medium risk households facing high health care costs.
The household willingness to pay (WTP) for a hypothetical health insurance prod-
uct served as a proxy for the demand for the SRM strategy health insurance. In order to
evaluate the implications of high risk exposure in combination with household's set of
SRM strategies on the demand of health insurance, several analyses (section 7.5.1) were
conducted. Several socio-economic household characteristics were positively related to
the WTP level, such as the household wealth and total monthly income quintiles, the ed-
ucational level of the household head and (with some restrictions)  positive attitudes to-
wards and knowledge of health insurance.
Contrary to the hypothesized direction, household exposure to general (non-health)
risks was negatively related to WTP. On the other hand, high-risk (health) households
were consistently and significantly positively associated with WTP levels. For those
households having experienced general risks, but without exposure to health risks, this
seemed to be a logical step, not to highly value protection from health risks, as they
(potentially) faced other kinds of risk.
The higher levels of WTP for a hypothetical insurance product by high-risk house-
holds confirmed the hypothesis that they were aware and sensitized by their risk status
and built SRM strategies in anticipation of future shocks (in the form of high health
care costs). Also, the hypothesis that high-cost households (3 months recall period) did
not  proactively  build  their  SRM  strategy  sets  (also  with  regard  to  health
insurance/WTP) was generally confirmed. The variable of high-cost households was
not a significant factor in the WTP analysis.
The relationship of other SRM strategies with WTP led to mixed results. While some
SRM strategies showed a negative relationship (income diversification,  use of savings,
use of credit,  likelihood of community assistance), other SRM strategies showed a posi-
tive relationship (activity level in community associations,  membership in microfinance,
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share of household members contributing significantly to the household income). Hence, it
was not generally confirmed that the application of other SRM strategies created a
crowding out effect on WTP (demand for health insurance). Contrary to the hypothe-
sis, health insurance membership was not a significant factor in relation to WTP.
In addition to the analysis of the WTP measure as proxy for demand for health in-
surance, the actual decision to become a member of a health insurance scheme pro-
vided more information on the relationship of health insurance with risk exposure and
the application of  other SRM strategies.  However,  the analysis of  health insurance
membership had the disadvantage of being mainly restricted to Ghana (due to the very
low outreach of health insurance in Malawi) and that the available variables explained
only a small part of the variance in the membership variable.
The first indication of the interplay between health insurance and other SRM strate-
gies was found in the general analysis of the household application of SRM strategies.
This finding indicated that the existence of health insurance did not crowd out other
SRM strategies (and vice versa), but that the strategies were rather complementary. Put
more generally, it seemed that access to SRM strategies was rather positively associ-
ated with additional SRM strategies. For example, in the case of Ghana, the wide use of
health insurance within the NHIS did not reduce the use of other SRM strategies, but
rather complemented them.
The analysis with health insurance membership as the dependent variable (section
7.5.2) showed that health insurance membership was related to a variety of risk expo-
sure and SRM-related variables. High-risk households, and household exposure to gen-
eral risks, were significantly and positively related to health insurance membership.
However, the relationship with general risk exposure was only significant in the gen-
eral model covering both countries and the model on Malawi. As expected, high-cost
households were significantly and negatively related to the uptake of health insurance
membership. Hence, this sub-analysis also confirmed that some protection from high
health care costs could be attributed to health insurance membership. The relationship
with other SRM strategies (complexity of sets of SRM strategies (without health insur-
ance)) also showed a complementary character, so that more complex SRM strategy
sets were positively related to health insurance membership.
In conclusion, several sub-analyses confirmed that household exposure to high risk
led to an increased complexity in the sets of SRM strategies. Those strategies that were
increasingly used by high-risk (health) households pointed to a subsequent building-
up of proactive SRM strategies, although this finding was not as clear as expected, in
comparison to  low/medium risk  households  facing  high  costs.  The high  uptake of
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health insurance by high-risk households was a further indication of the orientation
towards proactive strategies. This systematic build-up of SRM strategy sets by high-
risk households was also confirmed by the finding that the appearance of high-costs
among high-risk households did not lead to a significant difference in their application
of SRM strategies. High health risk exposure not only led to a higher level of health in-
surance membership, but also a higher WTP. Although the exposure to general (non-
health) risks was positively related to health insurance membership, it showed a nega-
tive relationship with WTP levels.
Given the concentration of the economic burden of general risks, and particularly of
health risks on relatively few individuals and households, the findings plead for an in-
creased targeting of programs supporting social risk management for the most vulner-
able groups. The least wealthy households were certainly among the most vulnerable,
as they had less access to SRM strategies, but this study also revealed that certain risk
factors (for general risks or health risks) made a substantial difference in the burden of
(future) risks that individuals and households had to carry. The findings indicated that
such high-risk households were aware – to some extent – of their high risk status and,
consequently, built more complex sets of (proactive) SRM strategies in anticipation of
future shocks. The high probability of future shocks made those high-risk households
vulnerable to falling into destitution and overburdening their existing SRM strategies.
Targeting this relatively small share of high-risk households, in order to improve their
proactive SRM capacities and to establish redundant SRM strategies on higher levels,
can protect them from the high burden of health shocks. The findings also showed that
(micro) health insurance provided some level of financial protection from high health
care costs, without crowding out other SRM strategies. This confirmed that health in-
surance was a well-suited element in the SRM strategy set of low-income households.
However, smaller insurance schemes generally have actuarial limits to include those
high-risk households and, therefore, might require a subsidization for the inclusion of
such high-risk groups, for example in the form of risk adjustment mechanisms.
The adapted social risk management framework provided a suitable basis for the
analysis in this study. To improve future analyses using the framework, this study calls
for a better understanding of the transition of the same type of SRM strategy from the
proactive side to the reactive, erosive side of social risk management strategies. Further
research is also required to identify suitable structures to support the application and
accessibility of proactive SRM strategies for all individuals and households, specifically
for high-risk households.
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Appendix 1:  Distribution and outliers' detection of willing-
ness to pay
Appendix 2: Association table of SRM strategies
Tab. 52: Pairwise correlation matrix of SRM strategies
Health In-
surance
Credit use Savings 
use
Income 
diversifi-
cation
Multiple 
income-
earners
Decision-
making 
role
High 
household
activity 
level
Health Insurance 1
Credit use 0.04271 1
Savings use 0.10972*** 0.18375*** 1
Income diversi-
fication
0.25373*** 0.10473*** 0.14579*** 1
I
Fig. 35: Distribution of original and transformed willingness to pay variable
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=1408 households. 
Multiple income-
earners
0.09174*** 0.10671*** 0.15771*** 0.37376*** 1
Decision-making
role
0.04678* 0.24073*** 0.08172*** 0.06775** 0.13679*** 1
High household 
activity level
0.02679 0.11771*** 0.08670*** 0.03270 0.09974*** 0.31679*** 1
Measure of association Φ. χ2-test of significance. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=1428 households.
Appendix 3: Complete table of sets of SRM strategies
#
Number 
of hh 
applying 
this SRM 
set
Health
insurance Credit Savings
Income
diversifica
tion
Multiple
income
earners
Decision-
making
role
Hh
activity
level
Σ of SRM
strategies
1 149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 63 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
3 47 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
4 40 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 5
5 40 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2
6 35 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
7 34 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
8 30 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 4
9 30 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3
10 30 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
11 27 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5
12 27 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 4
13 27 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3
14 26 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
15 26 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
16 25 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
17 24 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 3
18 24 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
19 21 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 4
20 21 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 4
21 21 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 3
22 20 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6
23 20 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
24 20 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 5
25 20 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3
26 20 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 3
27 19 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 4
28 19 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3
29 19 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
30 17 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3
31 16 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 4
32 15 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4
33 15 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2
34 14 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 3
35 13 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 5
36 13 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 4
37 13 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
38 12 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 6
39 12 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4
40 12 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3
41 12 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 3
42 12 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 3
II
#Number 
of hh 
applying 
this SRM 
set
Health
insurance Credit Savings
Income
diversifica
tion
Multiple
income
earners
Decision-
making
role
Hh
activity
level
Σ of SRM
strategies
43 12 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 3
44 12 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
45 10 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 5
46 10 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 4
47 9 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 5
48 9 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 4
49 9 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
50 9 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2
51 9 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
52 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
53 8 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 4
54 8 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 4
55 8 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 3
56 8 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
57 8 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
58 8 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
59 7 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 3
60 6 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 6
61 6 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 4
62 6 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 3
63 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
64 6 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2
65 5 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 5
66 5 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 5
67 5 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 5
68 5 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 5
69 5 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 4
70 5 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 4
71 5 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4
72 5 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 4
73 5 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 3
74 4 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 5
75 4 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 5
76 4 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 4
77 4 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 3
78 4 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 3
79 4 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3
80 4 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2
81 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
82 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 5
83 3 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 5
84 3 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 5
85 3 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 4
86 3 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 4
87 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 3
88 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3
89 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 3
90 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
91 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6
92 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 5
93 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 5
94 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 5
95 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 4
96 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 4
97 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 4
98 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 4
III
#Number 
of hh 
applying 
this SRM 
set
Health
insurance Credit Savings
Income
diversifica
tion
Multiple
income
earners
Decision-
making
role
Hh
activity
level
Σ of SRM
strategies
99 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 3
100 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 3
101 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3
102 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 3
103 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
104 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 6
105 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 5
106 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 5
107 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 5
108 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 4
109 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 4
110 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 4
111 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 4
112 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 4
113 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 4
114 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3
115 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3
116 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 3
117 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 3
118 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2
119 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
1428 49.58% 50.42% 50.42% 51.26% 49.58% 51.26% 46.22% 3.49
Appendix 4: Sets of SRM strategies split by membership in
local partner organization in Ghana
Contrary to the difference between households being member of the local partner or-
ganization and non-member households in Malawi, the difference between the mem-
ber and non-member households in Ghana was smaller (figure 36 and 37). An excep-
IV
Fig. 36: Most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies of member households in the 
local partner organizations in Ghana (over 50% of households)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=406 member households (Ghana). 11 SRM sets, total of 57 
SRM sets.
Note: Column percentages/mean are not weighted by the number of households applying a particular set 
of SRM strategies.
Credit Savings
26 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5
26 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3
24 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
23 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
21 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 4
18 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6
17 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3
14 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4
13 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 5
13 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
12 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 6
100.0% 36.4% 72.7% 72.7% 54.5% 27.3% 9.1% 3.73
Number of 
households 
applying this 
SRM set
Health insur-
ance
Income diver-
sification
Multiple in-
come earners
Decision-mak-
ing role
Household 
activity level
Σ of SRM 
strategies
207 hh (= 
50.99% of 
member hh)
tion was health insurance membership, as the local partner organizations were dis-
trict-wide mutual health insurance schemes in the Ghanaian NHIS offering health in-
surance.  There was no other scheme within the NHIS offering health insurance in
these districts and private health insurance only played a minor role. Therefore, the
difference of the mean number of SRM sets was slightly higher than subtracting health
insurance: 3.73 compared to 2.14. A difference was identified in decision-making roles
and high household activity level which did not play a role among non-member house-
holds, but were used by member households to 27.3% and 9.1%, respectively. In socio-
economic variables,  the households did not significantly differ: Member households
were slightly more wealthy (mean 3.08, median 3) compared to non-members (mean
2.81, median 3). Also, the income level was almost the same (mean 2.98, median 3)
compared to non-member households (mean 2.95, median 3). The households of mem-
ber-households were slightly larger (5.41 compared to 4.59) which could be partially a
result of the definition of that variable that a household counted as a member if any
household member was part of the partner organization. The higher use of income di-
versification and multiple income earners could be partially also a result of slightly
larger household size of member households. 
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Fig. 37: Most frequently applied sets of SRM strategies of non-member households in 
the local partner organizations in Ghana (over 50% of households)
Source: Pro-MHI-Africa household data. N=194 non-member households (Ghana). 7 SRM sets, total of 48 
SRM sets.
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Appendix 5: Pro MHI Africa - Household Survey Questionnaire*
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* The questionnaire is an adapted and largely rewritten version of the the questionnaire by the project 
“Strengthening Micro Health Insurance Units for the Poor in India” (ASIE/2004/095-995), funded by the EU-
India Economic Cross Cultural Programme (ECCP).
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Appendix 6: Codes for Classification of Diseases and Related
Health Problems (Annex 2a to the Questionnaire)
[Please code according to the classes. Code 888, if it is NOT possible to 
associate information by respondent to these classes]
Code Class of disease or related health problem
01 Infectious and parasitic diseases (e.g. worm infection, malaria, HIV/AIDS)
02 Neoplasms (e.g cancer, tumor)
03
Diseases of the blood and blood-forming organs and certain disorders involving
the immune mechanism (e.g. vitamin deficiency/anaemia, iron 
deficiency/anaemia)
04
Diseases of the circulatory system (e.g. heart, veins, arteries, blood supply 
system)
05 Diseases of the respiratory system (e.g. airways, lungs, breathing)
06
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases (e.g. diabetes mellitus, hormonal 
disorders)
07
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue (e.g. arthrosis, 
arthritis)
08 Diseases of the digestive system (e.g. stomach, intestines, esophagus/gullet)
09
Diseases of the nervous system (e.g. meningitis, alzheimer’s disease, 
epilepsy, multiple sclerosis)
10 Mental and behavioural disorders (e.g. dementia, schizophrenia, depression)
11
Injury, poisoning and certain other consequences of external causes (e.g. 
fracture, wounds)
12
External causes of morbidity and mortality (e.g. accidents, falls, complications 
of medical and surgical care)
13
Diseases of the genitourinary system (e.g. urinal tract infection, veneral 
diseases)
14
Pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium (e.g. abortion, complications 
during pregnancy, complications during delivery)
15
Certain conditions originating in the perinatal period (e.g. fetus and newborn 
affected by maternal factors, birth trauma, illnesses of fetus and newborn)
16 Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue (e.g. abscesses, skin rash, eczema)
17
Diseases of the eye and adnexa (e.g. inflammation/disorders of eyelid, visual 
disturbances and blindness)
18
Diseases of the ear and mastoid process (e.g. hearing loss, 
inflammation/disorders of ear function)
19
Congenital malformations, deformations and chromosomal abnormalities (e.g.  
malformations and deformations of the musculoskeletal system, 
malformations and deformations of special parts of body, Down’s syndrome)
20
Symptoms, signs and abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not elsewhere 
classified (e.g. fever, fatigue, headache, pain of unknown origin, abnormal 
findings without diagnosis)
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Appendix 7: Codes for Symptoms/Illnesses 
(Annex 2b to the Questionnaire)
Codes for Illnesses
Infectious Diseases
1. Buruli ulcer
2. Cholera
3. Diarrhoea/Dysentery 
4. Diphtheria 
5. Hepatitis (A,B,C)
6. Histoplasmosis/Darling's
disease
7. HIV/AIDS
8. Jaundice
9. Leprosy/Hansen’s 
disease
10. Measles
11. Poliomyelitis
12. Rabies
13. Salmonella 
Infection/Food 
poisoning
14. Sexually transmitted 
disease 
15. Shigellosis/Bacterial 
infection
16. Small pox
17. Tetanus
18. Tuberculosis/TBC
19. Typhoid fever/Typhus
20. Yellow Fever
Parasitic Diseases
21. Malaria 
22. Parasitic infection 
(Amoebiasis, 
Schistosomiasis, Worm 
infection)
23. Sleeping sickness/ 
Trypanosomiasis
Neoplasms/Cancer
24. Cervix Cancer
25. Gullet cancer
26. Lung cancer
27. Stomach cancer
28. Uterus cancer
29. Cancer (other)
Diseases of the circulatory 
system / cardiovascular 
diseases
30. Cardivascular disease
31. Cerebrovascular diseases
32. Coronar heart disease
33. Heart attack/Myocardial 
infarction
34. Hypertension/High 
Blood Pressure
35. Ischaemic heart 
disease/undersupply of 
blood/blood anemia in 
heart
36. Stroke/Post stroke
37. Rheumatic fever
38. Rheumatic heart disease
Diseases of the respiratory 
system
39. Angina pectoris
40. Asthma
41. Bronchitis
42. Chronic lung disease
43. Common cold & cough
44. Influenza
45. Lung disease
46. Pneumonia
47. Pharyngitis/Sore 
throat/Tonsillitis
48. Pleural effusion/Effusion
of thorax 
49. Upper respiratory tract 
infection
50. Water in lungs/lung 
oedema
Endocrine, nutritional and
metabolic diseases
51. Diabetes mellitus
52. Disorders of thyroid 
gland
53. Malnutrition
54. Metabolic disorders
55. Obesity and other 
hyperalimentation
56. Other nutritional 
deficiencies (e.g. iron or 
vitamines)
Diseases of the 
musculoskeletal system 
and connective tissue
57. Arthritis
58. Arthrosis/Decline or 
mutilation of joints
Diseases of the digestive
 system
59. Crohn's disease
60. Gastroenteritis
61. Haemorrhoids/Piles
62. Liver disease
Diseases of the nervous 
system
63. Alzheimer Disease
64. Epilepsy
65. Parkinsons'  Disease
66. Multiple sclerosis 
67. Meningitis
Injury, poisoning and 
certain other consequences 
of external causes /External
causes of morbidity and 
mortality
68. Appendicitis
69. Burn/Burns
70. Fracture
71. Head injury
72. Hernia
Diseases of the 
genitourinary system
73. Cystitis/Urinal tract 
infection/Bladder 
infection
XXXIII
74. Herpetic lesions
75. Nephritis/Nephrotic 
syndrome
76. Veneral disease (disease 
of the genitals, genital 
warts)
Pregnancy, childbirth and 
the puerperium/ Illnesses 
in perinatal period
77. Abortion/termination of 
pregnancy
78. Anemia (due to 
pregnancy)
79. Caesarean
80. Delivery (with 
complications)
81. Delivery (no 
complications)
82. Eclampsia/Preclampsia 
(cramps, high blood 
pressure, pass out, fits 
and headache)
83. Pregnancy induced 
hypertension
84. Pregnancy induced 
diabetes
85. Uterus Removal
Other
86. Disease of the blood and
blood-forming organs
87. Pigmentary 
abnormality/ Albinism
88. Mental and behavioural 
disorders 
Codes for Symptoms/Treatments
Symptoms involving the 
circulatory and respiratory
systems
89. Difficulty breathing 
90. Heart problem/pain
91. Pain in chest 
92. Pain in throat
Symptoms and signs 
involving the digestive 
system/abdomen
93. Abdominal and pelvic 
pain
94. Nausea and vomiting 
95. Stomach problem
96. Heart burn 
(Hyperacidity)
Symptoms involving the 
skin
97. Localized swelling, mass
and lump of skin and 
subcutaneous tissue 
98. Skin rash
Symptoms and signs 
involving the urinary 
system
99. Pain associated with 
urination
100. Urinary incontinence 
Other
101. Backache
102. Boils on body
103. Chills (feeling hot and 
cold)
104. Coughing blood
105. Cramps
106. Ear pain
107. Fainting
108. Febrile 
fits/seizure/convulsion
109. Fever
110. Hand pain
111. Headache (severe)
112. Itching
113. Joint pain
114. Knee pain
115. Leg pain
116. Loss of appetite
117. Neck pain
118. Nose bleeding
119. Oedema
120. Sore skin
121. Stomach Pain
122. Swelling of hands/legs
123. Teethache
124. Uterus problem/menses 
problem
125. Weakness/Fatigue
126. Weight loss
127. Wound
Other symptoms/illness
[For other symptoms/illness, please write in the questionnaire!]
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Appendix 8: Payment Card: Ghana 
(Annex 3 to the Questionnaire)
XXXV
0 1 GH¢ 
20 Gp 1.50 GH¢
30 Gp 2 GH¢
40 Gp 3 GH¢
60 Gp 4 GH¢
80 Gp
5 GH¢ 
or more
For how many Cedis per month would you be interested in 
buying a health insurance package for yourself?
Appendix 9: Cards with Health Insurance Services 
(Annex 5 to the Questionnaire)
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